residoo 0.2.0 → 0.3.1

package/src/integrity.js

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ const HOOK_SUSPICION = [
     // .claude/ and .vscode/ (Wiz IOC list), and the artifact the Mini
     // Shai-Hulud/Miasma SessionStart hooks execute.
     re: /\bsetup\.mjs\b/i,
-    reason: "references setup.mjs — the dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .claude/ and .vscode/ (Wiz IOC)",
+    reason: "references setup.mjs, the dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .claude/ and .vscode/ (Wiz IOC)",
   },
   {
     id: "curl-pipe-sh",
@@ -121,12 +121,12 @@ const HOOK_SUSPICION = [
     // linear-time on adversarial input (see CONTRIBUTING.md on ReDoS) and
     // stops a curl in one shell statement matching a pipe in the next.
     re: /\b(?:curl|wget)\b[^|;&\n]{0,200}\|\s*(?:ba|z|da|fi)?sh\b/i,
-    reason: "downloads from the network and pipes straight into a shell — a hook doing this re-fetches its payload on every session",
+    reason: "downloads from the network and pipes straight into a shell: a hook doing this re-fetches its payload on every session",
   },
   {
     id: "base64-decode",
     re: /\bbase64\b\s+(?:-d|-D|--decode)\b/,
-    reason: "decodes base64 before executing — the obfuscation step the 2026 npm campaigns used to hide payloads from exactly this kind of review",
+    reason: "decodes base64 before executing: the obfuscation step the 2026 npm campaigns used to hide payloads from exactly this kind of review",
   },
   {
     id: "script-in-dot-dir",
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ const HOOK_SUSPICION = [
     // "confirm you wrote it", not "malware".
     re: /(?:^|[\s"'/=])\.[A-Za-z0-9_][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*\/[^\s"']*\.(?:mjs|cjs|js)\b/,
     requireRunner: /\b(?:node|bun|deno)\b/,
-    reason: "runs a script that lives inside a dot-directory — the persistence shape of the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma SessionStart plants; confirm you wrote that script",
+    reason: "runs a script that lives inside a dot-directory: the persistence shape of the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma SessionStart plants; confirm you wrote that script",
     // Claude Code's own hooks docs suggest keeping hook scripts at
     // ~/.claude/hooks/<script>.js — warning on the vendor-documented layout
     // (and failing --fail-on-find CI on it, every scan) is the cry-wolf →
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ const HOOK_SUSPICION = [
     // stays warn. (setup.mjs never reaches here: dropper-name matches
     // first.)
     demoteIfHomeAnchored: true,
-    reasonInfo: "runs a script from a dot-directory under your home directory — the vendor-documented hook layout; confirm you wrote that script",
+    reasonInfo: "runs a script from a dot-directory under your home directory: the vendor-documented hook layout; confirm you wrote that script",
   },
 ];
 
@@ -384,9 +384,22 @@ function extractHooks(parsed) {
 
 /**
  * `home` and `cwd` are overridable for tests only (a synthetic planted HOME
- * beats mutating process.env mid-process); production callers pass nothing.
+ * beats mutating process.env mid-process); production callers pass nothing,
+ * except the CLI's --project mode, which pins both anchors to the project
+ * root AND sets `projectMode: true`. The flag exists because two behaviors
+ * must change when the anchors stop meaning "this user's machine":
+ *
+ * - GEMINI_CLI_HOME is ignored. It is this MACHINE's Gemini root override;
+ *   honoring it in a project scan would pull a machine-level settings file
+ *   into a verdict that claims to be about the checkout only, and could
+ *   fail CI on a clean repo because of the runner's (or a developer's) own
+ *   environment.
+ * - The home-anchored hook demotion (see HOOK_SUSPICION) is suppressed. The
+ *   demotion exists to avoid crying wolf on the user's own standing config;
+ *   a hook inside a COMMITTED repo config is not the user's standing config,
+ *   and demoting it there would hand a hostile repo a warn-tier bypass.
  */
-function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
+function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd(), projectMode = false } = {}) {
   const findings = [];
   const filesChecked = [];
   // Home checks and project checks can name the same file (running residoo
@@ -425,9 +438,9 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
     const res = readSmallFile(file);
     mark(file, res.status === "ok" ? "checked" : res.status);
     if (res.status === "unreadable") {
-      add("warn", "unreadable-config", file, "exists in an auto-execution location but could not be read — its contents are unverified, not clean");
+      add("warn", "unreadable-config", file, "exists in an auto-execution location but could not be read; its contents are unverified, not clean");
     } else if (res.status === "too-large") {
-      add("warn", "oversized-config", file, `larger than ${MAX_CONFIG_BYTES / 1024 / 1024}MB — far beyond any hand-written config (the Miasma payload runner was 4.3MB); not parsed, review it directly`);
+      add("warn", "oversized-config", file, `larger than ${MAX_CONFIG_BYTES / 1024 / 1024}MB, far beyond any hand-written config (the Miasma payload runner was 4.3MB); not parsed, review it directly`);
     }
     return res.status === "ok" ? res.text : null;
   };
@@ -437,14 +450,21 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
   // exact files Miasma planted in cloned repos — a repo-local
   // .claude/settings.json the user never wrote is the campaign's signature.
   // GEMINI_CLI_HOME is Gemini CLI's own documented root override (the CLI
-  // creates `.gemini` INSIDE it) — the same resolution agent-configs.js and
+  // creates `.gemini` INSIDE it), the same resolution agent-configs.js and
   // gemini-cli.js use. Hard-coding ~/.gemini here made the two modules
   // disagree about the same file within one run: agent-configs would find a
   // secret in the real settings file while integrity called that location
-  // absent and missed a planted hook in it.
-  const geminiHome = process.env.GEMINI_CLI_HOME
+  // absent and missed a planted hook in it. In project mode the override is
+  // a MACHINE-level fact and is deliberately ignored: the anchors point at
+  // the checkout, and a project verdict must never be pierced by the
+  // invoking environment (see the function docstring).
+  const geminiHome = !projectMode && process.env.GEMINI_CLI_HOME
     ? path.join(process.env.GEMINI_CLI_HOME, ".gemini")
     : path.join(home, ".gemini");
+  // Feeds the home-anchored demotion in suspicionReason: null disables it,
+  // which is the correct posture when `home` is a project root rather than
+  // anyone's home directory.
+  const demotionHome = projectMode ? null : home;
   const hookFiles = [
     path.join(home, ".claude", "settings.json"),
     path.join(home, ".claude", "settings.local.json"),
@@ -460,10 +480,10 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
 
     let parsed;
     try { parsed = JSON.parse(text); } catch {
-      add("warn", "unparseable-config", file, "exists in an auto-execution location but is not valid JSON — the agent's own loader would also choke on it, so corruption or tampering is worth a look; raw text was signature-checked instead");
+      add("warn", "unparseable-config", file, "exists in an auto-execution location but is not valid JSON; the agent's own loader would also choke on it, so corruption or tampering is worth a look; raw text was signature-checked instead");
       // The parse failing must not mean the campaign signatures go
       // unchecked — grep the raw text for the same shapes.
-      const hit = suspicionReason(text, home);
+      const hit = suspicionReason(text, demotionHome);
       if (hit) add(hit.severity, "hook", file, `suspicious signature in raw text: ${hit.reason}`);
       continue;
     }
@@ -473,31 +493,31 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
       // No hand-written config is 10k nodes deep/wide — this shape exists
       // to exhaust a walker. The hooks in it are unverified, said loudly;
       // the raw text still gets signature-checked below.
-      add("warn", "unwalkable-config", file, `hooks section exceeds ${MAX_WALK_NODES} nodes — far beyond any hand-written config; its hooks are unverified, not clean, review the file directly`);
-      const hit = suspicionReason(text, home);
+      add("warn", "unwalkable-config", file, `hooks section exceeds ${MAX_WALK_NODES} nodes, far beyond any hand-written config; its hooks are unverified, not clean, review the file directly`);
+      const hit = suspicionReason(text, demotionHome);
       if (hit) add(hit.severity, "hook", file, `suspicious signature in raw text: ${hit.reason}`);
     }
     for (const u of unrecognized) {
       // A `command` that isn't a string (e.g. ["node", "x.js"]) is not
       // extracted or signature-checked — schema drift must degrade to
       // still-reported, never a silent miss.
-      add("info", "hook-unrecognized", file, `${u.event ? safePreview(u.event, 40) : "unknown event"} hook entry whose "command" is not a string — not extracted or signature-checked; review it manually`);
+      add("info", "hook-unrecognized", file, `${u.event ? safePreview(u.event, 40) : "unknown event"} hook entry whose "command" is not a string: not extracted or signature-checked; review it manually`);
     }
     if (!truncated && hadHooksKey && hooks.length === 0 && unrecognized.length === 0 && sawLeaf) {
       // A populated hooks block this walker couldn't pull a command out of
       // is a coverage gap, and coverage gaps get said out loud. sawLeaf
       // keeps a legitimately empty {"SessionStart": []} block from tripping
       // this.
-      add("info", "hook-unrecognized", file, "has a hooks section whose shape this check doesn't recognize — no commands extracted; review it manually");
+      add("info", "hook-unrecognized", file, "has a hooks section whose shape this check doesn't recognize: no commands extracted; review it manually");
       continue;
     }
     for (const h of hooks) {
       const where = `${h.event ? safePreview(h.event, 40) : "unknown event"}${h.matcher ? ` (matcher: ${safePreview(h.matcher, 40)})` : ""}`;
-      const hit = suspicionReason(h.command, home);
+      const hit = suspicionReason(h.command, demotionHome);
       if (hit) {
         add(hit.severity, "hook", file, `${where} hook ${hit.reason}: "${safePreview(h.command)}"`);
       } else {
-        add("info", "hook", file, `${where} hook runs automatically: "${safePreview(h.command)}" — confirm you added this one`);
+        add("info", "hook", file, `${where} hook runs automatically: "${safePreview(h.command)}}"; confirm you added this one`);
       }
     }
   }
@@ -520,7 +540,7 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
       // exists but can't be listed hides whatever is in it.
       if (!(err && (err.code === "ENOENT" || err.code === "ENOTDIR"))) {
         mark(dir, "unreadable");
-        add("warn", "unreadable-config", dir, "directory exists but could not be listed — any loose scripts in it are unverified, not clean");
+        add("warn", "unreadable-config", dir, "directory exists but could not be listed; any loose scripts in it are unverified, not clean");
       }
       continue;
     }
@@ -531,9 +551,9 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
       // finding below always accompanies it (see the module header).
       mark(file, "checked");
       if (/^setup\.mjs$/i.test(e.name)) {
-        add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the exact dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .claude/ (Wiz IOC) — if you did not create this file, do not run the agent from here until you've read it");
+        add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the exact dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .claude/ (Wiz IOC); if you did not create this file, do not run the agent from here until you've read it");
       } else {
-        add("info", "loose-script", file, "script at the top level of an agent config directory — an auto-execution-adjacent location; review it");
+        add("info", "loose-script", file, "script at the top level of an agent config directory, an auto-execution-adjacent location; review it");
       }
     }
   }
@@ -553,9 +573,9 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
       // absence (EACCES, ELOOP) is unverified, not clean.
       mark(file, isFile ? "checked" : statFailed ? "unreadable" : "absent");
       if (statFailed) {
-        add("warn", "unreadable-config", file, "location could not be examined (stat failed) — unverified, not clean");
+        add("warn", "unreadable-config", file, "location could not be examined (stat failed): unverified, not clean");
       } else if (isFile) {
-        add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the exact dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .vscode/ (Wiz IOC) — if you did not create this file, review it before opening this folder in VS Code");
+        add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the exact dropper filename the Aug-2026 keyv/ChainDrop wave planted in .vscode/ (Wiz IOC); if you did not create this file, review it before opening this folder in VS Code");
       }
     }
   }
@@ -572,10 +592,10 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
     const bad = hits.filter((h) => h.suspicious);
     const joiners = hits.filter((h) => !h.suspicious);
     if (bad.length > 0) {
-      add("warn", "zero-width", file, `${bad.length} invisible character${bad.length === 1 ? "" : "s"}: ${summarizeZeroWidth(bad)} — zero-width Unicode carried hidden agent instructions in the TrapDoor campaign; inspect with a hex viewer before trusting this file`);
+      add("warn", "zero-width", file, `${bad.length} invisible character${bad.length === 1 ? "" : "s"}: ${summarizeZeroWidth(bad)} : zero-width Unicode carried hidden agent instructions in the TrapDoor campaign; inspect with a hex viewer before trusting this file`);
     }
     if (joiners.length > 0) {
-      add("info", "zero-width", file, `${summarizeZeroWidth(joiners)} adjacent to non-ASCII text — usually legitimate emoji/script joiners; listed so the count above can't quietly absorb them`);
+      add("info", "zero-width", file, `${summarizeZeroWidth(joiners)} adjacent to non-ASCII text: usually legitimate emoji/script joiners; listed so the count above can't quietly absorb them`);
     }
   };
   for (const file of zwFiles) {
@@ -593,7 +613,7 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
     catch (err) {
       if (!(err && (err.code === "ENOENT" || err.code === "ENOTDIR"))) {
         mark(rulesDir, "unreadable");
-        add("warn", "unreadable-config", rulesDir, "rules directory exists but could not be listed — its contents are unverified, not clean");
+        add("warn", "unreadable-config", rulesDir, "rules directory exists but could not be listed; its contents are unverified, not clean");
       }
     }
     if (entries) {
@@ -607,9 +627,9 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
         // filesChecked lie about verification depth.
         const text = readOrReport(file);
         if (/^setup\.mdc$/i.test(e.name)) {
-          add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the rules filename Miasma planted (.cursor/rules/setup.mdc) to prompt-inject Cursor on repo open — confirm you created it");
+          add("warn", "dropper-name", file, "matches the rules filename Miasma planted (.cursor/rules/setup.mdc) to prompt-inject Cursor on repo open; confirm you created it");
         } else {
-          add("info", "cursor-rule", file, "Cursor loads rules files as agent instructions automatically — confirm you added this one");
+          add("info", "cursor-rule", file, "Cursor loads rules files as agent instructions automatically; confirm you added this one");
         }
         if (text !== null) zwCheck(file, text);
       }
@@ -624,9 +644,9 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
     if (text !== null) {
       let parsed = null;
       try { parsed = JSON.parse(stripJsonc(text)); } catch {
-        add("warn", "unparseable-config", file, "not valid JSON even after comment/trailing-comma stripping — unverified, not clean; raw text was signature-checked instead");
+        add("warn", "unparseable-config", file, "not valid JSON even after comment/trailing-comma stripping: unverified, not clean; raw text was signature-checked instead");
         if (/"runOn"\s*:\s*"folderOpen"/.test(text)) {
-          add("warn", "autorun-task", file, 'raw text contains "runOn": "folderOpen" — a task that executes on folder open (Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence); review it');
+          add("warn", "autorun-task", file, 'raw text contains "runOn": "folderOpen", a task that executes on folder open (Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence); review it');
         }
       }
       if (parsed) {
@@ -643,14 +663,14 @@ function checkIntegrity({ home = os.homedir(), cwd = process.cwd() } = {}) {
           if (!node || typeof node !== "object") continue;
           if (node.runOptions && node.runOptions.runOn === "folderOpen") {
             const what = node.label || node.command || node.script || "(unnamed task)";
-            add("warn", "autorun-task", file, `task "${safePreview(what, 60)}" runs on folder open ("runOn": "folderOpen") — the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence mechanism; confirm you added it`);
+            add("warn", "autorun-task", file, `task "${safePreview(what, 60)}" runs on folder open ("runOn": "folderOpen"), the Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence mechanism; confirm you added it`);
           }
           for (const v of Object.values(node)) stack.push(v);
         }
         if (truncated) {
-          add("warn", "unwalkable-config", file, `structure exceeds ${MAX_WALK_NODES} nodes — far beyond any hand-written tasks.json; auto-run tasks in it are unverified, not clean, review the file directly`);
+          add("warn", "unwalkable-config", file, `structure exceeds ${MAX_WALK_NODES} nodes, far beyond any hand-written tasks.json; auto-run tasks in it are unverified, not clean, review the file directly`);
           if (/"runOn"\s*:\s*"folderOpen"/.test(text)) {
-            add("warn", "autorun-task", file, 'raw text contains "runOn": "folderOpen" — a task that executes on folder open (Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence); review it');
+            add("warn", "autorun-task", file, 'raw text contains "runOn": "folderOpen", a task that executes on folder open (Mini Shai-Hulud/Miasma persistence); review it');
           }
         }
       }

package/src/patterns.js

@@ -26,8 +26,26 @@ const PATTERNS = [
     re: /\bglpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{20,}\b/g },
   { id: "slack_token", label: "Slack token", confidence: "high",
     re: /\bxox[baprs]-[0-9A-Za-z-]{10,}\b/g },
-  { id: "stripe_key", label: "Stripe API key", confidence: "high",
+  { id: "stripe_key", label: "Stripe API key (live mode)", confidence: "high",
     re: /\b(sk|rk)_live_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
+  // The sandbox-mode twin of the rule above, same body charset and the same
+  // 20-char floor. Format verified against two production detectors plus the
+  // vendor (2026-09-02): gitleaks' stripe-access-token rule matches
+  // (sk|rk)_(test|live|prod)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{10,99}; trufflehog's Stripe
+  // detector is [rs]k_live_[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,247} with an explicit
+  // "doesn't include test keys" comment (a scope choice, not a format
+  // claim); and Stripe's own docs (docs.stripe.com/keys) name sk_test_ and
+  // rk_test_ as the sandbox secret/restricted prefixes. A separate rule
+  // rather than a widened live regex so a report can say WHICH mode leaked
+  // and rotation guidance can differ. A test key in a transcript is a real
+  // finding, not noise: the prefix is vendor-unique, the key grants full
+  // API access to the sandbox account (Stripe's docs: a secret key has
+  // unrestricted permissions on all Stripe APIs in its mode, and sandbox
+  // mode exposes ALL of the account's keys to whoever can call it), and a
+  // transcript that pastes sk_test today is the same workflow that will
+  // paste sk_live at go-live.
+  { id: "stripe_test_key", label: "Stripe API key (test mode)", confidence: "high",
+    re: /\b(sk|rk)_test_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}\b/g },
   // The negative lookahead keeps this rule mutually exclusive with anthropic_key
   // and openrouter_key below — without it, "sk-ant-..." or "sk-or-v1-..." match
   // BOTH this pattern and the more specific one, and get reported twice under

package/src/report.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 "use strict";
 
 const path = require("path");
+const { fingerprintFinding, ROTATION_ORDER_ADVISORY } = require("./rotation");
 
 // Minimal raw ANSI — no chalk, no deps. A security tool asking you to trust
 // a pile of third-party packages before it's even scanned anything is a bad
@@ -28,6 +29,90 @@ function ageDays(mtimeMs) {
   return Math.max(0, Math.floor((Date.now() - mtimeMs) / 86400000));
 }
 
+// File NAMES are attacker-controllable text headed for a terminal: in
+// --project mode a hostile checkout chooses its own filenames, and a name
+// carrying raw ESC bytes could clear the screen or overwrite the findings
+// block with a spoofed all-clear. Same discipline integrity.js applies to
+// its displayed paths (its stripControlChars/escapeInvisibles pair, mirrored
+// here rather than exported: patterns.js and integrity.js each keep their own
+// copy for the same shared-file reason): control bytes stripped, invisible
+// code points made visible so a zero-width name cannot render as nothing.
+const INVISIBLES_RE = /[\u200b\u200c\u200d\u2060\ufeff\u{e0000}-\u{e007f}]/gu;
+function safeBasename(file) {
+  return path.basename(String(file))
+    .replace(/[\x00-\x1f\x7f]/g, "")
+    .replace(INVISIBLES_RE, (ch) => "\\u{" + ch.codePointAt(0).toString(16).toUpperCase() + "}");
+}
+
+// Plain greedy word wrap for the one long-paragraph string this report prints
+// (the rotation ordering advisory). Continuation lines get the indent.
+function wrapText(s, width, indent) {
+  const words = String(s).split(/\s+/);
+  const lines = [];
+  let cur = "";
+  for (const w of words) {
+    if (cur && cur.length + 1 + w.length > width) { lines.push(cur); cur = w; }
+    else cur = cur ? cur + " " + w : w;
+  }
+  if (cur) lines.push(cur);
+  return lines.map((l, i) => (i === 0 ? l : indent + l));
+}
+
+/**
+ * The rotation section: what to DO about each distinct finding, fed by
+ * src/rotation.js's renderRotation() (pure data) and printed in the same
+ * visual language as the rest of the report. Compact on purpose: one status
+ * line plus one guidance pointer per distinct value; the full runbook lives
+ * behind "residoo explain <rule-id>" so the report stays scannable. The
+ * fingerprint is printed in full because it is the exact argument
+ * "residoo ack" takes; a truncated one would be prettier and useless.
+ *
+ * `showAdvisory` is set by render() only when integrity WARNINGS and secret
+ * findings coexist in one run: that is the ChainDrop scenario where rotating
+ * first can itself trigger the planted payload, so remediation order becomes
+ * safety-critical and the report says so before listing anything to rotate.
+ */
+function renderRotationSection(rotation, { noColor = false, showAdvisory = false } = {}) {
+  const paint = makePaint(noColor);
+  const lines = [];
+  const push = (s = "") => lines.push(s);
+  const { counts, entries } = rotation;
+  if (counts.distinct === 0) return "";
+
+  // "rotations", not "distinct values": the headline's distinct count dedupes
+  // raw values, while these entries dedupe fingerprints (which include the
+  // basename, so one value in two differently-named files is two rotations to
+  // track). Two counts under one word would read as a contradiction.
+  push(paint(c.bold, "Rotation:") +
+    ` ${counts.pending} of ${counts.distinct} rotation${counts.distinct === 1 ? "" : "s"} pending` +
+    (counts.acked > 0 ? ` (${counts.acked} acknowledged)` : ""));
+  if (showAdvisory) {
+    const wrapped = wrapText(ROTATION_ORDER_ADVISORY, 72, "     ");
+    push(`  ${paint(c.red + c.bold, "⚠  " + wrapped[0])}`);
+    for (const l of wrapped.slice(1)) push(`  ${paint(c.red, l)}`);
+  }
+  // Same anti-flood policy as the by-file table: a report is a summary, not a
+  // dump. Everything elided here is in --json in full.
+  const MAX_SHOWN = 12;
+  const shown = entries.slice(0, MAX_SHOWN);
+  for (const e of shown) {
+    const tag = e.status === "pending" ? paint(c.yellow, "pending") : paint(c.green, "acked  ");
+    push(`  ${tag}  ${e.fingerprint}  ${e.label}`);
+    if (e.status === "acked") {
+      push(paint(c.dim, `           acknowledged ${e.ackedAt || "(no timestamp)"}${e.ackNote ? `: ${e.ackNote}` : ""}`));
+    } else {
+      const g = e.guidance;
+      const where = g.rotateUrl ? `rotate: ${g.rotateUrl}` : `where: ${g.consolePath}`;
+      push(paint(c.dim, `           ${where}`));
+    }
+  }
+  if (entries.length > shown.length) {
+    push(paint(c.dim, `  … and ${entries.length - shown.length} more; see --json for the full list`));
+  }
+  push(paint(c.dim, `  Full runbook: residoo explain <rule-id> · mark one rotated: residoo ack <fingerprint>`));
+  return lines.join("\n");
+}
+
 /**
  * The integrity section — findings from src/integrity.js, rendered in the
  * same visual language as the scan report. Severity drives everything:
@@ -75,7 +160,7 @@ function renderIntegrity(integrity, { noColor = false } = {}) {
   return lines.join("\n");
 }
 
-function render({ findings, filesScanned, sourcesScanned, bytesScanned, suppressedCount = 0, distinctCounts = {}, unreadableFiles = [] }, { noColor = false, integrity = null } = {}) {
+function render({ findings, filesScanned, sourcesScanned, bytesScanned, suppressedCount = 0, distinctCounts = {}, unreadableFiles = [] }, { noColor = false, integrity = null, rotation = null } = {}) {
   const paint = makePaint(noColor);
   const lines = [];
   const push = (s = "") => lines.push(s);
@@ -131,17 +216,32 @@ function render({ findings, filesScanned, sourcesScanned, bytesScanned, suppress
     const distinctNote = distinct && distinct !== items.length
       ? paint(c.dim, `  (${distinct} distinct value${distinct === 1 ? "" : "s"}, re-exposed ${items.length - distinct}× across tool output)`)
       : "";
-    push(`  ${paint(c.bold, String(items.length).padStart(4))}  [${tag}]  ${label}${distinctNote}`);
+    // Flag when a rule's matches came from a decode/reconstruct pass rather
+    // than plain text: those would be invisible to a line-oriented scanner,
+    // so the reader should know the value was hidden.
+    const encoded = items.filter((f) => f.encoding).length;
+    const split = items.filter((f) => f.spanLines).length;
+    const marks = [];
+    if (encoded) marks.push(`${encoded} base64-wrapped`);
+    if (split) marks.push(`${split} split across lines`);
+    const markNote = marks.length ? paint(c.yellow, `  [${marks.join(", ")}]`) : "";
+    push(`  ${paint(c.bold, String(items.length).padStart(4))}  [${tag}]  ${label}${distinctNote}${markNote}`);
   }
 
   push();
   push(paint(c.bold, "By file:"));
   const fileRows = [...byFile.entries()].sort((a, b) => b[1] - a[1]).slice(0, 15);
   for (const [file, count] of fileRows) {
-    push(`  ${String(count).padStart(4)}  ${paint(c.cyan, path.basename(file))}`);
+    push(`  ${String(count).padStart(4)}  ${paint(c.cyan, safeBasename(file))}`);
   }
   if (byFile.size > fileRows.length) push(paint(c.dim, `  … and ${byFile.size - fileRows.length} more file(s)`));
 
+  if (rotation && rotation.counts.distinct > 0) {
+    const integrityWarns = integrity ? integrity.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "warn").length : 0;
+    push();
+    push(renderRotationSection(rotation, { noColor, showAdvisory: integrityWarns > 0 }));
+  }
+
   if (integrity) {
     push();
     push(renderIntegrity(integrity, { noColor }));
@@ -157,7 +257,12 @@ function render({ findings, filesScanned, sourcesScanned, bytesScanned, suppress
 // `integrity` is the checkIntegrity() result, or null when --no-integrity
 // skipped it — the key is always present so a --json consumer can tell
 // "checked, clean" apart from "never checked" without guessing from absence.
-function renderJson(result, integrity = null) {
+// `rotation` is src/rotation.js's renderRotation() result (counts + per-
+// distinct-fingerprint entries with guidance attached), or null for a caller
+// that never computed it; the per-finding `fingerprint` is emitted either
+// way, since it is derived from already-redacted material and is what
+// "residoo ack" takes.
+function renderJson(result, integrity = null, rotation = null) {
   return JSON.stringify(
     {
       summary: {
@@ -172,7 +277,33 @@ function renderJson(result, integrity = null) {
       findings: result.findings.map((f) => ({
         rule: f.ruleId, label: f.label, confidence: f.confidence,
         source: f.source, file: f.relFile, line: f.line, preview: f.preview,
+        // Markers for the two decode/reconstruct passes (absent on ordinary
+        // findings). `encoding` names how the value was wrapped ("base64" /
+        // "base64url"); `spanLines` names the adjacent line pair a split value
+        // was reconstructed across.
+        ...(f.encoding ? { encoding: f.encoding } : {}),
+        ...(f.spanLines ? { spanLines: f.spanLines } : {}),
+        fingerprint: fingerprintFinding(f),
+        // Only present on an --include-suppressed run: says WHY this finding
+        // is low-confidence, so a JSON consumer doesn't have to guess.
+        ...(f.suppressedReason ? { suppressedReason: f.suppressedReason } : {}),
       })),
+      // orderAdvisory mirrors the human report's ChainDrop ordering warning:
+      // remediation order is safety-critical when planted persistence and
+      // leaked credentials coexist, and a --json consumer (a CI summarizer)
+      // must not have to re-derive that condition. The advisory text when the
+      // condition holds, null otherwise.
+      rotation: rotation
+        ? {
+            counts: rotation.counts,
+            entries: rotation.entries,
+            orderAdvisory:
+              result.findings.length > 0 &&
+              integrity && integrity.findings.some((f) => f.severity === "warn")
+                ? ROTATION_ORDER_ADVISORY
+                : null,
+          }
+        : null,
       integrity: integrity
         ? {
             warningCount: integrity.findings.filter((f) => f.severity === "warn").length,
@@ -187,4 +318,4 @@ function renderJson(result, integrity = null) {
   );
 }
 
-module.exports = { render, renderIntegrity, renderJson };
+module.exports = { render, renderIntegrity, renderRotationSection, renderJson };