react-native-windows 0.81.34 → 0.81.35

package/external/folly/folly/hash/SpookyHashV1.h

@@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+// This is version 1 of SpookyHash, incompatible with version 2.
+//
+// SpookyHash: a 128-bit noncryptographic hash function
+// By Bob Jenkins, public domain
+//   Oct 31 2010: alpha, framework + SpookyHash::Mix appears right
+//   Oct 31 2011: alpha again, Mix only good to 2^^69 but rest appears right
+//   Dec 31 2011: beta, improved Mix, tested it for 2-bit deltas
+//   Feb  2 2012: production, same bits as beta
+//   Feb  5 2012: adjusted definitions of uint* to be more portable
+//   Mar 30 2012: 3 bytes/cycle, not 4.  Alpha was 4 but wasn't thorough enough.
+//
+// Up to 3 bytes/cycle for long messages.  Reasonably fast for short messages.
+// All 1 or 2 bit deltas achieve avalanche within 1% bias per output bit.
+//
+// This was developed for and tested on 64-bit x86-compatible processors.
+// It assumes the processor is little-endian.  There is a macro
+// controlling whether unaligned reads are allowed (by default they are).
+// This should be an equally good hash on big-endian machines, but it will
+// compute different results on them than on little-endian machines.
+//
+// Google's CityHash has similar specs to SpookyHash, and CityHash is faster
+// on some platforms.  MD4 and MD5 also have similar specs, but they are orders
+// of magnitude slower.  CRCs are two or more times slower, but unlike
+// SpookyHash, they have nice math for combining the CRCs of pieces to form
+// the CRCs of wholes.  There are also cryptographic hashes, but those are even
+// slower than MD5.
+//
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <cstddef>
+#include <cstdint>
+
+namespace folly {
+namespace hash {
+
+// clang-format off
+
+class SpookyHashV1
+{
+public:
+    //
+    // SpookyHash: hash a single message in one call, produce 128-bit output
+    //
+    static void Hash128(
+        const void *message,  // message to hash
+        size_t length,        // length of message in bytes
+        uint64_t *hash1,      // in/out: in seed 1, out hash value 1
+        uint64_t *hash2);     // in/out: in seed 2, out hash value 2
+
+    //
+    // Hash64: hash a single message in one call, return 64-bit output
+    //
+    static uint64_t Hash64(
+        const void *message,  // message to hash
+        size_t length,        // length of message in bytes
+        uint64_t seed)        // seed
+    {
+        uint64_t hash1 = seed;
+        Hash128(message, length, &hash1, &seed);
+        return hash1;
+    }
+
+    //
+    // Hash32: hash a single message in one call, produce 32-bit output
+    //
+    static uint32_t Hash32(
+        const void *message,  // message to hash
+        size_t length,        // length of message in bytes
+        uint32_t seed)        // seed
+    {
+        uint64_t hash1 = seed, hash2 = seed;
+        Hash128(message, length, &hash1, &hash2);
+        return (uint32_t)hash1;
+    }
+
+    //
+    // Init: initialize the context of a SpookyHash
+    //
+    void Init(
+        uint64_t seed1,     // any 64-bit value will do, including 0
+        uint64_t seed2);    // different seeds produce independent hashes
+
+    //
+    // Update: add a piece of a message to a SpookyHash state
+    //
+    void Update(
+        const void *message,  // message fragment
+        size_t length);       // length of message fragment in bytes
+
+
+    //
+    // Final: compute the hash for the current SpookyHash state
+    //
+    // This does not modify the state; you can keep updating it afterward
+    //
+    // The result is the same as if SpookyHash() had been called with
+    // all the pieces concatenated into one message.
+    //
+    void Final(
+        uint64_t *hash1,  // out only: first 64 bits of hash value.
+        uint64_t *hash2); // out only: second 64 bits of hash value.
+
+    //
+    // left rotate a 64-bit value by k bytes
+    //
+    static inline uint64_t Rot64(uint64_t x, int k)
+    {
+        return (x << k) | (x >> (64 - k));
+    }
+
+    //
+    // This is used if the input is 96 bytes long or longer.
+    //
+    // The internal state is fully overwritten every 96 bytes.
+    // Every input bit appears to cause at least 128 bits of entropy
+    // before 96 other bytes are combined, when run forward or backward
+    //   For every input bit,
+    //   Two inputs differing in just that input bit
+    //   Where "differ" means xor or subtraction
+    //   And the base value is random
+    //   When run forward or backwards one Mix
+    // I tried 3 pairs of each; they all differed by at least 212 bits.
+    //
+    static inline void Mix(
+        const uint64_t *data,
+        uint64_t &s0, uint64_t &s1, uint64_t &s2, uint64_t &s3,
+        uint64_t &s4, uint64_t &s5, uint64_t &s6, uint64_t &s7,
+        uint64_t &s8, uint64_t &s9, uint64_t &s10,uint64_t &s11)
+    {
+      s0 += data[0];   s2 ^= s10; s11 ^= s0;  s0 = Rot64(s0,11);   s11 += s1;
+      s1 += data[1];   s3 ^= s11; s0 ^= s1;   s1 = Rot64(s1,32);   s0 += s2;
+      s2 += data[2];   s4 ^= s0;  s1 ^= s2;   s2 = Rot64(s2,43);   s1 += s3;
+      s3 += data[3];   s5 ^= s1;  s2 ^= s3;   s3 = Rot64(s3,31);   s2 += s4;
+      s4 += data[4];   s6 ^= s2;  s3 ^= s4;   s4 = Rot64(s4,17);   s3 += s5;
+      s5 += data[5];   s7 ^= s3;  s4 ^= s5;   s5 = Rot64(s5,28);   s4 += s6;
+      s6 += data[6];   s8 ^= s4;  s5 ^= s6;   s6 = Rot64(s6,39);   s5 += s7;
+      s7 += data[7];   s9 ^= s5;  s6 ^= s7;   s7 = Rot64(s7,57);   s6 += s8;
+      s8 += data[8];   s10 ^= s6; s7 ^= s8;   s8 = Rot64(s8,55);   s7 += s9;
+      s9 += data[9];   s11 ^= s7; s8 ^= s9;   s9 = Rot64(s9,54);   s8 += s10;
+      s10 += data[10]; s0 ^= s8;  s9 ^= s10;  s10 = Rot64(s10,22); s9 += s11;
+      s11 += data[11]; s1 ^= s9;  s10 ^= s11; s11 = Rot64(s11,46); s10 += s0;
+    }
+
+    //
+    // Mix all 12 inputs together so that h0, h1 are a hash of them all.
+    //
+    // For two inputs differing in just the input bits
+    // Where "differ" means xor or subtraction
+    // And the base value is random, or a counting value starting at that bit
+    // The final result will have each bit of h0, h1 flip
+    // For every input bit,
+    // with probability 50 +- .3%
+    // For every pair of input bits,
+    // with probability 50 +- 3%
+    //
+    // This does not rely on the last Mix() call having already mixed some.
+    // Two iterations was almost good enough for a 64-bit result, but a
+    // 128-bit result is reported, so End() does three iterations.
+    //
+    static inline void EndPartial(
+        uint64_t &h0, uint64_t &h1, uint64_t &h2, uint64_t &h3,
+        uint64_t &h4, uint64_t &h5, uint64_t &h6, uint64_t &h7,
+        uint64_t &h8, uint64_t &h9, uint64_t &h10,uint64_t &h11)
+    {
+        h11+= h1;    h2 ^= h11;   h1 = Rot64(h1,44);
+        h0 += h2;    h3 ^= h0;    h2 = Rot64(h2,15);
+        h1 += h3;    h4 ^= h1;    h3 = Rot64(h3,34);
+        h2 += h4;    h5 ^= h2;    h4 = Rot64(h4,21);
+        h3 += h5;    h6 ^= h3;    h5 = Rot64(h5,38);
+        h4 += h6;    h7 ^= h4;    h6 = Rot64(h6,33);
+        h5 += h7;    h8 ^= h5;    h7 = Rot64(h7,10);
+        h6 += h8;    h9 ^= h6;    h8 = Rot64(h8,13);
+        h7 += h9;    h10^= h7;    h9 = Rot64(h9,38);
+        h8 += h10;   h11^= h8;    h10= Rot64(h10,53);
+        h9 += h11;   h0 ^= h9;    h11= Rot64(h11,42);
+        h10+= h0;    h1 ^= h10;   h0 = Rot64(h0,54);
+    }
+
+    static inline void End(
+        uint64_t &h0, uint64_t &h1, uint64_t &h2, uint64_t &h3,
+        uint64_t &h4, uint64_t &h5, uint64_t &h6, uint64_t &h7,
+        uint64_t &h8, uint64_t &h9, uint64_t &h10,uint64_t &h11)
+    {
+        EndPartial(h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+        EndPartial(h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+        EndPartial(h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+    }
+
+    //
+    // The goal is for each bit of the input to expand into 128 bits of
+    //   apparent entropy before it is fully overwritten.
+    // n trials both set and cleared at least m bits of h0 h1 h2 h3
+    //   n: 2   m: 29
+    //   n: 3   m: 46
+    //   n: 4   m: 57
+    //   n: 5   m: 107
+    //   n: 6   m: 146
+    //   n: 7   m: 152
+    // when run forwards or backwards
+    // for all 1-bit and 2-bit diffs
+    // with diffs defined by either xor or subtraction
+    // with a base of all zeros plus a counter, or plus another bit, or random
+    //
+    static inline void ShortMix(uint64_t &h0, uint64_t &h1,
+                                uint64_t &h2, uint64_t &h3)
+    {
+        h2 = Rot64(h2,50);  h2 += h3;  h0 ^= h2;
+        h3 = Rot64(h3,52);  h3 += h0;  h1 ^= h3;
+        h0 = Rot64(h0,30);  h0 += h1;  h2 ^= h0;
+        h1 = Rot64(h1,41);  h1 += h2;  h3 ^= h1;
+        h2 = Rot64(h2,54);  h2 += h3;  h0 ^= h2;
+        h3 = Rot64(h3,48);  h3 += h0;  h1 ^= h3;
+        h0 = Rot64(h0,38);  h0 += h1;  h2 ^= h0;
+        h1 = Rot64(h1,37);  h1 += h2;  h3 ^= h1;
+        h2 = Rot64(h2,62);  h2 += h3;  h0 ^= h2;
+        h3 = Rot64(h3,34);  h3 += h0;  h1 ^= h3;
+        h0 = Rot64(h0,5);   h0 += h1;  h2 ^= h0;
+        h1 = Rot64(h1,36);  h1 += h2;  h3 ^= h1;
+    }
+
+    //
+    // Mix all 4 inputs together so that h0, h1 are a hash of them all.
+    //
+    // For two inputs differing in just the input bits
+    // Where "differ" means xor or subtraction
+    // And the base value is random, or a counting value starting at that bit
+    // The final result will have each bit of h0, h1 flip
+    // For every input bit,
+    // with probability 50 +- .3% (it is probably better than that)
+    // For every pair of input bits,
+    // with probability 50 +- .75% (the worst case is approximately that)
+    //
+    static inline void ShortEnd(uint64_t &h0, uint64_t &h1,
+                                uint64_t &h2, uint64_t &h3)
+    {
+        h3 ^= h2;  h2 = Rot64(h2,15);  h3 += h2;
+        h0 ^= h3;  h3 = Rot64(h3,52);  h0 += h3;
+        h1 ^= h0;  h0 = Rot64(h0,26);  h1 += h0;
+        h2 ^= h1;  h1 = Rot64(h1,51);  h2 += h1;
+        h3 ^= h2;  h2 = Rot64(h2,28);  h3 += h2;
+        h0 ^= h3;  h3 = Rot64(h3,9);   h0 += h3;
+        h1 ^= h0;  h0 = Rot64(h0,47);  h1 += h0;
+        h2 ^= h1;  h1 = Rot64(h1,54);  h2 += h1;
+        h3 ^= h2;  h2 = Rot64(h2,32);  h3 += h2;
+        h0 ^= h3;  h3 = Rot64(h3,25);  h0 += h3;
+        h1 ^= h0;  h0 = Rot64(h0,63);  h1 += h0;
+    }
+
+private:
+
+    //
+    // Short is used for messages under 192 bytes in length
+    // Short has a low startup cost, the normal mode is good for long
+    // keys, the cost crossover is at about 192 bytes.  The two modes were
+    // held to the same quality bar.
+    //
+    static void Short(
+        const void *message,  // message (byte array, not necessarily aligned)
+        size_t length,        // length of message (in bytes)
+        uint64_t *hash1,      // in/out: in the seed, out the hash value
+        uint64_t *hash2);     // in/out: in the seed, out the hash value
+
+    // number of uint64_t's in internal state
+    static const size_t sc_numVars = 12;
+
+    // size of the internal state
+    static const size_t sc_blockSize = sc_numVars*8;
+
+    // size of buffer of unhashed data, in bytes
+    static const size_t sc_bufSize = 2*sc_blockSize;
+
+    //
+    // sc_const: a constant which:
+    //  * is not zero
+    //  * is odd
+    //  * is a not-very-regular mix of 1's and 0's
+    //  * does not need any other special mathematical properties
+    //
+    static const uint64_t sc_const = 0xdeadbeefdeadbeefULL;
+
+    uint64_t m_data[2*sc_numVars];  // unhashed data, for partial messages
+    uint64_t m_state[sc_numVars];   // internal state of the hash
+    size_t m_length;                // total length of the input so far
+    uint8_t  m_remainder;           // length of unhashed data stashed in m_data
+};
+
+// clang-format on
+
+} // namespace hash
+} // namespace folly

package/external/folly/folly/hash/SpookyHashV2.cpp

@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+// Spooky Hash
+// A 128-bit noncryptographic hash, for checksums and table lookup
+// By Bob Jenkins.  Public domain.
+//   Oct 31 2010: published framework, disclaimer ShortHash isn't right
+//   Nov 7 2010: disabled ShortHash
+//   Oct 31 2011: replace End, ShortMix, ShortEnd, enable ShortHash again
+//   April 10 2012: buffer overflow on platforms without unaligned reads
+//   July 12 2012: was passing out variables in final to in/out in short
+//   July 30 2012: I reintroduced the buffer overflow
+//   August 5 2012: SpookyV2: d = should be d += in short hash, and remove
+//                  extra mix from long hash
+
+#include <folly/hash/SpookyHashV2.h>
+
+#include <cstring>
+
+#include <folly/CppAttributes.h>
+#include <folly/Portability.h>
+
+namespace folly {
+namespace hash {
+
+// clang-format off
+
+//
+// short hash ... it could be used on any message,
+// but it's used by Spooky just for short messages.
+//
+void SpookyHashV2::Short(
+    const void *message,
+    size_t length,
+    uint64_t *hash1,
+    uint64_t *hash2)
+{
+    uint64_t buf[2*sc_numVars];
+    union
+    {
+        const uint8_t *p8;
+        uint32_t *p32;
+        uint64_t *p64;
+        size_t i;
+    } u;
+
+    u.p8 = (const uint8_t *)message;
+
+    if (!kHasUnalignedAccess && (u.i & 0x7))
+    {
+        memcpy(buf, message, length);
+        u.p64 = buf;
+    }
+
+    size_t remainder = length%32;
+    uint64_t a=*hash1;
+    uint64_t b=*hash2;
+    uint64_t c=sc_const;
+    uint64_t d=sc_const;
+
+    if (length > 15)
+    {
+        const uint64_t *end = u.p64 + (length/32)*4;
+
+        // handle all complete sets of 32 bytes
+        for (; u.p64 < end; u.p64 += 4)
+        {
+            c += Read8(u.p64, 0);
+            d += Read8(u.p64, 1);
+            ShortMix(a,b,c,d);
+            a += Read8(u.p64, 2);
+            b += Read8(u.p64, 3);
+        }
+
+        //Handle the case of 16+ remaining bytes.
+        if (remainder >= 16)
+        {
+            c += Read8(u.p64, 0);
+            d += Read8(u.p64, 1);
+            ShortMix(a,b,c,d);
+            u.p64 += 2;
+            remainder -= 16;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Handle the last 0..15 bytes, and its length
+    d += ((uint64_t)length) << 56;
+    switch (remainder)
+    {
+    case 15:
+        d += ((uint64_t)u.p8[14]) << 48;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 14:
+        d += ((uint64_t)u.p8[13]) << 40;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 13:
+        d += ((uint64_t)u.p8[12]) << 32;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 12:
+        d += u.p32[2];
+        c += u.p64[0];
+        break;
+    case 11:
+        d += ((uint64_t)u.p8[10]) << 16;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 10:
+        d += ((uint64_t)u.p8[9]) << 8;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 9:
+        d += (uint64_t)u.p8[8];
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 8:
+        c += u.p64[0];
+        break;
+    case 7:
+        c += ((uint64_t)u.p8[6]) << 48;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 6:
+        c += ((uint64_t)u.p8[5]) << 40;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 5:
+        c += ((uint64_t)u.p8[4]) << 32;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 4:
+        c += u.p32[0];
+        break;
+    case 3:
+        c += ((uint64_t)u.p8[2]) << 16;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 2:
+        c += ((uint64_t)u.p8[1]) << 8;
+        [[fallthrough]];
+    case 1:
+        c += (uint64_t)u.p8[0];
+        break;
+    case 0:
+        c += sc_const;
+        d += sc_const;
+    }
+    ShortEnd(a,b,c,d);
+    *hash1 = a;
+    *hash2 = b;
+}
+
+
+
+
+// do the whole hash in one call
+void SpookyHashV2::Hash128(
+    const void *message,
+    size_t length,
+    uint64_t *hash1,
+    uint64_t *hash2)
+{
+    if (length < sc_bufSize)
+    {
+        Short(message, length, hash1, hash2);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    uint64_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11;
+    uint64_t buf[sc_numVars];
+    uint64_t *end;
+    union
+    {
+        const uint8_t *p8;
+        uint64_t *p64;
+        size_t i;
+    } u;
+    size_t remainder;
+
+    h0=h3=h6=h9  = *hash1;
+    h1=h4=h7=h10 = *hash2;
+    h2=h5=h8=h11 = sc_const;
+
+    u.p8 = (const uint8_t *)message;
+    end = u.p64 + (length/sc_blockSize)*sc_numVars;
+
+    // handle all whole sc_blockSize blocks of bytes
+    if (kHasUnalignedAccess || ((u.i & 0x7) == 0))
+    {
+        while (u.p64 < end)
+        {
+            Mix(u.p64, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+            u.p64 += sc_numVars;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        while (u.p64 < end)
+        {
+            memcpy(buf, u.p64, sc_blockSize);
+            Mix(buf, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+            u.p64 += sc_numVars;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // handle the last partial block of sc_blockSize bytes
+    remainder = (length - ((const uint8_t *)end-(const uint8_t *)message));
+    memcpy(buf, end, remainder);
+    memset(((uint8_t *)buf)+remainder, 0, sc_blockSize-remainder);
+    ((uint8_t*)buf)[sc_blockSize - 1] = uint8_t(remainder);
+
+    // do some final mixing
+    End(buf, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+    *hash1 = h0;
+    *hash2 = h1;
+}
+
+
+
+// init spooky state
+void SpookyHashV2::Init(uint64_t seed1, uint64_t seed2)
+{
+    m_length = 0;
+    m_remainder = 0;
+    m_state[0] = seed1;
+    m_state[1] = seed2;
+}
+
+
+// add a message fragment to the state
+void SpookyHashV2::Update(const void *message, size_t length)
+{
+    uint64_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11;
+    size_t newLength = length + m_remainder;
+    uint8_t  remainder;
+    union
+    {
+        const uint8_t *p8;
+        uint64_t *p64;
+        size_t i;
+    } u;
+    const uint64_t *end;
+
+    // Is this message fragment too short?  If it is, stuff it away.
+    if (newLength < sc_bufSize)
+    {
+        memcpy(&((uint8_t *)m_data)[m_remainder], message, length);
+        m_length = length + m_length;
+        m_remainder = (uint8_t)newLength;
+        return;
+    }
+
+    // init the variables
+    if (m_length < sc_bufSize)
+    {
+        h0=h3=h6=h9  = m_state[0];
+        h1=h4=h7=h10 = m_state[1];
+        h2=h5=h8=h11 = sc_const;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        h0 = m_state[0];
+        h1 = m_state[1];
+        h2 = m_state[2];
+        h3 = m_state[3];
+        h4 = m_state[4];
+        h5 = m_state[5];
+        h6 = m_state[6];
+        h7 = m_state[7];
+        h8 = m_state[8];
+        h9 = m_state[9];
+        h10 = m_state[10];
+        h11 = m_state[11];
+    }
+    m_length = length + m_length;
+
+    // if we've got anything stuffed away, use it now
+    if (m_remainder)
+    {
+        uint8_t prefix = sc_bufSize-m_remainder;
+        memcpy(&(((uint8_t *)m_data)[m_remainder]), message, prefix);
+        u.p64 = m_data;
+        Mix(u.p64, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+        Mix(&u.p64[sc_numVars], h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+        u.p8 = ((const uint8_t *)message) + prefix;
+        length -= prefix;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        u.p8 = (const uint8_t *)message;
+    }
+
+    // handle all whole blocks of sc_blockSize bytes
+    end = u.p64 + (length/sc_blockSize)*sc_numVars;
+    remainder = (uint8_t)(length-((const uint8_t *)end-u.p8));
+    if (kHasUnalignedAccess || (u.i & 0x7) == 0)
+    {
+        while (u.p64 < end)
+        {
+            Mix(u.p64, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+            u.p64 += sc_numVars;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        while (u.p64 < end)
+        {
+            memcpy(m_data, u.p8, sc_blockSize);
+            Mix(m_data, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+            u.p64 += sc_numVars;
+        }
+    }
+
+    // stuff away the last few bytes
+    m_remainder = remainder;
+    memcpy(m_data, end, remainder);
+
+    // stuff away the variables
+    m_state[0] = h0;
+    m_state[1] = h1;
+    m_state[2] = h2;
+    m_state[3] = h3;
+    m_state[4] = h4;
+    m_state[5] = h5;
+    m_state[6] = h6;
+    m_state[7] = h7;
+    m_state[8] = h8;
+    m_state[9] = h9;
+    m_state[10] = h10;
+    m_state[11] = h11;
+}
+
+
+// report the hash for the concatenation of all message fragments so far
+void SpookyHashV2::Final(uint64_t *hash1, uint64_t *hash2) const
+{
+    // init the variables
+    if (m_length < sc_bufSize)
+    {
+        *hash1 = m_state[0];
+        *hash2 = m_state[1];
+        Short( m_data, m_length, hash1, hash2);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    uint64_t buf[2*sc_numVars];
+    memcpy(buf, m_data, sizeof(buf));
+    uint64_t *data = buf;
+    uint8_t remainder = m_remainder;
+
+    uint64_t h0 = m_state[0];
+    uint64_t h1 = m_state[1];
+    uint64_t h2 = m_state[2];
+    uint64_t h3 = m_state[3];
+    uint64_t h4 = m_state[4];
+    uint64_t h5 = m_state[5];
+    uint64_t h6 = m_state[6];
+    uint64_t h7 = m_state[7];
+    uint64_t h8 = m_state[8];
+    uint64_t h9 = m_state[9];
+    uint64_t h10 = m_state[10];
+    uint64_t h11 = m_state[11];
+
+    if (remainder >= sc_blockSize)
+    {
+        // m_data can contain two blocks; handle any whole first block
+        Mix(data, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+        data += sc_numVars;
+        remainder -= sc_blockSize;
+    }
+
+    // mix in the last partial block, and the length mod sc_blockSize
+    memset(&((uint8_t *)data)[remainder], 0, (sc_blockSize-remainder));
+
+    ((uint8_t *)data)[sc_blockSize-1] = remainder;
+
+    // do some final mixing
+    End(data, h0,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6,h7,h8,h9,h10,h11);
+
+    *hash1 = h0;
+    *hash2 = h1;
+}
+
+// clang-format on
+
+} // namespace hash
+} // namespace folly

package/{Folly/TEMP_UntilFollyUpdate → external/folly/folly}/hash/SpookyHashV2.h

@@ -299,7 +299,12 @@ private:
         FOLLY_BUILTIN_MEMCPY(&out, buf + off, sizeof(out));
         return out;
       } else {
-        //assert(0 == reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(buf) % sizeof(*buf)); // Windows
+        // [Windows
+        // This assert is not correct for the x86 code where the allocated buffer can be aligned by 32-bits instead of 64-bits.
+        // Intel CPUs allow unaligned memory access without issues.
+        // ARM64 CPUs prohibit unaligned memory access, but if it happens, then we would have an immediate crash at this point. Thus, the assert is redundant.
+        // Windows]
+        // assert(0 == reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(buf) % sizeof(*buf));
         return buf[off];
       }
     }