raz-encrypt 2.3.0 → 2.4.0

package/dist/store.js

@@ -1,14 +1,96 @@
+import { gcm } from "@noble/ciphers/aes.js";
+import { equalBytes } from "@noble/ciphers/utils.js";
+import { hkdf } from "@noble/hashes/hkdf.js";
+import { hmac } from "@noble/hashes/hmac.js";
 import { sha384 } from "@noble/hashes/sha2.js";
-import { bytesToHex, utf8ToBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils.js";
-import { appendFile, mkdir, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import { join } from "node:path";
+import { bytesToHex, concatBytes, hexToBytes, randomBytes, utf8ToBytes } from "@noble/hashes/utils.js";
+import { appendFile, mkdir, readFile, rm } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
 import { canonicalize } from "./canonicalJson.js";
+import { writeFileAtomic } from "./fileCrypto.js";
+function isV2Entry(entry) {
+    return entry.version === 2;
+}
+function stripChainFields(entry) {
+    const { prevMac: _prevMac, mac: _mac, ...rest } = entry;
+    return rest;
+}
 const GENESIS_HASH = "GENESIS";
+const AUDIT_LOG_HMAC_INFO = utf8ToBytes("raz-encrypt-audit-log-v1|hmac-key");
+// A separate key for the head record, so a head MAC can never be mistaken for an entry MAC (ADR 0019).
+const AUDIT_LOG_HEAD_INFO = utf8ToBytes("raz-encrypt-audit-log-v1|head-hmac-key");
+// A separate key from both MAC keys above, same reasoning (ADR 0027) — never derived from a passphrase, since appendLogEntry/readLog only ever receive an Identity.
+const AUDIT_LOG_ENC_INFO = utf8ToBytes("raz-encrypt-audit-log-v1|enc-key");
 function logFilePath(storageDir) {
     return join(storageDir, "log.jsonl");
 }
-function computeHash(entry) {
-    return bytesToHex(sha384(utf8ToBytes(canonicalize(entry))));
+function headFilePath(storageDir) {
+    return join(storageDir, "log.head.json");
+}
+/** Migration journal (ADR 0031): the head record the encrypted log WILL have, MACed like a head, written before the log is rewritten. */
+function journalFilePath(storageDir) {
+    return join(storageDir, "log.head.next.json");
+}
+/**
+ * HKDF-derived from BOTH the classical and PQC signing secrets (concatenated,
+ * same composition pattern as hybrid.ts's deriveHybridKey) — matching this
+ * library's hybrid posture everywhere else: compromising either secret key
+ * alone must not be enough to forge the chain. Recomputed fresh on every
+ * call, never persisted (ADR 0009).
+ */
+function deriveAuditLogKey(identity) {
+    return hkdf(sha384, concatBytes(identity.classical.secretKey, identity.pqcSign.secretKey), undefined, AUDIT_LOG_HMAC_INFO, 32);
+}
+/**
+ * Keyed with deriveAuditLogKey — plain SHA-384 (ADR 0009's rejected
+ * approach) lets anyone with filesystem write access to log.jsonl forge the
+ * whole chain with no knowledge of the Identity's secret material at all.
+ * HMAC means forging it requires that secret. Generic over the entry's own
+ * shape (v1 plaintext fields, or v2's `{version,nonce,ciphertext}` — issue
+ * #43) since `canonicalize` doesn't care which fields are present; the chain
+ * mechanism itself never changes, only the bytes it authenticates.
+ */
+function computeMac(identity, entry) {
+    return bytesToHex(hmac(sha384, deriveAuditLogKey(identity), utf8ToBytes(canonicalize(entry))));
+}
+/** Same derivation shape as deriveAuditLogKey, under its own info label (ADR 0027). */
+function deriveAuditLogEncKey(identity) {
+    return hkdf(sha384, concatBytes(identity.classical.secretKey, identity.pqcSign.secretKey), undefined, AUDIT_LOG_ENC_INFO, 32);
+}
+/** Associated data for an entry's content AEAD: binds the ciphertext to its format version and its own nonce, same pattern as fileCrypto.ts's headerAad. */
+function entryAad(nonce) {
+    return utf8ToBytes(canonicalize({ version: 2, nonce }));
+}
+function encryptEntryContent(identity, content) {
+    const nonceBytes = randomBytes(12);
+    const nonce = bytesToHex(nonceBytes);
+    const ciphertext = gcm(deriveAuditLogEncKey(identity), nonceBytes, entryAad(nonce)).encrypt(utf8ToBytes(canonicalize(content)));
+    return { nonce, ciphertext: bytesToHex(ciphertext) };
+}
+/** Throws (never returns something un-decrypted) if the entry doesn't authenticate under this identity's key. */
+function decryptEntryContent(identity, entry) {
+    try {
+        const plaintext = gcm(deriveAuditLogEncKey(identity), hexToBytes(entry.nonce), entryAad(entry.nonce)).decrypt(hexToBytes(entry.ciphertext));
+        return JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(plaintext));
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        throw new Error(`Audit log entry failed to decrypt: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`, { cause: err });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Constant-time MAC comparison (ADR 0009/0019's chain and head MACs are both
+ * HMAC-SHA384, so 96 lowercase hex chars). `candidate` is untrusted on-disk
+ * data of unknown shape: a non-string, wrong-length, or non-hex value is
+ * reported as a mismatch, never thrown, matching verifyKeyConfirmation's
+ * contract in crypto/hybrid.ts.
+ *
+ * Exported (ADR 0026) so the timing-safety test can exercise this exact
+ * compare in isolation, without the file I/O its only internal callers do.
+ */
+export function macEquals(candidate, expected) {
+    if (typeof candidate !== "string" || !/^[0-9a-f]{96}$/.test(candidate))
+        return false;
+    return equalBytes(hexToBytes(candidate), hexToBytes(expected));
 }
 async function readStoredEntries(storageDir) {
     try {
@@ -16,7 +98,15 @@ async function readStoredEntries(storageDir) {
         return raw
             .split("\n")
             .filter((line) => line.trim().length > 0)
-            .map((line) => JSON.parse(line));
+            .map((line) => {
+            const parsed = JSON.parse(line);
+            // A corrupted line can be valid JSON that isn't an object (e.g.
+            // `null`) — destructuring that downstream throws TypeError instead
+            // of being reported as a broken chain link. Coerce to an empty
+            // object so it flows safely through as a non-matching entry (found
+            // by fuzzing, issue #42).
+            return (typeof parsed === "object" && parsed !== null ? parsed : {});
+        });
     }
     catch (err) {
         if (err.code === "ENOENT")
@@ -24,39 +114,222 @@ async function readStoredEntries(storageDir) {
         throw err;
     }
 }
+function computeHeadMac(identity, head) {
+    const key = hkdf(sha384, concatBytes(identity.classical.secretKey, identity.pqcSign.secretKey), undefined, AUDIT_LOG_HEAD_INFO, 32);
+    return bytesToHex(hmac(sha384, key, utf8ToBytes(canonicalize(head))));
+}
+async function readHead(identity, path = headFilePath(identity.storageDir)) {
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = await readFile(path, "utf8");
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err.code === "ENOENT")
+            return { state: "missing" };
+        throw err;
+    }
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+        const { headMac, ...rest } = parsed;
+        if (rest.version !== 1 ||
+            typeof rest.count !== "number" ||
+            !Number.isSafeInteger(rest.count) ||
+            rest.count < 0 ||
+            typeof rest.mac !== "string" ||
+            typeof headMac !== "string" ||
+            (rest.encrypted !== undefined && rest.encrypted !== true)) {
+            return { state: "invalid" };
+        }
+        // Only ever include `encrypted` when true, exactly as writeHead does —
+        // otherwise a legacy head record's canonicalized bytes (and therefore
+        // its headMac) would silently change underneath it.
+        const head = rest.encrypted === true ? { version: 1, count: rest.count, mac: rest.mac, encrypted: true } : { version: 1, count: rest.count, mac: rest.mac };
+        return macEquals(headMac, computeHeadMac(identity, head)) ? { state: "ok", head } : { state: "invalid" };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { state: "invalid" };
+    }
+}
+/** Compares an already-read head against the entries on disk. Returns undefined when they agree (a head up to a few entries behind is fine: that is a crash between append and head update). */
+function checkHeadAgainst(read, entries) {
+    if (read.state === "missing")
+        return entries.length === 0 ? undefined : { reason: "head-missing", brokenAtIndex: entries.length };
+    if (read.state === "invalid")
+        return { reason: "head-invalid", brokenAtIndex: entries.length };
+    const { count, mac } = read.head;
+    if (count > entries.length)
+        return { reason: "truncated", brokenAtIndex: entries.length };
+    const expected = count === 0 ? GENESIS_HASH : entries[count - 1].mac;
+    if (mac !== expected)
+        return { reason: "head-invalid", brokenAtIndex: entries.length };
+    return undefined;
+}
 /**
- * Appends one entry to the local, append-only audit log (public metadata
- * only — no secrets). Each entry is chained to the previous one's hash
- * (see verifyLogIntegrity) so tampering or deleting past entries is
- * detectable, not just theoretically append-only.
+ * The head to judge `entries` by. Normally the head file. If a migration crashed after rewriting the
+ * log but before writing the head (ADR 0031), the head file is stale (or, for an empty log, absent); the journal holds the head the
+ * rewritten log should have. The journal is believed only if its MAC verifies AND it names exactly
+ * this log's tip, so it cannot launder a truncation or an edit. Read-only.
  */
-export async function appendLogEntry(identity, entry) {
+async function effectiveHead(identity, entries) {
+    const head = await readHead(identity);
+    const headFine = checkHeadAgainst(head, entries) === undefined;
+    const headIsEncrypted = head.state === "ok" && head.head.encrypted === true;
+    if (headFine && headIsEncrypted)
+        return { head, fromJournal: false };
+    const journal = await readHead(identity, journalFilePath(identity.storageDir));
+    // Also taken when the head is "fine" but not marked encrypted: an empty log has no stale head to notice.
+    if (journal.state === "ok" && journal.head.encrypted === true && journal.head.count === entries.length && checkHeadAgainst(journal, entries) === undefined) {
+        return { head: journal, fromJournal: true };
+    }
+    return { head, fromJournal: false };
+}
+async function checkHead(identity, entries) {
+    return checkHeadAgainst((await effectiveHead(identity, entries)).head, entries);
+}
+/** Like effectiveHead, but also finishes an interrupted migration (writes the head, removes the journal) and removes a stale journal. Call only from the serialized append/migrate paths. */
+async function recoverHead(identity, entries) {
+    const { head, fromJournal } = await effectiveHead(identity, entries);
+    if (fromJournal && head.state === "ok") {
+        await writeHead(identity, head.head.count, head.head.mac, true);
+        await rm(journalFilePath(identity.storageDir), { force: true });
+    }
+    else if (head.state === "ok" && checkHeadAgainst(head, entries) === undefined) {
+        await rm(journalFilePath(identity.storageDir), { force: true }); // stale journal from a crash before the log was rewritten
+    }
+    return head;
+}
+async function writeHead(identity, count, mac, encrypted, path = headFilePath(identity.storageDir)) {
+    const head = encrypted ? { version: 1, count, mac, encrypted: true } : { version: 1, count, mac };
+    await writeFileAtomic(path, JSON.stringify({ ...head, headMac: computeHeadMac(identity, head) }));
+}
+const appendState = new Map();
+function stateFor(storageDir) {
+    const key = resolve(storageDir);
+    let state = appendState.get(key);
+    if (!state) {
+        state = { queue: Promise.resolve(), tail: null, headTrusted: true, encrypted: false };
+        appendState.set(key, state);
+    }
+    return state;
+}
+async function doAppend(identity, entry, state) {
     const full = { ...entry, at: new Date().toISOString() };
-    const existing = await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir);
-    const prevHash = existing.length > 0 ? existing[existing.length - 1].hash : GENESIS_HASH;
-    const withPrev = { ...full, prevHash };
-    const stored = { ...withPrev, hash: computeHash(withPrev) };
-    await mkdir(identity.storageDir, { recursive: true });
+    if (!state.tail) {
+        const existing = await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir);
+        const head = await recoverHead(identity, existing);
+        state.tail = { mac: existing.length > 0 ? existing[existing.length - 1].mac : GENESIS_HASH, entryCount: existing.length };
+        state.headTrusted = checkHeadAgainst(head, existing) === undefined;
+        // The mode also comes from the last stored entry, so deleting the head cannot make
+        // new entries land in plaintext inside an encrypted log (ADR 0031).
+        const lastIsEncrypted = existing.length > 0 && isV2Entry(existing[existing.length - 1]);
+        state.encrypted = (head.state === "ok" && head.head.encrypted === true) || lastIsEncrypted;
+    }
+    const content = state.encrypted ? { version: 2, ...encryptEntryContent(identity, full) } : { ...full };
+    const withPrev = { ...content, prevMac: state.tail.mac };
+    const mac = computeMac(identity, withPrev);
+    const stored = { ...withPrev, mac };
+    await mkdir(identity.storageDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
     await appendFile(logFilePath(identity.storageDir), JSON.stringify(stored) + "\n", { mode: 0o600 });
+    state.tail = { mac, entryCount: state.tail.entryCount + 1 };
+    // Never overwrite a head that already disagreed with the log: that would
+    // launder a truncation into a "clean" state.
+    if (state.headTrusted)
+        await writeHead(identity, state.tail.entryCount, mac, state.encrypted);
+}
+/**
+ * Appends one entry to the local, append-only audit log (public metadata
+ * only — no secrets). Each entry is chained to the previous one's MAC
+ * (see verifyLogIntegrity), keyed from identity's own secret material
+ * (ADR 0009) so tampering or deleting past entries is detectable by anyone
+ * EXCEPT someone who also holds that secret — not just theoretically
+ * append-only, and not forgeable by file-write access alone.
+ */
+export async function appendLogEntry(identity, entry) {
+    const state = stateFor(identity.storageDir);
+    // Chain onto the previous operation regardless of how it settled (a past
+    // failure must not permanently block future appends to this storageDir),
+    // but this call's own outcome — via `task`, awaited below — propagates to
+    // ITS caller untouched.
+    const task = state.queue.catch(() => { }).then(() => doAppend(identity, entry, state));
+    state.queue = task.catch(() => { });
+    await task;
 }
+/** Transparently decrypts any v2 (encrypted, issue #43) entries alongside plaintext v1 ones. */
 export async function readLog(identity) {
-    return (await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir)).map(({ prevHash: _prevHash, hash: _hash, ...entry }) => entry);
+    return (await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir)).map((entry) => (isV2Entry(entry) ? decryptEntryContent(identity, entry) : stripChainFields(entry)));
 }
 /**
- * Walks the hash chain and reports whether it's intact. If an entry was
+ * Walks the MAC chain and reports whether it's intact. If an entry was
  * edited or deleted, `brokenAtIndex` is the (0-based) index of the first
- * entry whose chain link no longer matches.
+ * entry whose chain link no longer matches. Recomputing a matching MAC
+ * requires identity's own secret material (see computeMac/deriveAuditLogKey)
+ * — this is what makes forging the chain require more than filesystem
+ * write access (ADR 0009). It also checks the authenticated head record
+ * (ADR 0019), so deleting the most recent entries is reported too, with
+ * `reason: "truncated"`.
+ *
+ * Not detectable: replacing BOTH log.jsonl and log.head.json with an older,
+ * consistent pair, or deleting both files outright. Keep an off-box copy of
+ * the head if that matters to you.
  */
 export async function verifyLogIntegrity(identity) {
     const entries = await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir);
-    let expectedPrevHash = GENESIS_HASH;
+    let expectedPrevMac = GENESIS_HASH;
     for (let i = 0; i < entries.length; i++) {
-        const { prevHash, hash, ...rest } = entries[i];
-        if (prevHash !== expectedPrevHash || hash !== computeHash({ ...rest, prevHash })) {
+        const { prevMac, mac, ...rest } = entries[i];
+        if (prevMac !== expectedPrevMac || !macEquals(mac, computeMac(identity, { ...rest, prevMac }))) {
             return { intact: false, brokenAtIndex: i };
         }
-        expectedPrevHash = hash;
+        expectedPrevMac = mac;
     }
+    const problem = await checkHead(identity, entries);
+    if (problem)
+        return { intact: false, ...problem };
     return { intact: true };
 }
+/**
+ * One-time, explicit opt-in (issue #43/ADR 0027) to encrypt the audit log's
+ * entry content, so filesystem access alone no longer reveals what actions
+ * this identity has performed. Re-encrypts every existing entry in one pass
+ * (there is no mixed-format file afterwards) and marks the head record so
+ * every later `appendLogEntry` call encrypts just the one entry it writes —
+ * never the whole log again. A no-op if the log is already encrypted.
+ * Throws if the log fails its integrity check first: there is nothing safe
+ * to migrate if the chain can't be trusted.
+ */
+export async function migrateAuditLogToEncrypted(identity) {
+    const state = stateFor(identity.storageDir);
+    const task = state.queue.catch(() => { }).then(() => doMigrateToEncrypted(identity, state));
+    state.queue = task.catch(() => { });
+    await task;
+}
+async function doMigrateToEncrypted(identity, state) {
+    const head = await recoverHead(identity, await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir)); // finish an interrupted earlier migration first
+    if (head.state === "ok" && head.head.encrypted === true)
+        return; // already encrypted — true no-op
+    const integrity = await verifyLogIntegrity(identity);
+    if (!integrity.intact) {
+        throw new Error("Cannot migrate: the audit log failed its integrity check. Investigate before encrypting it.");
+    }
+    const entries = await readStoredEntries(identity.storageDir);
+    let prevMac = GENESIS_HASH;
+    const rewritten = [];
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+        const content = isV2Entry(entry) ? decryptEntryContent(identity, entry) : stripChainFields(entry);
+        const { nonce, ciphertext } = encryptEntryContent(identity, content);
+        const withPrev = { version: 2, nonce, ciphertext, prevMac };
+        const mac = computeMac(identity, withPrev);
+        rewritten.push({ ...withPrev, mac });
+        prevMac = mac;
+    }
+    await mkdir(identity.storageDir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
+    // Crash-safe order (ADR 0031): journal the head the new log will have, then rewrite the log, then the head, then drop the journal.
+    await writeHead(identity, rewritten.length, prevMac, true, journalFilePath(identity.storageDir));
+    await writeFileAtomic(logFilePath(identity.storageDir), rewritten.map((entry) => JSON.stringify(entry)).join("\n") + (rewritten.length > 0 ? "\n" : ""));
+    await writeHead(identity, rewritten.length, prevMac, true);
+    await rm(journalFilePath(identity.storageDir), { force: true });
+    state.tail = { mac: prevMac, entryCount: rewritten.length };
+    state.headTrusted = true;
+    state.encrypted = true;
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=store.js.map

package/dist/store.js.map

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package/dist/trust.d.ts

@@ -1,16 +1,75 @@
-import type { Identity, PublicCard } from "./identity.js";
+import { type Certificate, type VerifyResult } from "./crypto/hybrid.js";
+import { type Identity, type PublicCard } from "./identity.js";
 export interface TrustRecord {
     card: PublicCard;
     trustedAt: string;
     /** Set when this party was later revoked (see untrustParty). Absent = still trusted. */
     revokedAt?: string;
+    /**
+     * Set alongside revokedAt when this record was tombstoned by a verified
+     * rotation (applyRotation), not an ordinary revocation: the fingerprint of
+     * the card this party rotated TO. Informational only — verify() still
+     * reports "revoked-signer" for this record either way (ADR 0023/issue
+     * #37); nothing reads this field to change verification behavior.
+     */
+    rotatedTo?: string;
 }
+type Entries = Record<string, TrustRecord>;
+/**
+ * Thrown when trust.json cannot be trusted: its MAC does not verify (edited,
+ * truncated, copied from another identity), it is not valid JSON, or it is an
+ * unauthenticated legacy file that was never explicitly adopted with
+ * `migrateLegacyTrustStore`. Everything that consults the trust list fails
+ * closed on this rather than reading a file anyone with filesystem access
+ * could have written.
+ */
+export declare class TrustStoreIntegrityError extends Error {
+    constructor(message: string);
+}
+/**
+ * Exported (ADR 0026) so the timing-safety test can exercise this exact
+ * compare in isolation, without the file I/O its only internal callers do.
+ */
+export declare function macMatches(identity: Identity, entries: Entries, mac: unknown, seq?: number): boolean;
+/** What a caller can keep somewhere an attacker on this machine cannot write (a second device, a remote service) to catch a rollback of every local file at once. Not secret. */
+export interface TrustStoreAnchor {
+    seq: number;
+    mac: string;
+}
+/** The current `{ seq, mac }` of the trust store. Store it off-box after changes you care about. */
+export declare function getTrustStoreAnchor(identity: Identity): Promise<TrustStoreAnchor>;
+/**
+ * Throws TrustStoreIntegrityError if the local trust store is older than `anchor`, or has the
+ * same sequence number with different contents. Newer is fine. This is the only check that
+ * catches a rollback where trust.json and trust.seq.json were restored together (ADR 0030).
+ */
+export declare function verifyTrustStoreAnchor(identity: Identity, anchor: TrustStoreAnchor): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * One-time, explicit opt-in (issue #43/ADR 0027) to encrypt `trust.json`'s
+ * entries, so filesystem access alone no longer reveals who this identity
+ * trusts. A no-op if the store is already v4. A legacy (unauthenticated) file
+ * is not implicitly adopted here — call `migrateLegacyTrustStore` first, same
+ * as reading it would require.
+ */
+export declare function migrateTrustStoreToEncrypted(identity: Identity): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * One-time, explicit adoption of a trust.json written before trust-store
+ * MACs existed (a v1 alias map or a v2 fingerprint-keyed file). Those files
+ * carry no proof of who wrote them, so they are never read implicitly (an
+ * attacker could otherwise plant one and bypass the MAC). Calling this says
+ * "I have reviewed the current file and it is mine": its records are kept
+ * and the file is rewritten authenticated. Returns the number of records
+ * adopted; returns 0 and changes nothing if the file is missing or already
+ * authenticated (a modified authenticated file still throws).
+ */
+export declare function migrateLegacyTrustStore(identity: Identity): Promise<number>;
 /**
  * Records another party's public card as trusted, keyed by the card's
  * fingerprint (not alias — two different real parties could otherwise pick
  * the same alias and silently overwrite each other). Public keys are not
  * secret, so this file is plain JSON (unlike identity.enc.json), though it's
- * still permission-restricted to the owning user.
+ * permission-restricted to the owning user and, since ADR 0015, carries an
+ * HMAC (keyed from the Identity's secret keys) so edits are detected.
  *
  * Trusting a card again after it was revoked reinstates it (clears revokedAt).
  */
@@ -23,6 +82,14 @@ export declare function trustParty(identity: Identity, card: PublicCard): Promis
  * "untrusted-signer" (never trusted at all).
  */
 export declare function untrustParty(identity: Identity, alias: string): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Revokes exactly one card, identified by its `fingerprint(card)` string
+ * (spaces and case are ignored). Unlike `untrustParty`, parties that merely
+ * share an alias are untouched — alias is a non-unique display label.
+ * Returns true if a currently-trusted record was revoked, false if no such
+ * trusted record exists (a typo'd fingerprint is reported, not ignored).
+ */
+export declare function untrustFingerprint(identity: Identity, fingerprintValue: string): Promise<boolean>;
 /** Every currently-trusted (non-revoked) card. */
 export declare function listTrustedParties(identity: Identity): Promise<PublicCard[]>;
 /** Every trust record ever made, revoked or not — for audit/history purposes. */
@@ -39,3 +106,104 @@ export declare function getTrustedParty(identity: Identity, alias: string): Prom
 export declare function getTrustedPartiesByAlias(identity: Identity, alias: string): Promise<PublicCard[]>;
 /** All trust records (revoked or not) recorded under this alias. */
 export declare function getTrustRecordsByAlias(identity: Identity, alias: string): Promise<TrustRecord[]>;
+/**
+ * Verifies a self-signed card (from `exportSignedCard`) — checks the
+ * signature is self-consistent (the certificate's signer IS the card it's
+ * attached to) and, if the card carries an `expiresAt`, that it hasn't
+ * passed. Only on success does this call the ordinary `trustParty` to
+ * actually record it — self-signing proves the card is authentic and
+ * current, not that you've decided to trust it (Fingerprint confirmation
+ * is still the human-level trust decision, same as a bare card).
+ */
+export declare function trustSignedCard(identity: Identity, card: PublicCard, certificate: Certificate): Promise<VerifyResult>;
+export interface RotationDocument {
+    oldCard: PublicCard;
+    newCard: PublicCard;
+    rotatedAt: string;
+}
+export interface RotationStatement {
+    document: RotationDocument;
+    oldCertificate: Certificate;
+    newCertificate: Certificate;
+}
+/**
+ * Starts a key rotation: the OLD identity signs a statement naming `newCard`
+ * as its successor. Hand the result to `completeRotation`, called with the
+ * NEW identity, to get a complete, dual-signed RotationStatement — a single
+ * signature from the old key alone is never enough to redirect a peer's
+ * trust (see `applyRotation`), so this function's output is not yet usable
+ * on its own. Even a dual-signed statement is only as trustworthy as the new
+ * fingerprint the receiver confirms out of band (`applyRotation`).
+ */
+export declare function beginRotation(oldIdentity: Identity, newCard: PublicCard, options?: {
+    rotatedAt?: string;
+}): Promise<{
+    document: RotationDocument;
+    oldCertificate: Certificate;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Finishes a key rotation: the NEW identity signs the SAME document
+ * `beginRotation` produced, proving the new key exists and agrees to be
+ * named as successor. This proves the statement's author controls the new
+ * key; it does NOT prove the new key belongs to the real owner — an attacker
+ * who stole the old key can mint their own "new" identity and complete the
+ * statement themselves. Receivers close that gap with `applyRotation`'s
+ * out-of-band `confirmNewFingerprint`.
+ */
+export declare function completeRotation(newIdentity: Identity, draft: {
+    document: RotationDocument;
+    oldCertificate: Certificate;
+}): Promise<RotationStatement>;
+/**
+ * Verifies a RotationStatement (both signatures self-consistent, both
+ * certificates over the identical document) and, only if `oldCard` already
+ * has an existing Trust Record, moves trust to `newCard` and tombstones
+ * `oldCard`'s record (revokedAt set, plus rotatedTo pointing at newCard's
+ * fingerprint). A statement for a card you never trusted is a no-op — this
+ * is not a way to seed your trust store with a card you never decided to
+ * trust in the first place.
+ *
+ * `options.confirmNewFingerprint` is REQUIRED: the new card's fingerprint as
+ * the real owner gave it to you over a channel the statement did not travel
+ * on (phone call, in person). Dual signatures alone only prove the author
+ * holds both keys; an attacker with a stolen old key supplies their own
+ * "new" key and signs both. Spacing and case are ignored when comparing.
+ * A mismatch returns `{ valid: false, reason: "fingerprint-mismatch" }` and
+ * changes nothing; a missing value throws (ADR 0029).
+ */
+export declare function applyRotation(identity: Identity, statement: RotationStatement, options: {
+    confirmNewFingerprint: string;
+}): Promise<VerifyResult>;
+export interface RevocationDocument {
+    revokedCard: PublicCard;
+    revokedAt: string;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+/** A Certificate only stores its document's HASH, not the document itself (same as everywhere else in this codebase) — so a revocation notice bundles the document alongside its certificate, the same shape RotationStatement already uses for the same reason. */
+export interface RevocationNotice {
+    document: RevocationDocument;
+    certificate: Certificate;
+}
+/**
+ * Produces a self-signed, portable revocation notice for `identity`'s own
+ * card — verifiable by any peer independently of their (or your) local
+ * trust-store state. The same function works whether called reactively
+ * (retiring a key now) or right after createIdentity, to be stored
+ * separately and used later if this identity becomes inaccessible — that's
+ * what actually makes "recovery" possible for a lost passphrase or a lost
+ * identity file (ADR 0023): there is no special "pre-generated" mode, it's
+ * the same notice either way.
+ */
+export declare function createRevocationNotice(identity: Identity, options?: {
+    reason?: string;
+}): Promise<RevocationNotice>;
+/**
+ * Verifies a revocation notice (self-consistent, well-formed, `revokedAt`
+ * a valid ISO instant) and, only if the named card already has an existing
+ * Trust Record, tombstones it (revokedAt set) — exactly like
+ * `untrustFingerprint`. A notice for a card you never trusted is a no-op,
+ * for the same reason `applyRotation` is: this is not a pre-emptive
+ * denylist feature.
+ */
+export declare function applyRevocationNotice(identity: Identity, notice: RevocationNotice): Promise<VerifyResult>;
+export {};