quoxcli 0.0.0-stage → 0.2.0

package/lib/core/client.js

@@ -0,0 +1,584 @@
+/**
+ * HTTP client for QuoxCLI
+ *
+ * Wraps native fetch with:
+ * - Bearer token injection
+ * - Service-aware URL routing (auth:3101, collector:9848, etc.)
+ * - Auto-refresh on 401
+ * - Retry with exponential backoff for transient errors
+ * - Debug logging
+ */
+
+import { resolveActing, resolveActingToken } from './actingAs.js';
+import { detectCallerSource } from './callerSource.js';
+import { QuoxApiError, QuoxNetworkError, QuoxAuthError, QuoxTransientAuthError } from './errors.js';
+
+const RETRY_STATUSES = new Set([429, 502, 503]);
+const MAX_RETRIES = 3;
+const RETRY_DELAYS = [1000, 3000, 9000];
+
+// Generate a ULID-like correlation ID (timestamp + random, sortable, unique)
+// quox#558: undici reports every TLS trust failure as a bare "fetch failed",
+// which sent people debugging services that were up. Name the real cause and
+// the sanctioned fix (trust the CA; never disable verification).
+const TLS_TRUST_CODES = new Set([
+  'SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN',
+  'DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT',
+  'UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE',
+  'CERT_HAS_EXPIRED',
+  'ERR_TLS_CERT_ALTNAME_INVALID',
+]);
+
+export function describeNetworkError(service, baseUrl, err) {
+  const code = err?.cause?.code || err?.code;
+  let msg = `Could not connect to ${service} service at ${baseUrl}: ${err.message}`;
+  if (code && TLS_TRUST_CODES.has(code)) {
+    msg += `\n  TLS: certificate not trusted (${code}). For a self-signed dev edge, trust its CA:`
+      + `\n    export NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS=~/.config/quox/quox-dev-edge.pem`
+      + `\n  Never disable TLS verification (NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0) instead.`;
+  } else if (code === 'ERR_SSL_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER' || code === 'EPROTO') {
+    // quox#532 defect 1: the profile says https:// but the service answered
+    // PLAINTEXT (classic: url stamped https://localhost:3000 against plain
+    // http local services). Say "did you mean http://" instead of a raw
+    // fetch failed.
+    msg += `\n  The server answered plaintext to a TLS handshake: this profile's url says https:// but the service speaks http.`
+      + `\n  Did you mean ${String(baseUrl).replace(/^https:/, 'http:')} ? Fix it with: quox config set url <http-url>`;
+  } else if (code === 'ECONNREFUSED') {
+    // quox#548: "connection refused" could not distinguish service-absent
+    // from wrong-URL, and on boxes running a project-prefixed parallel stack
+    // the service often IS up, on a +10000 offset port. Say so instead of a
+    // dead end. Per-profile stamped service URLs also go stale silently
+    // (that half of quox#548 stays open) — the override is the escape hatch.
+    let offsetHint = '';
+    try {
+      const u = new URL(baseUrl);
+      if (u.port) offsetHint = ` (a project-prefixed stack would serve it at :${Number(u.port) + 10000})`;
+    } catch { /* baseUrl unparsable: skip the arithmetic, keep the rest */ }
+    msg += `\n  Nothing is listening there: the service is absent, or this profile's URL is stale${offsetHint}.`
+      + `\n  Check \`quox doctor\`, or override for this shell: export QUOX_${String(service).toUpperCase()}_URL=<url>`;
+  }
+  return msg;
+}
+
+function generateCorrelationId() {
+  const t = Date.now().toString(36);
+  const r = Math.random().toString(36).slice(2, 10);
+  return `cli-${t}-${r}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * HITL-CONTEXT (owner 2026-10-07): name the calling session and profile so an
+ * approval this call triggers says "VULCAN (CLI) · profile moo" instead of a
+ * bare agent id. Display-only on the server; never used for authorization.
+ * Session: $QUOX_SESSION (the Claude/terminal session name).
+ */
+export function callerContextHeaders(config, env = process.env, detectDeps = {}) {
+  const headers = {};
+  const clean = (v, n) => String(v).replace(/[^\w .:@+\-/]/g, '').trim().slice(0, n);
+  // QUOX_SESSION wins; otherwise auto-detect (QUOX_STREAM, attached agent,
+  // held slot, parent process) so the card never says only "CLI".
+  let session = env.QUOX_SESSION && clean(env.QUOX_SESSION, 48);
+  if (!session) {
+    try { session = detectCallerSource(env, detectDeps).label; } catch { session = null; }
+  }
+  if (session) headers['X-Quox-Session'] = clean(session, 48);
+  let profile = null;
+  try { profile = typeof config?.getActiveProfileName === 'function' ? config.getActiveProfileName() : null; } catch { profile = null; }
+  if (profile) {
+    const p = clean(profile, 32);
+    if (p) headers['X-Quox-Profile'] = p;
+  }
+  return headers;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The --debug "Body:" line. A sensitive request prints no body; otherwise top-level secret keys and
+ * any nested `credentials` object are masked (a top-level-only denylist printed vault create keys).
+ */
+export function debugBody(body, sensitive = false) {
+  if (sensitive) return '[redacted: sensitive request]';
+  const sanitized = { ...body };
+  for (const key of ['password', 'token', 'access_token', 'refresh_token', 'secret', 'api_key', 'mfa_code', 'credentials']) {
+    if (sanitized[key]) sanitized[key] = '***';
+  }
+  return JSON.stringify(sanitized);
+}
+
+export function createClient(config, auth) {
+  let refreshing = null;
+  // After a failed refresh, back off instead of latching off forever. The
+  // permanent latch was correct for 2-second CLI invocations but killed
+  // long-lived daemons (2026-08-23: both resident supervisors poll-looped
+  // to death after ONE transient refresh failure, because this instance
+  // never tried again for the rest of its life). A cooldown keeps the
+  // don't-hammer-auth property without the death sentence.
+  const REFRESH_RETRY_COOLDOWN_MS = 60 * 1000;
+  let refreshFailedAt = 0;
+  const correlationId = generateCorrelationId();
+
+  async function request(method, path, options = {}) {
+    const {
+      service = 'auth',
+      body,
+      query,
+      headers: extraHeaders = {},
+      timeout = 30000,
+      raw = false,
+      retries = MAX_RETRIES,
+      noAuth = false,
+      noActAs = false,
+      sensitive = false,
+    } = options;
+
+    const baseUrl = config.getServiceUrl(service);
+    const url = new URL(path, baseUrl);
+
+    if (query) {
+      for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(query)) {
+        if (value != null) url.searchParams.set(key, String(value));
+      }
+    }
+
+    const fetchHeaders = {
+      'X-Quox-Correlation': correlationId,
+      'X-Quox-Client': 'cli',
+      ...callerContextHeaders(config),
+      ...extraHeaders,
+    };
+
+    // Inject auth. Precedence: a stored USER token always wins over an
+    // ambient QUOX_SERVICE_KEY. The service key is the automation/daemon
+    // fallback for when nobody has logged in — a long-running process
+    // shelling out to this CLI has no human session and no refresh token,
+    // so it can't participate in the login/refresh dance below.
+    //
+    // The other order was a live bug (quoxai/quox#404): dev boxes export
+    // QUOX_SERVICE_KEY globally for quoxpert-mcp, so every command after a
+    // successful `quox login` sent X-Service-Key instead of the user's
+    // bearer token. The auth service's user endpoints (/api/auth/me and
+    // friends) don't accept X-Service-Key, so login printed success (it
+    // uses a raw fetch, bypassing this client) and everything after it 401'd.
+    //
+    // SEC: a custom header like X-Service-Key is NOT stripped by fetch on a
+    // cross-origin redirect, unlike Authorization (which the spec drops).
+    // That makes the long-lived, higher-privilege service key MORE exposed to
+    // a rogue-redirect harvest than an ordinary user's bearer token. Refuse to
+    // follow redirects at all when the service key is in play, so the key is
+    // never resent to a host we did not choose. Scoped to the service-key path
+    // deliberately: normal login flows keep their existing redirect behaviour.
+    // QUOX_FORCE_SERVICE_KEY inverts the precedence above for a caller that
+    // OWNS its service key and must never borrow the shared config's stored
+    // session — a long-running daemon (discord-pro bridge, soak sampler) shares
+    // ~/.config/quox/config.json, so whatever profile another process logged in
+    // last leaks in as a stored token and wins. When that token drifts to an
+    // identity the collector rejects, the daemon goes dark (2026-09-04: the
+    // bridge 400'd for hours on a resident JWT). The force flag is
+    // opt-in, so the #404 interactive-dev-box case is untouched.
+    let usingServiceKey = false;
+    // quox#772: opt-in acting identity (--as / QUOX_AS). Replaces the bearer
+    // with the agent's attach token; throws (no request sent) if not attached.
+    const acting = !noAuth && !noActAs ? await resolveActing() : { name: null };
+    const actingAs = acting.name;
+    if (actingAs) {
+      const heartbeat = {
+        post: (p, o) => request('POST', p, { ...o, noActAs: true }),
+        get: (p, o) => request('GET', p, { ...o, noActAs: true }),
+      };
+      const attachToken = await resolveActingToken(actingAs, heartbeat, { implicit: acting.source === 'default' });
+      fetchHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${attachToken}`;
+    } else if (!noAuth) {
+      const tokens = auth.getTokens();
+      const serviceKey = process.env.QUOX_SERVICE_KEY;
+      const forceServiceKey = !!process.env.QUOX_FORCE_SERVICE_KEY && !!serviceKey;
+      if (forceServiceKey) {
+        fetchHeaders['X-Service-Key'] = serviceKey;
+        usingServiceKey = true;
+      } else if (tokens?.access_token) {
+        fetchHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${tokens.access_token}`;
+      } else if (serviceKey) {
+        fetchHeaders['X-Service-Key'] = serviceKey;
+        usingServiceKey = true;
+      }
+    }
+
+    if (body && !(body instanceof FormData)) {
+      fetchHeaders['Content-Type'] = 'application/json';
+    }
+
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeout);
+
+    const isDebug = process.argv.includes('--debug');
+
+    if (isDebug) {
+      console.error(`-> ${method} ${url.toString()}`);
+      if (body && !(body instanceof FormData)) {
+        console.error(`   Body: ${debugBody(body, sensitive).slice(0, 200)}`);
+      }
+    }
+
+    let lastError;
+
+    for (let attempt = 0; attempt <= retries; attempt++) {
+      try {
+        const res = await fetch(url.toString(), {
+          method,
+          headers: fetchHeaders,
+          body: body instanceof FormData ? body : body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined,
+          signal: controller.signal,
+          ...(usingServiceKey ? { redirect: 'manual' } : {}),
+        });
+
+        // See the redirect note above: with redirect:'manual' a 3xx comes back
+        // as a real response instead of being followed. Surface it loudly —
+        // a Quox service should never redirect a CLI call, so this is either a
+        // misconfiguration or someone trying to harvest the service key.
+        if (usingServiceKey && res.status >= 300 && res.status < 400) {
+          throw new QuoxApiError(
+            `Refused to follow a ${res.status} redirect while authenticating with QUOX_SERVICE_KEY `
+            + `(would resend the service key to ${res.headers.get('location') || 'an unknown host'}). `
+            + 'Point QUOX_URL at the real collector instead of a redirecting front end.',
+            res.status,
+          );
+        }
+
+        if (isDebug) {
+          console.error(`<- ${res.status} ${res.statusText} (${method} ${path})`);
+        }
+
+        // Auto-refresh on 401 — but only when the locally-tracked token
+        // actually looks expired. A 401 can also come from a route that
+        // requires entirely different credentials (e.g. a service-key-gated
+        // /internal/* route hit with a valid, non-expired user token) — that
+        // is not a session-expiry signal, and attempting a refresh anyway
+        // risks the refresh call itself failing and wiping the whole stored
+        // profile over what is really just "wrong token for this route".
+        // In that case, skip the refresh and fall through to the normal
+        // error handling below so the original 401/403 is surfaced as-is.
+        const looksExpired = typeof auth.isExpired === 'function' ? auth.isExpired() : true;
+
+        const refreshCoolingDown = refreshFailedAt && (Date.now() - refreshFailedAt < REFRESH_RETRY_COOLDOWN_MS);
+        if (res.status === 401 && !noAuth && !actingAs && attempt === 0 && !refreshCoolingDown && looksExpired) {
+          try {
+            if (!refreshing) {
+              const serviceUrl = config.getServiceUrl('auth');
+              refreshing = auth.refresh(serviceUrl).finally(() => { refreshing = null; });
+            }
+            await refreshing;
+
+            // Update auth header and retry
+            const newTokens = auth.getTokens();
+            if (newTokens?.access_token) {
+              fetchHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${newTokens.access_token}`;
+            }
+            continue;
+          } catch (refreshErr) {
+            // Genuine refresh failure — start the retry cooldown and surface
+            // a clear re-login prompt. A daemon's next request after the
+            // cooldown gets another chance; see REFRESH_RETRY_COOLDOWN_MS.
+            //
+            // CARRY THE REAL REASON. A bare `catch {}` here replaced every
+            // refresh failure with "Session expired", which is a GUESS at the
+            // cause: auth.refresh() distinguishes a dead token from an
+            // unhealthy service from a malformed request, and all three arrived
+            // as the same sentence telling the user to log in again. That cost
+            // hours on 2026-08-24, when the real cause was the CLI sending the
+            // refresh token in a header the server never reads.
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            if (refreshErr && refreshErr.transient) {
+              // Auth is only temporarily unavailable (429 / restart): no
+              // cooldown, and keep the type so a listener can back off.
+              throw new QuoxTransientAuthError(`Re-authentication temporarily unavailable. ${refreshErr.message}`, refreshErr.retryAfterMs ?? null);
+            }
+            refreshFailedAt = Date.now();
+            const why = refreshErr?.message ? ` ${refreshErr.message}` : '';
+            throw new QuoxAuthError(`Session expired. Run \`quox login\` to re-authenticate.${why}`);
+          }
+        }
+
+        // Retry transient errors
+        if (RETRY_STATUSES.has(res.status) && attempt < retries) {
+          const delay = RETRY_DELAYS[attempt] || 9000;
+          if (isDebug) {
+            console.error(`   Retrying in ${delay}ms (attempt ${attempt + 1}/${retries})...`);
+          }
+          await sleep(delay);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+
+        if (raw) return res;
+
+        if (!res.ok) {
+          let data;
+          try {
+            data = await res.json();
+          } catch {
+            data = { error: 'unknown', message: res.statusText };
+          }
+          // A permission error while we silently fell back to the SERVICE
+          // KEY is almost never a permissions problem: the service key
+          // carries no user identity, so any route gated on who you are
+          // refuses it. Say that, because the raw error sends people to fix
+          // the wrong thing. Live cost, 2026-08-23: the instance owner hit
+          // `403 instance_admin_required` on `quox admin config`, and it was
+          // filed as a missing-role bug (quox#470) with a chicken-and-egg
+          // theory about who could grant it. He had held instance-admin
+          // since March. His session had simply expired and the CLI had
+          // quietly downgraded the request to a key with no user attached.
+          let message = data.message || `Request failed with status ${res.status}`;
+          // quox#617: surface the server's machine-readable `reason`. A vault
+          // update returns 403 with `reason: 'mfa_required'` for an MFA-enabled
+          // owner (a step-up gate) vs `reason: 'role_<r>_lacks_capability_<cap>'`
+          // for a genuine missing-permission — two very different fixes that
+          // read as one opaque "you do not have permission" once the reason is
+          // dropped. The body already carries it (and reaches .body below); we
+          // just also fold it into the human message so the WHY is visible
+          // without --debug. Skipped when the message already contains it.
+          if (data.reason && !String(message).includes(data.reason)) {
+            message += ` (reason: ${data.reason})`;
+          }
+          if (usingServiceKey && (res.status === 403 || res.status === 401)) {
+            message += `\nNote: this request used the service key (QUOX_SERVICE_KEY) because no user session was stored for this profile. `
+              + `The service key has no user identity, so anything gated on WHO you are will refuse it regardless of your real permissions. `
+              + `Run \`quox login\` (or \`quox -p <profile> login\`) and retry before treating this as a permissions problem.`;
+          }
+          // LL-3d: carry the WHOLE body, not just message/detail. Endpoints
+          // that answer with structured context (the licensing 409's
+          // bound_instance_name / bound[] / max_servers, the 402's plugin)
+          // had it flattened away here, so command handlers could only print
+          // "Request failed with status 409".
+          throw new QuoxApiError(
+            res.status,
+            data.error || 'api_error',
+            message,
+            data.detail || data.details,
+            data
+          );
+        }
+
+        // Handle empty responses (204 No Content)
+        if (res.status === 204) return { success: true };
+
+        const contentType = res.headers.get('content-type') || '';
+        if (contentType.includes('application/json')) {
+          return await res.json();
+        }
+        return { success: true, text: await res.text() };
+
+      } catch (err) {
+        clearTimeout(timer);
+
+        if (err instanceof QuoxApiError || err instanceof QuoxAuthError) {
+          throw err;
+        }
+
+        if (err.name === 'AbortError') {
+          throw new QuoxNetworkError(`Request timed out after ${timeout}ms`);
+        }
+
+        lastError = err;
+
+        if (attempt < retries && isTransientError(err)) {
+          const delay = RETRY_DELAYS[attempt] || 9000;
+          await sleep(delay);
+          continue;
+        }
+
+        throw new QuoxNetworkError(
+          describeNetworkError(service, baseUrl, err),
+          err
+        );
+      }
+    }
+
+    throw lastError || new QuoxNetworkError('Request failed after retries');
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Open a Server-Sent Events (SSE) stream and yield parsed events.
+   *
+   * Mirrors the collector's `POST /chat/stream` contract (quox#782): when
+   * `options.body` is given it is sent as a JSON POST body so prompts never
+   * appear in the URL; `options.query` remains for non-sensitive params.
+   * Response is `text/event-stream`
+   * with `data: <json>\n\n` frames (plus `: ping` keep-alive comments).
+   *
+   * Each yielded value is the parsed JSON payload of one `data:` frame
+   * (e.g. `{ type: 'connected', ... }`, `{ type: 'chunk', content: '...' }`,
+   * `{ type: 'done', ... }`, `{ type: 'error', error: '...' }`). The
+   * generator returns naturally on `done`/`error` events or when the
+   * server closes the connection.
+   *
+   * @param {string} path - e.g. '/chat/stream'
+   * @param {object} options
+   * @param {string} [options.service='collector']
+   * @param {object} [options.query] - query string params (never put prompts here)
+   * @param {object} [options.body] - JSON body; switches the request to POST
+   * @param {object} [options.headers] - extra headers
+   * @param {AbortSignal} [options.signal] - external abort signal (e.g. Ctrl+C)
+   * @param {boolean} [options.untilClose] - keep reading past done/error until the server closes (quoxon: turn.finished arrives after done)
+   */
+  async function* stream(path, options = {}) {
+    const {
+      service = 'collector',
+      query,
+      body: streamBody,
+      headers: extraHeaders = {},
+      signal: externalSignal,
+      untilClose = false,
+    } = options;
+
+    const baseUrl = config.getServiceUrl(service);
+    const url = new URL(path, baseUrl);
+
+    if (query) {
+      for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(query)) {
+        if (value != null) url.searchParams.set(key, String(value));
+      }
+    }
+
+    const fetchHeaders = {
+      Accept: 'text/event-stream',
+      'X-Quox-Correlation': correlationId,
+      ...(streamBody !== undefined ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {}),
+      ...extraHeaders,
+    };
+
+    // Same precedence as request() above, including the QUOX_FORCE_SERVICE_KEY
+    // override for daemons that own their key and must not borrow the shared
+    // config's stored session.
+    const streamActingR = await resolveActing();
+    const streamActing = streamActingR.name;
+    const streamTokens = auth.getTokens();
+    let streamServiceKey = null;
+    const streamForceKey = !!process.env.QUOX_FORCE_SERVICE_KEY && !!process.env.QUOX_SERVICE_KEY;
+    if (streamActing) {
+      const heartbeat = { post: (p, o) => request('POST', p, { ...o, noActAs: true }), get: (p, o) => request('GET', p, { ...o, noActAs: true }) };
+      fetchHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${await resolveActingToken(streamActing, heartbeat, { implicit: streamActingR.source === 'default' })}`;
+    } else if (streamForceKey) {
+      streamServiceKey = process.env.QUOX_SERVICE_KEY;
+      fetchHeaders['X-Service-Key'] = streamServiceKey;
+    } else if (streamTokens?.access_token) {
+      fetchHeaders['Authorization'] = `Bearer ${streamTokens.access_token}`;
+    } else if (process.env.QUOX_SERVICE_KEY) {
+      streamServiceKey = process.env.QUOX_SERVICE_KEY;
+      fetchHeaders['X-Service-Key'] = streamServiceKey;
+    }
+
+    const isDebug = process.argv.includes('--debug');
+    if (isDebug) {
+      console.error(`-> ${streamBody !== undefined ? 'POST' : 'GET'}(stream) ${url.toString()}`);
+    }
+
+    let res;
+    try {
+      res = await fetch(url.toString(), {
+        method: streamBody !== undefined ? 'POST' : 'GET',
+        headers: fetchHeaders,
+        ...(streamBody !== undefined ? { body: JSON.stringify(streamBody) } : {}),
+        signal: externalSignal,
+        // Same redirect protection as the non-streaming path above: never let
+        // a 3xx resend X-Service-Key to a host we did not choose.
+        ...(streamServiceKey ? { redirect: 'manual' } : {}),
+      });
+    } catch (err) {
+      throw new QuoxNetworkError(
+        describeNetworkError(service, baseUrl, err),
+        err
+      );
+    }
+
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      let data;
+      try {
+        data = await res.json();
+      } catch {
+        data = { error: 'unknown', message: res.statusText };
+      }
+      throw new QuoxApiError(
+        res.status,
+        data.error || 'api_error',
+        data.message || `Stream request failed with status ${res.status}`,
+        data.detail || data.details,
+        data
+      );
+    }
+
+    if (!res.body) {
+      throw new QuoxNetworkError('Stream response had no body.');
+    }
+
+    const reader = res.body.getReader();
+    const decoder = new TextDecoder();
+    let buffer = '';
+
+    try {
+      while (true) {
+        const { done, value } = await reader.read();
+        if (done) break;
+
+        buffer += decoder.decode(value, { stream: true });
+        const lines = buffer.split('\n');
+        buffer = lines.pop() ?? '';
+
+        for (const line of lines) {
+          if (!line.startsWith('data:')) continue; // skip blank lines and ": ping" comments
+          const raw = line.slice(5).trim();
+          if (!raw || raw === '[DONE]') continue;
+
+          let event;
+          try {
+            event = JSON.parse(raw);
+          } catch {
+            if (isDebug) console.error(`   [stream] skipping malformed frame: ${raw.slice(0, 100)}`);
+            continue;
+          }
+
+          yield event;
+
+          if (!untilClose && (event.type === 'done' || event.type === 'error')) {
+            return;
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    } finally {
+      // cancel first so the HTTP body is torn down, not just unlocked
+      try { reader.cancel().catch(() => {}); } catch { /* already closed */ }
+      try { reader.releaseLock(); } catch { /* already released */ }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return {
+    get(path, options) {
+      return request('GET', path, options);
+    },
+    post(path, options) {
+      return request('POST', path, options);
+    },
+    patch(path, options) {
+      return request('PATCH', path, options);
+    },
+    put(path, options) {
+      return request('PUT', path, options);
+    },
+    delete(path, options) {
+      return request('DELETE', path, options);
+    },
+    request,
+    stream,
+  };
+}
+
+function sleep(ms) {
+  return new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, ms));
+}
+
+function isTransientError(err) {
+  const msg = err.message || '';
+  return msg.includes('ECONNRESET') ||
+    msg.includes('ECONNREFUSED') ||
+    msg.includes('ETIMEDOUT') ||
+    msg.includes('fetch failed');
+}