qualiow-exploratory-testing 2.3.0 → 2.3.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/.claude-plugin/marketplace.json +1 -1
- package/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/CHANGELOG.md +80 -0
- package/README.md +20 -13
- package/agents/qa-bug-judge.md +1 -1
- package/agents/qa-diff-indexer-agent.md +1 -1
- package/agents/qa-gather-agent.md +1 -1
- package/agents/qa-reporting-agent.md +1 -1
- package/bin/mobile-cli.mjs +74 -26
- package/bin/qualiow +7 -2
- package/bin/wk-ios +60 -6
- package/bin/wkeval.mjs +7 -2
- package/dist/cli/index.js +718 -172
- package/dist/index.d.ts +63 -19
- package/dist/index.js +586 -136
- package/docs/GETTING-STARTED.md +19 -9
- package/docs/MOBILE-SETUP.md +31 -0
- package/hooks/hooks.json +12 -2
- package/hooks/scripts/bash-guard.mjs +242 -0
- package/hooks/scripts/secret-patterns.d.mts +4 -1
- package/hooks/scripts/secret-patterns.mjs +126 -34
- package/hooks/scripts/write-guard.mjs +70 -15
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore/references/evidence-triage.md +44 -12
- package/skills/qa-explore/references/output-contract.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore/references/security-rules.md +14 -2
- package/skills/qa-explore-cleanup/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore-mobile/SKILL.md +13 -3
- package/skills/qa-explore-mobile/references/mobile-edges.md +3 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore-quick/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-explore-report/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-gather/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-knowledge-add/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-knowledge-list/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-verify-backend/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/skills/qa-verify-backend/phases/05-reporting.md +2 -1
package/dist/index.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -920,6 +920,11 @@ declare const KnowledgeChangelogSchema: z.ZodObject<{
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* require an actual `=` or `:` operator so ordinary prose ("Password field
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* accepts…", "the secret sauce") is left intact; card numbers are only redacted
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* when they pass a Luhn check, so millisecond timestamps and order ids survive.
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*
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* `hooks/scripts/secret-patterns.mjs` carries the same list, regex for regex
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* (`tests/unit/redact-hardening.test.ts` compares the sources). Every pattern
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* must stay linear on adversarial input: a write-guard hook that times out
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* fails open, so no unbounded quantifier may restart at every offset of a run.
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*/
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interface RedactOptions {
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emails?: boolean;
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@@ -1020,7 +1025,8 @@ declare function describeSessionDir(name: string): DiscoveredSessionDir | null;
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*
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* Splits pipe-delimited rows and drops only the leading/trailing empty cells
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* produced by the outer pipes — internal empty cells are preserved, so column
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* indices stay aligned even when a cell is blank.
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* indices stay aligned even when a cell is blank. An escaped pipe (`\|`) is cell
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* content, not a delimiter, as in GFM.
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*/
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interface ParsedTable {
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headers: string[];
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@@ -1536,8 +1542,16 @@ interface EvidenceFile {
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lines: number;
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text: string;
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truncated_from?: number;
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/** The file was larger than the read window: `truncated_from` is a lower bound. */
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partial?: boolean;
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}
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-
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/**
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* `outside-session` also covers a symlink whose target leaves the session;
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* `auth-state` is anything under `.auth/` (by name or by real path) or a file
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* shaped like a Playwright storage state; `not-file` is a directory, FIFO,
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* device or anything else that is not a regular file.
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*/
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type EvidenceSkipReason = 'image' | 'missing' | 'type' | 'outside-session' | 'excluded' | 'auth-state' | 'not-file' | 'budget';
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interface EvidenceSkipped {
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file: string;
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reason: EvidenceSkipReason;
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@@ -1600,9 +1614,9 @@ interface TriageResult {
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mode: TriageMode;
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model: string;
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createdAt: string;
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request
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/** The exact request body sent (state, model, questions, and `max_len` for Laya). */
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request: SystemOneRequest & {
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state: TriageState;
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questions: Record<string, TriageQuestion>;
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};
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response: SystemOneResponse | null;
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usage: TriageUsage | null;
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@@ -1637,7 +1651,9 @@ interface TriageResult {
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* then `.env`);
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* - `laya` (self-hosted) must point at a loopback endpoint.
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* `--provider` only narrows the target's own list; it can never add a provider
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* the target did not name.
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* the target did not name. The card must resolve (symlinks included) to
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* `<cwd>/output/sessions/<dir>/verification/claims/CLAIM-NNN.md` in a real
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* session directory. What leaves the machine is written verbatim to
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* `verification/<STEM>-NNN.json`; the human block goes to `<STEM>-NNN.md`.
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*
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* Exit codes: 0 triaged (or --dry-run) · 1 usage / unparseable card ·
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@@ -1725,6 +1741,12 @@ declare function combineRoutes(routes: Route[]): Route;
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* Redirects are refused: a 307/308 would re-send the body to wherever the
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* server points, which defeats both the fixed hosted endpoint and the
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* loopback-only rule for Laya.
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*
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* The response is untrusted: its text ends up in stdout and in the
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* `<STEM>-NNN.md` block the Phase 7 agent reads. `assertResponse()` keeps
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* only the fields the question set asked for, allow-lists every `choice`,
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* clamps every probability to [0, 1] and flattens the model id; the body is
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* read with a byte limit before it is parsed.
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*/
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declare const JEV_ENDPOINT = "https://api.typesafe.ai/v1/systemone";
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@@ -1756,7 +1778,14 @@ interface CallResult {
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/** 500 ms, 1 s, 2 s … plus up to 250 ms of jitter. */
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declare function backoffMs(attempt: number, random?: () => number): number;
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declare function callSystemOne(req: SystemOneRequest, opts: CallOptions): Promise<CallResult>;
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/**
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/**
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* Every requested question must be answered with the type it was asked as.
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* What comes back is rebuilt from the question set, never passed through:
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* answers to questions that were not asked and unknown fields are dropped, a
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* `choice` outside the question's criteria keys is malformed, probabilities
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* are kept only for those keys and clamped to [0, 1], the model id is one
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* sanitised line of at most 64 characters.
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*/
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declare function assertResponse(json: unknown, questions: Record<string, TriageQuestion>): SystemOneResponse;
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declare const LAYA_DEFAULT_ENDPOINT = "http://127.0.0.1:8000/v1/systemone";
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declare const LAYA_DEFAULT_MODEL = "multilingual";
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@@ -1788,23 +1817,31 @@ declare function parseVerdictBlock(content: string): ParsedVerdict;
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*
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* `redact()` is the pack's secret list and is shared with the write guard, so
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* it must not learn URL, host or path rules (`tests/unit/hooks.test.ts` pins
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* that parity). This module composes it: secrets first, then every URL
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*
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*
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*
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*
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*
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* the
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* that parity). This module composes it: secrets first, then every URL (any
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* `scheme://`, JSON-escaped `scheme:\/\/` too) is reduced to its path, every
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* dotted hostname to `[HOST]` (a scheme-less `host.tld/path?query` keeps the
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* path and loses the query) and every absolute path under a common root
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* (`/Users`, `/home`, `/tmp`, `/srv`, `/workspace`, a drive letter, …) to its
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* basename. A path under any other root passes through: a generic rule would
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* also eat the `[URL /path]` tokens kept on purpose. The path of a URL carries
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* the signal a triage needs (which screen); the host does not.
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*
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* Pattern-based, so it has gaps, and the docs state them: IP addresses,
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* single-label hostnames (`intranet`), URL paths (kept on purpose, and they can
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* name a customer or an internal service) and free-text product, company or
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* people names all pass through unchanged. The exact request is saved next to
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* the verdict so a human can see what was sent.
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*
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* Every pattern here is bounded so hostile page text cannot stall the scrub.
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* A run of more than `LONG_RUN` token characters (`[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]` with no
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* separator) is replaced whole before `redact()` sees it: some of its rules
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* are quadratic on such runs, and nothing a triage needs is that long.
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* Callers cap each field first (`capForScrub()`); `scrubForTransmission()`
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* itself never looks past `MAX_SCRUB_CHARS`.
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*/
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interface ScrubResult {
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text: string;
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/** `redact()` categories plus 'URL', 'Host' and '
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/** `redact()` categories plus 'URL', 'Host', 'Path' and 'Long token' when they fired. */
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redactions: string[];
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}
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declare function scrubForTransmission(text: string): ScrubResult;
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@@ -1827,9 +1864,14 @@ declare const DEFAULT_EVIDENCE_MAX_LINES = 120;
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declare const MAX_STATE_CHARS = 96000;
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declare const MAX_PATTERNS = 12;
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declare const EVIDENCE_NOTE: string;
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/** `verification/claims/CLAIM-NNN.md` → the session directory. */
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/** `verification/claims/CLAIM-NNN.md` → the session directory, by position only. */
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declare function sessionDirOfClaim(claimFile: string): string;
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/**
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* The text files a card lists, read under the containment rules. `sessionDir`
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* is the directory `resolveClaimLocation()` validated; without it the
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* directory is taken from the card's position (tests, library callers).
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*/
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declare function collectEvidence(claim: ParsedClaim, claimFile: string, maxLines?: number, sessionDir?: string): CollectedEvidence;
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/**
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* The bold lead-ins of the "False Positive" sections of `learned-patterns.md`
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* (project copy first, then the resolved data dir) plus the session's own
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@@ -1842,9 +1884,11 @@ declare function buildTriageState(claim: ParsedClaim, evidence: CollectedEvidenc
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redactions: string[];
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};
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/**
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* Keeps the serialised state under `maxChars
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*
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* evidence
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* Keeps the serialised state under `maxChars`: first the last evidence file is
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* halved, then dropped (reason `budget`) once it is down to a stub; with no
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* evidence file left, `evidence_inline`, `actual`, the longest step and
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* `expected` are halved in that order, down to a floor. Returns the evidence
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* metadata as it stands after the cut.
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*/
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declare function fitStateToBudget(state: TriageState, evidence: CollectedEvidence, maxChars?: number): {
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sent: Array<Omit<EvidenceFile, 'text'>>;
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