qlogicagent 2.13.5 → 2.13.6

package/dist/skills/permissions/denial-tracking.d.ts

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Denial Tracking — CC denialTracking.ts parity.
- *
- * Tracks consecutive and total classifier denials to determine
- * when to fall back to interactive prompting.
- *
- * CC reference: src/utils/permissions/denialTracking.ts
- *
- * Integration:
- *   - recordDenial() after each classifier block
- *   - recordSuccess() after each classifier allow
- *   - shouldFallbackToPrompting() before skipping approval dialog
- */
-export interface DenialTrackingState {
-    consecutiveDenials: number;
-    totalDenials: number;
-}
-export declare const DENIAL_LIMITS: {
-    /** Max consecutive denials before falling back to prompting. */
-    readonly maxConsecutive: 3;
-    /** Max total denials in a session before forcing prompt mode. */
-    readonly maxTotal: 20;
-};
-export declare function createDenialTrackingState(): DenialTrackingState;
-/**
- * Record a classifier denial. Increments both counters.
- * Returns a new state object (immutable pattern).
- */
-export declare function recordDenial(state: DenialTrackingState): DenialTrackingState;
-/**
- * Record a classifier success. Resets consecutive counter only.
- * Returns same reference if no change needed (optimization).
- */
-export declare function recordSuccess(state: DenialTrackingState): DenialTrackingState;
-/**
- * Check if the classifier should fall back to interactive prompting.
- *
- * CC pattern: After N consecutive denials or M total denials,
- * the auto-classifier is likely miscalibrated — show the user
- * the approval dialog instead.
- */
-export declare function shouldFallbackToPrompting(state: DenialTrackingState): boolean;

package/dist/skills/permissions/denial-tracking.js

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Denial Tracking — CC denialTracking.ts parity.
- *
- * Tracks consecutive and total classifier denials to determine
- * when to fall back to interactive prompting.
- *
- * CC reference: src/utils/permissions/denialTracking.ts
- *
- * Integration:
- *   - recordDenial() after each classifier block
- *   - recordSuccess() after each classifier allow
- *   - shouldFallbackToPrompting() before skipping approval dialog
- */
-// ── Constants (CC parity) ───────────────────────────────────
-export const DENIAL_LIMITS = {
-    /** Max consecutive denials before falling back to prompting. */
-    maxConsecutive: 3,
-    /** Max total denials in a session before forcing prompt mode. */
-    maxTotal: 20,
-};
-// ── State Management ────────────────────────────────────────
-export function createDenialTrackingState() {
-    return {
-        consecutiveDenials: 0,
-        totalDenials: 0,
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Record a classifier denial. Increments both counters.
- * Returns a new state object (immutable pattern).
- */
-export function recordDenial(state) {
-    return {
-        consecutiveDenials: state.consecutiveDenials + 1,
-        totalDenials: state.totalDenials + 1,
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Record a classifier success. Resets consecutive counter only.
- * Returns same reference if no change needed (optimization).
- */
-export function recordSuccess(state) {
-    if (state.consecutiveDenials === 0)
-        return state; // No change
-    return {
-        ...state,
-        consecutiveDenials: 0,
-    };
-}
-/**
- * Check if the classifier should fall back to interactive prompting.
- *
- * CC pattern: After N consecutive denials or M total denials,
- * the auto-classifier is likely miscalibrated — show the user
- * the approval dialog instead.
- */
-export function shouldFallbackToPrompting(state) {
-    return (state.consecutiveDenials >= DENIAL_LIMITS.maxConsecutive ||
-        state.totalDenials >= DENIAL_LIMITS.maxTotal);
-}

package/dist/skills/permissions/group-security-policy.d.ts

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-import type { PermissionRuleEntry } from "./types.js";
-/**
- * File path patterns considered sensitive — reading/writing these
- * is blocked in group sessions. Used by the file access guard.
- */
-export declare const GROUP_SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS: readonly RegExp[];
-/**
- * Returns the set of permission rules to inject for group sessions.
- * These should be prepended to the rule engine (first-match wins).
- */
-export declare function getGroupSecurityRules(): PermissionRuleEntry[];
-/**
- * Checks if a file path matches sensitive patterns blocked in group mode.
- */
-export declare function isGroupSensitivePath(filePath: string): boolean;

package/dist/skills/permissions/group-security-policy.js

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-// ============================================================
-// Group Security Policy — P7 Direction A
-//
-// When the active project is type="group", injects restrictive
-// permission rules to prevent:
-//   - Reading sensitive files (.env, *.key, *.pem, id_rsa, etc.)
-//   - Executing destructive shell commands (rm -rf, drop, etc.)
-//   - Accessing credential stores or secret managers
-//
-// These rules are prepended (highest priority) to the rule engine
-// when a group session is detected.
-// ============================================================
-/**
- * Tools that are completely blocked in group sessions.
- * Pattern uses glob syntax matching tool names.
- */
-const GROUP_DENIED_TOOLS = [
-    {
-        pattern: "Bash",
-        behavior: "ask",
-        reason: "Group security: shell commands require approval in group chat",
-        source: "group-policy",
-    },
-    {
-        pattern: "computer",
-        behavior: "deny",
-        reason: "Group security: computer control blocked in group chat",
-        source: "group-policy",
-    },
-];
-/**
- * File path patterns considered sensitive — reading/writing these
- * is blocked in group sessions. Used by the file access guard.
- */
-export const GROUP_SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS = [
-    /\.env($|\.)/i,
-    /\.(key|pem|p12|pfx|jks)$/i,
-    /id_rsa/i,
-    /id_ed25519/i,
-    /\.ssh\//i,
-    /secret/i,
-    /credential/i,
-    /token/i,
-    /password/i,
-    /\.aws\//i,
-    /\.gnupg\//i,
-];
-/**
- * Returns the set of permission rules to inject for group sessions.
- * These should be prepended to the rule engine (first-match wins).
- */
-export function getGroupSecurityRules() {
-    return [...GROUP_DENIED_TOOLS];
-}
-/**
- * Checks if a file path matches sensitive patterns blocked in group mode.
- */
-export function isGroupSensitivePath(filePath) {
-    return GROUP_SENSITIVE_FILE_PATTERNS.some((pat) => pat.test(filePath));
-}

package/dist/skills/permissions/hook-runner.d.ts

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-import type { HookRegistry } from "../../contracts/hooks.js";
-import type { ChatMessage } from "../../protocol/wire/index.js";
-import type { ToolDefinition } from "../../protocol/wire/index.js";
-import { PermissionRuleEngine } from "./rule-engine.js";
-import type { ApprovalRequest, ApprovalResponse } from "./types.js";
-import { type ClassifierLLMCall } from "./permission-classifier.js";
-import { DenialAuditLogger } from "./denial-audit-log.js";
-export type PermissionRole = "interactive" | "coordinator" | "worker";
-export interface PermissionCheckerDeps {
-    ruleEngine: PermissionRuleEngine;
-    hookRegistry: HookRegistry;
-    /** Returns the current workspace root for operation classification. */
-    getWorkspaceRoot(): string;
-    /**
-     * Callback to send an approval request to the host (Gateway/Electron).
-     * Must return a promise that resolves when the user responds.
-     * If the host does not support approval, this should reject or return deny.
-     */
-    onRequestApproval: (request: ApprovalRequest) => Promise<ApprovalResponse>;
-    /** Called when a tool is denied (for logging/observability) */
-    onDenied?: (toolName: string, message: string) => void;
-    /**
-     * LLM call function for the auto-mode classifier (cc yoloClassifier pattern).
-     * If not provided, auto mode falls back to the approval dialog.
-     */
-    classifierLLMCall?: ClassifierLLMCall;
-    /**
-     * Recent conversation messages for classifier context.
-     * Called lazily when the classifier needs to run.
-     */
-    getRecentMessages?: () => ChatMessage[];
-    /**
-     * Permission role context (CC: interactive/coordinator/worker).
-     * Determines how the checker behaves:
-     * - interactive: full approval dialog flow (default)
-     * - coordinator: auto-approve non-destructive ops, no user prompts
-     * - worker: classifier-only path, no approval dialog fallback
-     */
-    permissionRole?: PermissionRole;
-    /** Denial audit logger for persistent audit trail. */
-    auditLogger?: DenialAuditLogger;
-    /** Current session ID (for audit context). */
-    sessionId?: string;
-    /** Getter for current turn ID (changes per turn). */
-    getTurnId?: () => string;
-    /** Best-effort community telemetry sink for consent-gated sandbox metrics. */
-    communityTelemetryRecorder?: {
-        recordTelemetry(input: {
-            event: "community.sandbox.violation";
-            metadata?: Record<string, unknown>;
-        }): Promise<unknown>;
-    };
-}
-export declare class PermissionChecker {
-    private readonly ruleEngine;
-    private readonly hookRegistry;
-    private readonly getWorkspaceRoot;
-    private readonly onRequestApproval;
-    private readonly onDenied;
-    private readonly classifierLLMCall;
-    private readonly getRecentMessages;
-    private readonly permissionRole;
-    private readonly pendingApprovals;
-    private readonly auditLogger;
-    private readonly sessionId;
-    private readonly getTurnId;
-    private readonly communityTelemetryRecorder;
-    private readonly communitySandboxTurnIds;
-    /**
-     * cut7c — community-skill (untrusted) scoped deny/ask rules, passed per-call as
-     * `ruleEngine.check(..., { extraRules })` for community turns. NOT a second engine:
-     * the single rule engine evaluates these alongside the base rules. FS/exec tools are
-     * absent here → they flow through the unified pipeline (workspace + prompt + OS sandbox).
-     */
-    private readonly communityScopedRules;
-    private unregisterHook;
-    /** Tool meta cache — populated from ToolDefinition[] at agent creation */
-    private toolMetaCache;
-    /** Classifier result cache — avoids redundant LLM calls (CC permissionCache parity) */
-    private classifierCache;
-    /** Denial tracking state — CC denialTracking.ts parity */
-    private denialTracking;
-    constructor(deps: PermissionCheckerDeps);
-    /**
-     * Register the permission check hook on the HookRegistry.
-     * Returns an unregister function.
-     */
-    register(): () => void;
-    /**
-     * Resolve an incoming approval response (called by host RPC handler).
-     */
-    resolveApproval(response: ApprovalResponse): void;
-    /**
-     * Update tool metadata cache (call when tool list changes).
-     */
-    setToolMeta(tools: ToolDefinition[]): void;
-    get ruleEngineRef(): PermissionRuleEngine;
-    /**
-     * cut7c — whether the CURRENT turn is a community-skill (untrusted) turn. Consumed by
-     * the OS-sandbox builder to tighten community execs (netPolicy=deny: no outbound network
-     * from the sandboxed child) as defense-in-depth on POSIX.
-     */
-    isCommunitySandboxTurn(): boolean;
-    /** Fire permission.denied hook + onDenied callback + audit log */
-    private fireDenied;
-    private handleResult;
-    private toConfirmationRequest;
-    private handleInteractiveApproval;
-    /**
-     * Worker/coordinator "ask" handler: classifier-only, no approval dialog.
-     * CC pattern: headless workers never prompt users.
-     */
-    private handleWorkerAsk;
-    private requestApproval;
-    /**
-     * Clear the classifier cache (CC parity: called on mode change / session end).
-     */
-    clearClassifierCache(): void;
-    private cancelAllPending;
-}