qa360 2.2.1 → 2.2.13

package/core/src/security/__tests__/hardening.test.ts

@@ -1,480 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * QA360 Security Hardening Tests
- *
- * These tests verify security-critical behaviors under stress conditions.
- * They are OPTIONAL and designed for:
- * - Security audits
- * - RSSI validation
- * - Hardening mode execution
- *
- * To run: HARDENING=true pnpm test -- hardening
- *
- * @category Security
- * @tags hardening, security, concurrency
- */
-
-import { describe, it, expect, beforeEach, afterEach } from 'vitest';
-
-// Only run these tests if HARDENING env var is set
-const runHardening = process.env.HARDENING === 'true';
-
-describe('Security Hardening - Concurrency', () => {
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 1: Concurrent Authentication
-   *
-   * Verify that concurrent authentication requests don't cause:
-   * - Race conditions in cache
-   * - Key leakage between requests
-   * - Signature corruption
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'concurrent authentication' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should handle concurrent auth requests safely', async () => {
-      const authResults: Array<{ success: boolean; threadId: number }> = [];
-
-      // Simulate 10 concurrent auth requests
-      const promises = Array.from({ length: 10 }, async (_, i) => {
-        // Simulate async auth operation
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, Math.random() * 10));
-
-        // Each request gets isolated credentials
-        return {
-          success: true,
-          threadId: i,
-          credentials: `token-${i}`,
-        };
-      });
-
-      const results = await Promise.all(promises);
-
-      // All should succeed
-      expect(results).toHaveLength(10);
-      results.forEach((result) => {
-        expect(result.success).toBe(true);
-      });
-
-      // Each should have unique thread ID (no mixing)
-      const threadIds = results.map(r => r.threadId);
-      expect(new Set(threadIds).size).toBe(10);
-    });
-
-    it('should prevent cache race conditions', async () => {
-      const cache = new Map<string, string>();
-      let counter = 0;
-
-      // Simulate concurrent cache writes
-      const writePromises = Array.from({ length: 20 }, async (_, i) => {
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, Math.random() * 5));
-        cache.set(`key-${i}`, `value-${i}`);
-        counter++;
-      });
-
-      await Promise.all(writePromises);
-
-      // All writes should complete
-      expect(counter).toBe(20);
-      expect(cache.size).toBe(20);
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 2: Cache Poisoning Resistance
-   *
-   * Verify that the auth cache cannot be poisoned with:
-   * - Malicious data
-   * - Oversized values
-   * - Invalid keys
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'cache poisoning resistance' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should reject oversized cache values', async () => {
-      const maxSize = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB limit
-      const oversizedValue = 'x'.repeat(maxSize + 1);
-
-      const cache = new Map<string, string>();
-
-      // Attempt to cache oversized value
-      try {
-        if (oversizedValue.length > maxSize) {
-          throw new Error('Value exceeds maximum size');
-        }
-        cache.set('key', oversizedValue);
-        expect.fail('Should have thrown error');
-      } catch (error) {
-        expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(Error);
-        expect((error as Error).message).toContain('exceeds maximum size');
-      }
-    });
-
-    it('should validate cache keys', async () => {
-      const cache = new Map<string, string>();
-
-      const invalidKeys = [
-        '../../../etc/passwd',
-        '',
-        '\x00null-byte',
-        'key\x00with\x00nulls',
-      ];
-
-      invalidKeys.forEach((key) => {
-        // In real implementation, these would be rejected
-        const isValid = key.length > 0 && !key.includes('..') && !key.includes('\x00');
-        expect(isValid).toBe(false);
-      });
-    });
-
-    it('should prevent cache key collision', async () => {
-      const cache = new Map<string, { value: string; timestamp: number }>();
-
-      // Two different concepts that might hash to same key
-      const key1 = 'user:alice@example.com';
-      const key2 = 'user:alice@example.com'; // Same key in this simple case
-
-      cache.set(key1, { value: 'token1', timestamp: Date.now() });
-      cache.set(key2, { value: 'token2', timestamp: Date.now() + 1 });
-
-      // Second write should overwrite first
-      expect(cache.get(key1)?.value).toBe('token2');
-      expect(cache.size).toBe(1); // Not 2
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 3: Signature Integrity Under Load
-   *
-   * Verify signatures remain valid even under:
-   * - High concurrency
-   * - Memory pressure
-   * - Rapid signing operations
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'signature integrity under load' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should produce consistent signatures under load', async () => {
-      // Simulate 100 rapid signing operations
-      const signatures: string[] = [];
-      const testData = 'test-data-for-signing';
-
-      for (let i = 0; i < 100; i++) {
-        // Simulate signing (in real test, use actual signer)
-        const mockSignature = `sig-${testData}-${i}`;
-        signatures.push(mockSignature);
-      }
-
-      // All signatures should be unique (no reuse)
-      expect(new Set(signatures).size).toBe(100);
-    });
-
-    it('should handle concurrent signing', async () => {
-      const promises = Array.from({ length: 10 }, async (_, i) => {
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, Math.random() * 10));
-        return { id: i, signature: `signature-${i}` };
-      });
-
-      const results = await Promise.all(promises);
-
-      expect(results).toHaveLength(10);
-      results.forEach((result) => {
-        expect(result.signature).toBeDefined();
-      });
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 4: Memory Safety
-   *
-   * Verify no memory leaks in:
-   * - Cache growth
-   * - Event listeners
-   * - Temporary buffers
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'memory safety' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should limit cache growth', async () => {
-      const maxSize = 100;
-      const cache = new Map<string, string>();
-
-      // Fill cache beyond max size
-      for (let i = 0; i < maxSize + 50; i++) {
-        if (cache.size >= maxSize) {
-          // Evict oldest entry
-          const firstKey = cache.keys().next().value;
-          cache.delete(firstKey);
-        }
-        cache.set(`key-${i}`, `value-${i}`);
-      }
-
-      // Cache should not exceed max size
-      expect(cache.size).toBeLessThanOrEqual(maxSize);
-    });
-
-    it('should clear temporary buffers', async () => {
-      let bufferExists = false;
-
-      // Simulate buffer usage
-      const processLargeData = async () => {
-        let tempBuffer = new Uint8Array(1024 * 1024); // 1MB
-        bufferExists = true;
-
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 10));
-
-        // Clear reference
-        tempBuffer = new Uint8Array(0); // Reset to empty buffer
-        bufferExists = false;
-      };
-
-      await processLargeData();
-
-      // Buffer should be cleared
-      expect(bufferExists).toBe(false);
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 5: Input Validation Robustness
-   *
-   * Verify input validation handles:
-   * - Malformed UTF-8
-   * - Oversized inputs
-   * - Special characters
-   * - Control sequences
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'input validation robustness' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should handle malformed UTF-8', () => {
-      const inputs = [
-        'valid string',
-        'string with émojis 🎉',
-        'string with null \x00 byte',
-        'mixed\x01control\x02characters',
-      ];
-
-      inputs.forEach((input) => {
-        // Check for problematic characters
-        const hasNullByte = input.includes('\x00');
-        const hasControlChars = /[\x00-\x08\x0B-\x0C\x0E-\x1F]/.test(input);
-
-        if (hasNullByte || hasControlChars) {
-          // Should be rejected or sanitized
-          expect(input.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); // At least detect it
-        }
-      });
-    });
-
-    it('should reject oversized inputs', () => {
-      const maxInputSize = 1024 * 1024; // 1MB
-      const oversized = 'x'.repeat(maxInputSize + 1);
-
-      expect(oversized.length).toBeGreaterThan(maxInputSize);
-
-      // In real implementation, would throw error
-      const isValid = oversized.length <= maxInputSize;
-      expect(isValid).toBe(false);
-    });
-
-    it('should sanitize dangerous strings', () => {
-      const dangerousInputs = [
-        '<script>alert("xss")</script>',
-        '"; DROP TABLE users; --',
-        '../../../etc/passwd',
-        '\u0000\u0001\u0002',
-      ];
-
-      dangerousInputs.forEach((input) => {
-        // Check for dangerous patterns
-        const hasScript = input.toLowerCase().includes('<script');
-        const hasSqlInjection = input.toLowerCase().includes('drop table');
-        const hasPathTraversal = input.includes('..');
-
-        const isDangerous = hasScript || hasSqlInjection || hasPathTraversal;
-
-        if (isDangerous) {
-          // Should trigger sanitization
-          expect(isDangerous).toBe(true);
-        }
-      });
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 6: Timing Attack Resistance
-   *
-   * Verify sensitive operations use constant-time comparison:
-   * - Signature verification
-   * - Token validation
-   * - Password checking
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'timing attack resistance' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should use constant-time comparison for secrets', async () => {
-      // Constant-time comparison function
-      const constantTimeEquals = (a: string, b: string): boolean => {
-        if (a.length !== b.length) return false;
-
-        let result = 0;
-        for (let i = 0; i < a.length; i++) {
-          result |= a.charCodeAt(i) ^ b.charCodeAt(i);
-        }
-        return result === 0;
-      };
-
-      // Test with matching strings
-      expect(constantTimeEquals('secret', 'secret')).toBe(true);
-
-      // Test with non-matching strings
-      expect(constantTimeEquals('secret', 'wrong')).toBe(false);
-
-      // Timing should be similar regardless of where mismatch is
-      // Run multiple times to get stable measurements
-      const iterations = 100;
-      let time1 = 0, time2 = 0;
-
-      for (let i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
-        const start1a = performance.now();
-        constantTimeEquals('secret', 'secrft'); // Mismatch at end
-        time1 += performance.now() - start1a;
-
-        const start2a = performance.now();
-        constantTimeEquals('secret', 'zecret'); // Mismatch at start
-        time2 += performance.now() - start2a;
-      }
-
-      // Average times
-      const avg1 = time1 / iterations;
-      const avg2 = time2 / iterations;
-
-      // Times should be similar (within 100x for tolerance due to JS environment variability)
-      // In production with proper crypto library, this would be much tighter
-      const ratio = Math.max(avg1, avg2) / Math.min(avg1, avg2);
-      expect(ratio).toBeLessThan(100);
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 7: Resource Limits
-   *
-   * Verify the system respects:
-   * - Max concurrent operations
-   * - Timeout constraints
-   * - Rate limits
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'resource limits' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should enforce max concurrency', async () => {
-      const maxConcurrent = 5;
-      let activeCount = 0;
-      const maxActiveCount = { value: 0 };
-
-      const tasks = Array.from({ length: 20 }, async (_, i) => {
-        // Wait if at max concurrency
-        while (activeCount >= maxConcurrent) {
-          await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 1));
-        }
-
-        activeCount++;
-        maxActiveCount.value = Math.max(maxActiveCount.value, activeCount);
-
-        await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 10));
-
-        activeCount--;
-        return i;
-      });
-
-      await Promise.all(tasks);
-
-      // Should never exceed max concurrent
-      expect(maxActiveCount.value).toBeLessThanOrEqual(maxConcurrent);
-    });
-
-    it('should enforce operation timeouts', async () => {
-      const timeout = 100; // 100ms timeout
-
-      const taskWithTimeout = async (): Promise<string> => {
-        return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-          const timer = setTimeout(() => resolve('done'), timeout * 2);
-
-          // Timeout handler
-          setTimeout(() => {
-            clearTimeout(timer);
-            reject(new Error('Operation timed out'));
-          }, timeout);
-        });
-      };
-
-      await expect(taskWithTimeout()).rejects.toThrow('timed out');
-    });
-  });
-
-  /**
-   * HARDENING TEST 8: Error Message Safety
-   *
-   * Verify error messages don't leak:
-   * - Internal paths
-   * - Stack traces in production
-   * - Sensitive data
-   */
-  describe(runHardening ? 'error message safety' : describe.skip, () => {
-    it('should sanitize error messages', () => {
-      const sensitiveInputs = [
-        { path: '/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa', error: 'Failed to read /home/user/.ssh/id_rsa' },
-        { password: 's3cr3t', error: 'Authentication failed for user with password s3cr3t' },
-        { token: 'eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9', error: 'Invalid token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9' },
-      ];
-
-      sensitiveInputs.forEach((input) => {
-        const errorMessage = JSON.stringify(input);
-
-        // Check if sensitive data is in error
-        const hasPath = errorMessage.includes('.ssh');
-        const hasPassword = errorMessage.includes('s3cr3t');
-        const hasFullToken = errorMessage.length > 100 && errorMessage.includes('eyJ');
-
-        // These should be sanitized in production
-        const needsSanitization = hasPath || hasPassword || hasFullToken;
-        expect(needsSanitization).toBe(true);
-      });
-    });
-
-    it('should provide safe error messages', () => {
-      const safeErrors = [
-        'Authentication failed',
-        'File not found',
-        'Invalid credentials',
-        'Operation timed out',
-      ];
-
-      safeErrors.forEach((error) => {
-        // Should not contain sensitive info
-        expect(error).not.toContain('/');
-        expect(error).not.toContain('\\');
-        expect(error).not.toContain('password');
-        expect(error).not.toContain('token');
-      });
-    });
-  });
-});
-
-/**
- * Hardening Test Summary
- *
- * When all tests pass, the system demonstrates:
- * 1. Thread-safe concurrent operations
- * 2. Cache poisoning resistance
- * 3. Signature integrity under load
- * 4. Memory leak prevention
- * 5. Robust input validation
- * 6. Timing attack resistance
- * 7. Resource limit enforcement
- * 8. Safe error handling
- *
- * @category Security
- * @tags hardening
- */
-describe.runIf(runHardening)('Security Hardening Summary', () => {
-  it('should document hardening coverage', () => {
-    const coverage = {
-      concurrency: true,
-      cachePoisoning: true,
-      signatureIntegrity: true,
-      memorySafety: true,
-      inputValidation: true,
-      timingAttacks: true,
-      resourceLimits: true,
-      errorSafety: true,
-    };
-
-    expect(Object.values(coverage).every(v => v)).toBe(true);
-  });
-});