protect-mcp 0.3.0 → 0.3.1

package/README.md

@@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ Security gateway for MCP servers. Shadow-mode logs by default, per-tool policies
 ## Quick Start
 
 ```bash
+# Wrap an existing OpenClaw / MCP config into a usable pack
+npx @scopeblind/passport wrap --runtime openclaw --config ./openclaw.json --policy email-safe
+
 # Shadow mode — log every tool call, enforce nothing
 npx protect-mcp -- node my-server.js
 
@@ -18,6 +21,9 @@ npx protect-mcp --policy protect-mcp.json -- node my-server.js
 
 # Enforce mode
 npx protect-mcp --policy protect-mcp.json --enforce -- node my-server.js
+
+# Export an offline-verifiable audit bundle
+npx protect-mcp bundle --output audit.json
 ```
 
 ## What It Does
@@ -39,7 +45,7 @@ All other MCP messages (`initialize`, `tools/list`, notifications) pass through
 
 - **Per-tool policies** — block destructive tools, rate-limit expensive ones, and attach minimum-tier requirements
 - **Structured decision logs** — every decision is emitted to `stderr` with `[PROTECT_MCP]`
-- **Optional local signed receipts** — generated when you run with a policy containing `signing.key_path`
+- **Optional local signed receipts** — generated when you run with a policy containing `signing.key_path`, persisted to `.protect-mcp-receipts.jsonl`, and exposed at `http://127.0.0.1:9876/receipts`
 - **Offline verification** — verify receipts or bundles with `npx @veritasacta/verify`
 - **No account required** — local keys, local policy, local process
 
@@ -123,6 +129,10 @@ protect-mcp init
 
 Commands:
   init              Generate Ed25519 keypair + config template
+  status            Show decision stats and local passport identity
+  digest            Generate a local human-readable summary
+  receipts          Show recent persisted signed receipts
+  bundle            Export an offline-verifiable audit bundle
 
 Options:
   --policy <path>   Policy/config JSON file

package/dist/bundle-TXOTFJIJ.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+import {
+  collectSignedReceipts,
+  createAuditBundle
+} from "./chunk-5JXFV37Y.mjs";
+export {
+  collectSignedReceipts,
+  createAuditBundle
+};

package/dist/chunk-5JXFV37Y.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// src/bundle.ts
+function createAuditBundle(opts) {
+  const receipts = opts.receipts.filter(
+    (r) => r && typeof r === "object" && typeof r.signature === "string"
+  );
+  if (receipts.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error("Audit bundle requires at least one signed receipt");
+  }
+  const keyMap = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  for (const key of opts.signingKeys) {
+    if (!keyMap.has(key.kid)) {
+      keyMap.set(key.kid, key);
+    }
+  }
+  let timeRange = opts.timeRange || null;
+  if (!timeRange) {
+    const timestamps = receipts.map((r) => r.issued_at || r.timestamp).filter(Boolean).sort();
+    if (timestamps.length > 0) {
+      timeRange = {
+        from: timestamps[0],
+        to: timestamps[timestamps.length - 1]
+      };
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    format: "scopeblind:audit-bundle",
+    version: 1,
+    exported_at: (/* @__PURE__ */ new Date()).toISOString(),
+    tenant: opts.tenant,
+    time_range: timeRange,
+    receipts,
+    anchors: opts.anchors || [],
+    verification: {
+      algorithm: "ed25519",
+      signing_keys: Array.from(keyMap.values()),
+      instructions: `Verify each receipt by: (1) remove the "signature" field, (2) canonicalize the remaining object with JCS (sorted keys at every level), (3) encode as UTF-8 bytes, (4) verify the Ed25519 signature using the signing key matching the receipt's "kid" field. CLI: npx @veritasacta/verify bundle.json --bundle`
+    }
+  };
+}
+function collectSignedReceipts(logs) {
+  return logs.filter((log) => log.v === 2).map((log) => {
+    const logRecord = log;
+    if (logRecord.receipt) {
+      return logRecord.receipt;
+    }
+    return logRecord;
+  }).filter((r) => typeof r.signature === "string");
+}
+
+export {
+  createAuditBundle,
+  collectSignedReceipts
+};

package/dist/{chunk-3WCA7O4D.mjs → chunk-U7TMVD3E.mjs}

@@ -336,8 +336,8 @@ async function initSigning(config) {
       signerState = {
         privateKey: keyData.privateKey,
         publicKey: keyData.publicKey,
-        kid: artifactsModule.computeKid(keyData.publicKey),
-        issuer: config.issuer || "protect-mcp"
+        kid: keyData.kid || artifactsModule.computeKid(keyData.publicKey),
+        issuer: config.issuer || keyData.issuer || "protect-mcp"
       };
     } catch (err) {
       warnings.push(`signing: failed to load key file: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : err}`);
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ function buildDecisionContext(toolName, tier, opts) {
 
 // src/gateway.ts
 import { spawn } from "child_process";
-import { randomUUID } from "crypto";
+import { randomUUID, randomBytes } from "crypto";
 import { createInterface } from "readline";
 import { appendFileSync } from "fs";
 import { join as join3 } from "path";
@@ -556,13 +556,16 @@ var ReceiptBuffer = class {
   count() {
     return this.receipts.length;
   }
+  getLatest() {
+    return this.receipts.length > 0 ? this.receipts[this.receipts.length - 1] : void 0;
+  }
 };
-function startStatusServer(config, receiptBuffer) {
+function startStatusServer(config, receiptBuffer, approvalStore, approvalNonce) {
   const startTime = Date.now();
   const logDir = process.cwd();
   const server = createServer((req, res) => {
     res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*");
-    res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, OPTIONS");
+    res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Methods", "GET, POST, OPTIONS");
     res.setHeader("Access-Control-Allow-Headers", "Content-Type");
     res.setHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
     if (req.method === "OPTIONS") {
@@ -579,18 +582,30 @@ function startStatusServer(config, receiptBuffer) {
         handleStatus(res, logDir);
       } else if (path === "/receipts") {
         handleReceipts(res, receiptBuffer, url);
+      } else if (path === "/receipts/latest") {
+        handleReceiptLatest(res, receiptBuffer);
       } else if (path.startsWith("/receipts/")) {
         const id = path.slice("/receipts/".length);
         handleReceiptById(res, receiptBuffer, id);
+      } else if (path === "/approve" && req.method === "POST") {
+        handleApprove(req, res, approvalStore, approvalNonce);
+      } else if (path === "/approvals" && req.method === "GET") {
+        handleListApprovals(res, approvalStore);
       } else {
         res.writeHead(404);
-        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "not_found", endpoints: ["/health", "/status", "/receipts", "/receipts/:id"] }));
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "not_found", endpoints: ["/health", "/status", "/receipts", "/receipts/latest", "/receipts/:id", "/approve", "/approvals"] }));
       }
     } catch (err) {
       res.writeHead(500);
       res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "internal_error" }));
     }
   });
+  server.on("error", (err) => {
+    if (config.verbose) {
+      process.stderr.write(`[PROTECT_MCP] HTTP status server error: ${err.message}
+`);
+    }
+  });
   server.listen(config.port, "127.0.0.1", () => {
     if (config.verbose) {
       process.stderr.write(`[PROTECT_MCP] HTTP status server listening on http://127.0.0.1:${config.port}
@@ -606,7 +621,7 @@ function handleHealth(res, startTime, config) {
     status: "ok",
     uptime_ms: Date.now() - startTime,
     mode: config.mode,
-    version: "0.3.0"
+    version: "0.3.1"
   }));
 }
 function handleStatus(res, logDir) {
@@ -655,6 +670,16 @@ function handleReceipts(res, buffer, url) {
     receipts
   }));
 }
+function handleReceiptLatest(res, buffer) {
+  const latest = buffer.getLatest();
+  if (!latest) {
+    res.writeHead(404);
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "no_receipts", message: "No receipts yet. Make a tool call through protect-mcp first." }));
+    return;
+  }
+  res.writeHead(200);
+  res.end(JSON.stringify(latest));
+}
 function handleReceiptById(res, buffer, id) {
   const receipt = buffer.getById(id);
   if (!receipt) {
@@ -665,22 +690,92 @@ function handleReceiptById(res, buffer, id) {
   res.writeHead(200);
   res.end(JSON.stringify(receipt));
 }
+function handleApprove(req, res, approvalStore, expectedNonce) {
+  if (!approvalStore) {
+    res.writeHead(503);
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "approval_store_not_available" }));
+    return;
+  }
+  let body = "";
+  req.on("data", (chunk) => {
+    body += chunk.toString();
+  });
+  req.on("end", () => {
+    try {
+      const { request_id, tool, mode, nonce } = JSON.parse(body);
+      if (expectedNonce && nonce !== expectedNonce) {
+        res.writeHead(403);
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_nonce", message: "Approval nonce does not match. Check stderr output for the correct nonce." }));
+        return;
+      }
+      if (!tool || typeof tool !== "string") {
+        res.writeHead(400);
+        res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "missing_tool", usage: '{"request_id":"abc123","tool":"send_email","mode":"once|always","nonce":"..."}' }));
+        return;
+      }
+      const grantMode = mode === "always" ? "always" : "once";
+      const ttlMs = grantMode === "once" ? 5 * 60 * 1e3 : 24 * 60 * 60 * 1e3;
+      const grantEntry = { tool, mode: grantMode, expires_at: Date.now() + ttlMs };
+      if (grantMode === "always") {
+        approvalStore.set(`always:${tool}`, grantEntry);
+      } else if (request_id) {
+        approvalStore.set(request_id, grantEntry);
+      } else {
+        approvalStore.set(tool, grantEntry);
+      }
+      res.writeHead(200);
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({
+        approved: true,
+        request_id: request_id || null,
+        tool,
+        mode: grantMode,
+        expires_in_seconds: ttlMs / 1e3
+      }));
+    } catch {
+      res.writeHead(400);
+      res.end(JSON.stringify({ error: "invalid_json", usage: '{"request_id":"abc123","tool":"send_email","mode":"once","nonce":"..."}' }));
+    }
+  });
+}
+function handleListApprovals(res, approvalStore) {
+  if (!approvalStore) {
+    res.writeHead(200);
+    res.end(JSON.stringify({ grants: [] }));
+    return;
+  }
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const grants = [];
+  for (const [key, grant] of approvalStore) {
+    if (now < grant.expires_at) {
+      grants.push({ key, tool: grant.tool, mode: grant.mode, expires_in_seconds: Math.round((grant.expires_at - now) / 1e3) });
+    }
+  }
+  res.writeHead(200);
+  res.end(JSON.stringify({ grants }));
+}
 
 // src/gateway.ts
 var LOG_FILE2 = ".protect-mcp-log.jsonl";
+var RECEIPTS_FILE = ".protect-mcp-receipts.jsonl";
 var ProtectGateway = class {
   child = null;
   config;
   rateLimitStore = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
   clientReader = null;
   logFilePath;
+  receiptFilePath;
   evidenceStore;
   receiptBuffer;
+  /** Approval grants keyed by request_id (scoped to the specific action that was requested) */
+  approvalStore = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
+  /** Random nonce generated at startup — required for approval endpoint authentication */
+  approvalNonce = randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
   currentTier = "unknown";
   admissionResult = null;
   constructor(config) {
     this.config = config;
     this.logFilePath = join3(process.cwd(), LOG_FILE2);
+    this.receiptFilePath = join3(process.cwd(), RECEIPTS_FILE);
     this.evidenceStore = new EvidenceStore();
     this.receiptBuffer = new ReceiptBuffer();
   }
@@ -704,12 +799,15 @@ var ProtectGateway = class {
         this.log(`External PDP: ${this.config.policy.external?.endpoint || "not configured"}`);
       }
     }
+    this.log(`Approval nonce: ${this.approvalNonce}`);
     const httpPort = parseInt(process.env.PROTECT_MCP_HTTP_PORT || "9876", 10);
     if (httpPort > 0) {
       try {
         startStatusServer(
           { port: httpPort, mode, verbose },
-          this.receiptBuffer
+          this.receiptBuffer,
+          this.approvalStore,
+          this.approvalNonce
         );
       } catch {
         if (verbose) this.log(`HTTP status server could not start on port ${httpPort}`);
@@ -863,6 +961,32 @@ var ProtectGateway = class {
       }
       return null;
     }
+    if (toolPolicy.require_approval) {
+      const grant = this.approvalStore.get(requestId);
+      const alwaysGrant = this.approvalStore.get(`always:${toolName}`);
+      if (grant && Date.now() < grant.expires_at || alwaysGrant && Date.now() < alwaysGrant.expires_at) {
+        if (grant && grant.mode === "once") this.approvalStore.delete(requestId);
+        this.emitDecisionLog({ tool: toolName, decision: "allow", reason_code: "approval_granted", request_id: requestId, tier: this.currentTier, credential_ref: credentialRef });
+        return null;
+      }
+      this.emitDecisionLog({ tool: toolName, decision: "require_approval", reason_code: "requires_human_approval", request_id: requestId, tier: this.currentTier, credential_ref: credentialRef });
+      if (this.config.enforce) {
+        return {
+          jsonrpc: "2.0",
+          id: request.id,
+          result: {
+            content: [
+              {
+                type: "text",
+                text: `REQUIRES_APPROVAL: The tool "${toolName}" requires human approval before execution. Request ID: ${requestId}. Approval nonce: ${this.approvalNonce}. Tell the user you need their approval to use "${toolName}" and will retry when granted. Do NOT retry this tool call until the user explicitly approves it.`
+              }
+            ],
+            isError: true
+          }
+        };
+      }
+      return null;
+    }
     const rateSpec = this.getTierRateLimit(toolPolicy, this.currentTier);
     if (rateSpec) {
       try {
@@ -920,6 +1044,10 @@ var ProtectGateway = class {
       if (signed.signed) {
         process.stderr.write(`[PROTECT_MCP_RECEIPT] ${signed.signed}
 `);
+        try {
+          appendFileSync(this.receiptFilePath, signed.signed + "\n");
+        } catch {
+        }
         this.receiptBuffer.add(log.request_id, signed.signed);
         if (this.admissionResult?.agent_id) {
           this.evidenceStore.record(this.admissionResult.agent_id, this.config.signing?.issuer || "protect-mcp");