progmune-runtime 3.7.56 → 3.7.58

package/dist/frameworks/nestjs-detector.test.js

@@ -418,3 +418,223 @@ export class NotesController {
         (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.some((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION" && i.route === "POST notes/create")).toBe(true);
     });
 });
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+// §52（2026-10-03）：app-level provider 注册事件
+//
+// immich held-out 实测倒在了第三种注册途径上：
+//   const commonMiddleware = [{ provide: APP_PIPE, useClass: ZodValidationPipe }, ...];
+//   const apiMiddleware = [FileUploadInterceptor, ...commonMiddleware, {...}];
+//   @Module({ providers: [...common, ...apiMiddleware, ...] })
+// `APP_PIPE` 与 `@Module` 之间隔了**两跳数组 spread**，只看装饰器那一层永远
+// 看不到 ⇒ 153 条 NO_VALIDATION 误报。修复原则是「注册事件」而非「写法」：
+// 哪里有注册意图，哪里就是证据，不再要求它必须直连某个 @Module。
+//
+// 同组反向测试是硬要求（R75）：压制放宽后必须证明「该报的还在报」。
+// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+(0, vitest_1.describe)("nestjs-detector app-level provider 注册事件（§52）", () => {
+    const ZOD_STUB = `
+export function createZodDto(schema: any): any { return class {} as any; }
+export const CreateAlbumSchema = { albumName: "string" };
+export class CreateAlbumDto extends createZodDto(CreateAlbumSchema) {}
+export class PlainAlbumDto { albumName: string = ""; }
+`;
+    const ALBUM_CONTROLLER = `
+import { Body, Controller, Post } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { CreateAlbumDto } from "./album.dto";
+@Controller("albums")
+export class AlbumController {
+  @Post()
+  create(@Body() dto: CreateAlbumDto) { return {}; }
+}
+`;
+    const APP_MODULE_SPREAD = `
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { APP_PIPE } from "@nestjs/core";
+import { ZodValidationPipe } from "nestjs-zod";
+import { FileUploadInterceptor } from "./middleware";
+
+const commonMiddleware = [
+  { provide: APP_PIPE, useClass: ZodValidationPipe },
+];
+const apiMiddleware = [FileUploadInterceptor, ...commonMiddleware];
+
+@Module({ providers: [...apiMiddleware] })
+export class AppModule {}
+`;
+    function writeImmishApp() {
+        write("tsconfig.json", TSCONFIG);
+        write("src/album.dto.ts", ZOD_STUB);
+        write("src/album.controller.ts", ALBUM_CONTROLLER);
+        write("src/middleware.ts", `
+export class FileUploadInterceptor {}
+`);
+    }
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("APP_PIPE 经两跳 spread 进 @Module ⇒ 已校验 DTO 的 mutation 不报 NO_VALIDATION（immich 形态）", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", APP_MODULE_SPREAD);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.globalValidationPipes).toContain("ZodValidationPipe");
+        const nv = a.issues.filter((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION");
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(nv.map((i) => i.route)).not.toContain("POST albums");
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("反向：同一形态但摘掉 APP_PIPE 注册 ⇒ 精确转红（不是无差别压制）", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", `
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { FileUploadInterceptor } from "./middleware";
+const apiMiddleware = [FileUploadInterceptor];
+@Module({ providers: [...apiMiddleware] })
+export class AppModule {}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.globalValidationPipes).toEqual([]);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.some((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION" && i.route === "POST albums")).toBe(true);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("反向：有全局管道但入参不是已校验 DTO ⇒ 仍报（保守豁免不扩散到裸类型）", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", APP_MODULE_SPREAD);
+        write("src/album.controller.ts", `
+import { Body, Controller, Post } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { PlainAlbumDto } from "./album.dto";
+@Controller("albums")
+export class AlbumController {
+  @Post()
+  create(@Body() dto: PlainAlbumDto) { return {}; }
+}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.some((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION" && i.route === "POST albums")).toBe(true);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("反向：注释里的 APP_PIPE 不算注册事件 ⇒ 仍报（text-fallback 抗噪）", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", `
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+// 计划中：providers: [{ provide: APP_PIPE, useClass: ZodValidationPipe }]
+// * 文档注释形态同样不应被当作注册证据
+@Module({ providers: [] })
+export class AppModule {}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.globalValidationPipes).toEqual([]);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.some((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION" && i.route === "POST albums")).toBe(true);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("@UsePipes 自定义管道名（不带 Pipe 后缀）⇒ 识别为已注册管道", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/album.controller.ts", `
+import { Body, Controller, Post, UsePipes } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { CreateAlbumDto } from "./album.dto";
+@Controller("albums")
+export class AlbumController {
+  @Post()
+  @UsePipes(bodyTrimSanitizer)
+  create(@Body() dto: CreateAlbumDto) { return {}; }
+}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.filter((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION" && i.route === "POST albums")).toEqual([]);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("@UseGuards(AuthGuard('JWT')) 的参数字符串不产生假认证证据（反向 Sophie）", () => {
+        write("tsconfig.json", TSCONFIG);
+        write("src/auth.guard.ts", GUARD);
+        write("src/api.controller.ts", `
+import { Controller, Post, UseGuards } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { JWTStrategy } from "./jwt";
+@Controller("api")
+export class ApiController {
+  @Post("transfer")
+  @UseGuards(JWTStrategy)
+  transfer() { return {}; }
+}
+`);
+        write("src/jwt.ts", `
+export const JWT = "Bearer";
+export class JWTStrategy { canActivate(): boolean { return false; } }
+`);
+        write("src/app.module.ts", MODULE_EMPTY);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        // JWTStrategy 名字里带 jwt ⇒ 认证守卫（EXPECT 有保护）
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.issues.filter((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_AUTH")).toEqual([]);
+        // 但若写成字符串参数，不得凭 'JWT' 这个 token 冒充守卫名
+        write("src/api.controller.ts", `
+import { Controller, Post, UseGuards } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { AnonymousGate } from "./gate";
+@Controller("api")
+export class ApiController {
+  @Post("transfer")
+  @UseGuards(AnonymousGate("JWT"))
+  transfer() { return {}; }
+}
+`);
+        write("src/gate.ts", `
+export function AnonymousGate(scheme: string): any { return class { canActivate() { return true; } }; }
+`);
+        const b = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(b.issues.some((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_AUTH" && i.route === "POST api/transfer")).toBe(true);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("registrations 带可复核的 (file, line) 与发现途径", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", APP_MODULE_SPREAD);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        const pipeReg = a.registrations.filter((r) => r.token === "APP_PIPE");
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(pipeReg.length).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+        for (const r of pipeReg) {
+            // 可复核：每条注册都必须能指回某个文件的某一行
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(r.file).toMatch(/app\.module\.ts$/);
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(r.line).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(r.impl).toBe("ZodValidationPipe");
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(["module-decorator", "module-property", "array-literal", "text-fallback"]).toContain(r.source);
+        }
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("数组路径别名：展开成多条 route，公开豁免重新生效（nocodb 形态，普查 72%）", () => {
+        write("tsconfig.json", TSCONFIG);
+        write("src/app.module.ts", MODULE_EMPTY);
+        write("src/token.controller.ts", `
+import { Controller, Post } from "@nestjs/common";
+@Controller(["meta/bases/:id", "api/v1/db/meta/projects/:id"])
+export class TokenController {
+  @Post(["login", "signin"])
+  login() { return {}; }
+  @Post(["api-tokens"])
+  createToken() { return {}; }
+}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        const paths = a.routes.map((r) => `${r.method} ${r.path}`).sort();
+        // 2 个 controller 别名 × 3 个方法别名 = 6 条
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(paths).toEqual([
+            "POST api/v1/db/meta/projects/:id/api-tokens",
+            "POST api/v1/db/meta/projects/:id/login",
+            "POST api/v1/db/meta/projects/:id/signin",
+            "POST meta/bases/:id/api-tokens",
+            "POST meta/bases/:id/login",
+            "POST meta/bases/:id/signin",
+        ]);
+        // 旧实现下 path 是整段数组文本 ⇒ /login 豁免匹配不到 ⇒ 4 条 login/signin 全被误报
+        const noAuth = a.issues.filter((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_AUTH").map((i) => i.route);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(noAuth.sort()).toEqual([
+            "POST api/v1/db/meta/projects/:id/api-tokens",
+            "POST meta/bases/:id/api-tokens",
+        ]);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("@Module(configVar)：装饰器参数是变量时仍能读到 providers（nocodb 形态，普查 71%）", () => {
+        writeImmishApp();
+        write("src/app.module.ts", `
+import { Module } from "@nestjs/common";
+import { APP_PIPE } from "@nestjs/core";
+import { ZodValidationPipe } from "nestjs-zod";
+
+const moduleMetadata = {
+  imports: [],
+  controllers: [],
+  providers: [{ provide: APP_PIPE, useClass: ZodValidationPipe }],
+};
+
+@Module(moduleMetadata)
+export class AppModule {}
+`);
+        const a = (0, nestjs_detector_1.analyzeNestJSProject)(dir);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(a.globalValidationPipes).toContain("ZodValidationPipe");
+        const nv = a.issues.filter((i) => i.type === "NESTJS_NO_VALIDATION");
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(nv.map((i) => i.route)).not.toContain("POST albums");
+    });
+});

package/dist/protocol-detector-identity-substring.test.js

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+"use strict";
+var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
+    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
+      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
+    }
+    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
+}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
+    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
+    o[k2] = m[k];
+}));
+var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
+    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
+}) : function(o, v) {
+    o["default"] = v;
+});
+var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
+    var ownKeys = function(o) {
+        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
+            var ar = [];
+            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
+            return ar;
+        };
+        return ownKeys(o);
+    };
+    return function (mod) {
+        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
+        var result = {};
+        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
+        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
+        return result;
+    };
+})();
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+/**
+ * fr-001 定向回归：身份映射查找用 JSON.contains 子串匹配
+ * （REALWORLD_FIX_REGRESSION_V1 fr-001，open-webui CVE-2026-87016）
+ *
+ * 判据在 tools/extract_ir.py 的 has_identity_substring_match：
+ * ① 函数名身份查找形态（oauth/scim/sso/saml + sub/subject/external_id/identity）
+ * ② 体内有 <对象>.contains( 调用
+ * ③ contains 对象链含 oauth/scim 字段
+ * 三条件同时成立才注入 __progmune_identity_substring_match__ 标记。
+ */
+const vitest_1 = require("vitest");
+const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
+const os = __importStar(require("os"));
+const path = __importStar(require("path"));
+const extract_ir_python_1 = require("./extract-ir-python");
+let dir;
+(0, vitest_1.beforeEach)(() => {
+    dir = fs.mkdtempSync(path.join(os.tmpdir(), "fr001-"));
+});
+(0, vitest_1.afterEach)(() => {
+    fs.rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+function write(rel, content) {
+    const full = path.join(dir, rel);
+    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(full), { recursive: true });
+    fs.writeFileSync(full, content);
+}
+const MARKER = "__progmune_identity_substring_match__";
+(0, vitest_1.describe)("fr-001 identity substring match（提取器标记）", () => {
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("修复前形态：oauth JSON 列 contains() 做身份映射 → 注入标记", () => {
+        write("users.py", `
+class User:
+    oauth = None
+    scim = None
+
+async def get_user_by_oauth_sub(provider, sub, db=None):
+    query = select(User)
+    if dialect == 'sqlite':
+        oauth_match = User.oauth.contains({provider: {'sub': sub}})
+        query = query.where(oauth_match)
+    row = await session.execute(query)
+    return row
+
+async def get_user_by_scim_external_id(provider, external_id, db=None):
+    query = select(User)
+    if dialect == 'sqlite':
+        scim_match = User.scim.contains({provider: {'external_id': external_id}})
+        query = query.where(scim_match)
+    return (await session.execute(query)).scalars().first()
+`);
+        const ir = (0, extract_ir_python_1.extractIRPython)(dir);
+        const oauthFn = ir.find((f) => f.name === "get_user_by_oauth_sub");
+        const scimFn = ir.find((f) => f.name === "get_user_by_scim_external_id");
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(oauthFn).toBeDefined();
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(scimFn).toBeDefined();
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(oauthFn.calls).toContain(MARKER);
+        (0, vitest_1.expect)(scimFn.calls).toContain(MARKER);
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("修复后形态：下标提取 + 精确等值 → 无标记", () => {
+        write("users.py", `
+async def get_user_by_oauth_sub(provider, sub, db=None):
+    # Subscript, never contains(): on a JSON column contains() degrades to a substring LIKE.
+    query = select(User).where(User.oauth[provider]['sub'].as_string() == sub)
+    row = (await session.execute(query)).scalars().first()
+    return row
+
+async def get_user_by_scim_external_id(provider, external_id, db=None):
+    query = select(User).where(User.scim[provider]['external_id'].as_string() == external_id)
+    return (await session.execute(query)).scalars().first()
+`);
+        const ir = (0, extract_ir_python_1.extractIRPython)(dir);
+        for (const f of ir) {
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(f.calls).not.toContain(MARKER);
+        }
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("负例：非身份查找函数用 .contains → 无标记（函数名不含 oauth/scim 词形）", () => {
+        write("utils.py", `
+def has_feature(config, name):
+    return config.features.contains({'name': name})
+
+async def get_user_by_id(user_id, db=None):
+    query = select(User).where(User.id == user_id)
+    return (await session.execute(query)).scalars().first()
+`);
+        const ir = (0, extract_ir_python_1.extractIRPython)(dir);
+        for (const f of ir) {
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(f.calls).not.toContain(MARKER);
+        }
+    });
+    (0, vitest_1.it)("负例：身份词形函数但 contains 对象不是 oauth/scim 字段 → 无标记", () => {
+        write("utils.py", `
+async def get_oauth_subject_from_claim(claim, db=None):
+    # 函数名含 oauth+subject，但 contains 的对象是普通 dict，不是模型 JSON 列
+    payload = {'claims': {'sub': claim}}
+    if payload.contains({'provider': 'x'}):
+        return claim
+    return None
+`);
+        const ir = (0, extract_ir_python_1.extractIRPython)(dir);
+        for (const f of ir) {
+            (0, vitest_1.expect)(f.calls).not.toContain(MARKER);
+        }
+    });
+});

package/dist/protocol-detector.js

@@ -845,6 +845,23 @@ const SAFEGUARD_RULES = [
         conceptMissing: ["ResourceOwnership", "CrossUserReference"],
         conceptExpected: ["folder write-access check", "get_*_by_id_and_user_id query"],
     },
+    {
+        name: "Identity Lookup with Substring Match",
+        category: "auth",
+        // 2026-10-04（REALWORLD_FIX_REGRESSION_V1 fr-001）：Python 提取器在
+        // 「身份映射查找函数（oauth_sub/scim_external_id 词形）对 oauth/scim
+        // JSON 列调用 .contains()」时注入标记——JSON 列的 contains() 退化为
+        // 子串 LIKE（open-webui CVE-2026-87016 修复注释原话），subject 含
+        // %/_ 通配符可绑定任意账户（含管理员）。证据语义在提取器侧
+        // （has_identity_substring_match，三条件：函数名身份查找形态 +
+        // 体内有 .contains( 调用 + 对象链含 oauth/scim 字段）。
+        languages: ["python"],
+        trigger: /\b(__progmune_identity_substring_match__)\b/,
+        safeguards: [],
+        violationMessage: "Identity mapping lookup (OAuth subject / SCIM external-id) matches with JSON contains() — on a JSON column contains() degrades to a substring LIKE, so a subject containing %/_ wildcards can bind to an arbitrary account (incl. admin). Use subscript extraction + equality (e.g. User.oauth[provider]['sub'].as_string() == sub).",
+        conceptMissing: ["ExactIdentityMatch", "SubscriptExtraction"],
+        conceptExpected: ["oauth[provider]['sub'] == sub", "scim[provider]['external_id'] == external_id"],
+    },
     {
         name: "XSS (Unsafe Template Rendering)",
         category: "xss",
@@ -1121,17 +1138,17 @@ const SAFEGUARD_RULES = [
         conceptExpected: ["checkExpiry", "autoRenew", "certificate watch"],
     },
     // ── Data Integrity: Mutation without audit ──
-    {
-        name: "Data Mutation Without Audit Trail",
-        category: "data_integrity",
-        trigger: /\b(update|delete|modify|change|mutate|set\w*field|edit|remove|drop)\b/i,
-        safeguards: [
-            { pattern: /\b(audit|log\w*change|change\w*log|track\w*change|record\w*mutation|mutation\w*log|history|version|revision|snapshot|write\w*ahead|wal\b)/i, label: "audit_trail" },
-        ],
-        violationMessage: "Data mutation without audit trail. Cannot track who changed what or recover from accidental data corruption.",
-        conceptMissing: ["AuditTrail", "ChangeTracking", "DataLineage"],
-        conceptExpected: ["auditLog", "changeHistory", "write-ahead log"],
-    },
+    // 2026-10-04（修冤枉第一刀）：移除 "Data Mutation Without Audit Trail"。
+    // 数据依据：fp-gold 131/131 全 FP（docmost/hedgedoc/hoppscotch/verdaccio/
+    // 3×realworld 七仓九片）；TS 盲测 gold 795 条 0 条此族；PyGoat 232 条里
+    // 此族 8 条全 unlabeled 且样本全 FP 形态；84 条 GHSA 无一条审计轨迹类。
+    // 根因是概念性失明（非词表问题）：真实架构里审计在框架/中间件层
+    // （ORM 拦截器/数据库触发器/日志系统），函数名里永远不会出现 audit
+    // 字样 ⇒ 判据「mutation 函数名附近有审计词汇」在真实代码形态上永远
+    // 不可能满足。与授权族保留的理由对照（R92）：授权族在真实世界有 TP
+    // （fr 语料 8/9 位置命中是授权类），此族在所有口径 TP=0。
+    // 若未来有函数级审计判据（如 decorator/@Audited 标记通道），按
+    // 「先语料后规则」重新提案。
     // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
     // Governance meta-rule: Framework Version Convention Check
     // Lesson from proxy.ts incident (2026-08-03)

package/dist/sdk.js

@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ const risk_model_1 = require("./risk-model");
 const protocol_knowledge_1 = require("./protocol-knowledge");
 const evidence_repository_1 = require("./evidence-repository");
 /** Runtime version — stable public identifier. Internal layers evolve underneath. */
-exports.RUNTIME_VERSION = "3.7.56";
+exports.RUNTIME_VERSION = "3.7.58";
 function verify(filePath) {
     const cert = (0, certify_1.certify)(filePath);
     const kb = (0, protocol_knowledge_1.buildKnowledgeBase)();

package/dist/trust/alert-ranker.js

@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ exports.DEFAULT_RULE_PRIOR = {
     "Password Hashing": 0.0525,
     "Password Hashing (Weak)": 0.0525,
     "Registration Without Email Verification": 0.0525,
-    "Data Mutation Without Audit Trail": 0.0057,
+    // 2026-10-04：Data Mutation Without Audit Trail 规则已移除（fp-gold
+    // 131/131 全 FP、全口径 TP=0，概念性失明——见 protocol-detector.ts 注记），
+    // 先验条目随之删除。
 };
 /** 未知族的兜底先验 = 全局基线 */
 exports.DEFAULT_BASE = 0.0984;

package/dist/trust/confidence-calculator.js

@@ -207,6 +207,8 @@ function computeCoverageConfidence(projectPath) {
     // 1. Load protocol transition space
     const space = loadTransitionSpace(projectPath);
     const namespaces = [...space.perNamespace.keys()];
+    // §53：协议定义不存在 ⇒ 本指标不可测（0 分是「没得测」，不是「测得低」）
+    const applicable = fs.existsSync(path.join(projectPath, "protocols.json"));
     // 2. Load trajectory coverage
     const coverage = loadTrajectoryCoverage(projectPath);
     // 3. Compute per-namespace confidence
@@ -250,7 +252,7 @@ function computeCoverageConfidence(projectPath) {
     const summary = `Weighted coverage: ${score}% ±${margin}%. ` +
         `${saturated} namespaces saturated, ${partial} partial, ${noVocab} no vocabulary. ` +
         (noVocab > 0 ? `Top gap: add trajectories for ${noVocab} uncovered namespaces.` : "");
-    return { score, margin, level, breakdown, summary };
+    return { score, margin, level, breakdown, summary, applicable };
 }
 /**
  * Clear internal caches (for testing or when corpus is updated).

package/dist/trust/engine.js

@@ -178,16 +178,30 @@ async function evaluateTrust(ctx) {
     const effectiveScore = policyResult.hasCritical
         ? Math.min(overallScore, types_1.DECISION_THRESHOLDS.criticalLock)
         : overallScore;
-    const decision = (0, score_calculator_1.determineDecision)(effectiveScore, policyResult.hasCritical, explainResult.status);
     // ── Phase 1: Coverage-based confidence (replaces qualitative labels) ──
     const coverageConfidence = (0, confidence_calculator_1.computeCoverageConfidence)(ctx.projectPath);
+    // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+    //  §53 / R97：决策门禁
+    //
+    //  实测触发场景（immich / nocodb）：authentication 子协议 0 分（21 / 586 条违规），
+    //  coverageConfidence 0% LOW，mappingCoverage 4%~8% LOW —— 三项独立的
+    //  「其实没看到什么」的指标全部触底，聚合结果却仍是 83 / APPROVED / HIGH。
+    //
+    //  门禁只做**封顶**（不许说通过），不做扣分：没有观察就没有扣分依据。
+    // ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
+    const decisionGates = (0, score_calculator_1.evaluateDecisionGates)({
+        protocolSafety: protocolResult,
+        coverageLevel: coverageConfidence.level,
+        coverageApplicable: coverageConfidence.applicable,
+    });
+    const decision = (0, score_calculator_1.determineDecision)(effectiveScore, policyResult.hasCritical, explainResult.status, decisionGates);
     const dimConfidences = [
         policyResult.hasCritical ? "LOW" : coverageResult.confidence,
         protocolResult.confidence,
         coverageResult.confidence,
         governanceResult.confidence,
     ];
-    const confidence = (0, score_calculator_1.determineConfidence)(dimConfidences, explainResult.status);
+    const confidence = (0, score_calculator_1.determineConfidence)(dimConfidences, explainResult.status, decisionGates.observationIncomplete);
     // ═══════════════════════════════════════
     //  PHASE 5: ASSEMBLE
     // ═══════════════════════════════════════
@@ -227,17 +241,21 @@ async function evaluateTrust(ctx) {
             score: effectiveScore,
             decision,
             confidence,
+            decisionGates,
             coverageConfidence: extractionWarning
                 ? {
                     score: 0,
                     margin: 25,
                     level: "LOW",
+                    // §53：IR 提取失败同样是「没得测」，不是「测得低」
+                    applicable: false,
                     summary: `${extractionWarning}——本次扫描是废票，不得据此得出「干净」结论`,
                 }
                 : {
                     score: coverageConfidence.score,
                     margin: coverageConfidence.margin,
                     level: coverageConfidence.level,
+                    applicable: coverageConfidence.applicable,
                     summary: coverageConfidence.summary,
                 },
             extractionWarning,