profclaw 2.0.0 → 2.3.0

package/dist/utils/prevent-sleep.js

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Sleep Prevention Utility
+ *
+ * Prevents OS sleep/screensaver during long agent runs.
+ * - macOS: uses `caffeinate -i -w {pid}`
+ * - Linux: tries `systemd-inhibit` then falls back to `xdg-screensaver suspend`
+ * - Windows: no-op (PowerShell SetThreadExecutionState not exposed without ffi)
+ */
+import { spawn } from 'child_process';
+let _instance = null;
+export class SleepPreventer {
+    _process = null;
+    _active = false;
+    /**
+     * Start preventing OS sleep.
+     * Safe to call multiple times — subsequent calls are no-ops if already active.
+     */
+    start() {
+        if (this._active)
+            return;
+        const platform = process.platform;
+        try {
+            if (platform === 'darwin') {
+                this._process = spawn('caffeinate', ['-i', '-w', String(process.pid)], {
+                    detached: false,
+                    stdio: 'ignore',
+                });
+                this._process.unref();
+                this._active = true;
+            }
+            else if (platform === 'linux') {
+                // Try systemd-inhibit first; it works on most modern distros
+                this._process = spawn('systemd-inhibit', [
+                    '--what=sleep:idle',
+                    '--who=profClaw',
+                    '--why=Agent run in progress',
+                    '--mode=block',
+                    'sleep', 'infinity',
+                ], { detached: false, stdio: 'ignore' });
+                this._process.unref();
+                this._process.on('error', () => {
+                    // systemd-inhibit unavailable — try xdg-screensaver
+                    this._process = null;
+                    try {
+                        const p = spawn('xdg-screensaver', ['suspend', String(process.pid)], {
+                            detached: false,
+                            stdio: 'ignore',
+                        });
+                        p.unref();
+                        this._process = p;
+                    }
+                    catch {
+                        // xdg-screensaver also unavailable — silent no-op
+                    }
+                });
+                this._active = true;
+            }
+            // Windows / unknown: no-op — _active stays false
+        }
+        catch {
+            // If spawn itself throws, treat as silent failure
+            this._process = null;
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * Stop preventing sleep and release the system process.
+     */
+    stop() {
+        if (!this._active)
+            return;
+        if (this._process) {
+            try {
+                this._process.kill();
+            }
+            catch {
+                // Already dead — ignore
+            }
+            this._process = null;
+        }
+        this._active = false;
+    }
+    isActive() {
+        return this._active;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Returns the shared singleton SleepPreventer instance.
+ */
+export function getSleepPreventer() {
+    if (!_instance) {
+        _instance = new SleepPreventer();
+    }
+    return _instance;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=prevent-sleep.js.map

package/dist/utils/sanitizer.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/**
+ * Output Sanitization Utilities
+ *
+ * Protects against terminal injection, path traversal, dangerous shell commands,
+ * and sensitive data leaking into logs.
+ */
+/**
+ * Sanitize text before displaying in a terminal.
+ *
+ * - Strips all ANSI/VT escape sequences to prevent terminal injection via
+ *   malicious model responses (e.g. cursor repositioning, title bar spoofing).
+ * - Removes non-printable control characters except newlines.
+ *
+ * @param text Untrusted string from external source (model output, API data, etc.)
+ * @returns Safe string suitable for terminal display
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeForTerminal(text: string): string;
+/**
+ * Sanitize a file path to prevent path traversal attacks.
+ *
+ * Checks that the resolved path is strictly inside `baseDir`.
+ * Rejects:
+ *   - Paths containing `..` segments that escape the base
+ *   - Absolute paths outside `baseDir`
+ *   - Null bytes
+ *
+ * @param inputPath  Path provided by the user / untrusted source
+ * @param baseDir    Absolute directory that the path must stay inside
+ * @returns Normalized absolute path if safe, or `null` if the path is unsafe
+ */
+export declare function sanitizePath(inputPath: string, baseDir: string): string | null;
+interface ShellSafetyResult {
+    safe: boolean;
+    reason?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Evaluate whether a shell command string is safe to run.
+ *
+ * This is a best-effort heuristic for the `/run` feature and is NOT a sandbox.
+ * Dangerous patterns (rm -rf, sudo, chmod 777, curl | bash, etc.) are rejected.
+ *
+ * @param cmd Raw command string submitted by the user
+ * @returns `{ safe: true }` or `{ safe: false, reason: '...' }`
+ */
+export declare function sanitizeShellCommand(cmd: string): ShellSafetyResult;
+/**
+ * Redact sensitive values from a plain-text string before it reaches logs.
+ *
+ * Replaces patterns matching API keys, bearer tokens, passwords, and similar
+ * credential-shaped values with `[REDACTED]`.
+ *
+ * @param text Raw string that may contain secrets
+ * @returns String with sensitive values replaced
+ */
+export declare function redactSensitive(text: string): string;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitizer.d.ts.map

package/dist/utils/sanitizer.js

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/**
+ * Output Sanitization Utilities
+ *
+ * Protects against terminal injection, path traversal, dangerous shell commands,
+ * and sensitive data leaking into logs.
+ */
+import { resolve, normalize, relative, isAbsolute } from 'node:path';
+// ─── Terminal sanitization ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * ANSI / VT escape sequence pattern.
+ *
+ * Handles:
+ *   - CSI sequences:  ESC [ <params> <final>
+ *   - OSC sequences:  ESC ] <text> BEL   or  ESC ] <text> ESC \
+ *   - Two-char ESC sequences:  ESC <single byte in 0x40-0x5F>
+ *
+ * Must be listed longest-match first (OSC before two-char) to avoid partial matches.
+ */
+const ANSI_ESCAPE_RE = /\x1B(?:\][^\x07\x1B]*(?:\x07|\x1B\\)|\[[0-?]*[ -/]*[@-~]|[@-_])/g;
+/**
+ * Additional terminal control characters that should not appear in display output.
+ * Excludes LF (\n) and CR (\r) which are legitimate line endings.
+ */
+const CONTROL_CHARS_RE = /[\x00-\x08\x0B\x0C\x0E-\x1A\x1C-\x1F\x7F]/g;
+/**
+ * Sanitize text before displaying in a terminal.
+ *
+ * - Strips all ANSI/VT escape sequences to prevent terminal injection via
+ *   malicious model responses (e.g. cursor repositioning, title bar spoofing).
+ * - Removes non-printable control characters except newlines.
+ *
+ * @param text Untrusted string from external source (model output, API data, etc.)
+ * @returns Safe string suitable for terminal display
+ */
+export function sanitizeForTerminal(text) {
+    if (!text)
+        return text;
+    return text
+        .replace(ANSI_ESCAPE_RE, '')
+        .replace(CONTROL_CHARS_RE, '');
+}
+// ─── Path sanitization ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Sanitize a file path to prevent path traversal attacks.
+ *
+ * Checks that the resolved path is strictly inside `baseDir`.
+ * Rejects:
+ *   - Paths containing `..` segments that escape the base
+ *   - Absolute paths outside `baseDir`
+ *   - Null bytes
+ *
+ * @param inputPath  Path provided by the user / untrusted source
+ * @param baseDir    Absolute directory that the path must stay inside
+ * @returns Normalized absolute path if safe, or `null` if the path is unsafe
+ */
+export function sanitizePath(inputPath, baseDir) {
+    if (!inputPath || typeof inputPath !== 'string')
+        return null;
+    // Reject null bytes
+    if (inputPath.includes('\x00'))
+        return null;
+    // Reject clearly absolute paths that start outside baseDir right away
+    // (resolve will handle this too, but this is a fast early-exit)
+    const normalizedBase = normalize(resolve(baseDir));
+    const resolvedInput = resolve(normalizedBase, inputPath);
+    const rel = relative(normalizedBase, resolvedInput);
+    // relative() returns something starting with '..' when outside base
+    if (rel.startsWith('..') || isAbsolute(rel))
+        return null;
+    return resolvedInput;
+}
+/**
+ * Patterns that indicate a dangerously destructive or privilege-escalating command.
+ * Order matters — first match wins and provides the clearest reason.
+ */
+const DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
+    // Destructive filesystem
+    { pattern: /rm\s+(-[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*|-[a-zA-Z]*r[a-zA-Z]*f[a-zA-Z]*|--force|--recursive)/, reason: 'destructive rm flags detected' },
+    { pattern: /rm\s+-rf/, reason: 'rm -rf detected' },
+    { pattern: /:\s*\(\s*\)\s*\{.*\}/, reason: 'fork bomb pattern detected' },
+    // Privilege escalation
+    { pattern: /\bsudo\b/, reason: 'sudo is not allowed' },
+    { pattern: /\bsu\s+-/, reason: 'su command is not allowed' },
+    { pattern: /chmod\s+[0-7]*7[0-7][0-7]/, reason: 'chmod 777 / world-writable permission denied' },
+    { pattern: /chown\s+root/, reason: 'chown root is not allowed' },
+    // Remote code execution via pipe-to-shell
+    { pattern: /\|\s*(ba|z|da|fi|c)?sh\b/, reason: 'pipe to shell is not allowed' },
+    { pattern: /curl[^|]*\|/, reason: 'curl piped to shell is not allowed' },
+    { pattern: /wget[^|]*\|/, reason: 'wget piped to shell is not allowed' },
+    // Disk wipe / overwrite
+    { pattern: /\bdd\s+.*of=\/dev\/(sd|nvme|hd|disk)/, reason: 'dd write to block device is not allowed' },
+    { pattern: /mkfs\./, reason: 'filesystem format command is not allowed' },
+    // Environment manipulation that could bypass guards
+    { pattern: /\benv\s+-i\b/, reason: 'env -i clears environment and is not allowed' },
+    // Bypass via exec
+    { pattern: /\bexec\s+bash\b/, reason: 'exec bash shell replacement is not allowed' },
+];
+/**
+ * Evaluate whether a shell command string is safe to run.
+ *
+ * This is a best-effort heuristic for the `/run` feature and is NOT a sandbox.
+ * Dangerous patterns (rm -rf, sudo, chmod 777, curl | bash, etc.) are rejected.
+ *
+ * @param cmd Raw command string submitted by the user
+ * @returns `{ safe: true }` or `{ safe: false, reason: '...' }`
+ */
+export function sanitizeShellCommand(cmd) {
+    if (!cmd || typeof cmd !== 'string') {
+        return { safe: false, reason: 'empty or invalid command' };
+    }
+    const trimmed = cmd.trim();
+    if (trimmed.length === 0) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: 'empty command' };
+    }
+    // Null bytes in commands indicate injection attempts
+    if (trimmed.includes('\x00')) {
+        return { safe: false, reason: 'null byte in command' };
+    }
+    for (const { pattern, reason } of DANGEROUS_PATTERNS) {
+        if (pattern.test(trimmed)) {
+            return { safe: false, reason };
+        }
+    }
+    return { safe: true };
+}
+// ─── Sensitive value redaction ────────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * Matches common API key / token / secret value patterns in plain text.
+ *
+ * Designed to catch values that appear in log lines such as:
+ *   Authorization: Bearer sk-proj-abc123...
+ *   token=ghp_abcXYZ
+ *   password=s3cr3t
+ *   OPENAI_API_KEY=sk-...
+ */
+const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS = [
+    // Authorization header value
+    { pattern: /((?:Bearer|Basic|Token)\s+)[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]+=*/gi, replacement: '$1[REDACTED]' },
+    // API key prefixes (OpenAI sk-, Anthropic sk-ant-, etc.)
+    { pattern: /\b(sk-(?:ant-|proj-)?)[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{8,}/g, replacement: '$1[REDACTED]' },
+    // GitHub tokens
+    { pattern: /\b(gh[pousr]_)[A-Za-z0-9]{36,}/g, replacement: '$1[REDACTED]' },
+    // Generic "key-*" style tokens
+    { pattern: /\b(key-)[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{8,}/g, replacement: '$1[REDACTED]' },
+    // Query / form param assignments: token=, password=, api_key=, apikey=, secret=
+    {
+        pattern: /\b((?:token|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|secret|access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|client[_-]?secret)=)[^\s&"']+/gi,
+        replacement: '$1[REDACTED]',
+    },
+    // JSON field values: "password": "...", "token": "..."
+    {
+        pattern: /"(password|token|secret|apiKey|api_key|accessToken|access_token|refreshToken|refresh_token|clientSecret|client_secret|authorization)"\s*:\s*"[^"]{4,}"/gi,
+        replacement: '"$1": "[REDACTED]"',
+    },
+];
+/**
+ * Redact sensitive values from a plain-text string before it reaches logs.
+ *
+ * Replaces patterns matching API keys, bearer tokens, passwords, and similar
+ * credential-shaped values with `[REDACTED]`.
+ *
+ * @param text Raw string that may contain secrets
+ * @returns String with sensitive values replaced
+ */
+export function redactSensitive(text) {
+    if (!text || typeof text !== 'string')
+        return text;
+    let result = text;
+    for (const { pattern, replacement } of SENSITIVE_PATTERNS) {
+        result = result.replace(pattern, replacement);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sanitizer.js.map

package/docker-compose.yml

@@ -1,17 +1,12 @@
 # Profiles:
 #   (default)   profclaw (pro mode) + redis
-#   pico        profclaw (pico mode) -- no redis, no UI
-#   ai          + ollama (free local AI)
-#   tools       + redis-commander
-#   monitoring  + prometheus + grafana
+#   ai          + ollama (free local AI, optional)
 #
-# Quick start per mode:
-#   docker compose up -d                                  # pro (default)
-#   docker compose up -d profclaw-pico                    # pico only (minimal)
-#   docker compose --profile ai up -d                     # pro + ollama
+# Quick start:
+#   docker compose up -d                          # pro mode (default)
+#   docker compose --profile ai up -d             # pro + ollama
 #
-# NOTE: `docker compose --profile pico up -d` starts pico AND pro (port conflict).
-#       Use `docker compose up -d profclaw-pico` for pico-only.
+# Copy .env.example to .env and fill in your keys before starting.
 
 services:
   # ===================
@@ -24,40 +19,19 @@ services:
     container_name: profclaw
     ports:
       - "${PORT:-3000}:3000"
+    env_file:
+      - .env
     environment:
-      # Core
+      # Core (override .env values for container-specific settings)
       - NODE_ENV=production
       - PORT=3000
       - PROFCLAW_MODE=pro
-      # Redis
+      # Redis (points to the redis service in this compose network)
       - REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379
-      - PROFCLAW_REQUIRE_REDIS=true
-      # Database
+      # Database (stored in the data volume)
       - DATABASE_URL=file:/app/data/profclaw.db
-      # OpenClaw
-      - OPENCLAW_BASE_URL=${OPENCLAW_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:18789}
-      - OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN=${OPENCLAW_GATEWAY_TOKEN}
-      - OPENCLAW_WORKING_DIR=/workspace
-      # GitHub
-      - GITHUB_TOKEN=${GITHUB_TOKEN}
-      - GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET=${GITHUB_WEBHOOK_SECRET}
-      - GITHUB_AI_TASK_LABEL=${GITHUB_AI_TASK_LABEL:-ai-task}
-      # Task Queue
-      - TASK_CONCURRENCY=${TASK_CONCURRENCY:-2}
-      # AI Providers (optional)
-      - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}
-      - OPENAI_API_KEY=${OPENAI_API_KEY}
-      - AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY=${AZURE_OPENAI_API_KEY}
-      - AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT=${AZURE_OPENAI_ENDPOINT}
-      - GROQ_API_KEY=${GROQ_API_KEY}
-      # Ollama (free local AI)
-      - OLLAMA_BASE_URL=${OLLAMA_BASE_URL:-http://ollama:11434}
-      # Tool Execution
-      - POOL_MAX_CONCURRENT=${POOL_MAX_CONCURRENT:-50}
-      - POOL_TIMEOUT_MS=${POOL_TIMEOUT_MS:-300000}
     volumes:
-      - profclaw-data:/app/data
-      - workspace:/workspace
+      - ./data:/app/data
     depends_on:
       redis:
         condition: service_healthy
@@ -72,38 +46,7 @@ services:
       - profclaw-network
 
   # ===================
-  # profClaw Pico (minimal, no Redis)
-  # ===================
-  profclaw-pico:
-    build:
-      context: .
-      dockerfile: Dockerfile.pico
-    container_name: profclaw-pico
-    ports:
-      - "${PORT:-3000}:3000"
-    environment:
-      - NODE_ENV=production
-      - PORT=3000
-      - PROFCLAW_MODE=pico
-      - ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=${ANTHROPIC_API_KEY}
-      - OPENAI_API_KEY=${OPENAI_API_KEY}
-      - OLLAMA_BASE_URL=${OLLAMA_BASE_URL:-http://host.docker.internal:11434}
-    volumes:
-      - profclaw-data:/app/data
-    healthcheck:
-      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:3000/health"]
-      interval: 30s
-      timeout: 10s
-      retries: 3
-      start_period: 5s
-    restart: unless-stopped
-    profiles:
-      - pico
-    networks:
-      - profclaw-network
-
-  # ===================
-  # Redis (Task Queue)
+  # Redis (Task Queue - required for pro mode)
   # ===================
   redis:
     image: redis:7-alpine
@@ -123,7 +66,7 @@ services:
       - profclaw-network
 
   # ===================
-  # Ollama (Free Local AI)
+  # Ollama (Free Local AI - optional profile)
   # ===================
   ollama:
     image: ollama/ollama:latest
@@ -144,78 +87,11 @@ services:
     networks:
       - profclaw-network
 
-  # ===================
-  # Redis Commander (Dev Tools)
-  # ===================
-  redis-commander:
-    image: rediscommander/redis-commander:latest
-    container_name: profclaw-redis-ui
-    environment:
-      - REDIS_HOSTS=profclaw:redis:6379
-    ports:
-      - "${REDIS_COMMANDER_PORT:-8081}:8081"
-    depends_on:
-      redis:
-        condition: service_healthy
-    profiles:
-      - tools
-    networks:
-      - profclaw-network
-
-  # ===================
-  # Prometheus (Metrics)
-  # ===================
-  prometheus:
-    image: prom/prometheus:latest
-    container_name: profclaw-prometheus
-    ports:
-      - "${PROMETHEUS_PORT:-9090}:9090"
-    volumes:
-      - ./docker/prometheus.yml:/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml:ro
-      - prometheus-data:/prometheus
-    command:
-      - '--config.file=/etc/prometheus/prometheus.yml'
-      - '--storage.tsdb.path=/prometheus'
-      - '--storage.tsdb.retention.time=15d'
-    profiles:
-      - monitoring
-    networks:
-      - profclaw-network
-
-  # ===================
-  # Grafana (Dashboards)
-  # ===================
-  grafana:
-    image: grafana/grafana:latest
-    container_name: profclaw-grafana
-    ports:
-      - "${GRAFANA_PORT:-3001}:3000"
-    environment:
-      - GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:-admin}
-      - GF_USERS_ALLOW_SIGN_UP=false
-    volumes:
-      - grafana-data:/var/lib/grafana
-      - ./docker/grafana/provisioning:/etc/grafana/provisioning:ro
-    depends_on:
-      - prometheus
-    profiles:
-      - monitoring
-    networks:
-      - profclaw-network
-
 volumes:
-  profclaw-data:
-    driver: local
   redis-data:
     driver: local
-  workspace:
-    driver: local
   ollama-data:
     driver: local
-  prometheus-data:
-    driver: local
-  grafana-data:
-    driver: local
 
 networks:
   profclaw-network:

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "profclaw",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
+  "version": "2.3.0",
   "description": "Smart, lightweight AI agent engine -- run locally on anything from a $10 board to a VPS",
   "main": "dist/index.js",
   "types": "dist/index.d.ts",
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@
     "dev:api": "tsx watch src/server.ts",
     "dev:ui": "pnpm --dir ui dev",
     "kill:ports": "lsof -ti :3000 | xargs kill -9 2>/dev/null || true; lsof -ti :5173 | xargs kill -9 2>/dev/null || true",
-    "build": "tsc && pnpm --dir ui build",
+    "build": "tsc --skipLibCheck && pnpm --dir ui build",
+    "build:backend": "tsc",
     "prepublishOnly": "pnpm build",
     "start": "node dist/server.js",
     "profclaw": "node profclaw.mjs",
@@ -104,11 +105,11 @@
     "@ai-sdk/azure": "^3.0.26",
     "@ai-sdk/google": "^3.0.20",
     "@ai-sdk/openai": "^3.0.25",
-    "@hono/node-server": "^1.13.8",
+    "@hono/node-server": "^1.19.10",
     "@hono/zod-validator": "^0.4.3",
     "@inquirer/prompts": "^8.3.0",
     "@libsql/client": "^0.17.0",
-    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.0.0",
+    "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.26.0",
     "ai": "^6.0.68",
     "ai-sdk-ollama": "^3.3.0",
     "bullmq": "^5.34.8",
@@ -119,34 +120,58 @@
     "dockerode": "^4.0.9",
     "drizzle-orm": "^0.39.1",
     "figlet": "^1.8.0",
+    "glin-profanity": "^3.3.0",
     "glob": "^13.0.1",
-    "hono": "^4.6.16",
+    "hono": "^4.12.7",
+    "ink": "^5.2.1",
+    "ink-select-input": "^6.2.0",
+    "ink-spinner": "^5.0.0",
+    "ink-table": "^3.0.0",
+    "ink-text-input": "^6.0.0",
     "ioredis": "^5.4.2",
     "js-yaml": "^4.1.1",
-    "minimatch": "^10.1.2",
+    "minimatch": "^10.2.3",
     "node-pty": "^1.1.0",
     "openai": "^6.17.0",
     "ora": "^8.1.1",
     "playwright-core": "^1.58.1",
     "postgres": "^3.4.5",
     "proper-lockfile": "^4.1.2",
+    "react": "^18.3.1",
     "sqlite-vec": "0.1.7-alpha.2",
     "sqlite3": "^5.1.7",
     "zod": "^3.24.1",
     "zod-to-json-schema": "^3.25.1"
   },
+  "pnpm": {
+    "overrides": {
+      "tar": ">=7.5.11",
+      "minimatch": ">=10.2.3",
+      "rollup": ">=4.59.0",
+      "flatted": ">=3.4.2",
+      "esbuild": ">=0.25.0",
+      "prismjs": ">=1.30.0",
+      "markdown-it": ">=14.1.1",
+      "qs": ">=6.14.2",
+      "@types/react": "^19.2.5",
+      "@types/react-dom": "^19.2.3"
+    }
+  },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@types/dockerode": "^4.0.1",
     "@types/figlet": "^1.7.0",
     "@types/js-yaml": "^4.0.9",
     "@types/node": "^22.10.7",
     "@types/proper-lockfile": "^4.1.4",
+    "@types/react": "^19.2.5",
     "@types/sqlite3": "^5.1.0",
     "@vitest/coverage-v8": "^4.0.18",
     "@vitest/ui": "^4.0.18",
+    "ajv": "8.17.1",
     "concurrently": "^9.1.2",
     "drizzle-kit": "^0.30.2",
     "eslint": "^9.18.0",
+    "ink-testing-library": "^4.0.0",
     "tsx": "^4.19.2",
     "typescript": "^5.7.3",
     "typescript-eslint": "^8.54.0",

package/skills/deploy-cloudflare/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+---
+name: deploy-cloudflare
+description: |
+  Deploy applications to Cloudflare Workers/Pages. Handles wrangler setup,
+  configuration, and deployment. Returns the live URL.
+user-invocable: true
+metadata:
+  profclaw:
+    emoji: "☁️"
+    category: deployment
+    requires:
+      bins: ["wrangler"]
+---
+
+# Deploy to Cloudflare
+
+Deploy to Cloudflare Workers (APIs/functions) or Pages (static/SSR sites).
+
+## When to Use
+- User asks to deploy to Cloudflare
+- User wants edge/serverless deployment
+- Project is a Hono/Express API, static site, or Next.js/Remix/Astro
+
+## Workers (API/Backend)
+
+### 1. Generate wrangler.toml
+```toml
+name = "my-app"
+main = "src/index.ts"
+compatibility_date = "2024-01-01"
+
+[vars]
+ENVIRONMENT = "production"
+```
+
+### 2. Deploy
+```bash
+exec command:"wrangler deploy"
+```
+
+URL: `https://my-app.<account>.workers.dev`
+
+## Pages (Frontend/SSR)
+
+### 1. Build the project
+```bash
+exec command:"pnpm build"
+```
+
+### 2. Deploy
+```bash
+exec command:"wrangler pages deploy dist"
+```
+
+URL: `https://my-app.pages.dev`
+
+## After Deploy
+Tell the user:
+1. The live URL (*.workers.dev or *.pages.dev)
+2. Custom domain: `wrangler pages domains add my-app example.com`
+3. Logs: `wrangler tail` (real-time)
+4. Env vars: `wrangler secret put API_KEY`