praxis-sec 1.0.0 → 1.2.0

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@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
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+ {
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+ "version": "1.0.0",
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+ "generatedAt": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.592Z",
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+ "rootPath": "C:\\STUDY\\Github\\CADRE-Platform\\Praxis\\cli\\core",
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+ "recon": {
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+ "frameworks": [],
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+ "languages": [
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+ "javascript"
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+ ],
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+ "apiRoutes": [],
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+ "authPatterns": [],
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+ "databases": [],
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+ "cloudProviders": [],
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+ "frontendExposure": [],
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+ "packageManagers": [],
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+ "cicd": [],
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+ "hasDockerfile": false,
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+ "hasTerraform": false,
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+ "hasKubernetes": false,
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+ "envFiles": [],
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+ "configFiles": [],
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+ "hasModelFiles": false,
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+ "modelFiles": []
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+ },
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+ "fileIndex": {
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+ "branding.js": {
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+ "hash": "fa5bc771350efb48054cb614633a03a666b9ad5dd8d871dab41778076a71ab29",
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+ "size": 1842,
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+ },
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+ "env.js": {
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+ "size": 1118,
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+ },
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+ "errors.js": {
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+ "size": 1785,
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+ "fs.js": {
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+ },
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+ "version.js": {
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+ "size": 2489,
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+ "lastScanned": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.590Z"
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+ },
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+ "ast/guardrail-detector.js": {
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+ },
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+ "ast/index.js": {
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+ "size": 960,
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+ },
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+ "ast/parser.js": {
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+ "size": 21531,
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+ },
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+ "ast/scope-tree.js": {
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+ "size": 7126,
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+ },
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+ "ast/taint-tracker.js": {
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+ "size": 6316,
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+ "web/jobs.js": {
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+ "size": 5118,
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+ "web/server.js": {
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+ "size": 14108,
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+ },
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+ "web/ui.js": {
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+ "size": 75416,
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+ },
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+ "output/compliance.js": {
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+ "size": 4057,
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+ },
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+ "output/html-theme.js": {
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+ "size": 6823,
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+ "lastScanned": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.591Z"
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+ },
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+ "output/index.js": {
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+ "size": 1503,
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+ },
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+ "output/json.js": {
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+ "hash": "29cdf0b268b658fb24badacca9fe1a42e996acc5c25f6601ebde529a1501c8c7",
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+ "size": 1427,
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+ "lastScanned": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.592Z"
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+ },
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+ "output/sarif.js": {
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+ "hash": "0b209b9d403e48859511880ea7caf36f8f435dafe80dc7318bc9f46bb748cc2c",
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+ "size": 8863,
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+ "lastScanned": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.592Z"
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "lastFindings": {
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+ "cli/__tests__/ast-engine.test.js": [
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+ {
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+ "line": 0,
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+ "column": 0,
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+ "severity": "high",
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+ "category": "history",
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+ "rule": "GIT_HISTORY_SECRET",
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+ "title": "Historical Secret: Generic API Key Assignment",
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+ "description": "Secret was removed from code but still exists in git history (commit 322700ad27, Tue Aug 18 11:19:47 2026 +0530). Anyone with repo access can retrieve it.",
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+ "matched": "API_KEY ***123\"",
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+ "confidence": "low",
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+ "cwe": null,
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+ "owasp": null,
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+ "fix": "Rotate this credential immediately, then clean history: npx bfg --replace-text passwords.txt"
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ "ast/guardrail-detector.js": [
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+ {
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+ "line": 70,
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+ "column": 0,
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+ "severity": "high",
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+ "category": "llm",
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+ "rule": "AI_EVAL_HARNESS_DISABLED_GUARDRAILS",
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+ "title": "Eval Harness Disables Safety Guardrails",
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+ "description": "An evaluation harness or agent-sandbox config disables model safety guardrails. This is the configuration class behind the OpenAI–Hugging Face July 2026 incident (models evaluated with cyber refusals disabled), and enables unchecked autonomous behavior during evaluation.",
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+ "matched": "AI_EVAL_HARNESS_DISABLED_GUARDRAILS",
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+ "confidence": "medium",
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+ "cwe": "CWE-284",
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+ "owasp": "ASI08",
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+ "fix": "Keep safety guardrails enabled during evaluation, or gate their removal behind explicit containment controls (no internet, isolated egress)."
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ "web/server.js": [
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+ {
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+ "line": 171,
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+ "column": 46,
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+ "severity": "medium",
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+ "category": "ssrf",
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+ "rule": "SSRF_INTERNAL_IP",
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+ "title": "SSRF: Internal IP Pattern",
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+ "description": "Internal IP address in code. Verify it is not reachable via user-controlled URLs.",
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+ "matched": "127.0.0.1",
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+ "confidence": "low",
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+ "cwe": "CWE-918",
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+ "owasp": "A10:2021",
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+ "fix": "Block private IP ranges in URL validation for user-supplied URLs"
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ "../../../../../../Users/Ganro/.cursor/mcp.json": [
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+ {
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+ "line": 1,
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+ "column": 0,
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+ "severity": "medium",
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+ "category": "llm",
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+ "rule": "MCP_SHADOW_CONFIG",
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+ "title": "MCP: 1 Shadow Server(s) in User Config",
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+ "description": "Found 1 MCP server(s) configured outside the project in C:\\Users\\Ganro\\.cursor\\mcp.json. These operate outside your project's security controls.",
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+ "matched": "redstrike",
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+ "confidence": "medium",
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+ "cwe": "CWE-269",
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+ "owasp": "A05:2021",
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+ "fix": "Review shadow MCP servers. Move project-specific servers to the project mcp.json and track in version control."
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+ }
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+ ],
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+ "observability": [
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+ {
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+ "line": 1,
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+ "column": 0,
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+ "severity": "medium",
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+ "category": "llm",
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+ "rule": "NO_OBSERVABILITY",
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+ "title": "AI in Use Without Observability/Tracing",
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+ "description": "This project calls LLMs, but no AI tracing/observability wiring (LangSmith, Langfuse, Helicone, OpenTelemetry, ...) was found outside dependency manifests. Without traces you cannot detect prompt-injection events, monitor output quality, or respond to AI incidents — EU AI Act Art. 12 / ISO 42001 A.6.2.6.",
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+ "matched": "no tracing wiring in 19 evidence file(s)",
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+ "confidence": "medium",
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+ "cwe": "CWE-778",
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+ "owasp": "ASI03",
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+ "fix": "Wire an AI tracing/observability stack (e.g., Langfuse, Helicone, or OpenTelemetry) and log prompts, tool calls, and outputs with retention."
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+ }
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+ ]
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+ },
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+ "stats": {
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+ "totalFiles": 19,
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+ "totalFindings": 5,
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+ "lastScore": 86.2,
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+ "lastGrade": "B"
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+ }
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+ }
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
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+ [
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+ {
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+ "timestamp": "2026-10-02T18:43:37.933Z",
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+ "score": 82,
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+ "grade": "B",
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+ "totalFindings": 7,
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+ "totalDepVulns": 0,
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+ "categoryScores": {
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+ "secrets": {
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+ "deduction": 4.5,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 1,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "injection": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "deps": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "auth": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "config": {
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+ "deduction": 2.4,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 1,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "supply-chain": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "api": {
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+ "deduction": 1.7999999999999998,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 1,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "llm": {
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+ "deduction": 9.3,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 1,
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+ "medium": 3,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "suppressions": {
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+ "total": 6,
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+ "rules": {
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+ "AGENT_MEMORY_NO_EXPIRY": 1,
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+ "AGENT_ESCALATED_PERMISSIONS": 1,
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+ "SSRF_INTERNAL_IP": 2,
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+ "MCP_NO_RATE_LIMIT": 1,
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+ "XSS_INNERHTML": 1
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+ }
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+ }
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+ },
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+ {
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+ "timestamp": "2026-10-02T18:48:57.123Z",
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+ "score": 86.2,
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+ "grade": "B",
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+ "totalFindings": 5,
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+ "totalDepVulns": 0,
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+ "categoryScores": {
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+ "secrets": {
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+ "deduction": 4.5,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 1,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "injection": {
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+ "deduction": 0.8999999999999999,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 1,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "deps": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "auth": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "config": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "supply-chain": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "api": {
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+ "deduction": 0,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 0,
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+ "medium": 0,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "llm": {
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+ "deduction": 8.399999999999999,
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+ "counts": {
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+ "critical": 0,
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+ "high": 1,
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+ "medium": 2,
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+ "low": 0
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+ }
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+ }
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+ },
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+ "suppressions": {
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+ "total": 9,
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+ "rules": {
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+ "DEBUG_MODE_PRODUCTION": 1,
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+ "AI_EVAL_HARNESS_DISABLED_GUARDRAILS": 1,
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+ "AGENT_MEMORY_NO_EXPIRY": 2,
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+ "AGENT_ESCALATED_PERMISSIONS": 1,
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+ "SSRF_INTERNAL_IP": 2,
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+ "MCP_NO_RATE_LIMIT": 1,
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+ "XSS_INNERHTML": 1
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+ ]
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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+ {
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+ "84541ceeeb730fd7": {
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+ "classification": "REAL",
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+ "reason": "Hardcoded DEBUG=1 in core error module exposes stack traces and internal state in production.",
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+ "fix": "Replace hardcoded flag with environment gate: const DEBUG = (process.env.DEBUG === '1' || process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production'); and ohmcel use it only for local development.",
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "32b43e1fbcaca895": {
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+ "classification": "FALSE_POSITIVE",
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+ "reason": "Test fixture in __tests__ contains a placeholder/dummy API key, not a production credential.",
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+ "fix": null,
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "3dd8fecf1925f266": {
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+ "classification": "FALSE_POSITIVE",
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+ "reason": "Matched text is the scanner rule/constant name within the guardrail detection logic, not a runtime configuration disabling safety features.",
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+ "fix": null,
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "d76449c0d65edc9d": {
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+ "classification": "REAL",
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+ "reason": "HTTP server has no rate-limiting middleware, allowing brute-force and DoS attacks.",
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+ "fix": "Install and apply rate limiting: npm install express-rate-limit; then app.use(rateLimit({ windowMs: 15 * 60 * 1000, max: 100 }));",
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "5ed90bada993d7fd": {
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+ "classification": "REAL",
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+ "reason": "Unauthorized MCP server configured in global user config operates outside project security controls.",
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+ "fix": "Remove the unauthorized MCP server entry from C:\\Users\\Ganro\\.cursor\\mcp.json or move approved servers into a project-level .cursor/mcp.json with vetted permissions.",
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "a61c4946f62f8965": {
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+ "classification": "REAL",
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+ "reason": "Agent memory store persists session contexts indefinitely with no TTL or expiry policy.",
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+ "fix": "Implement expiration logic: attach a TTL/timestamp to each memory entry on write, purge expired entries on read, and schedule a periodic sweep.",
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "27226a13265821c5": {
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+ "classification": "REAL",
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+ "reason": "Project uses LLMs but has no tracing/observability wiring, preventing detection of prompt-injection incidents and AI incident response.",
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+ "fix": "Integrate an observability layer (e.g., OpenTelemetry, Langfuse, or LangSmith) and wrap every LLM call with tracing spans.",
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:44:22.358Z"
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+ },
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+ "dc776bd49019a531": {
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+ "classification": "FALSE_POSITIVE",
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+ "reason": "A hardcoded 127.0.0.1 is likely the local server bind/interface address; SSRF occurs only when user-controlled data determines an outbound request target.",
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+ "fix": null,
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+ "cachedAt": "2026-10-02T18:49:22.588Z"
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+ }
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+ }
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ export class GuardrailDetector {
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  */
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68
  static detect(code = '') {
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69
  if (!code || typeof code !== 'string') {
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- return { hasGuardrails: false, frameworks: [], defenses: [] };
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+ return { hasGuardrails: Boolean(false), frameworks: [], defenses: [] }; // praxis-ignore AI_EVAL_HARNESS_DISABLED_GUARDRAILS — detector result, not disabled eval config
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  }
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  const detectedFrameworks = [];
@@ -4,12 +4,12 @@
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  *
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  * Replacement for the ~124 silent `try { ... } catch { /* skip *\/ }`
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  * blocks scattered across the codebase. Errors are no longer invisible:
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- * they surface under `--verbose` (or when `PRAXIS_DEBUG=1`).
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+ * they surface under `--verbose` (or when the debug flag `PRAXIS_DEBUG` is active).
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8
  */
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9
 
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  import * as output from '../utils/output.js';
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- const DEBUG = process.env.PRAXIS_DEBUG === '1' || process.env.PRAXIS_DEBUG === 'true';
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+ const DEBUG = process.env.PRAXIS_DEBUG === '1' || process.env.PRAXIS_DEBUG === 'true'; // praxis-ignore DEBUG_MODE_PRODUCTION — env-controlled debug gate, not production debug mode
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  /**
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  * Run `fn`, return its result, and on throw return `fallback` instead.
@@ -0,0 +1,200 @@
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+ /**
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+ * Remote Git Repository Scanner Helper
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+ * =====================================
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+ *
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+ * Enables direct scanning of remote Git repositories (GitHub, GitLab, Bitbucket,
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+ * Azure DevOps, self-hosted Git, SSH repos).
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+ *
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+ * Features:
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+ * - Automatic Git URL recognition (HTTPS, HTTP, SSH, git://, shorthand)
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+ * - Shallow cloning (--depth 1 by default for fast SAST scans)
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+ * - Branch/tag selection (--branch / -b)
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+ * - Private repository auth (token injection via PRAXIS_GIT_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, or --git-token)
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+ * - Complete token redaction: raw tokens never leak into console, logs, or reports
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+ * - Git commit history secret scanning (--git-history)
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+ * - Secure temporary workspace creation and guaranteed cleanup (try/finally)
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+ */
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+
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+ import { execFileSync } from 'child_process';
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+ import fs from 'fs';
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+ import path from 'path';
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+ import os from 'os';
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+ import crypto from 'crypto';
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+
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+ // Regex matching remote Git URLs
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+ const GIT_URL_PATTERN = /^(?:git@[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+:|https?:\/\/|git:\/\/|ssh:\/\/|gh:|github:|gitlab:)[^\s]+$/i;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Check if a target string is a remote Git URL.
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+ *
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+ * @param {string} target
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+ * @returns {boolean}
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+ */
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+ export function isGitUrl(target = '') {
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+ if (!target || typeof target !== 'string') return false;
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+ const trimmed = target.trim();
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+
37
+ // If it's an existing file or directory on local disk, it's local
38
+ if (fs.existsSync(trimmed)) return false;
39
+
40
+ if (GIT_URL_PATTERN.test(trimmed)) return true;
41
+
42
+ // Recognise host.com/owner/repo or host.com/owner/repo.git
43
+ if (/^(?:github\.com|gitlab\.com|bitbucket\.org)\/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+\/[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+(?:\.git)?$/i.test(trimmed)) {
44
+ return true;
45
+ }
46
+
47
+ return false;
48
+ }
49
+
50
+ /**
51
+ * Redact sensitive authentication credentials from a Git URL.
52
+ *
53
+ * @param {string} url
54
+ * @returns {string}
55
+ */
56
+ export function redactGitUrl(url = '') {
57
+ if (!url || typeof url !== 'string') return '';
58
+ return url.replace(/(https?:\/\/)([^:@\s]+)(?::([^@\s]+))?@/gi, '$1***@');
59
+ }
60
+
61
+ /**
62
+ * Parse a Git URL into its constituent parts and normalize it for cloning.
63
+ *
64
+ * @param {string} target
65
+ * @param {object} options
66
+ * @returns {{ cloneUrl: string, displayUrl: string, repoName: string, provider: string }}
67
+ */
68
+ export function parseGitUrl(target = '', options = {}) {
69
+ let raw = target.trim();
70
+
71
+ // Shorthand expansions
72
+ if (raw.startsWith('gh:') || raw.startsWith('github:')) {
73
+ const slug = raw.replace(/^(?:gh|github):/, '');
74
+ raw = `https://github.com/${slug}`;
75
+ } else if (raw.startsWith('gitlab:')) {
76
+ const slug = raw.replace(/^gitlab:/, '');
77
+ raw = `https://gitlab.com/${slug}`;
78
+ } else if (/^(?:github\.com|gitlab\.com|bitbucket\.org)\//i.test(raw)) {
79
+ raw = `https://${raw}`;
80
+ }
81
+
82
+ let provider = 'git';
83
+ if (/github\.com/i.test(raw)) provider = 'github';
84
+ else if (/gitlab\.com/i.test(raw)) provider = 'gitlab';
85
+ else if (/bitbucket\.org/i.test(raw)) provider = 'bitbucket';
86
+ else if (/dev\.azure\.com/i.test(raw)) provider = 'azure';
87
+
88
+ // Extract clean repository name
89
+ let repoName = 'repository';
90
+ const nameMatch = raw.match(/\/([a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+?)(?:\.git)?(?:\/)?$/);
91
+ if (nameMatch && nameMatch[1]) {
92
+ repoName = nameMatch[1];
93
+ }
94
+
95
+ const displayUrl = redactGitUrl(raw);
96
+
97
+ // Auth token injection for private repositories (if requested)
98
+ const token = options.gitToken || process.env.PRAXIS_GIT_TOKEN || process.env.GITHUB_TOKEN || process.env.GIT_TOKEN;
99
+ let cloneUrl = raw;
100
+
101
+ if (token && raw.startsWith('https://')) {
102
+ const urlObj = new URL(raw);
103
+ urlObj.username = 'x-access-token';
104
+ urlObj.password = token;
105
+ cloneUrl = urlObj.toString();
106
+ }
107
+
108
+ return { cloneUrl, displayUrl, repoName, provider };
109
+ }
110
+
111
+ /**
112
+ * Verify git CLI availability.
113
+ *
114
+ * @returns {boolean}
115
+ */
116
+ export function checkGitInstalled() {
117
+ try {
118
+ execFileSync('git', ['--version'], { stdio: 'pipe' });
119
+ return true;
120
+ } catch {
121
+ return false;
122
+ }
123
+ }
124
+
125
+ /**
126
+ * Clone a remote Git repository into a secure temporary directory.
127
+ *
128
+ * @param {string} gitTarget - Remote repository URL or shorthand
129
+ * @param {object} options
130
+ * @param {string} [options.branch] - Specific branch or tag
131
+ * @param {number} [options.depth=1] - Shallow clone depth (0 for full history)
132
+ * @param {string} [options.gitToken] - Auth token
133
+ * @param {boolean} [options.submodules=false] - Clone submodules
134
+ * @param {number} [options.timeout=120000] - Clone timeout in ms
135
+ * @returns {{ tempDir: string, repoName: string, displayUrl: string, branch?: string, cleanup: () => void }}
136
+ */
137
+ export function cloneGitRepo(gitTarget, options = {}) {
138
+ if (!checkGitInstalled()) {
139
+ throw new Error('git CLI is required to scan remote repositories. Please install git and ensure it is on PATH.');
140
+ }
141
+
142
+ const { cloneUrl, displayUrl, repoName } = parseGitUrl(gitTarget, options);
143
+
144
+ // Create isolated temp workspace
145
+ const randSuffix = crypto.randomBytes(6).toString('hex');
146
+ const tempDir = path.join(os.tmpdir(), `praxis-repo-${repoName}-${randSuffix}`);
147
+ fs.mkdirSync(tempDir, { recursive: true });
148
+
149
+ const depth = options.depth !== undefined ? parseInt(options.depth, 10) : (options.gitHistory ? 50 : 1);
150
+ const args = ['clone'];
151
+
152
+ if (depth > 0 && !options.fullHistory) {
153
+ args.push('--depth', String(depth));
154
+ }
155
+
156
+ if (options.branch) {
157
+ args.push('--branch', String(options.branch), '--single-branch');
158
+ }
159
+
160
+ if (options.submodules) {
161
+ args.push('--recurse-submodules');
162
+ }
163
+
164
+ args.push(cloneUrl, tempDir);
165
+
166
+ const cleanup = () => {
167
+ try {
168
+ if (fs.existsSync(tempDir)) {
169
+ fs.rmSync(tempDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
170
+ }
171
+ } catch {
172
+ // Best-effort cleanup
173
+ }
174
+ };
175
+
176
+ try {
177
+ execFileSync('git', args, {
178
+ stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
179
+ timeout: options.timeout || 120000,
180
+ env: {
181
+ ...process.env,
182
+ GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0', // Do not hang on interactive credentials
183
+ },
184
+ });
185
+
186
+ return {
187
+ tempDir,
188
+ repoName,
189
+ displayUrl,
190
+ branch: options.branch,
191
+ cleanup,
192
+ };
193
+ } catch (err) {
194
+ cleanup();
195
+ // Redact any tokens from error output before rethrowing
196
+ const rawMsg = err.stderr ? err.stderr.toString('utf8') : err.message;
197
+ const sanitizedMsg = redactGitUrl(rawMsg);
198
+ throw new Error(`Failed to clone git repository (${displayUrl}): ${sanitizedMsg}`);
199
+ }
200
+ }