plugin-agent-orchestrator 1.0.21 → 1.0.23

package/src/server/services/AgentRegistryService.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,61 @@
 import { toPlain, asObject, normalizeEmployeeUsername } from '../utils/ctx-utils';
 
+type OrchestratorConfigRow = {
+  leaderUsername?: string;
+  subAgentUsername?: string;
+};
+
+type ModelRef = { llmService: string; model: string };
+
+/**
+ * Normalize an AI employee's `modelSettings` (or a per-rule override) into a
+ * flat { llmService, model } the harness can hand to getLLMService().
+ *
+ * The admin UI (plugin-ai ModelSettings) stores the dedicated model selection
+ * as `{ enabled, models: [{ llmService, model }] }` and clears the flat
+ * `llmService`/`model` fields. Older records still use the flat shape, and
+ * per-rule overrides arrive flat too. Mirror plugin-ai's resolveModel:
+ *   - if `enabled`, prefer `models[0]`, else fall back to the flat fields
+ *   - a bare flat { llmService, model } (e.g. a rule override) is also valid
+ */
+function extractModelRef(value: any): ModelRef | undefined {
+  if (!value) return undefined;
+
+  const isValid = (m: any): m is ModelRef => Boolean(m?.llmService && m?.model);
+
+  // Dedicated model configuration (UI shape).
+  if (value.enabled) {
+    const models = Array.isArray(value.models) ? value.models : [];
+    const first = models.find(isValid);
+    if (first) {
+      return { llmService: first.llmService, model: first.model };
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Flat legacy shape, or a per-rule override.
+  if (isValid(value)) {
+    return { llmService: value.llmService, model: value.model };
+  }
+
+  return undefined;
+}
+
+function sanitizeToolPart(value: string) {
+  return (value || '').replace(/[^a-zA-Z0-9_-]/g, '_');
+}
+
+function buildDelegateToolName(leaderUsername: string, subAgentUsername: string) {
+  return `delegate_${sanitizeToolPart(leaderUsername)}_to_${sanitizeToolPart(subAgentUsername)}`;
+}
+
+function buildDispatchToolName(leaderUsername: string) {
+  return `dispatch_subagents_${sanitizeToolPart(leaderUsername)}`;
+}
+
+function buildLegacyDelegateToolName(subAgentUsername: string) {
+  return `delegate_to_${sanitizeToolPart(subAgentUsername)}`;
+}
+
 export class AgentRegistryService {
   constructor(private readonly plugin: any) {}
 
@@ -59,26 +115,28 @@ export class AgentRegistryService {
       throw new Error(`Sub-agent "${subAgentUsername}" was not found.`);
     }
 
-    const hasModelSettings = (val: any): val is { llmService: string; model: string } => {
-      return Boolean(val?.llmService && val?.model);
-    };
-
-    let modelSettings = hasModelSettings(dynamicValues) ? dynamicValues : undefined;
+    // 1. Explicit per-rule override (already a flat { llmService, model }).
+    const dynamic = extractModelRef(dynamicValues);
+    if (dynamic) {
+      return dynamic;
+    }
 
-    if (!modelSettings) {
-      if (hasModelSettings(subAgent.modelSettings)) {
-        modelSettings = subAgent.modelSettings;
-      }
+    // 2. Sub-agent's own dedicated model configuration.
+    const subAgentModel = extractModelRef(subAgent.modelSettings);
+    if (subAgentModel) {
+      return subAgentModel;
     }
 
-    if (!modelSettings && leaderUsername) {
+    // 3. Inherit from leader.
+    if (leaderUsername) {
       const leader = await this.getAIEmployee(leaderUsername);
-      if (leader && hasModelSettings(leader.modelSettings)) {
-        modelSettings = leader.modelSettings;
+      const leaderModel = extractModelRef(leader?.modelSettings);
+      if (leaderModel) {
+        return leaderModel;
       }
     }
 
-    return modelSettings;
+    return undefined;
   }
 
   /**
@@ -127,49 +185,33 @@ export class AgentRegistryService {
       const configRepo = this.db.getRepository('orchestratorConfig');
       if (!configRepo) return false;
 
+      const configs: OrchestratorConfigRow[] = await configRepo.find({
+        filter: { enabled: true },
+      });
+      if (!configs || configs.length === 0) return false;
+
       // 1. Check if it matches dispatch_subagents_${leader}
       if (toolName.startsWith('dispatch_subagents_')) {
-        const leader = toolName.substring('dispatch_subagents_'.length);
-        const count = await configRepo.count({
-          filter: {
-            leaderUsername: leader,
-            enabled: true,
-          },
-        });
-        return count > 0;
-      }
-
-      // 2. Check if it matches delegate_${leader}_to_${subAgent}
-      if (toolName.startsWith('delegate_') && toolName.includes('_to_')) {
-        const parts = toolName.substring('delegate_'.length).split('_to_');
-        if (parts.length === 2) {
-          const [leader, subAgent] = parts;
-          const count = await configRepo.count({
-            filter: {
-              leaderUsername: leader,
-              subAgentUsername: subAgent,
-              enabled: true,
-            },
-          });
-          if (count > 0) return true;
-        }
+        return configs.some((config) => buildDispatchToolName(config.leaderUsername || '') === toolName);
       }
 
-      // 3. Check legacy alias: delegate_to_${subAgent}
+      // 2. Check legacy alias: delegate_to_${subAgent}
       if (toolName.startsWith('delegate_to_')) {
-        const subAgent = toolName.substring('delegate_to_'.length);
-        const configs = await configRepo.find({
-          filter: {
-            subAgentUsername: subAgent,
-            enabled: true,
-          },
-        });
-        // Legacy alias is only registered if there is exactly one leader for this subAgent
-        if (configs?.length === 1) {
+        const matchingConfigs = configs.filter(
+          (config) => buildLegacyDelegateToolName(config.subAgentUsername || '') === toolName,
+        );
+        if (matchingConfigs.length === 1) {
           return true;
         }
       }
 
+      // 3. Check if it matches delegate_${leader}_to_${subAgent}
+      if (toolName.startsWith('delegate_') && toolName.includes('_to_')) {
+        return configs.some(
+          (config) => buildDelegateToolName(config.leaderUsername || '', config.subAgentUsername || '') === toolName,
+        );
+      }
+
       return false;
     } catch {
       return false;

package/src/server/services/CircuitBreaker.ts

@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ export class CircuitBreakerRegistry {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Build the circuit key for a sub-agent. Keying by `${leader}::${target}` keeps
+ * one leader's failures from opening the circuit for the same sub-agent under a
+ * different leader — their delegations are independent code paths. Falls back to
+ * the bare target when no leader is known.
+ */
+export function subAgentCircuitKey(leaderUsername: string | undefined, target: string): string {
+  return leaderUsername ? `${leaderUsername}::${target}` : target;
+}
+
 // Singleton shared across the plugin
 let globalInstance: CircuitBreakerRegistry | null = null;
 

package/src/server/services/CodeValidator.ts

@@ -1,159 +1,237 @@
-interface ForbiddenPattern {
-  pattern: RegExp;
-  reason: string;
-}
-
-const DANGEROUS_NODE_PATTERNS: ForbiddenPattern[] = [
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'child_process module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]cluster['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'cluster module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]dgram['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'dgram module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]net['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'net module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]http['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'http module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]https['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'https module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]vm['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'vm module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /process\.exit/, reason: 'process.exit not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /process\.env(?!\s*\.OUTPUT_DIR)/, reason: 'process.env access not allowed (use OUTPUT_DIR only)' },
-  { pattern: /process\.kill/, reason: 'process.kill not allowed' },
-];
-
-const DANGEROUS_PYTHON_PATTERNS: ForbiddenPattern[] = [
-  { pattern: /import\s+subprocess/, reason: 'subprocess module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /from\s+subprocess\s+import/, reason: 'subprocess module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /import\s+shutil/, reason: 'shutil module not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /__import__\s*\(/, reason: '__import__ not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /os\.system\s*\(/, reason: 'os.system not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /os\.popen\s*\(/, reason: 'os.popen not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /os\.exec\w*\s*\(/, reason: 'os.exec* not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /os\.spawn\w*\s*\(/, reason: 'os.spawn* not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /\beval\s*\(/, reason: 'eval not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, reason: 'exec not allowed' },
-  { pattern: /\bcompile\s*\(/, reason: 'compile not allowed' },
-];
-
-/** Built-in Node.js modules that are always allowed in sandbox code */
-const NODE_BUILTINS = [
-  'fs', 'path', 'os', 'crypto', 'util', 'stream', 'buffer',
-  'querystring', 'url', 'assert', 'events', 'string_decoder', 'zlib',
-];
-
-/** Built-in Python modules that are always allowed in sandbox code */
-const PYTHON_BUILTINS = [
-  'os', 'sys', 'json', 'math', 'datetime', 'collections', 'itertools',
-  'functools', 'pathlib', 'typing', 'io', 'csv', 're', 'string', 'textwrap',
-  'decimal', 'fractions', 'random', 'statistics', 'copy', 'enum', 'dataclasses',
-  'abc', 'contextlib', 'operator', 'time', 'calendar', 'locale', 'struct',
-  'hashlib', 'base64', 'binascii', 'codecs', 'unicodedata', 'pprint',
-  'warnings', 'traceback', 'logging', 'unittest', 'argparse', 'ast',
-  'tempfile', 'xml', 'zipfile',
-  // Pre-installed local packages (trusted, bundled with plugin)
-  'svg_to_pptx',
-];
-
-/**
- * Maps PyPI package names to their Python import names
- * (only where they differ from the package name).
- */
-const PYTHON_IMPORT_NAME_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
-  'python-docx': 'docx',
-  'python-pptx': 'pptx',
-  'Pillow': 'PIL',
-  'pyyaml': 'yaml',
-};
-
-export class CodeValidator {
-  /**
-   * Check code against forbidden patterns (dangerous modules/functions).
-   * @throws CodeValidationError if a forbidden pattern is found.
-   */
-  validate(code: string, language: 'node' | 'python'): void {
-    const patterns = language === 'node'
-      ? DANGEROUS_NODE_PATTERNS
-      : DANGEROUS_PYTHON_PATTERNS;
-
-    for (const { pattern, reason } of patterns) {
-      if (pattern.test(code)) {
-        throw new CodeValidationError(reason, pattern.source);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Validate that code only imports packages in the whitelist.
-   * Called after the basic forbidden pattern check.
-   * Skips validation if whitelist is empty (env not initialized yet).
-   *
-   * @param code - The code to validate
-   * @param language - 'node' or 'python'
-   * @param whitelist - Array of allowed package names (from skillWorkerConfigs.packageWhitelist)
-   */
-  validateImports(code: string, language: 'node' | 'python', whitelist: string[]): void {
-    if (!whitelist?.length) return; // Skip if env not initialized
-
-    if (language === 'node') {
-      this.validateNodeImports(code, whitelist);
-    } else if (language === 'python') {
-      this.validatePythonImports(code, whitelist);
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Check Node.js require() calls against the whitelist.
-   * Built-in modules (fs, path, etc.) are always allowed.
-   */
-  private validateNodeImports(code: string, whitelist: string[]): void {
-    // Match require statements with string literal arguments (non-relative paths)
-    const requires = [...code.matchAll(/require\s*\(\s*['"]([^'"./][^'"]*)['"]\s*\)/g)];
-
-    for (const match of requires) {
-      const raw = match[1];
-      // Handle scoped packages (e.g. '@org/lib') and subpaths (e.g. 'lib/utils')
-      const pkgName = raw.startsWith('@')
-        ? raw.split('/').slice(0, 2).join('/')
-        : raw.split('/')[0];
-
-      if (NODE_BUILTINS.includes(pkgName)) continue;
-      if (whitelist.includes(pkgName)) continue;
-
-      throw new CodeValidationError(
-        `Package "${pkgName}" is not in the allowed whitelist. Allowed: ${whitelist.join(', ')}`,
-        `require('${pkgName}')`,
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Check Python import/from statements against the whitelist.
-   * Built-in modules (os, sys, json, etc.) are always allowed.
-   * Handles PyPI→import name mapping (e.g., python-docx → docx, Pillow → PIL).
-   */
-  private validatePythonImports(code: string, whitelist: string[]): void {
-    // Match: import pkg, from pkg import ..., import pkg.sub
-    const imports = [...code.matchAll(/(?:^|\n)\s*(?:import|from)\s+([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/g)];
-
-    // Build allowed import names from whitelist
-    const allowedImports = new Set([
-      ...PYTHON_BUILTINS,
-      ...whitelist.map((p) => PYTHON_IMPORT_NAME_MAP[p] || p),
-    ]);
-
-    for (const match of imports) {
-      const pkg = match[1];
-      if (allowedImports.has(pkg)) continue;
-
-      throw new CodeValidationError(
-        `Module "${pkg}" is not in the allowed whitelist. Allowed: ${[...allowedImports].join(', ')}`,
-        `import ${pkg}`,
-      );
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-export class CodeValidationError extends Error {
-  constructor(
-    message: string,
-    public matchedPattern: string,
-  ) {
-    super(`Code validation failed: ${message}`);
-    (this as any).name = 'CodeValidationError';
-  }
-}
+interface ForbiddenPattern {
+  pattern: RegExp;
+  reason: string;
+}
+
+const DANGEROUS_NODE_PATTERNS: ForbiddenPattern[] = [
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]child_process['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'child_process module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]cluster['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'cluster module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]dgram['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'dgram module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]net['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'net module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]http['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'http module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]https['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'https module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]vm['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'vm module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]worker_threads['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'worker_threads module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]inspector['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'inspector module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*['"]v8['"]\s*\)/, reason: 'v8 module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /process\.exit/, reason: 'process.exit not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /process\.env(?!\s*\.OUTPUT_DIR)/, reason: 'process.env access not allowed (use OUTPUT_DIR only)' },
+  { pattern: /process\.kill/, reason: 'process.kill not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /process\.binding\s*\(/, reason: 'process.binding not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bglobalThis\b/, reason: 'globalThis access not allowed' },
+  // Indirect eval / dynamic Function construction (bypasses the import allowlist).
+  { pattern: /\beval\s*\(/, reason: 'eval not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bnew\s+Function\s*\(/, reason: 'new Function() not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bFunction\s*\(/, reason: 'Function() constructor not allowed' },
+  // Dynamic import() can pull arbitrary modules at runtime, bypassing require() checks.
+  { pattern: /\bimport\s*\(/, reason: 'dynamic import() not allowed' },
+  // require resolved from a non-literal expression (e.g. require(varName)).
+  { pattern: /require\s*\(\s*(?!['"])/, reason: 'require() with a non-literal argument not allowed' },
+];
+
+const DANGEROUS_PYTHON_PATTERNS: ForbiddenPattern[] = [
+  { pattern: /import\s+subprocess/, reason: 'subprocess module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /from\s+subprocess\s+import/, reason: 'subprocess module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+shutil/, reason: 'shutil module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+socket/, reason: 'socket module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+ctypes/, reason: 'ctypes module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+pickle/, reason: 'pickle module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+marshal/, reason: 'marshal module not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /import\s+importlib/, reason: 'importlib module not allowed' },
+  {
+    pattern: /from\s+(?:socket|ctypes|pickle|marshal|importlib)\s+import/,
+    reason: 'restricted module import not allowed',
+  },
+  { pattern: /__import__\s*\(/, reason: '__import__ not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bimportlib\b/, reason: 'importlib access not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /os\.system\s*\(/, reason: 'os.system not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /os\.popen\s*\(/, reason: 'os.popen not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /os\.exec\w*\s*\(/, reason: 'os.exec* not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /os\.spawn\w*\s*\(/, reason: 'os.spawn* not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /os\.fork\s*\(/, reason: 'os.fork not allowed' },
+  // getattr/setattr can reconstruct blocked names like getattr(os,'sys'+'tem').
+  { pattern: /\bgetattr\s*\(/, reason: 'getattr not allowed (can bypass name checks)' },
+  { pattern: /\bsetattr\s*\(/, reason: 'setattr not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\b__builtins__\b/, reason: '__builtins__ access not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\beval\s*\(/, reason: 'eval not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bexec\s*\(/, reason: 'exec not allowed' },
+  { pattern: /\bcompile\s*\(/, reason: 'compile not allowed' },
+];
+
+/** Built-in Node.js modules that are always allowed in sandbox code */
+const NODE_BUILTINS = [
+  'fs',
+  'path',
+  'os',
+  'crypto',
+  'util',
+  'stream',
+  'buffer',
+  'querystring',
+  'url',
+  'assert',
+  'events',
+  'string_decoder',
+  'zlib',
+];
+
+/** Built-in Python modules that are always allowed in sandbox code */
+const PYTHON_BUILTINS = [
+  'os',
+  'sys',
+  'json',
+  'math',
+  'datetime',
+  'collections',
+  'itertools',
+  'functools',
+  'pathlib',
+  'typing',
+  'io',
+  'csv',
+  're',
+  'string',
+  'textwrap',
+  'decimal',
+  'fractions',
+  'random',
+  'statistics',
+  'copy',
+  'enum',
+  'dataclasses',
+  'abc',
+  'contextlib',
+  'operator',
+  'time',
+  'calendar',
+  'locale',
+  'struct',
+  'hashlib',
+  'base64',
+  'binascii',
+  'codecs',
+  'unicodedata',
+  'pprint',
+  'warnings',
+  'traceback',
+  'logging',
+  'unittest',
+  'argparse',
+  'ast',
+  'tempfile',
+  'xml',
+  'zipfile',
+  // Pre-installed local packages (trusted, bundled with plugin)
+  'svg_to_pptx',
+];
+
+/**
+ * Maps PyPI package names to their Python import names
+ * (only where they differ from the package name).
+ */
+const PYTHON_IMPORT_NAME_MAP: Record<string, string> = {
+  'python-docx': 'docx',
+  'python-pptx': 'pptx',
+  Pillow: 'PIL',
+  pyyaml: 'yaml',
+};
+
+export class CodeValidator {
+  /**
+   * Check code against forbidden patterns (dangerous modules/functions).
+   * @throws CodeValidationError if a forbidden pattern is found.
+   */
+  validate(code: string, language: 'node' | 'python'): void {
+    const patterns = language === 'node' ? DANGEROUS_NODE_PATTERNS : DANGEROUS_PYTHON_PATTERNS;
+
+    for (const { pattern, reason } of patterns) {
+      if (pattern.test(code)) {
+        throw new CodeValidationError(reason, pattern.source);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Validate that code only imports packages in the allowlist (builtins +
+   * whitelist). Called after the basic forbidden pattern check.
+   *
+   * An empty whitelist does NOT skip validation: only built-in modules are
+   * then allowed. This closes an exfiltration hole — stdlib modules such as
+   * Python `urllib`/`socket`/`ftplib` need no install, so skipping the check
+   * when the env was not initialized would let a skill open outbound
+   * connections. Set SKILL_HUB_ALLOW_ANY_IMPORT=true to restore the old
+   * skip-when-empty behaviour for legacy deployments.
+   *
+   * @param code - The code to validate
+   * @param language - 'node' or 'python'
+   * @param whitelist - Allowed package names (from skillWorkerConfigs.packageWhitelist)
+   */
+  validateImports(code: string, language: 'node' | 'python', whitelist: string[]): void {
+    if (!whitelist?.length && process.env.SKILL_HUB_ALLOW_ANY_IMPORT === 'true') {
+      return;
+    }
+    const list = whitelist || [];
+
+    if (language === 'node') {
+      this.validateNodeImports(code, list);
+    } else if (language === 'python') {
+      this.validatePythonImports(code, list);
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check Node.js require() calls against the whitelist.
+   * Built-in modules (fs, path, etc.) are always allowed.
+   */
+  private validateNodeImports(code: string, whitelist: string[]): void {
+    // Match require statements with string literal arguments (non-relative paths)
+    const requires = [...code.matchAll(/require\s*\(\s*['"]([^'"./][^'"]*)['"]\s*\)/g)];
+
+    for (const match of requires) {
+      const raw = match[1];
+      // Handle scoped packages (e.g. '@org/lib') and subpaths (e.g. 'lib/utils')
+      const pkgName = raw.startsWith('@') ? raw.split('/').slice(0, 2).join('/') : raw.split('/')[0];
+
+      if (NODE_BUILTINS.includes(pkgName)) continue;
+      if (whitelist.includes(pkgName)) continue;
+
+      throw new CodeValidationError(
+        `Package "${pkgName}" is not in the allowed whitelist. Allowed: ${whitelist.join(', ')}`,
+        `require('${pkgName}')`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Check Python import/from statements against the whitelist.
+   * Built-in modules (os, sys, json, etc.) are always allowed.
+   * Handles PyPI→import name mapping (e.g., python-docx → docx, Pillow → PIL).
+   */
+  private validatePythonImports(code: string, whitelist: string[]): void {
+    // Match: import pkg, from pkg import ..., import pkg.sub
+    const imports = [...code.matchAll(/(?:^|\n)\s*(?:import|from)\s+([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)/g)];
+
+    // Build allowed import names from whitelist
+    const allowedImports = new Set([...PYTHON_BUILTINS, ...whitelist.map((p) => PYTHON_IMPORT_NAME_MAP[p] || p)]);
+
+    for (const match of imports) {
+      const pkg = match[1];
+      if (allowedImports.has(pkg)) continue;
+
+      throw new CodeValidationError(
+        `Module "${pkg}" is not in the allowed whitelist. Allowed: ${[...allowedImports].join(', ')}`,
+        `import ${pkg}`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export class CodeValidationError extends Error {
+  constructor(
+    message: string,
+    public matchedPattern: string,
+  ) {
+    super(`Code validation failed: ${message}`);
+    (this as any).name = 'CodeValidationError';
+  }
+}