pixelkiln 0.26.0 → 0.28.0

package/README.md

@@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ Left/Right inspects alternatives, Enter or 1–9 selects, 0 leaves a row
 unresolved, and closing without **Apply selections** applies nothing
 ([CLI reference](docs/CLI.md#pick)). [`pixelkiln gallery`](docs/CLI.md#gallery)
 is its companion: every generation at integer zoom with its prompt, cost, hashes,
-lineage, and quality record; `--edit` changes prompts and adds assets; `--budget`
-generates and reviews from the page under that ceiling; `--json` prints the snapshot.
+lineage, and quality record; `--edit` changes prompts, adds assets, and serves a pinned,
+hash-verified [Pixelorama](docs/CLI.md#tools) build; `--budget` generates and reviews from the page.
 
 ![PixelKiln generation gallery UI](./website/public/gallery-ui-showcase.jpg)
 

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ reporter.
 ## Sensitive areas
 
 PixelKiln handles provider credentials, paid API actions, remote object deletion,
-local output paths, a localhost review server, and generated HTML containing
-provider data. Temporary provider result URLs can also contain signing
+local output paths, a localhost review server, generated HTML containing
+provider data, and a downloaded editor build served to the browser. Temporary provider result URLs can also contain signing
 credentials in their query string. Reports involving authentication leakage, path traversal,
 cross-origin review actions, HTML/script injection, unsafe overwrite/delete
 behavior, lockfile corruption, or budget bypass are security relevant.
@@ -46,3 +46,13 @@ download may retain its source locally so `fetch` can retry, but that in-flight
 lockfile should not be committed. `npm run test:security` checks every tracked
 JSON file for credential-bearing URLs and reports only the file and JSON path,
 never the sensitive value.
+
+The in-browser editor is fetched from a PixelKiln GitHub release and verified
+file by file against SHA-256 hashes pinned inside the package before anything
+is served; `PIXELKILN_EDITOR_URL` changes where the bytes come from but not
+what is accepted. The gallery serves it only under the pinned release path and
+only the pinned file names, with a Content-Security-Policy that keeps the
+editor page to its own files and lets only the gallery frame it. A report that
+the editor can be served from another location, that verification can be
+bypassed, or that the editor page can reach beyond its origin is security
+relevant.

package/dist/cli.d.ts

@@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ interface Args {
     tag: boolean;
     /** gallery: allow the page to edit manifest intent (prompts, sizes, tags, new assets). */
     edit: boolean;
+    /** gallery: do not offer the in-browser editor even with --edit. */
+    noEditor: boolean;
     /** fetch: re-download downloaded outputs and replace files whose object changed upstream. */
     refresh: boolean;
     from?: string;
@@ -88,7 +90,7 @@ interface Args {
      */
     explicitLock?: string;
 }
-declare const COMMANDS: readonly ["init", "plan", "doctor", "gen", "submit", "poll", "pick", "fetch", "restore", "adopt", "accept", "salvage", "purge", "prune", "audit", "cache", "pack", "mount", "export", "tag", "balance", "status", "gallery", "edit", "quality", "refine", "recipe", "workspace", "help", "--help", "-h", "--version", "-v"];
+declare const COMMANDS: readonly ["init", "plan", "doctor", "gen", "submit", "poll", "pick", "fetch", "restore", "adopt", "accept", "salvage", "purge", "prune", "audit", "cache", "pack", "mount", "export", "tag", "balance", "status", "gallery", "edit", "tools", "quality", "refine", "recipe", "workspace", "help", "--help", "-h", "--version", "-v"];
 /**
  * Strict parsing. Unknown flags are a hard error rather than being ignored,
  * because a silently-dropped filter is expensive here: `--styles neon` (plural,