pi-task-tracker 0.2.2 → 0.2.4

package/README.md

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ Optional `taskTracker` key in `~/.pi/agent/settings.json` (all default to `true`
 - `readme` — maintain the `README.md` project-structure section
 - `autoCommit` — per-task commits; these are the `/rollback` checkpoints, so disabling this also disables rollback targets
 - `guard` — master switch for the built-in permission layer (default `true`). Set `false` to defer permission decisions entirely to another extension (e.g. `pi-permission-system`): no external-write checks, no git-ask prompts, no cd sandbox.
-- `externalWrite` — policy for tool calls that would create/modify files OUTSIDE the session directory: `"block"` (default, hard deny — external changes cannot be tracked or rolled back), `"ask"` (per-attempt confirmation), `"off"` (no enforcement; `pi-permission-system` rules still apply). Reads stay free. Copying files FROM outside INTO the session is allowed (`cp` checks only its destination); moving/deleting external paths is blocked. Everything INSIDE the session directory passes by default — the only sandbox-internal intervention is the `cd` disable. Git history protection is **inherited**: history-rewriting git (rebase/reset/amend/force-push/clean/...) prompts for confirmation right here, so `pi-permission-system` can be uninstalled without losing that layer; routine git passes untouched, an external `git init`/`clone` is allowed with a heads-up that the new repo is not tracked. Shell commands are analyzed statically (redirects, `rm/mv/cp/touch/...`, `cd` tracking, PowerShell equivalents); git protection is inherited from `pi-permission-system` — routine git passes untouched and history-rewriting git still prompts there; only redirect targets and `-C` destinations on git segments are checked. **`cd`/`Set-Location` are disabled outright** (sandbox design: pi's bash tool runs each command in a fresh child process pinned to the session directory anyway, so a `cd` can never move the session — denying it keeps the analysis simple and the writable scope exactly the trackable scope).
+- `externalWrite` — policy for tool calls that would create/modify files OUTSIDE the session directory: `"block"` (default, hard deny — external changes cannot be tracked or rolled back), `"ask"` (per-attempt confirmation), `"off"` (no enforcement; `pi-permission-system` rules still apply). Reads stay free. Copying files FROM outside INTO the session is allowed (`cp` checks only its destination); moving/deleting external paths is blocked. Everything INSIDE the session directory passes by default — the only sandbox-internal intervention is the `cd` disable. Git history protection is **inherited**: history-rewriting git (rebase/reset/amend/force-push/clean/...) prompts for confirmation right here, so `pi-permission-system` can be uninstalled without losing that layer; routine git passes untouched, an external `git init`/`clone` is allowed with a heads-up that the new repo is not tracked. Shell commands are analyzed statically (redirects, `rm/mv/cp/touch/...`, `cd` tracking, PowerShell equivalents); git protection is inherited from `pi-permission-system` — routine git passes untouched and history-rewriting git still prompts there; only redirect targets and `-C` destinations on git segments are checked. **`cd` is free inside the session directory; a `cd` that would move the working directory outside it is blocked** (that is the one operation that changes pi's effective scope). No cd-tracking is performed — resolution baseline stays the session root, so a deep in-session `cd` followed by enough `../` levels to escape may over-block, which is the fail-safe direction.
 
 ## Requirements
 

package/index.ts

@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ function findEnclosingRepo(dir: string): string | null {
 // ---- External-write guard ----
 // Enforces the tracking boundary as a write boundary: pi-task-tracker can
 // only track (and therefore only roll back) the session directory, so by
-// default (config taskTracker.externalWrite="block") tool calls that would
+// default (config taskTracker.externalWrite="ask") tool calls that would
 // create/modify files OUTSIDE it are denied. Reads stay free. Git command
 // protection is inherited from pi-permission-system's bash rules (rebase/
 // reset/amend/force-push/... ask there): this guard never inspects git
@@ -184,8 +184,20 @@ function guardShellExternalWrite(cmd: string, sessionCwd: string): { block?: str
   const out: { block?: string; ask?: string; notify?: string } = {};
   for (const seg of segments) {
     if (/^(cd|sl|set-location)\s/i.test(seg)) {
-      out.block = "cd is disabled in this sandbox; run commands from the session directory";
-      return out;
+      // only a cd that would move the working directory OUTSIDE the session
+      // is stopped; in-session cd is free. Resolution baseline stays
+      // sessionCwd (no cd tracking) - documented limitation: a deep in-session
+      // cd followed by enough ../ levels to escape the session may over-block,
+      // which is the fail-safe direction.
+      const arg = seg.replace(/^(cd|sl|set-location)\s+/i, "").trim();
+      if (arg) {
+        const r = guardResolve(sessionCwd, arg);
+        if (r.external) {
+          out.block = r.abs;
+          return out;
+        }
+      }
+      continue;
     }
     // 2. redirects: > >> 2> 2>> &> &>> >| (not heredocs, not fd dups like 2>&1)
     for (const m of seg.matchAll(/(?:^|[^<>&=(])(?:\d?>{1,2}|&>>?|>\|)\s*([^\s;&|]+)/g)) {
@@ -296,7 +308,7 @@ async function guardExternalWriteHit(
         if (ok) return null;
         return `pi-task-tracker scope guard: user denied external write to '${hit.block}'. Do not retry or bypass.`;
       }
-      return `pi-task-tracker scope guard (externalWrite=block): this command writes to '${hit.block}' outside the session directory. ${why} Stay inside the session directory, or have the user adjust taskTracker.externalWrite / run it manually.`;
+      return `pi-task-tracker scope guard (externalWrite=${mode}): this command writes to '${hit.block}' outside the session directory. ${why} Stay inside the session directory, or have the user adjust taskTracker.externalWrite / run it manually.`;
     }
     return null;
   }
@@ -318,7 +330,7 @@ async function guardExternalWriteHit(
     if (ok) return "__ask__";
     return `pi-task-tracker scope guard: user denied external write to '${p}'. Do not retry or bypass.`;
   }
-  return `pi-task-tracker scope guard (externalWrite=block): tool '${toolName}' targets '${p}' outside the session directory. ${why} Ask the user to adjust taskTracker.externalWrite or perform the change manually.`;
+  return `pi-task-tracker scope guard (externalWrite=${mode}): tool '${toolName}' targets '${p}' outside the session directory. ${why} Ask the user to adjust taskTracker.externalWrite or perform the change manually.`;
 }
 
 function isExternalAbs2(base: string, p: string): boolean {
@@ -577,7 +589,7 @@ interface TrackerConfig {
 }
 
 function readConfig(): TrackerConfig {
-  const fallback: TrackerConfig = { todo: true, readme: true, autoCommit: true, externalWrite: "block", guard: true };
+  const fallback: TrackerConfig = { todo: true, readme: true, autoCommit: true, externalWrite: "ask", guard: true };
   try {
     const dir = process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR || path.join(os.homedir(), ".pi", "agent");
     const file = process.env.PI_TRACKER_SETTINGS || path.join(dir, "settings.json");
@@ -588,7 +600,7 @@ function readConfig(): TrackerConfig {
       readme: t.readme !== false,
       autoCommit: t.autoCommit !== false,
       guard: t.guard !== false,
-      externalWrite: t.externalWrite === "ask" || t.externalWrite === "off" ? t.externalWrite : "block",
+      externalWrite: t.externalWrite === "block" || t.externalWrite === "off" ? t.externalWrite : "ask",
     };
   } catch {
     return fallback;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "pi-task-tracker",
-  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "version": "0.2.4",
   "description": "Task workflow tracking for the pi coding agent: TODO/README maintenance, per-task git auto-commits as checkpoints, and an interactive /rollback. Hashline-aware, nested-repo aware, subagent-artifact-safe.",
   "keywords": [
     "pi-package",