pi-roundtable 0.7.5 → 0.7.7

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -5,6 +5,21 @@ The format follows [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.7.7] - 2026-10-03
+
+### Changed
+
+- `scrubDiagnostic` takes linear time on a long run of `eyJ-` too: the JWT pattern now starts at the beginning of a run (a JWT glued directly after `-` is no longer masked by that pattern, only as the value of a secret-named field).
+- `scrubDiagnostic` reads a quoted value up to its closing quote, so a secret holding `}`, `]`, blanks, `&`, `,` or `;` is masked whole; `}` and `]` end only an unquoted value. A value an earlier rule already masked is not masked again (no `[redacted]]`).
+
+## [0.7.6] - 2026-10-03
+
+### Changed
+
+- `scrubDiagnostic` takes time linear in the text at any bound (`diagnosticChars: Infinity` included): every pattern starts at the beginning of a run through a lookbehind, and a value is read only for a secret-named field.
+- `scrubDiagnostic` no longer masks what is not a secret: plural `tokens` counters (`max_tokens`, `input_tokens`), a numeric value of a token name, setting names such as `password_policy` or `token_limit`, and the word after `Basic`, `Bearer` or `token` unless it has a credential shape. A value ends at `}` and `]`.
+- Drawing: `permissive` also accepts an empty relationship-map node id (the argument schema allows it), draws a sigil whose intention has no letters or is blank, and ignores a sacred-geometry color canvas cannot parse.
+
 ## [0.7.5] - 2026-10-03
 
 ### Added

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
 	"name": "pi-roundtable",
-	"version": "0.7.5",
+	"version": "0.7.7",
 	"description": "A plugin-driven Pi agent server for Discord",
 	"type": "module",
 	"license": "MIT",

package/src/kit/diagnostics.ts

@@ -1,40 +1,118 @@
+/*
+ * A pattern whose first characters can recur inside the run it then scans (a leading `\b` before a
+ * repeatable class, or a literal such as `eyJ` that may appear again after a `-`) restarts at every
+ * repeat and takes quadratic time. Those patterns start at the beginning of a run of their own
+ * character class through a lookbehind; the others begin with a literal that cannot recur inside
+ * what they scan. Scrubbing then takes time linear in the text at any length.
+ */
+
 /** Tool text that may name a credential: userinfo in URLs, bearer values, and well-known token shapes. */
-const CREDENTIALS: [RegExp, string][] = [
-	[/\b([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^\s/@]+@/gi, "$1[redacted]@"],
+const CREDENTIALS: [RegExp, string | ((...match: string[]) => string)][] = [
+	[/(?<![a-z0-9+.-])([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^\s/@]+@/gi, "$1[redacted]@"],
 	[
 		/\b(authorization|proxy-authorization)\s*[:=]\s*[^\r\n]+/gi,
 		"$1: [redacted]",
 	],
-	[/\b(bearer|basic|token)\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,}/gi, "$1 [redacted]"],
 	[
-		/\b(gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}|xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,})\b/g,
-		"[redacted]",
+		/\b(bearer|basic|token)(\s+)([A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]{8,})/gi,
+		(match, scheme = "", _space = "", value = "") =>
+			looksLikeCredential(value) ? `${scheme} [redacted]` : match,
 	],
-	// Assignments, query parameters and JSON fields whose name says it is a secret, in any case.
 	[
-		/\b([a-z0-9_-]*(?:token|secret|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|credential)[a-z0-9_-]*)(["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?)[^\s"',&;]+/gi,
-		"$1$2[redacted]",
+		/\b(gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,}|glpat-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}|sk-[A-Za-z0-9_-]{16,}|xox[abprs]-[A-Za-z0-9-]{10,}|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{30,})\b/g,
+		"[redacted]",
 	],
 	[
 		/\b(cookie|set-cookie|x-api-key|x-auth-token|x-access-token)\s*:\s*[^\r\n]+/gi,
 		"$1: [redacted]",
 	],
-	[/\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g, "[redacted]"],
+	[
+		/(?<![A-Za-z0-9_-])eyJ[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_-]*/g,
+		"[redacted]",
+	],
 	[
 		/-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?(?:-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----|$)/g,
 		"[redacted]",
 	],
 ];
 
+/** A bare word such as "authentication" is not a credential; a value with digits, symbols or inner capitals, or a very long one, may be. */
+function looksLikeCredential(value: string): boolean {
+	return (
+		/[0-9+/=_~]/.test(value) || /[a-z][A-Z]/.test(value) || value.length >= 32
+	);
+}
+
+/** Names that say the value is a secret. A plural `tokens` counts tokens, and is not one. */
+const SECRET_NAME =
+	/token(?!s(?![a-z]))|secret|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|credential/i;
+/** What a name may continue with after the keyword and still hold a setting, not a secret. */
+const SETTING_SUFFIX =
+	/^[_-]?(?:policy|policies|rules?|length|count|limit|max|min|type|format|expir\w*|ttl|lifetime|required|enabled|strategy|file|path|url|name|field|prompt|hint|window|budget|usage)(?![a-z])/i;
+
+/** Whether the name says its value is a secret; a count is not a token, so a token name needs a non-numeric value. */
+function secretKind(name: string): "secret" | "token" | undefined {
+	const keyword = SECRET_NAME.exec(name);
+	if (!keyword) return undefined;
+	const rest = name.slice(keyword.index + keyword[0].length);
+	if (SETTING_SUFFIX.test(rest)) return undefined;
+	return /^token/i.test(keyword[0]) ? "token" : "secret";
+}
+
+/** The name and separator of an assignment, query parameter or JSON field; the value is read separately. */
+const ASSIGNMENT = /(?<![a-z0-9_-])([a-z0-9_-]+)(["']?\s*[:=]\s*["']?)/gi;
+/** An unquoted value ends at a blank, a quote, a separator or a closing bracket. */
+const UNQUOTED = /[^\s"',&;}\]]+/y;
+/** A quoted value runs to its closing quote, whatever it holds. */
+const DOUBLE_QUOTED = /[^"]+/y;
+const SINGLE_QUOTED = /[^']+/y;
+
+/** The value that follows a separator ending in `end`, or undefined when there is none. */
+function valueAt(
+	text: string,
+	end: number,
+	separator: string,
+): string | undefined {
+	const quote = separator.endsWith('"')
+		? DOUBLE_QUOTED
+		: separator.endsWith("'")
+			? SINGLE_QUOTED
+			: UNQUOTED;
+	quote.lastIndex = end;
+	return quote.exec(text)?.[0];
+}
+
+/** Masks the value of every assignment whose name says it is a secret, in any case. */
+function maskAssignments(text: string): string {
+	let out = "";
+	let cursor = 0;
+	for (const match of text.matchAll(ASSIGNMENT)) {
+		const start = match.index ?? 0;
+		const end = start + match[0].length;
+		if (start < cursor) continue;
+		// The value is read only for a secret name, so ordinary text costs nothing more to pass.
+		const kind = secretKind(match[1] ?? "");
+		if (!kind) continue;
+		const value = valueAt(text, end, match[2] ?? "");
+		// An earlier rule already masked this value.
+		if (value === undefined || value.startsWith("[redacted")) continue;
+		if (kind === "token" && /^[0-9]+$/.test(value)) continue;
+		out += `${text.slice(cursor, end)}[redacted]`;
+		cursor = end + value.length;
+	}
+	return out + text.slice(cursor);
+}
+
 /**
  * Text from a failed subprocess or worker, safe to show a model or the owner: credentials are
  * masked, control characters are removed, and the length is bounded. Empty input returns "".
  */
 export function scrubDiagnostic(text: string, max = 600): string {
-	// The patterns run on a bounded prefix, so hostile input cannot make them slow.
+	// Only what could survive the final cut is scrubbed, so the work follows the bound asked for.
 	let clean = text.slice(0, Math.max(max * 4, 4096));
 	for (const [pattern, replacement] of CREDENTIALS)
-		clean = clean.replace(pattern, replacement);
+		clean = clean.replace(pattern, replacement as string);
+	clean = maskAssignments(clean);
 	clean = Array.from(clean, (char) => {
 		const code = char.charCodeAt(0);
 		// Keep tab and newline; every other control character becomes a space.