pi-polkit 0.1.0 → 0.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +71 -0
- package/README.md +66 -12
- package/package.json +3 -3
- package/polkit-redirect.ts +11 -7
- package/polkit-shims.ts +536 -78
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -5,6 +5,77 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
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The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/),
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and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [0.2.0] - 2026-11-05
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### Added
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- `sudo -n`, `doas -n`: a non-interactive `pkcheck` on
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`org.freedesktop.policykit.exec` decides whether the command runs. polkit grants
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it without asking, or the shim exits `1` with `sudo: a password is required` and
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the reason that dropping `-n` lets the agent answer. Measured: a successful
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`pkexec` leaves no temporary authorization behind (`pkcheck --list-temp` stays
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empty), so the silent second run is the agent's own password cache and no
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non-interactive query can predict it; `-n` therefore reports policy, not a
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guess.
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- `sudo -v` performs the authentication (`pkcheck --allow-user-interaction`) and
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exits `0`, `1`, `126` when the dialog is dismissed, or `127`; `sudo -nv` uses
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the non-interactive check.
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- `sudo -l` prints `pkaction --verbose` for the action and this session's
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temporary authorizations.
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- `sudo -k`/`-K` revoke polkit's temporary authorizations and say that an agent's
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own password cache cannot be cleared from here.
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- `sudo -H`, `-N`, `-P` are accepted as no-ops: pkexec already sets `HOME`, keeps
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no timestamp and leaves groups alone.
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- `sudo -s COMMAND` and `--shell` run the command through a shell, `sudo -b`
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starts it in the background and returns, and `sudo -E`/
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`--preserve-env[=LIST]` re-export the environment inside the command.
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- `sudo --help` and `sudo -V` are answered by the real binary, so scripts that
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probe sudo keep working.
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- Short options bundle (`sudo -nu bob`), and unknown long options report their own
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name instead of `--`.
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- Registered bash tool: one guideline line tells the model that elevation goes
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through polkit, what `-n`, `-v` and `-l` answer, so it plans with the real
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contract instead of learning it from a failed call.
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- `pi-polkit-env`: helper that turns `NAME=VALUE` arguments into export
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statements. `-E` passes entries through argv (`env -0` into `xargs -0`), so
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spaces, quotes and newlines survive, and it drops every shim directory from
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`PATH` so an elevated command cannot resolve sudo back to a shim.
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### Changed
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- The shims share one prologue: `fail`, the polkit subject (pinned with
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`pid,start-time,uid` as `pkcheck(1)` requires), the two checks and the `pkexec`
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wrapper.
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- `-n` failures exit `1` like sudo, not `64`: `64` now means only that the
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invocation cannot be expressed. README documents the four-way handling
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(translated, no-op, checked, refused) and polkit's missing temp authorization.
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- `sudo -i`, `-S`, `-A`, `sudoedit` and `visudo` still refuse, now from the shared
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prelude.
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## [0.1.1] - 2026-11-04
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### Added
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- `polkit-shims.ts`: `su` stand-in. `su -c COMMAND [USER]` (also `-cCOMMAND`,
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`--command COMMAND`, `--command=COMMAND`) becomes
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`pkexec --keep-cwd --user USER sh -c COMMAND`, because a non-login `su`
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keeps the working directory and runs its command through a shell. Every other
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form is refused with status `64` and one line naming the alternative: `su`,
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`su -`, `su -l` (login shell → `pkexec bash`), `-m`/`-p`/`-w` (pkexec
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sanitizes the environment), `-s` (name the shell in the command), `-g`/`-G`
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(pkexec cannot switch groups), `--pty` (no terminal), `-f` and
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`--session-command`.
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- README scope statement: the extension covers elevation → polkit only;
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ssh, gpg/pinentry, keyrings, database clients, `kinit` and disk encryption
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are explicitly out of scope and need an askpass helper or a PTY.
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### Changed
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- README authorisation note: a desktop agent may reuse the password it already
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holds, so a second command can run without a dialog; that cache belongs to
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the agent and must not be relied on. `su -c … USER` authenticates an
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administrator rather than `USER`, and runs the command with `sh -c`.
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## [0.1.0] - 2026-11-01
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### Added
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package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -1,10 +1,24 @@
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# pi-polkit
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Redirects `sudo` and `
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Redirects `sudo`, `doas` and `su -c` to `pkexec` inside Pi, so authorisation
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goes through the desktop's polkit agent (KDE, GNOME, …) instead of a terminal
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the shell tools do not have. Applies to the `bash` tool and to `!` user
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commands; `sudo` in other terminals is unchanged.
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## Scope
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This extension covers one category: **elevation → polkit**. It exists because
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the `bash` tool has no terminal, so any program that reads a password from
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`/dev/tty` fails there. `sudo`, `doas` and `su -c` are that category, and they
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are routed to `pkexec`, which asks the desktop's polkit agent instead.
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Password prompts that are not polkit's business are out of scope: `ssh`,
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`ssh-add`, `gpg`/pinentry, keyrings (`secret-tool`, KWallet), database clients
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(`psql`, `mysql -p`, `redis-cli`), `kinit`, and disk encryption (`cryptsetup`,
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`fscrypt`, `gocryptfs`). They read the process's own terminal, so they need an
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askpass helper or a pseudo-terminal, not polkit; mixing them in would make this
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extension's boundary meaningless.
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## Installation
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Install as a Pi package (published on npm):
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@@ -32,17 +46,31 @@ pi -e ./pi-polkit
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| `sudo apt install x` | polkit dialog, then runs as root |
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| `sudo -u bob …` | as above, as `bob` |
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| `cat x \| sudo tee y` | dialog for `tee` |
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| `sudo -n …` |
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| `sudo -
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| `sudo -n …` | runs only if polkit would authorise without asking; otherwise exit 1 with `sudo: a password is required` |
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| `sudo -v` | performs the authentication, as `sudo -v` does |
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| `sudo -l` | prints the polkit policy and this session's temporary authorizations |
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| `sudo -k`, `-K` | revokes polkit's temporary authorizations |
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| `sudo -H`, `-N`, `-P` | accepted: pkexec already does what they ask |
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| `sudo -s CMD` | runs `CMD` through a shell, as root |
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| `sudo -E …` | runs with the caller's environment |
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| `sudo -b …` | starts the command in the background |
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| `sudo --help`, `-V` | answered by the real sudo; nothing elevates |
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| `sudo -i`, `-S`, `-A` | refused, with the equivalent command |
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| `sudoedit`, `visudo` | refused, with the alternative |
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| `su -c 'id'` | dialog, then runs as root |
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| `su -c 'id' bob` | as above, as `bob` (administrator password) |
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| `su`, `su -`, `su -l` | refused: no interactive shell, no terminal |
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| `su -m`, `-s`, `-g`, `-w`, `--pty` | refused, with the alternative |
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| `pkexec …` | passed through |
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-
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An option is refused only when polkit cannot express it: it needs a terminal, a
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password channel polkit does not have, or an editor. Refusals exit with status 64
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and one line naming the alternative.
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## How it works
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-
`sudo` and `
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those instead of the system binaries, and they forward the command to
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`sudo`, `doas` and `su` stand-ins are placed first on `PATH`, so the shell
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resolves those instead of the system binaries, and they forward the command to
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`pkexec`. Command text is never rewritten, so quoting, pipes and subshells need
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no special handling.
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@@ -55,7 +83,9 @@ Two wiring paths put the stand-ins on `PATH`, one per execution form:
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line instead.
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The shim directory is created lazily in `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` (falling back to
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`/tmp`) as `0700` and removed at session shutdown.
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`/tmp`) as `0700` and removed at session shutdown. It also holds
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`pi-polkit-env`, the helper that `sudo -E` uses to re-export an environment
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pkexec stripped.
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## Authorisation
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one; other actions may not, according to policy. The extension takes no part in
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that decision.
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`org.freedesktop.policykit.exec` asks for administrator authentication on every
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call, but the desktop agent may keep the password it just received and answer
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the next challenge itself (KDE's agent does). A second command in the same
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session then runs without a dialog. That cache belongs to the agent: another
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agent, a restarted agent or a dismissed dialog means the next command prompts
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again, so do not rely on it.
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Measured on polkit 128 with `polkit-gnome`'s agent: after a successful `pkexec`,
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`pkcheck --list-temp` prints nothing and a non-interactive `pkcheck` still
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reports that authentication is required. polkit records no temporary
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authorization for this action, so the silent second run is the agent answering
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from its own copy of the password, and no user-space query can predict it. That
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is why `sudo -n` reports what the policy says rather than guessing whether a
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dialog would appear, and why `sudo -k` can only clear polkit's own record.
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## Limitations
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- Absolute paths (`/usr/bin/sudo`) and relative ones (`./sudo`) bypass `PATH`.
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- Commands that reset `PATH` (`env -i`, `PATH=/usr/bin …`) bypass it as well.
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- Programs that invoke `sudo` with a scrubbed environment bypass it.
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- `su -c … USER` authenticates an administrator (polkit), not `USER`, so an
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account that real `su` would allow can be refused here.
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- `su -c` runs the command with `sh -c`, not with the target user's login shell.
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- `sudo -E` re-exports the environment through `pkexec`'s argument list, so the
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values are visible in `ps` while the command starts. Exported shell functions
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are skipped, and `PATH` loses the shim directories.
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- `sudo -k` cannot clear the password a desktop agent holds; only polkit's
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temporary authorizations are revoked.
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- PowerShell is not handled; the extension targets Linux only.
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These bypass the redirect, not polkit, which still decides whether the command
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## Exit status
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| Status | Meaning
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| Status | Meaning |
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|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|
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| 1 | `-n` or `-v` could not be satisfied: polkit requires authentication, or refuses |
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| 126 | the polkit dialog was dismissed |
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| 127 | not authorized, or the program could not run |
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| 64 | the extension refused the invocation |
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Messages are in English.
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package/package.json
CHANGED
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{
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"name": "pi-polkit",
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"version": "0.
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"description": "Redirect sudo
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"version": "0.2.0",
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"description": "Redirect sudo, doas and su to pkexec in Pi via PATH shims, so the desktop polkit agent handles authentication",
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"type": "module",
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"pi": {
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"extensions": ["./index.ts"]
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"engines": {
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"node": ">=22.19.0"
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},
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"keywords": ["pi-package", "pi-extension", "sudo", "doas", "pkexec", "polkit", "security"],
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"keywords": ["pi-package", "pi-extension", "sudo", "doas", "su", "pkexec", "polkit", "security"],
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"license": "MIT",
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"repository": {
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"type": "git",
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package/polkit-redirect.ts
CHANGED
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import { polkitShimsPathExportLine, removePolkitShims, withPolkitShimsOnPath } from "./polkit-shims"
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/**
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* Redirects sudo and
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* Redirects sudo, doas and su -c to pkexec inside Pi, so authorisation goes
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* through the desktop's polkit agent (KDE, GNOME, …) instead of a terminal the
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* shell tools do not have. Applies to the `bash` tool and to `!` user
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* commands; `sudo` in other terminals is unchanged.
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*
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* The redirect is a PATH prepend, not a command rewrite: the shims in
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* polkit-shims.ts stand in for the sudo/doas binaries, and the shell's own
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* polkit-shims.ts stand in for the sudo/doas/su binaries, and the shell's own
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* name resolution picks them up for `sudo`, `$(sudo …)`, `xargs sudo`,
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* `FOO=1 sudo` and nested scripts alike. Nothing parses the command string,
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* and nothing parses pkexec's output: the shims hand pkexec's exit status
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// The bash tool spawns with a prepared environment, so the shims reach it as
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// a PATH prepend. Registering the built-in's own definition under its own
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// name replaces it and keeps its prompt metadata and renderers.
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-
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const bash = createBashToolDefinition(process.cwd(), {
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spawnHook: ({ command, cwd, env }) => ({ command, cwd, env: withPolkitShimsOnPath(env) }),
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})
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// The model plans privilege with what it knows about sudo. Say once, in the
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// system prompt, how this shell differs, so it does not learn it by failing.
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bash.promptGuidelines?.push(
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"`sudo`, `doas` and `su -c` are routed to pkexec, so a desktop polkit dialog authorises them instead of a terminal password prompt. `sudo -n` runs the command only if polkit would authorise it without asking, `sudo -v` performs the authentication, and `sudo -l` prints the polkit policy that decides.",
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)
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pi.registerTool(bash)
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pi.on("user_bash", () => ({ operations: polkitShimsUserBashOperations() }))
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}
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/**
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* Local shell operations whose commands resolve sudo through the shims. The
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* Local shell operations whose commands resolve sudo and su through the shims. The
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* `!` user commands run through pi's own bash backend with no prepared
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* environment, so the PATH prepend happens as the first command line; the
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|
38
42
|
* exit status and output of the command itself are unchanged.
|
package/polkit-shims.ts
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,82 +10,263 @@ import { isAbsolute, join } from "node:path"
|
|
|
10
10
|
*/
|
|
11
11
|
export const SHIM_USAGE_EXIT = 64
|
|
12
12
|
|
|
13
|
+
/** The action pkexec checks; the checks below ask polkit about the same one. */
|
|
14
|
+
const POLKIT_ACTION = "org.freedesktop.policykit.exec"
|
|
15
|
+
|
|
13
16
|
/**
|
|
14
|
-
* The
|
|
15
|
-
*
|
|
16
|
-
* and never parses what pkexec prints: the exit status is the whole result.
|
|
17
|
-
*
|
|
18
|
-
* Only options with an exact pkexec equivalent are translated. Everything
|
|
19
|
-
* else is refused with an actionable message rather than forwarded, because
|
|
20
|
-
* pkexec would reject it with a message that does not say what to do instead.
|
|
17
|
+
* The part every shim starts with: one refusal helper, and a check that the two
|
|
18
|
+
* polkit tools exist at all.
|
|
21
19
|
*/
|
|
22
|
-
const
|
|
23
|
-
# pi-polkit: sudo shim. Routes sudo to pkexec so polkit can authorize it.
|
|
24
|
-
# Generated at extension startup; do not edit.
|
|
25
|
-
|
|
26
|
-
fail() {
|
|
20
|
+
const SHIM_PRELUDE = `fail() {
|
|
27
21
|
printf 'pi-polkit: %s\\n' "$1" >&2
|
|
28
22
|
exit ${SHIM_USAGE_EXIT}
|
|
29
23
|
}
|
|
30
24
|
|
|
31
25
|
command -v pkexec >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail 'pkexec is not installed; install polkit'
|
|
26
|
+
command -v pkcheck >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail 'pkcheck is not installed; install polkit'
|
|
27
|
+
`
|
|
28
|
+
|
|
29
|
+
/**
|
|
30
|
+
* The checks that answer what sudo's timestamp file used to answer, plus the
|
|
31
|
+
* pkexec wrapper. Only exit statuses are read: pkcheck's messages and its
|
|
32
|
+
* `polkit.result` detail are localised and addressed to humans, so parsing them
|
|
33
|
+
* would break on the next locale or polkit release.
|
|
34
|
+
*/
|
|
35
|
+
const SHIM_CHECKS = `# The action pkexec checks: a pkcheck verdict on it describes what the next
|
|
36
|
+
# pkexec will do, which is how the shims answer what sudo's timestamp answered.
|
|
37
|
+
ACTION=${POLKIT_ACTION}
|
|
38
|
+
|
|
39
|
+
# pkcheck(1) warns that a bare pid races with pid reuse, so pin the start time.
|
|
40
|
+
subject() {
|
|
41
|
+
started=$(awk '{ print $22 }' /proc/$$/stat 2>/dev/null)
|
|
42
|
+
if [ -n "$started" ]; then
|
|
43
|
+
printf '%s,%s,%s' "$$" "$started" "$(id -u)"
|
|
44
|
+
else
|
|
45
|
+
printf '%s' "$$"
|
|
46
|
+
fi
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
# 0 grants the action without asking anyone, 2 requires authentication,
|
|
50
|
+
# 1 refuses it. pkcheck's own 126 (usage) and 127 (error) pass through.
|
|
51
|
+
check_without_prompt() {
|
|
52
|
+
pkcheck --action-id "$ACTION" --process "$(subject)" >/dev/null 2>&1
|
|
53
|
+
}
|
|
54
|
+
|
|
55
|
+
# The same check with the desktop agent allowed to answer. An agent that still
|
|
56
|
+
# holds the password answers without a dialog, which is why a 0 here also means
|
|
57
|
+
# the next pkexec runs as root without asking.
|
|
58
|
+
check_with_prompt() {
|
|
59
|
+
pkcheck --action-id "$ACTION" --process "$(subject)" --allow-user-interaction >/dev/null 2>&1
|
|
60
|
+
}
|
|
61
|
+
|
|
62
|
+
# -n means "run only if no one has to be asked". polkit cannot say whether the
|
|
63
|
+
# agent would answer from its cache, so a 2 is reported as needing a password
|
|
64
|
+
# and the command is not run: that is what -n promises, in both directions.
|
|
65
|
+
require_without_prompt() {
|
|
66
|
+
if [ -n "$noninteractive" ]; then
|
|
67
|
+
check_without_prompt
|
|
68
|
+
status=$?
|
|
69
|
+
case $status in
|
|
70
|
+
0)
|
|
71
|
+
return 0
|
|
72
|
+
;;
|
|
73
|
+
1)
|
|
74
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: %s: polkit denies %s to this process\\n' "$PROG" "$ACTION" >&2
|
|
75
|
+
exit 1
|
|
76
|
+
;;
|
|
77
|
+
2)
|
|
78
|
+
printf '%s: a password is required (polkit requires authentication for %s; drop -n to let the desktop agent answer, which it may do from its cache)\\n' "$PROG" "$ACTION" >&2
|
|
79
|
+
exit 1
|
|
80
|
+
;;
|
|
81
|
+
*)
|
|
82
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: %s: polkit check failed (status %s)\\n' "$PROG" "$status" >&2
|
|
83
|
+
exit 127
|
|
84
|
+
;;
|
|
85
|
+
esac
|
|
86
|
+
fi
|
|
87
|
+
return 0
|
|
88
|
+
}
|
|
89
|
+
|
|
90
|
+
# pkexec is silent when the dialog is dismissed (status 126), so say what the
|
|
91
|
+
# status means. Every other failure path already prints its own reason.
|
|
92
|
+
run_pkexec() {
|
|
93
|
+
pkexec "$@"
|
|
94
|
+
status=$?
|
|
95
|
+
if [ $status -eq 126 ]; then
|
|
96
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: %s\\n' 'the polkit authentication dialog was dismissed' >&2
|
|
97
|
+
fi
|
|
98
|
+
exit $status
|
|
99
|
+
}
|
|
100
|
+
`
|
|
101
|
+
|
|
102
|
+
/**
|
|
103
|
+
* The sudo shim. Lives on PATH ahead of the real sudo, so the shell — not this
|
|
104
|
+
* extension — decides that `sudo` means this file. It forwards to pkexec and
|
|
105
|
+
* never parses what pkexec prints: the exit status is the whole result.
|
|
106
|
+
*
|
|
107
|
+
* Options are handled in four ways, and only the last one refuses. Those whose
|
|
108
|
+
* effect pkexec already has (`-H`, `-N`, `-P`) are accepted as no-ops; those
|
|
109
|
+
* polkit answers better than a run (`-n`, `-v`, `-l`, `-k`) become checks; those
|
|
110
|
+
* a wrapper can express (`-s COMMAND`, `-E`, `-b`) are translated; the rest,
|
|
111
|
+
* which need a terminal or a password channel polkit does not have, are refused
|
|
112
|
+
* with one line naming the alternative.
|
|
113
|
+
*/
|
|
114
|
+
const SUDO_SHIM = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
115
|
+
# pi-polkit: sudo shim. Routes sudo to pkexec so polkit can authorize it.
|
|
116
|
+
# Generated at extension startup; do not edit.
|
|
32
117
|
|
|
118
|
+
${SHIM_PRELUDE}
|
|
119
|
+
${SHIM_CHECKS}
|
|
120
|
+
PROG=sudo
|
|
33
121
|
user=
|
|
122
|
+
noninteractive=
|
|
123
|
+
preserve=
|
|
124
|
+
preserve_names=
|
|
125
|
+
background=
|
|
126
|
+
mode=
|
|
127
|
+
|
|
34
128
|
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
35
129
|
case $1 in
|
|
36
130
|
--)
|
|
37
131
|
shift
|
|
38
132
|
break
|
|
39
133
|
;;
|
|
40
|
-
-u)
|
|
41
|
-
[ $# -ge 2 ] || fail 'sudo -u needs a username: -u USER PROGRAM'
|
|
42
|
-
user=$2
|
|
43
|
-
shift 2
|
|
44
|
-
;;
|
|
45
134
|
--user)
|
|
46
135
|
[ $# -ge 2 ] || fail 'sudo --user needs a username: --user USER PROGRAM'
|
|
47
136
|
user=$2
|
|
48
137
|
shift 2
|
|
49
138
|
;;
|
|
50
|
-
-u?*)
|
|
51
|
-
user=\${1#-u}
|
|
52
|
-
[ -n "$user" ] || fail 'sudo -u needs a username: -u USER PROGRAM'
|
|
53
|
-
shift
|
|
54
|
-
;;
|
|
55
139
|
--user=*)
|
|
56
140
|
user=\${1#--user=}
|
|
57
|
-
[ -n "$user" ] || fail 'sudo --user needs a username: --user USER PROGRAM'
|
|
58
141
|
shift
|
|
59
142
|
;;
|
|
60
|
-
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
143
|
+
--non-interactive)
|
|
144
|
+
noninteractive=1
|
|
145
|
+
shift
|
|
146
|
+
;;
|
|
147
|
+
--preserve-env)
|
|
148
|
+
preserve=1
|
|
149
|
+
shift
|
|
150
|
+
;;
|
|
151
|
+
--preserve-env=*)
|
|
152
|
+
preserve=1
|
|
153
|
+
preserve_names=\${1#--preserve-env=}
|
|
154
|
+
shift
|
|
155
|
+
;;
|
|
156
|
+
--set-home | --no-update | --preserve-groups)
|
|
157
|
+
shift
|
|
158
|
+
;;
|
|
159
|
+
--list)
|
|
160
|
+
mode=list
|
|
161
|
+
shift
|
|
62
162
|
;;
|
|
63
|
-
|
|
64
|
-
|
|
163
|
+
--validate)
|
|
164
|
+
mode=validate
|
|
165
|
+
shift
|
|
65
166
|
;;
|
|
66
|
-
-
|
|
67
|
-
|
|
167
|
+
--reset-timestamp | --remove-timestamp)
|
|
168
|
+
mode=revoke
|
|
169
|
+
shift
|
|
68
170
|
;;
|
|
69
|
-
|
|
70
|
-
|
|
171
|
+
--background)
|
|
172
|
+
background=1
|
|
173
|
+
shift
|
|
71
174
|
;;
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
73
|
-
|
|
175
|
+
--help)
|
|
176
|
+
mode=help
|
|
177
|
+
shift
|
|
74
178
|
;;
|
|
75
|
-
|
|
76
|
-
|
|
179
|
+
--version)
|
|
180
|
+
mode=version
|
|
181
|
+
shift
|
|
77
182
|
;;
|
|
78
|
-
|
|
79
|
-
|
|
183
|
+
--stdin | --askpass | --edit | --login)
|
|
184
|
+
case $1 in
|
|
185
|
+
--edit)
|
|
186
|
+
fail 'sudoedit is not supported; write a temp file and run pkexec install or pkexec cp on it.'
|
|
187
|
+
;;
|
|
188
|
+
--stdin)
|
|
189
|
+
fail 'sudo -S reads the password from stdin; pkexec authenticates through the polkit agent. Drop -S.'
|
|
190
|
+
;;
|
|
191
|
+
--askpass)
|
|
192
|
+
fail 'SUDO_ASKPASS does not apply to pkexec; drop -A.'
|
|
193
|
+
;;
|
|
194
|
+
*)
|
|
195
|
+
fail 'sudo -i opens a login shell; run pkexec bash instead.'
|
|
196
|
+
;;
|
|
197
|
+
esac
|
|
80
198
|
;;
|
|
81
|
-
|
|
82
|
-
|
|
199
|
+
--shell)
|
|
200
|
+
mode=shell
|
|
201
|
+
shift
|
|
83
202
|
;;
|
|
84
|
-
|
|
85
|
-
fail
|
|
203
|
+
--*)
|
|
204
|
+
fail "option has no pkexec equivalent: $1 (pkexec accepts --user, --keep-cwd, --disable-internal-agent)"
|
|
86
205
|
;;
|
|
87
206
|
-?*)
|
|
88
|
-
|
|
207
|
+
rest=\${1#-}
|
|
208
|
+
shift
|
|
209
|
+
while [ -n "$rest" ]; do
|
|
210
|
+
letter=\${rest%"\${rest#?}"}
|
|
211
|
+
rest=\${rest#?}
|
|
212
|
+
case $letter in
|
|
213
|
+
u)
|
|
214
|
+
if [ -n "$rest" ]; then
|
|
215
|
+
user=$rest
|
|
216
|
+
rest=
|
|
217
|
+
else
|
|
218
|
+
[ $# -ge 1 ] || fail 'sudo -u needs a username: -u USER PROGRAM'
|
|
219
|
+
user=$1
|
|
220
|
+
shift
|
|
221
|
+
fi
|
|
222
|
+
;;
|
|
223
|
+
n)
|
|
224
|
+
noninteractive=1
|
|
225
|
+
;;
|
|
226
|
+
E)
|
|
227
|
+
preserve=1
|
|
228
|
+
;;
|
|
229
|
+
H | N | P)
|
|
230
|
+
# pkexec already sets HOME, keeps no timestamp and leaves groups alone.
|
|
231
|
+
;;
|
|
232
|
+
b)
|
|
233
|
+
background=1
|
|
234
|
+
;;
|
|
235
|
+
l)
|
|
236
|
+
mode=list
|
|
237
|
+
;;
|
|
238
|
+
v)
|
|
239
|
+
mode=validate
|
|
240
|
+
;;
|
|
241
|
+
k | K)
|
|
242
|
+
mode=revoke
|
|
243
|
+
;;
|
|
244
|
+
s)
|
|
245
|
+
mode=shell
|
|
246
|
+
;;
|
|
247
|
+
h)
|
|
248
|
+
mode=help
|
|
249
|
+
;;
|
|
250
|
+
V)
|
|
251
|
+
mode=version
|
|
252
|
+
;;
|
|
253
|
+
i)
|
|
254
|
+
fail 'sudo -i opens a login shell; run pkexec bash instead.'
|
|
255
|
+
;;
|
|
256
|
+
e)
|
|
257
|
+
fail 'sudoedit is not supported; write a temp file and run pkexec install or pkexec cp on it.'
|
|
258
|
+
;;
|
|
259
|
+
S)
|
|
260
|
+
fail 'sudo -S reads the password from stdin; pkexec authenticates through the polkit agent. Drop -S.'
|
|
261
|
+
;;
|
|
262
|
+
A)
|
|
263
|
+
fail 'SUDO_ASKPASS does not apply to pkexec; drop -A.'
|
|
264
|
+
;;
|
|
265
|
+
*)
|
|
266
|
+
fail "option has no pkexec equivalent: -$letter (pkexec accepts --user, --keep-cwd, --disable-internal-agent)"
|
|
267
|
+
;;
|
|
268
|
+
esac
|
|
269
|
+
done
|
|
89
270
|
;;
|
|
90
271
|
*)
|
|
91
272
|
break
|
|
@@ -93,20 +274,148 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
|
93
274
|
esac
|
|
94
275
|
done
|
|
95
276
|
|
|
96
|
-
#
|
|
97
|
-
#
|
|
98
|
-
|
|
99
|
-
|
|
277
|
+
# --help and --version describe the binary, not the authorisation, so nothing is
|
|
278
|
+
# elevated: answering them exactly keeps scripts that probe sudo working.
|
|
279
|
+
if [ "$mode" = help ] || [ "$mode" = version ]; then
|
|
280
|
+
for candidate in /usr/bin/sudo /bin/sudo /usr/local/bin/sudo; do
|
|
281
|
+
[ -x "$candidate" ] || continue
|
|
282
|
+
if [ "$mode" = help ]; then
|
|
283
|
+
exec "$candidate" --help
|
|
284
|
+
fi
|
|
285
|
+
exec "$candidate" --version
|
|
286
|
+
done
|
|
287
|
+
fail 'the real sudo is not installed, so --help and --version cannot be answered'
|
|
288
|
+
fi
|
|
289
|
+
|
|
290
|
+
# -l reports the policy polkit will apply and the authorizations this session
|
|
291
|
+
# already holds. Both halves are local and never prompt.
|
|
292
|
+
if [ "$mode" = list ]; then
|
|
293
|
+
pkaction --action-id "$ACTION" --verbose || exit 127
|
|
294
|
+
printf '\\npi-polkit: temporary authorizations in this session\\n'
|
|
295
|
+
pkcheck --list-temp || exit 127
|
|
296
|
+
exit 0
|
|
297
|
+
fi
|
|
298
|
+
|
|
299
|
+
# -v asks the same question sudo -v asks: can authentication succeed right now?
|
|
300
|
+
if [ "$mode" = validate ]; then
|
|
301
|
+
if [ -n "$noninteractive" ]; then
|
|
302
|
+
check_without_prompt
|
|
303
|
+
else
|
|
304
|
+
check_with_prompt
|
|
305
|
+
fi
|
|
100
306
|
status=$?
|
|
101
|
-
|
|
102
|
-
|
|
307
|
+
case $status in
|
|
308
|
+
0)
|
|
309
|
+
exit 0
|
|
310
|
+
;;
|
|
311
|
+
1)
|
|
312
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: sudo: polkit denies %s to this process\\n' "$ACTION" >&2
|
|
313
|
+
exit 1
|
|
314
|
+
;;
|
|
315
|
+
2)
|
|
316
|
+
if [ -n "$noninteractive" ]; then
|
|
317
|
+
printf 'sudo: a password is required (polkit requires authentication for %s)\\n' "$ACTION" >&2
|
|
318
|
+
else
|
|
319
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: sudo: no polkit authentication agent answered\\n' >&2
|
|
320
|
+
fi
|
|
321
|
+
exit 1
|
|
322
|
+
;;
|
|
323
|
+
3)
|
|
324
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: %s\\n' 'the polkit authentication dialog was dismissed' >&2
|
|
325
|
+
exit 126
|
|
326
|
+
;;
|
|
327
|
+
*)
|
|
328
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: sudo: polkit check failed (status %s)\\n' "$status" >&2
|
|
329
|
+
exit 127
|
|
330
|
+
;;
|
|
331
|
+
esac
|
|
332
|
+
fi
|
|
333
|
+
|
|
334
|
+
# -k drops what polkit itself recorded. The password a desktop agent keeps is
|
|
335
|
+
# the agent's, not polkit's, so say that it stays.
|
|
336
|
+
if [ "$mode" = revoke ]; then
|
|
337
|
+
pkcheck --revoke-temp || exit 127
|
|
338
|
+
if [ $# -eq 0 ]; then
|
|
339
|
+
printf 'pi-polkit: %s\\n' 'revoked the temporary polkit authorizations; a desktop agent that caches the password keeps its own copy, so the next command may still not ask' >&2
|
|
340
|
+
exit 0
|
|
103
341
|
fi
|
|
104
|
-
|
|
342
|
+
fi
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
# -E: pkexec strips the environment, so name the variables again inside the shell
|
|
345
|
+
# that runs the command. Entries reach the helper as arguments, so spaces, quotes
|
|
346
|
+
# and newlines survive exactly; the helper also drops every shim directory from
|
|
347
|
+
# PATH, so an elevated command cannot resolve sudo back to a shim.
|
|
348
|
+
shim_dir=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd 2>/dev/null)
|
|
349
|
+
env_helper=$shim_dir/pi-polkit-env
|
|
350
|
+
[ -x "$env_helper" ] || fail "the pi-polkit environment helper is missing: $env_helper"
|
|
351
|
+
|
|
352
|
+
# Runs in the caller's shell, never in a command substitution: an exit there
|
|
353
|
+
# would only end the subshell, and a name reaches eval below, so it must be a
|
|
354
|
+
# name before that happens.
|
|
355
|
+
check_preserve() {
|
|
356
|
+
if [ -z "$preserve_names" ]; then
|
|
357
|
+
command -v xargs >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail '-E needs xargs to forward the environment; name the variables instead: --preserve-env=NAME[,NAME...]'
|
|
358
|
+
return 0
|
|
359
|
+
fi
|
|
360
|
+
old_ifs=$IFS
|
|
361
|
+
IFS=,
|
|
362
|
+
for name in $preserve_names; do
|
|
363
|
+
case $name in
|
|
364
|
+
'' | [0-9]* | *[!A-Za-z0-9_]*)
|
|
365
|
+
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
366
|
+
fail "not a variable name: $name"
|
|
367
|
+
;;
|
|
368
|
+
esac
|
|
369
|
+
done
|
|
370
|
+
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
371
|
+
}
|
|
372
|
+
|
|
373
|
+
export_prefix() {
|
|
374
|
+
if [ -n "$preserve_names" ]; then
|
|
375
|
+
set --
|
|
376
|
+
old_ifs=$IFS
|
|
377
|
+
IFS=,
|
|
378
|
+
for name in $preserve_names; do
|
|
379
|
+
is_set=
|
|
380
|
+
eval "is_set=\\\${$name+yes}"
|
|
381
|
+
[ -n "$is_set" ] || continue
|
|
382
|
+
eval "value=\\\${$name}"
|
|
383
|
+
set -- "$@" "$name=$value"
|
|
384
|
+
done
|
|
385
|
+
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
386
|
+
"$env_helper" "$@"
|
|
387
|
+
return
|
|
388
|
+
fi
|
|
389
|
+
env -0 | xargs -0 -n 64 "$env_helper"
|
|
105
390
|
}
|
|
106
391
|
|
|
392
|
+
require_without_prompt
|
|
393
|
+
|
|
394
|
+
[ $# -gt 0 ] || fail 'sudo needs a command: sudo [OPTIONS] COMMAND (an interactive shell needs a terminal)'
|
|
395
|
+
|
|
396
|
+
# -s runs the command through a shell, which pkexec expresses exactly.
|
|
397
|
+
if [ "$mode" = shell ]; then
|
|
398
|
+
set -- /bin/sh -c "$*"
|
|
399
|
+
fi
|
|
400
|
+
|
|
401
|
+
# The preserved environment is exported by a shell prologue, so the command keeps
|
|
402
|
+
# its own argv rather than being flattened into one string.
|
|
403
|
+
if [ -n "$preserve" ]; then
|
|
404
|
+
check_preserve
|
|
405
|
+
prefix=$(export_prefix)
|
|
406
|
+
set -- /bin/sh -c "\${prefix}exec \\"\\$@\\"" sh "$@"
|
|
407
|
+
fi
|
|
408
|
+
|
|
107
409
|
if [ -n "$user" ]; then
|
|
108
|
-
|
|
410
|
+
set -- --user "$user" "$@"
|
|
411
|
+
fi
|
|
412
|
+
|
|
413
|
+
# -b returns as soon as the command is started, as sudo -b does.
|
|
414
|
+
if [ -n "$background" ]; then
|
|
415
|
+
pkexec "$@" &
|
|
416
|
+
exit 0
|
|
109
417
|
fi
|
|
418
|
+
|
|
110
419
|
run_pkexec "$@"
|
|
111
420
|
`
|
|
112
421
|
|
|
@@ -115,14 +424,13 @@ const DOAS_SHIM = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
|
115
424
|
# pi-polkit: doas shim. Routes doas to pkexec so polkit can authorize it.
|
|
116
425
|
# Generated at extension startup; do not edit.
|
|
117
426
|
|
|
118
|
-
|
|
119
|
-
|
|
120
|
-
|
|
121
|
-
}
|
|
122
|
-
|
|
123
|
-
command -v pkexec >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail 'pkexec is not installed; install polkit'
|
|
124
|
-
|
|
427
|
+
${SHIM_PRELUDE}
|
|
428
|
+
${SHIM_CHECKS}
|
|
429
|
+
PROG=doas
|
|
125
430
|
user=
|
|
431
|
+
noninteractive=
|
|
432
|
+
mode=
|
|
433
|
+
|
|
126
434
|
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
127
435
|
case $1 in
|
|
128
436
|
--)
|
|
@@ -136,14 +444,15 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
|
136
444
|
;;
|
|
137
445
|
-u?*)
|
|
138
446
|
user=\${1#-u}
|
|
139
|
-
[ -n "$user" ] || fail 'doas -u needs a username: -u USER PROGRAM'
|
|
140
447
|
shift
|
|
141
448
|
;;
|
|
142
449
|
-n)
|
|
143
|
-
|
|
450
|
+
noninteractive=1
|
|
451
|
+
shift
|
|
144
452
|
;;
|
|
145
453
|
-s)
|
|
146
|
-
|
|
454
|
+
mode=shell
|
|
455
|
+
shift
|
|
147
456
|
;;
|
|
148
457
|
-C | -a | -L)
|
|
149
458
|
fail "option has no pkexec equivalent: $1"
|
|
@@ -157,49 +466,198 @@ while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
|
157
466
|
esac
|
|
158
467
|
done
|
|
159
468
|
|
|
160
|
-
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
162
|
-
|
|
163
|
-
|
|
164
|
-
|
|
165
|
-
|
|
166
|
-
|
|
167
|
-
fi
|
|
168
|
-
exit $status
|
|
169
|
-
}
|
|
469
|
+
require_without_prompt
|
|
470
|
+
|
|
471
|
+
[ $# -gt 0 ] || fail 'doas needs a command: doas [OPTIONS] COMMAND (an interactive shell needs a terminal)'
|
|
472
|
+
|
|
473
|
+
if [ "$mode" = shell ]; then
|
|
474
|
+
set -- /bin/sh -c "$*"
|
|
475
|
+
fi
|
|
170
476
|
|
|
171
477
|
if [ -n "$user" ]; then
|
|
172
|
-
|
|
478
|
+
set -- --user "$user" "$@"
|
|
173
479
|
fi
|
|
480
|
+
|
|
174
481
|
run_pkexec "$@"
|
|
175
482
|
`
|
|
176
483
|
|
|
484
|
+
/**
|
|
485
|
+
* The su shim. `su -c` is the only form pkexec can express exactly: a command
|
|
486
|
+
* run as the target user through a shell, in the current directory. Every
|
|
487
|
+
* other form asks for a login shell, an environment, a shell binary, a group
|
|
488
|
+
* or a terminal, none of which pkexec can honour, so it is refused instead.
|
|
489
|
+
*/
|
|
490
|
+
const SU_SHIM = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
491
|
+
# pi-polkit: su shim. Routes su -c to pkexec so polkit can authorize it.
|
|
492
|
+
# Generated at extension startup; do not edit.
|
|
493
|
+
|
|
494
|
+
${SHIM_PRELUDE}
|
|
495
|
+
${SHIM_CHECKS}
|
|
496
|
+
PROG=su
|
|
497
|
+
user=
|
|
498
|
+
cmd=
|
|
499
|
+
has_cmd=
|
|
500
|
+
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
501
|
+
case $1 in
|
|
502
|
+
--)
|
|
503
|
+
shift
|
|
504
|
+
break
|
|
505
|
+
;;
|
|
506
|
+
-c)
|
|
507
|
+
[ $# -ge 2 ] || fail 'su -c needs a command: su -c COMMAND [USER]'
|
|
508
|
+
cmd=$2
|
|
509
|
+
has_cmd=1
|
|
510
|
+
shift 2
|
|
511
|
+
;;
|
|
512
|
+
-c?*)
|
|
513
|
+
cmd=\${1#-c}
|
|
514
|
+
has_cmd=1
|
|
515
|
+
shift
|
|
516
|
+
;;
|
|
517
|
+
--command)
|
|
518
|
+
[ $# -ge 2 ] || fail 'su --command needs a command: su --command COMMAND [USER]'
|
|
519
|
+
cmd=$2
|
|
520
|
+
has_cmd=1
|
|
521
|
+
shift 2
|
|
522
|
+
;;
|
|
523
|
+
--command=*)
|
|
524
|
+
cmd=\${1#--command=}
|
|
525
|
+
has_cmd=1
|
|
526
|
+
shift
|
|
527
|
+
;;
|
|
528
|
+
- | -l | --login)
|
|
529
|
+
fail 'su starts a login shell; run pkexec bash instead.'
|
|
530
|
+
;;
|
|
531
|
+
-s | --shell | -s?* | --shell=*)
|
|
532
|
+
fail 'su -s picks the shell; name the shell in the command: pkexec sh -c ...'
|
|
533
|
+
;;
|
|
534
|
+
-m | -p | --preserve-environment)
|
|
535
|
+
fail 'pkexec deliberately sanitizes the environment; drop -m/-p.'
|
|
536
|
+
;;
|
|
537
|
+
-g | -G | --group | --supp-group | -g?* | -G?* | --group=* | --supp-group=*)
|
|
538
|
+
fail 'su -g/-G switches groups; pkexec can only switch users.'
|
|
539
|
+
;;
|
|
540
|
+
-w | --whitelist-environment | -w?* | --whitelist-environment=*)
|
|
541
|
+
fail 'su -w whitelists environment variables; pkexec sanitizes the environment.'
|
|
542
|
+
;;
|
|
543
|
+
-P | --pty)
|
|
544
|
+
fail 'su --pty asks for a terminal; the bash tool has none.'
|
|
545
|
+
;;
|
|
546
|
+
-f | --fast)
|
|
547
|
+
fail 'su -f is a shell flag; pass it to the shell in the command instead.'
|
|
548
|
+
;;
|
|
549
|
+
--session-command | --session-command=*)
|
|
550
|
+
fail 'su --session-command keeps the session; pkexec always starts a new process.'
|
|
551
|
+
;;
|
|
552
|
+
-h | --help | -V | --version)
|
|
553
|
+
fail "option has no pkexec equivalent: $1"
|
|
554
|
+
;;
|
|
555
|
+
-?*)
|
|
556
|
+
fail "unknown su option: $1"
|
|
557
|
+
;;
|
|
558
|
+
*)
|
|
559
|
+
[ -z "$user" ] || fail 'su passes arguments after the user name to the shell; use su -c COMMAND USER.'
|
|
560
|
+
user=$1
|
|
561
|
+
shift
|
|
562
|
+
;;
|
|
563
|
+
esac
|
|
564
|
+
done
|
|
565
|
+
|
|
566
|
+
# Operands after -- are the same user-then-nothing sequence.
|
|
567
|
+
while [ $# -gt 0 ]; do
|
|
568
|
+
[ -z "$user" ] || fail 'su passes arguments after the user name to the shell; use su -c COMMAND USER.'
|
|
569
|
+
user=$1
|
|
570
|
+
shift
|
|
571
|
+
done
|
|
572
|
+
|
|
573
|
+
[ -n "$user" ] || user=root
|
|
574
|
+
[ -n "$has_cmd" ] || fail 'su without -c opens an interactive shell; run pkexec bash instead.'
|
|
575
|
+
|
|
576
|
+
# su keeps the working directory unless it is a login shell, and --keep-cwd is
|
|
577
|
+
# how pkexec does the same.
|
|
578
|
+
run_pkexec --keep-cwd --user "$user" sh -c "$cmd"
|
|
579
|
+
`
|
|
580
|
+
|
|
581
|
+
/**
|
|
582
|
+
* The environment helper: turns `NAME=VALUE` arguments into an export statement
|
|
583
|
+
* each, so `-E` can rebuild the environment pkexec stripped. Values arrive as
|
|
584
|
+
* arguments rather than text, so spaces, quotes and newlines need no escaping on
|
|
585
|
+
* the way in. PATH keeps every entry except the shim directories.
|
|
586
|
+
*/
|
|
587
|
+
const POLKIT_ENV_HELPER = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
588
|
+
# pi-polkit: rebuilds a stripped environment. Generated at extension startup;
|
|
589
|
+
# do not edit.
|
|
590
|
+
|
|
591
|
+
for entry in "$@"; do
|
|
592
|
+
name=\${entry%%=*}
|
|
593
|
+
value=\${entry#*=}
|
|
594
|
+
case $name in
|
|
595
|
+
'' | [0-9]* | *[!A-Za-z0-9_]*)
|
|
596
|
+
continue
|
|
597
|
+
;;
|
|
598
|
+
PATH)
|
|
599
|
+
filtered=
|
|
600
|
+
old_ifs=$IFS
|
|
601
|
+
IFS=:
|
|
602
|
+
for dir in $value; do
|
|
603
|
+
case \${dir##*/} in
|
|
604
|
+
pi-polkit-*)
|
|
605
|
+
continue
|
|
606
|
+
;;
|
|
607
|
+
esac
|
|
608
|
+
filtered=$filtered\${filtered:+:}$dir
|
|
609
|
+
done
|
|
610
|
+
IFS=$old_ifs
|
|
611
|
+
value=$filtered
|
|
612
|
+
;;
|
|
613
|
+
esac
|
|
614
|
+
quote="'"
|
|
615
|
+
quoted=
|
|
616
|
+
while :; do
|
|
617
|
+
case $value in
|
|
618
|
+
*"$quote"*)
|
|
619
|
+
quoted=$quoted\${value%%"$quote"*}"'\\\\''"
|
|
620
|
+
value=\${value#*"$quote"}
|
|
621
|
+
;;
|
|
622
|
+
*)
|
|
623
|
+
quoted=$quoted$value
|
|
624
|
+
break
|
|
625
|
+
;;
|
|
626
|
+
esac
|
|
627
|
+
done
|
|
628
|
+
printf "export '%s=%s'; " "$name" "$quoted"
|
|
629
|
+
done
|
|
630
|
+
`
|
|
631
|
+
|
|
632
|
+
|
|
177
633
|
/** sudoedit edits through sudo's own temporary-file flow; polkit has none. */
|
|
178
634
|
const SUDOEDIT_SHIM = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
179
|
-
|
|
180
|
-
|
|
635
|
+
${SHIM_PRELUDE}
|
|
636
|
+
fail 'sudoedit is not supported; write a temp file and run pkexec install or pkexec cp on it.'
|
|
181
637
|
`
|
|
182
638
|
|
|
183
639
|
/** visudo needs an interactive editor on a terminal the shell tool does not have. */
|
|
184
640
|
const VISUDO_SHIM = `#!/bin/sh
|
|
185
|
-
|
|
186
|
-
|
|
641
|
+
${SHIM_PRELUDE}
|
|
642
|
+
fail 'visudo needs an interactive terminal; validate a candidate file with pkexec visudo -c -f FILE instead.'
|
|
187
643
|
`
|
|
188
644
|
|
|
189
645
|
/** File name → script body. Names must match the commands being redirected. */
|
|
190
646
|
const POLKIT_SHIM_SCRIPTS: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
191
647
|
sudo: SUDO_SHIM,
|
|
192
648
|
doas: DOAS_SHIM,
|
|
649
|
+
su: SU_SHIM,
|
|
193
650
|
sudoedit: SUDOEDIT_SHIM,
|
|
194
651
|
visudo: VISUDO_SHIM,
|
|
652
|
+
"pi-polkit-env": POLKIT_ENV_HELPER,
|
|
195
653
|
}
|
|
196
654
|
|
|
197
655
|
/** Shim directory of the running extension; created on first use, cleared by removePolkitShims. */
|
|
198
656
|
let shimDirectory: string | undefined
|
|
199
657
|
|
|
200
658
|
/**
|
|
201
|
-
* Returns the shim directory, writing the
|
|
202
|
-
*
|
|
659
|
+
* Returns the shim directory, writing the stand-in scripts on first use.
|
|
660
|
+
* Creation is lazy so factory-only invocations (runs that never start a
|
|
203
661
|
* session) leave nothing behind.
|
|
204
662
|
*/
|
|
205
663
|
export function ensurePolkitShims(): string {
|
|
@@ -219,7 +677,7 @@ export function removePolkitShims(): void {
|
|
|
219
677
|
|
|
220
678
|
/**
|
|
221
679
|
* Returns the environment with the shim directory first on PATH, so the shell
|
|
222
|
-
* resolves sudo and
|
|
680
|
+
* resolves sudo, doas and su to the shims instead of the system binaries. The
|
|
223
681
|
* prepend is idempotent: an environment that already carries the prefix is
|
|
224
682
|
* returned unchanged.
|
|
225
683
|
*/
|