pi-openai-toolkit 0.20.8 → 0.21.0

package/src/auto-mode/types.ts

@@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
-import type { AutoModeConfig } from "../types";
-
-export const AUTO_MODE_ENTRY_TYPE = "pi-openai-toolkit.auto-mode-decision.v1";
-export const AUTO_MODE_STATUS_KEY = "pi-openai-toolkit:auto-mode";
-export const AUTO_MODE_FLAG = "auto";
-export const AUTO_MODE_COMMAND = "auto";
-
-/**
- * Built-in tools that change state outside the conversation. Everything else is
- * read-only by default and only reviewed when the user opts in through
- * `autoMode.extraTools` or `gate: "all"`.
- */
-export const SIDE_EFFECT_TOOLS = ["bash", "write", "edit"] as const;
-
-export const MAX_REVIEW_INPUT_CHARS = 8_000;
-export const MAX_REVIEW_INTENT_CHARS = 2_000;
-export const MAX_REVIEW_REASON_CHARS = 600;
-export const MAX_REVIEW_MODEL_KEY_CHARS = 256;
-
-/** Budgets for the compact transcript handed to the reviewer. */
-export const MAX_TRANSCRIPT_CHARS = 24_000;
-export const MAX_TRANSCRIPT_TOOL_CHARS = 12_000;
-export const MAX_TRANSCRIPT_ENTRY_CHARS = 2_000;
-export const MAX_TRANSCRIPT_RECENT_ENTRIES = 40;
-export const TRUNCATION_MARKER = "<truncated />";
-
-/** Risk of the planned action itself, as scored by the reviewer. */
-export type RiskLevel = "low" | "medium" | "high" | "critical";
-
-/** How far the observed conversation actually authorizes that action. */
-export type UserAuthorization = "unknown" | "low" | "medium" | "high";
-
-/**
- * Why a review could not be completed. Kept separate from `deny` on purpose: an
- * infrastructure failure must never be reported to the agent as a safety verdict.
- */
-export type ReviewFailureCause =
-	| "not-configured"
-	| "timeout"
-	| "cancelled"
-	| "provider-error"
-	| "invalid-output";
-
-/**
- * The reviewer's full verdict. Only `outcome` is required from the model; the
- * remaining fields are back-filled by `parseReviewVerdict` so that a terse
- * `{"outcome":"allow"}` answer is still a usable, recordable decision.
- */
-export type GuardianVerdict = {
-	outcome: "allow" | "deny";
-	riskLevel: RiskLevel;
-	userAuthorization: UserAuthorization;
-	rationale: string;
-};
-
-/**
- * Result of asking the reviewer model about one pending tool call.
- * `unavailable` means the review could not be completed at all; it is never
- * treated as approval.
- */
-export type ReviewOutcome =
-	| {
-			kind: "allow";
-			verdict: GuardianVerdict;
-			reviewerModel: string;
-			evidenceRounds: number;
-	  }
-	| {
-			kind: "deny";
-			verdict: GuardianVerdict;
-			reviewerModel: string;
-			evidenceRounds: number;
-	  }
-	| { kind: "unavailable"; reason: string; cause: ReviewFailureCause };
-
-/** Non-blocking pre-score produced by the trajectory classifier. */
-export type ClassifierRisk = "low" | "high";
-
-/**
- * Why the classifier's cached score could or could not satisfy a gated call.
- * Mirrors the deferral reasons the blocking reviewer exists to cover: anything
- * other than `low_risk` falls through to the synchronous review.
- */
-export type FastDecisionReason =
-	| "low_risk"
-	| "elevated_risk"
-	| "stale_score"
-	| "scoring_failure"
-	| "missing_score"
-	| "authorization_changed"
-	| "requires_synchronous_review";
-
-export type AutoModeDecisionSource =
-	| "reviewer"
-	| "classifier"
-	| "human"
-	| "policy"
-	| "circuit-breaker";
-
-export type AutoModeDecisionRecord = {
-	timestamp: number;
-	toolName: string;
-	toolCallId: string;
-	decision:
-		| "allow"
-		| "deny"
-		| "unavailable-allowed"
-		| "unavailable-blocked"
-		| "turn-interrupted";
-	reason: string;
-	reviewerModel?: string;
-	source: AutoModeDecisionSource;
-	/** Present on reviewer verdicts; omitted for classifier fast paths. */
-	riskLevel?: RiskLevel;
-	userAuthorization?: UserAuthorization;
-	evidenceRounds?: number;
-	/** Only present when `source` is `classifier`. */
-	fastDecision?: FastDecisionReason;
-};
-
-export type AutoModeModelRef = {
-	provider?: string;
-	id?: string;
-};
-
-export type AutoModeGateSource = AutoModeConfig["gate"];
-
-/**
- * Truncate to a bounded single-line-safe diagnostic. Reviewer reasons and tool
- * arguments both originate from untrusted text, so every persisted copy is capped.
- */
-export function boundReviewText(value: unknown, maxChars: number): string {
-	const text = typeof value === "string" ? value : String(value ?? "");
-	const collapsed = text.replace(/[\u0000-\u0008\u000b\u000c\u000e-\u001f\u007f]/g, "").trim();
-	if (collapsed.length <= maxChars) return collapsed;
-	return `${collapsed.slice(0, Math.max(0, maxChars - 3))}...`;
-}