pi-mono-all 1.0.0

package/node_modules/pi-mono-sentinel/CHANGELOG.md

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+# pi-mono-sentinel
+
+## 1.10.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+### Enhanced: output-scanner whitelist
+
+- Secret-detection prompts for `read` now offer `Allow once`, `Always allow this file`, and `Deny` instead of only yes/no.
+- Bash file-read prompts can remember all flagged target files, so safe documentation/example-key files stop prompting repeatedly.
+
+## 1.10.0
+
+### Major Changes
+
+### Removed: token vault
+
+- Removed the `token-vault` guard (introduced in 1.9.0) — the feature did not work as expected.
+- Deleted `guards/token-vault.ts` and its registration in `index.ts`.
+- Removed `resolve_token`, `list_tokens`, `set_token` tools.
+- Removed `/token` command, bash token placeholder substitution, result sanitizer, and system prompt injection.
+- Added whitelist to sentinel permissions, to stop asking all the time.
+
+## 1.9.3
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+### Added: set_token tool
+
+- New `set_token({ name, value })` tool so the LLM can programmatically save a token after collecting it via `ask_user_question`. Completes the full automated flow: ask_user_question → set_token → resolve_token → `$TOKEN_name` in bash.
+- Updated `resolve_token` "not found" error to suggest `set_token` instead of `/token set`.
+- Rewrote system prompt injection to guide the LLM through `ask_user_question` → `set_token` → `resolve_token` flow, removing the old instruction to tell users to run `/token set`.
+
+## 1.9.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+### Enhanced: token vault
+
+- Inject a system-prompt reminder via `before_agent_start` so the LLM always knows to use `resolve_token`/`list_tokens` for API keys instead of `ask_user_question`.
+- Added `promptSnippet` and `promptGuidelines` to `resolve_token` and `list_tokens` tools for automatic discovery.
+
+## 1.9.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+### Enhanced: token vault
+
+- Added `promptSnippet` and `promptGuidelines` to `resolve_token` and `list_tokens` tools so the LLM automatically discovers and proactively uses them for authentication without user prompting.
+
+## 1.9.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+### Added: token vault
+
+- Added secure local token storage at `~/.pi/agent/tokens.json` with owner-only file permissions.
+- New LLM-safe tools: `resolve_token({ name })` returns only a masked confirmation and `list_tokens({})` lists names without values.
+- Resolved tokens can be used in bash via `$TOKEN_name` placeholder substitution and injected environment variables without exposing secrets to the model transcript.
+- Direct `read` / `write` / `edit` access to `tokens.json` is blocked; bash and read results are sanitized if a stored token value appears.
+- New `/token set|list|get|delete|env` command for user-side token management.
+
+## 1.8.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+### Added: permission-gate guard
+
+- New third guard `permission-gate` proactively intercepts raw `bash` commands and `write` / `edit` calls that perform out-of-scope or system-level operations — closing the gap left by `execution-tracker`, which only fires for files written earlier in the same session.
+- Bash risk classes: `remote-pipe-exec` (`curl|wget … | bash|sh|zsh`), `privilege-escalation` (`sudo`), `destructive-system-rm` (`rm -rf` on `/usr`, `/Library`, `/System`, `/opt`, `/etc`, `/var`, `/bin`, `/sbin`, `/private`, or `~`), `package-manager-install` (`brew install/upgrade/update/reinstall`), `persistence` (`crontab`, `systemctl enable`, `launchctl load`), `shell-config-write` (redirects/`tee` into `~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`, etc.), `system-binary-install` (`cp`/`mv`/`install`/`ln` into `/usr/local/bin`).
+- Path categories for `write` / `edit`: `shell-config`, `system-directory`, `outside-project`. Path resolution handles `~` expansion and `cwd`-relative paths correctly.
+- Project-local `rm -rf` (e.g. `node_modules`, `dist`) is intentionally not flagged — only system/home roots.
+- Fail-safe behavior: when no UI is available, dangerous operations are blocked with a descriptive `reason`; when UI is present, the user gets a single combined `confirm()` showing all matched labels.
+
+### Tests
+
+- New `permissions` suite covering bash command classification, path resolution (`~` expansion, cwd-relative, absolute) and path category classification.
+
+### Documentation
+
+- Updated sentinel README with the new guard, risk-class table, path-category table and decision matrix.
+
+## 1.7.2
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+### Fixed: ask-user-question
+
+- Remove unused `StringEnum` import from `@mariozechner/pi-ai`.
+
+## 1.7.1
+
+### Patch Changes
+
+### Fixed: team-mode
+
+- Widget no longer mislabels blocked or approval-pending teams as "running smoothly" — blockers and pending approvals are now detected via team summaries.
+- Preserve in-flight work on re-emitted `session_start` events instead of tearing the runtime down and SIGTERM-ing live teammates.
+- Auto-relaunch leaders for `running` teams after a session reset; surface failures as both a team signal and a UI notification.
+- `createTeam` now defaults `repoRoots` to `[process.cwd()]` when the caller passes an empty array.
+- Archive `process.json` into `history/` before a new task reuses the same role slot, so the prior task's final state is no longer silently clobbered.
+
+### Enhanced: team-mode
+
+- Durable intent queue for subprocess handoff: `team_spawn_teammate` calls made from a teammate subprocess are written to disk and executed by the main session's `LeaderRuntime` instead of spawning orphaned grand-children.
+- New tool `team_task_create_batch` lets the leader emit the full initial task DAG in one call, removing per-task LLM round-trips during bootstrap.
+- `team_create` / `launchLeader` accept an `awaitBootstrap` option so the user sees the task graph before the tool returns; leader launch retries up to 3 times on transient failures.
+- Persist per-turn debug artifacts (prompt, invocation, stderr, raw event stream) for both leader and teammate subprocesses, exposed via `TeammateSummary.debugArtifacts`.
+- Track `exitCode`, `exitSignal`, `terminationReason`, `stderrTail`, `toolExecutions`, `model` and `modelProvider` on every `TeammateProcess` record.
+- Provider detection now consults pi's `settings.json` and `auth.json` in addition to env vars; default model IDs aligned with the provider/model scheme.
+- `collectPiOutput` supports `AbortSignal` cancellation.
+
+### Tests
+
+- New `intent-queue` and `model-config` suites; expanded coverage across `leader-runtime`, `team-manager`, `team-query-tool` and `formatters`.
+
+## 1.7.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+### Enhanced: status-line
+
+- Improved progress rendering and colors in expert mode
+
+### Enhanced: team-mode
+
+- **LLM-driven leader** — replaced the hardcoded `research → synthesis → implementation → verification` state machine with a pi subprocess coordinator that authors the task graph via tool calls
+- **New tool `team_task_create`** so the leader can author tasks at runtime
+- **New tool `team_handoff`** for explicit teammate → teammate context handoffs (replaces regex-scraping of `Handoffs:` output sections)
+- **File-based teammate specs** — drop `.claude/teammates/<role>.md` frontmatter files (`name`, `description`, `needsWorktree`, `hasMemory`, `modelTier`) to extend or override the seven built-in roles
+- **Event-driven leader wakes** — mailbox messages addressed to the leader (or broadcast) trigger a debounced (~200ms) cycle instead of waiting for the 20s polling tick
+- **Templates accept any string** — `fullstack` / `research` / `refactor` remain as built-ins, but unknown template keys are accepted and no-op gracefully
+- **Provider config per team** — per-team model overrides via `/team models`
+- Reduced leader overhead and parent-session token churn
+- `spawnTeammate` now always appends the full runtime-built context (signals, mailbox, dependencies, team memory) so teammates get the richer snapshot even when the caller's `context` argument is brief
+
+### Breaking changes: team-mode
+
+- Removed `LeaderPhase` enum and `currentPhase` field from `TeamRecord` / `TeamSummary`
+- Removed `parseExplicitHandoffs` export and the legacy `Handoffs:` output parser — peer handoffs must go through the `team_handoff` tool
+- Removed the deterministic auto-spawn loop (`ensureBootstrapTasks`) — all task authoring and teammate spawning is now the LLM leader's responsibility
+- Removed `StringEnum` gate on `team_create`'s `template` parameter (now plain string)
+
+### Fixed: review
+
+- Annotate diff lines so the model picks correct line numbers
+- Fix slice chunk around lines for comments in the reviewer TUI
+
+### Documentation
+
+- Updated root README and sentinel extension README
+- Documented the new file-based teammate spec format and event-driven leader wake in the team-mode README
+
+## 1.6.0
+
+### Minor Changes
+
+Initial release of sentinel extension, replacing the previous `grep` extension with a security-focused monitoring and guarding system for sensitive operations.

package/node_modules/pi-mono-sentinel/README.md

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+# sentinel
+
+The `sentinel` extension adds content-aware security guards that intercept tool calls before they execute.
+
+It addresses cross-cutting security gaps that pure command-based guardrails miss:
+
+- **Content-in-location** — a file the agent is about to read contains secrets
+- **Indirect execution** — a file the agent wrote earlier in the session is later executed via `bash`
+- **Out-of-scope operations** — a raw `bash` command performs a system-level action (sudo, `curl | bash`, `brew install`, `rm -rf /Library/...`) or a `write`/`edit` targets a file outside the project root (shell config, system directory)
+- **Credential safety** — the LLM never hardcodes API keys or secrets in tool calls
+
+## Guards
+
+### 1. output-scanner — secret detection on read
+
+Pre-reads files before `read` tool calls execute and scans for credential patterns. If secrets are found, the user is asked before the read is allowed. The same guard also intercepts `bash` commands that read file content (`cat`, `head`, `tail`, `less`, `more`) and pre-scans their targets.
+
+Detected patterns include:
+
+- AWS access and secret keys
+- GitHub personal access and OAuth tokens
+- Anthropic, OpenAI, Slack, Stripe, Google OAuth keys
+- PEM private keys
+- Generic `secret/password/token/api_key = "..."` assignments
+- High-entropy strings above a Shannon-entropy threshold
+
+Scan results are cached per file by `mtime` and invalidated via `context-guard:file-modified` events. If a detected secret is safe for the current file (for example, documentation containing fake/example keys), the confirmation dialog offers **Allow once**, **Always allow this file**, or **Deny**. Remembered files are stored in Sentinel's persistent whitelist.
+
+### 2. execution-tracker — write/execute correlation
+
+Two hooks working together:
+
+- **Write-time tracking** — every `write` and `edit` tool call is recorded in a session write registry. The new content is scanned for dangerous patterns but the write is never blocked.
+- **Execution-time correlation** — when `bash` runs a script, the path is extracted and checked against the registry. If the script was written in this session and contains dangerous patterns, execution is escalated to the user (or blocked when there is no UI).
+
+Flagged patterns include `curl | bash`, `wget | bash`, `eval` against untrusted input, `curl -X POST` exfiltration, `rm -rf`, `chmod 777`, `sudo`, and persistence hooks (`crontab`, `systemctl enable`, `launchctl`).
+
+If the target file was modified after the tracked write, it is re-read and re-scanned before the decision — avoiding false positives when the agent rewrote the dangerous content out.
+
+### 3. permission-gate — proactive bash / write / edit gate
+
+Where `execution-tracker` only fires for _session-written_ scripts, `permission-gate` intercepts every `bash` command and every `write` / `edit` and matches them against a fixed set of risk classes. It runs in addition to the other two guards.
+
+**Bash risk classes**
+
+| Risk class                | Example                                            |
+| ------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
+| `remote-pipe-exec`        | `curl -Ls https://mise.run \| bash`                |
+| `privilege-escalation`    | `sudo systemctl restart nginx`                     |
+| `destructive-system-rm`   | `rm -rf /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools`       |
+| `package-manager-install` | `brew install ripgrep`                             |
+| `persistence`             | `crontab -l`, `systemctl enable`, `launchctl load` |
+| `shell-config-write`      | `echo "export FOO=1" >> ~/.zshrc`                  |
+| `system-binary-install`   | `cp ./mybin /usr/local/bin/mybin`                  |
+
+`rm -rf` on project-local paths (e.g. `node_modules`, `dist`, `./build/cache`) is intentionally not flagged.
+
+**Path categories for `write` / `edit`**
+
+| Category           | Example                                    |
+| ------------------ | ------------------------------------------ |
+| `shell-config`     | `~/.zshrc`, `~/.bashrc`, `~/.profile`      |
+| `system-directory` | `/usr/*`, `/Library/*`, `/opt/*`, `/etc/*` |
+| `outside-project`  | any absolute path not under `ctx.cwd`      |
+
+**Decision matrix**
+
+```
+UI available + user allows  → proceed
+UI available + user denies  → block with reason
+No UI + dangerous detected  → block with reason (fail-safe)
+No risk classes matched     → proceed
+```
+
+When multiple risk classes match a single command, all matched labels are surfaced in one combined confirmation dialog instead of stacking prompts.
+
+## Behavior
+
+- **No UI available** — guards fail safe by blocking with a clear `reason`.
+- **UI available** — the user sees a dialog with the matched labels, line numbers, and snippets, and can allow once, remember the file/path when supported, or deny.
+- Session state (scan cache, write registry) is cleared on `session_start`.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+pi install npm:pi-mono-sentinel
+```

package/node_modules/pi-mono-sentinel/__tests__/output-scanner.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/**
+ * Pi Sentinel — read-targets tests.
+ */
+
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { describe, test } from "node:test";
+
+import {
+	expandPaths,
+	extractReadTargets,
+} from "../patterns/read-targets.ts";
+
+describe("extractReadTargets", () => {
+	test("detects cat, head, tail, less, more", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("cat .env"), [".env"]);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("head -n 5 .env.local"), [
+			"5",
+			".env.local",
+		]);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("tail -f logs/app.log"), [
+			"logs/app.log",
+		]);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("less README.md"), ["README.md"]);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("more config.json"), ["config.json"]);
+	});
+
+	test("skips flags for direct commands", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("cat -n .env"), [".env"]);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("head --lines=10 .env"), [".env"]);
+	});
+
+	test("detects grep and rg", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets('grep -ri "linear" .env*'), [
+			".env*",
+		]);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("rg --hidden api_key src/"),
+			["api_key", "src/"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("grep pattern file1 file2"),
+			["pattern", "file1", "file2"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("skips quoted patterns in grep/rg", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets('grep -i "secret" .env .env.local'),
+			[".env", ".env.local"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("grep -E 'password|token' .env"),
+			[".env"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("stops at shell operators for grep/rg", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets('grep x .env | head -5'),
+			["x", ".env"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("grep x .env && cat .env"),
+			["x", ".env"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("detects awk and sed", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("awk '{print $1}' .env"),
+			[".env"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("sed 's/foo/bar/g' .env"),
+			[".env"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("detects jq and yq", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("jq '.api_key' config.json"),
+			["config.json"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			extractReadTargets("yq '.secrets' config.yaml"),
+			["config.yaml"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("does not flag unrelated commands", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("npm run dev"), []);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("echo hello"), []);
+		assert.deepEqual(extractReadTargets("ls -la"), []);
+	});
+});
+
+describe("expandPaths", () => {
+	test("returns single path when no wildcards", async () => {
+		const result = await expandPaths("/tmp", ".env");
+		assert.deepEqual(result, ["/tmp/.env"]);
+	});
+
+	test("expands simple globs", async () => {
+		const result = await expandPaths("/tmp", ".env*");
+		// /tmp may or may not have .env files; just verify it returns paths
+		assert.ok(Array.isArray(result));
+		assert.ok(result.length > 0);
+	});
+});

package/node_modules/pi-mono-sentinel/__tests__/permissions.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/**
+ * Pi Sentinel — permission-gate pattern tests.
+ */
+
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { homedir } from "node:os";
+import { describe, test } from "node:test";
+
+import {
+	classifyBashCommand,
+	classifyPath,
+	resolveTargetPath,
+} from "../patterns/permissions.ts";
+
+const HOME = homedir();
+const PROJECT = "/tmp/example-project";
+
+describe("classifyBashCommand", () => {
+	test("flags curl | bash", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("curl -Ls https://mise.run | bash"),
+			["remote-pipe-exec"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags wget | sh", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("wget -qO- https://example.com/install.sh | sh"),
+			["remote-pipe-exec"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags sudo", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("sudo systemctl restart nginx"),
+			["privilege-escalation"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags brew install", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("brew install ripgrep"),
+			["package-manager-install"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("brew upgrade --cask docker"),
+			["package-manager-install"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags rm -rf on /Library", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("rm -rf /Library/Developer/CommandLineTools"),
+			["destructive-system-rm"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags rm -rf on home directory tilde", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("rm -rf ~/"),
+			["destructive-system-rm"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("does NOT flag rm -rf on a project-local path", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("rm -rf node_modules dist"),
+			[],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("rm -rf ./build/cache"),
+			[],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags persistence hooks", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("crontab -l | tee crontab.bak"),
+			["persistence"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("sudo systemctl enable nginx"),
+			["privilege-escalation", "persistence"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/x.plist"),
+			["persistence"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags shell config redirect via bash", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand('echo "export FOO=1" >> ~/.zshrc'),
+			["shell-config-write"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand('echo "alias x=y" | tee -a ~/.bashrc'),
+			["shell-config-write"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("flags binary install into /usr/local/bin", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("cp ./mybin /usr/local/bin/mybin"),
+			["system-binary-install"],
+		);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("mv release/cli /usr/local/bin/"),
+			["system-binary-install"],
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("stacks multiple risk classes", () => {
+		const matched = classifyBashCommand(
+			"sudo curl -Ls https://x.example/install.sh | bash",
+		);
+		assert.ok(matched.includes("privilege-escalation"));
+		assert.ok(matched.includes("remote-pipe-exec"));
+	});
+
+	test("does NOT flag safe commands", () => {
+		assert.deepEqual(classifyBashCommand("echo hello"), []);
+		assert.deepEqual(classifyBashCommand("ls -la"), []);
+		assert.deepEqual(classifyBashCommand("git status"), []);
+		assert.deepEqual(
+			classifyBashCommand("npm install --save-dev typescript"),
+			[],
+		);
+	});
+});
+
+describe("resolveTargetPath", () => {
+	test("expands ~", () => {
+		assert.equal(resolveTargetPath("~", PROJECT), HOME);
+		assert.equal(
+			resolveTargetPath("~/.zshrc", PROJECT),
+			`${HOME}/.zshrc`,
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("resolves cwd-relative paths", () => {
+		assert.equal(
+			resolveTargetPath("src/index.ts", PROJECT),
+			`${PROJECT}/src/index.ts`,
+		);
+		assert.equal(
+			resolveTargetPath("./foo.txt", PROJECT),
+			`${PROJECT}/foo.txt`,
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("preserves absolute paths", () => {
+		assert.equal(
+			resolveTargetPath("/usr/local/bin/foo", PROJECT),
+			"/usr/local/bin/foo",
+		);
+	});
+});
+
+describe("classifyPath", () => {
+	test("returns shell-config for ~/.zshrc", () => {
+		assert.equal(classifyPath(`${HOME}/.zshrc`, PROJECT), "shell-config");
+		assert.equal(classifyPath(`${HOME}/.bashrc`, PROJECT), "shell-config");
+		assert.equal(classifyPath(`${HOME}/.profile`, PROJECT), "shell-config");
+	});
+
+	test("returns system-directory for /usr, /Library, /opt, /etc", () => {
+		assert.equal(
+			classifyPath("/usr/local/bin/foo", PROJECT),
+			"system-directory",
+		);
+		assert.equal(
+			classifyPath("/Library/LaunchDaemons/foo.plist", PROJECT),
+			"system-directory",
+		);
+		assert.equal(classifyPath("/opt/homebrew/bin/x", PROJECT), "system-directory");
+		assert.equal(classifyPath("/etc/hosts", PROJECT), "system-directory");
+	});
+
+	test("returns outside-project for paths outside cwd", () => {
+		assert.equal(
+			classifyPath("/tmp/elsewhere/foo.txt", PROJECT),
+			"outside-project",
+		);
+		assert.equal(
+			classifyPath(`${HOME}/Desktop/notes.txt`, PROJECT),
+			"outside-project",
+		);
+	});
+
+	test("returns null for in-project paths", () => {
+		assert.equal(classifyPath(`${PROJECT}/src/index.ts`, PROJECT), null);
+		assert.equal(classifyPath(`${PROJECT}/package.json`, PROJECT), null);
+	});
+
+	test("does not confuse a sibling dir with the project root", () => {
+		assert.equal(
+			classifyPath("/tmp/example-project-other/file.txt", PROJECT),
+			"outside-project",
+		);
+	});
+});

package/node_modules/pi-mono-sentinel/__tests__/whitelist.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/**
+ * Sentinel whitelist persistence tests.
+ */
+
+import assert from "node:assert/strict";
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
+import { join } from "node:path";
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, test } from "node:test";
+
+import { SentinelSession } from "../session.ts";
+
+describe("SentinelSession whitelist", () => {
+	let agentDir: string;
+	const originalAgentDir = process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR;
+
+	beforeEach(() => {
+		agentDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "sentinel-whitelist-test-"));
+		process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR = agentDir;
+	});
+
+	afterEach(() => {
+		if (originalAgentDir === undefined) {
+			delete process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR;
+		} else {
+			process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR = originalAgentDir;
+		}
+		rmSync(agentDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+	});
+
+	test("starts empty", () => {
+		const session = new SentinelSession();
+		assert.equal(session.isWhitelisted("/some/path"), false);
+	});
+
+	test("adds and checks whitelist entries", () => {
+		const session = new SentinelSession();
+		session.addToWhitelist("/Users/me/.pi/agent/skills/figma/SKILL.md");
+		assert.equal(
+			session.isWhitelisted("/Users/me/.pi/agent/skills/figma/SKILL.md"),
+			true,
+		);
+		assert.equal(session.isWhitelisted("/other/path"), false);
+	});
+
+	test("reset does not clear whitelist", () => {
+		const session = new SentinelSession();
+		session.addToWhitelist("/persisted/path");
+		session.reset();
+		assert.equal(session.isWhitelisted("/persisted/path"), true);
+	});
+
+	test("read whitelist is separate from permission whitelist", () => {
+		const session = new SentinelSession();
+		session.addToReadWhitelist("/safe/example-doc.md");
+		assert.equal(session.isReadWhitelisted("/safe/example-doc.md"), true);
+		assert.equal(session.isWhitelisted("/safe/example-doc.md"), false);
+	});
+});