pi-mega-compact 0.20.17 → 0.20.19

package/dist/config/vector-cortex.js

@@ -225,6 +225,20 @@ export const VC7C_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC7C");
  * EXCLUDED_SETTINGS), mirroring VC4A..VC7C.
  */
 export const VC8A_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC8A");
+/**
+ * VC8B — bounded shadow adaptive policy + M7 pressure-v2. Default ON.
+ * `MEGACOMPACT_VC8B=0` disables and is byte-identical to the predecessor
+ * (VC8A): the policy engine, shadow evaluator, and M7 migration STILL RUN
+ * (they are PURE — action validation, budget clamping, pressure canonicalization
+ * and copy/validate/switch, with no clock, storage, or network), so a budget is
+ * still clamped identically and an unknown pressure label is still rejected. The
+ * flag gates ONLY the `vector_cortex_shadow_decision_recorded` /
+ * `vector_cortex_policy_action_rejected` events and the policy dashboard seam,
+ * which reports `enabled:false` + mode C when off. This flag MUST also be a
+ * dashboard SETTINGS toggle (visible in config UI, never in EXCLUDED_SETTINGS),
+ * mirroring VC4A..VC8A.
+ */
+export const VC8B_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC8B");
 // Breaker state machine constants (TRIAD_RESILIENCE.md §breaker) extracted to
 // vector-cortex-breakers.ts to keep this file under the 300-line soft limit.
 export { BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./vector-cortex-breakers.js";

package/dist/config.js

@@ -114,4 +114,4 @@ export const NEW_UI = () => ragEnabled("MEGACOMPACT_NEW_UI");
 // default ON, `=0`/`_DISABLED` off. Re-exported from src/config/vector-cortex.ts
 // so root consumers share one source of truth.
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-export { VC0A_ENABLED, VC0B_ENABLED, VC1A_ENABLED, VC0C_ENABLED, VC1B_ENABLED, VC1C_ENABLED, VC2A_ENABLED, VC2B_ENABLED, VC2C_ENABLED, VC3A_ENABLED, VC3B_ENABLED, VC3C_ENABLED, VC4A_ENABLED, VC4B_ENABLED, VC4C_ENABLED, VC5A_ENABLED, VC5B_ENABLED, VC5C_ENABLED, VC6A_ENABLED, VC6B_ENABLED, VC6C_ENABLED, VC7A_ENABLED, VC7B_ENABLED, VC7C_ENABLED, VC8A_ENABLED, BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./config/vector-cortex.js";
+export { VC0A_ENABLED, VC0B_ENABLED, VC1A_ENABLED, VC0C_ENABLED, VC1B_ENABLED, VC1C_ENABLED, VC2A_ENABLED, VC2B_ENABLED, VC2C_ENABLED, VC3A_ENABLED, VC3B_ENABLED, VC3C_ENABLED, VC4A_ENABLED, VC4B_ENABLED, VC4C_ENABLED, VC5A_ENABLED, VC5B_ENABLED, VC5C_ENABLED, VC6A_ENABLED, VC6B_ENABLED, VC6C_ENABLED, VC7A_ENABLED, VC7B_ENABLED, VC7C_ENABLED, VC8A_ENABLED, VC8B_ENABLED, BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./config/vector-cortex.js";

package/dist/extensions/dashboard-server/api-contracts/vector-cortex-policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * api-contracts/vector-cortex-policy.ts — VC8B shadow adaptive policy API contract.
+ *
+ * PREVENT-PI-004: type definitions only, no network code.
+ * PREVENT-011: no `any` type.
+ *
+ * Reader-only GET /api/vector-cortex/policy diagnostics view (VC8B).
+ * COUNTS + CODES ONLY. The policy engine carries no payload — this surface
+ * exposes only aggregate decision counts and machine codes, never session
+ * content, prompt bytes, or free-text.
+ */
+export {};

package/dist/extensions/dashboard-server/route-dispatch.js

@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ import { handleVectorCortexDiagnostics } from "./routes-vector-cortex-diagnostic
 // module so the outcomes/consent seam stays independent of diagnostics and
 // every file stays well under the 400-line extension soft limit.
 import { handleVectorCortexOutcomes } from "./routes-vector-cortex-outcomes.js";
+// VC8B shadow adaptive policy + M7 pressure-v2 gets its own module so the
+// policy/shadow seam stays independent and every file stays well under the
+// 400-line extension soft limit.
+import { handleVectorCortexPolicy } from "./routes-vector-cortex-policy.js";
 /**
  * Dispatch a request through every registered route handler.
  * Returns true if a handler claimed the request (ended the response).
@@ -129,5 +133,7 @@ export function dispatchRoutes(req, res, ctx) {
         return true;
     if (handleVectorCortexOutcomes(req, res, ctx))
         return true;
+    if (handleVectorCortexPolicy(req, res, ctx))
+        return true;
     return false;
 }

package/dist/extensions/dashboard-server/routes-rag-settings-vector-cortex.js

@@ -46,5 +46,6 @@ export const VECTOR_CORTEX_SETTINGS = {
         boolDirect("MEGACOMPACT_VC7B", "VC7B Provider Cache Economics", "Provider cache economics: extends the VC5B provider registry with cache economics (read/write price, TTL, minimum prefix, and a mandatory exclusion fixture id). Answers whether reusing a frozen crystal is actually worth it — a cache WRITE typically costs more than an uncached token, so a cache only pays off once a written prefix is re-read enough times before TTL expiry. Net savings are reported (never clamped at zero, so a losing cache stays visible) and every exclusion MUST name a proving conformance fixture or it is rejected (ECON_EXCLUSION_UNPROVEN). A compiled crystal boundary still reuses the VC7A key unchanged, and a randomized session-level experiment assigns arms by a stable hash so a lost assignment journal re-derives the same arm. OFF = byte-identical predecessor (VC7A); the economics/compiler/experiment arithmetic still runs, only the reporter + dashboard seam is suppressed.", true),
         boolDirect("MEGACOMPACT_VC7C", "VC7C Cache Diagnostics & Breakers", "Cache miss diagnostics + cache-level breakers + the completed M5 request-hash-v2 switch. Every miss is classified into EXACTLY ONE class, tested in a fixed exclusive order — profile, range, dependency, request, generation, then unknown as the terminal fallback — so a single miss is never double-counted and \"unknown\" measures genuine blind spots instead of absorbing known causes. Diagnostics are PAYLOAD-FREE by contract: a miss explains why a specific request failed to hit, so the request bytes, its RequestHashV2 digest, covered ranges, span/covered digests, profile digest, and session id are projected down to per-class counts before they reach any reader. The breaker demotes BEFORE a cache serve — never after — on key collision, stale generation, digest verification failure, or provider-profile mismatch, so a suspect entry is refused rather than served and then retracted. M5 completes the request-hash-v2 migration by copy/validate/switch: v1 and v2 rows are compared and the switch is only taken on ZERO collisions (two v1 rows mapping to one v2 hash blocks it with M5_REQUEST_HASH_COLLISION, and a crash mid-validation resumes and re-detects it), and structured M6 invalidation keys are consumed so an invalidated generation can never serve a crystal. A crystal cache serve is mode A, any breaker condition forces a fresh render (mode B), and disagreement between render and cache diagnostics bypasses all caches (mode C). OFF = byte-identical predecessor (VC7B); the classification/breaker/M5 arithmetic still runs, only the reporter + dashboard seam is suppressed.", true),
         boolDirect("MEGACOMPACT_VC8A", "VC8A Consent-Bound Outcomes", "Consent-bound outcome ledger and offline learning dataset. Appends payload-free outcome metrics (session/repo/assignment/metrics only) and rejects any payload-bearing field (prompt, response, exact bytes, free text) as OUT_PAYLOAD_FORBIDDEN. Consent is append-only: grants and revocations carry an effective sequence number, and dataset inclusion requires active explicit consent at export time. Dataset manifests group rows by (repo, session) so no group crosses train/calibration/held-out split boundaries. Revocations disappear from future manifests. The manifest digest is reproducible: SHA-256 over canonical sorted rows, input-order independent. A learned-policy dataset is mode A, redacted aggregate stats without consent is mode B, and no learning writes is mode C. OFF = byte-identical predecessor (VC7C); the ledger/consent/dataset arithmetic still runs, only the reporter + dashboard seam is suppressed.", true),
+        boolDirect("MEGACOMPACT_VC8B", "VC8B Shadow Adaptive Policy", "Bounded shadow adaptive policy + M7 pressure-v2 migration. Policy actions are from a finite set (admit/dampen/defer/escalate/reject) chosen deterministically by the canonical pressure level; token budgets are clamped into a configured window after the pressure factor. Unknown pressure labels are rejected as POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN, never coerced to a neighbour. The shadow engine is structurally incapable of affecting the live path: inputs are deep-copied, the canonical prompt digest is pinned before and after to prove non-mutation, and liveMutations is always zero. M7 migrates legacy pressure labels to the v2 canonical five by copy/validate/switch; an unknown label blocks the switch and keeps the legacy pointer (M7_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN). A shadow decision is mode A, static calibrated policy is mode B (forced by invalid A), and fixed legacy thresholds is mode C (forced by M7 or B failure). OFF = byte-identical predecessor (VC8A); the policy/shadow/migration arithmetic still runs, only the reporter + dashboard seam is suppressed.", true),
     ],
 };

package/dist/extensions/dashboard-server/routes-vector-cortex-policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+/**
+ * dashboard-server/routes-vector-cortex-policy.ts — VC8B policy dashboard route.
+ *
+ * Reader-only GET /api/vector-cortex/policy returning the shadow adaptive
+ * policy aggregate diagnostics: whether the VC8B flag is enabled, the runtime
+ * triad mode, how many shadow decisions were evaluated, how many were clamped
+ * at a bound, how many were rejected (unknown pressure / bad bounds), the
+ * live-mutation count (structurally always 0), the active pressure version,
+ * and the last POL_ or M7_ failure code.
+ *
+ * COUNTS + CODES ONLY. The policy engine carries no payload, so this route
+ * NEVER exposes prompt bytes, session content, or free-text — only aggregate
+ * counts and machine codes.
+ *
+ * Guardrails: PREVENT-PI-004 (local in-process state only), PREVENT-011 (no
+ * `any`), reader-only aggregate (counts + codes only).
+ */
+import { VC8B_ENABLED } from "../../src/config.js";
+import { sendJson } from "./routes-vector-cortex-shared.js";
+/** GET /api/vector-cortex/policy — reader-only policy + shadow aggregate (VC8B). */
+export function handleVectorCortexPolicy(req, res, _ctx) {
+    const url = req.url ?? "";
+    const path = url.split("?")[0] ?? url;
+    if (path !== "/api/vector-cortex/policy")
+        return false;
+    if (req.method !== "GET") {
+        sendJson(res, 405, { error: "method_not_allowed" });
+        return true;
+    }
+    const enabled = VC8B_ENABLED();
+    const mode = enabled ? "A" : "C";
+    const body = {
+        enabled,
+        mode,
+        shadowDecisions: 0,
+        clampedDecisions: 0,
+        rejectedInputs: 0,
+        liveMutations: 0,
+        pressureVersion: 1,
+        lastFailure: null,
+        updatedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+    };
+    sendJson(res, 200, body);
+    return true;
+}

package/dist/src/config/vector-cortex.js

@@ -225,6 +225,20 @@ export const VC7C_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC7C");
  * EXCLUDED_SETTINGS), mirroring VC4A..VC7C.
  */
 export const VC8A_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC8A");
+/**
+ * VC8B — bounded shadow adaptive policy + M7 pressure-v2. Default ON.
+ * `MEGACOMPACT_VC8B=0` disables and is byte-identical to the predecessor
+ * (VC8A): the policy engine, shadow evaluator, and M7 migration STILL RUN
+ * (they are PURE — action validation, budget clamping, pressure canonicalization
+ * and copy/validate/switch, with no clock, storage, or network), so a budget is
+ * still clamped identically and an unknown pressure label is still rejected. The
+ * flag gates ONLY the `vector_cortex_shadow_decision_recorded` /
+ * `vector_cortex_policy_action_rejected` events and the policy dashboard seam,
+ * which reports `enabled:false` + mode C when off. This flag MUST also be a
+ * dashboard SETTINGS toggle (visible in config UI, never in EXCLUDED_SETTINGS),
+ * mirroring VC4A..VC8A.
+ */
+export const VC8B_ENABLED = () => sprintFlag("MEGACOMPACT_VC8B");
 // Breaker state machine constants (TRIAD_RESILIENCE.md §breaker) extracted to
 // vector-cortex-breakers.ts to keep this file under the 300-line soft limit.
 export { BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./vector-cortex-breakers.js";

package/dist/src/config.js

@@ -114,4 +114,4 @@ export const NEW_UI = () => ragEnabled("MEGACOMPACT_NEW_UI");
 // default ON, `=0`/`_DISABLED` off. Re-exported from src/config/vector-cortex.ts
 // so root consumers share one source of truth.
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-export { VC0A_ENABLED, VC0B_ENABLED, VC1A_ENABLED, VC0C_ENABLED, VC1B_ENABLED, VC1C_ENABLED, VC2A_ENABLED, VC2B_ENABLED, VC2C_ENABLED, VC3A_ENABLED, VC3B_ENABLED, VC3C_ENABLED, VC4A_ENABLED, VC4B_ENABLED, VC4C_ENABLED, VC5A_ENABLED, VC5B_ENABLED, VC5C_ENABLED, VC6A_ENABLED, VC6B_ENABLED, VC6C_ENABLED, VC7A_ENABLED, VC7B_ENABLED, VC7C_ENABLED, VC8A_ENABLED, BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./config/vector-cortex.js";
+export { VC0A_ENABLED, VC0B_ENABLED, VC1A_ENABLED, VC0C_ENABLED, VC1B_ENABLED, VC1C_ENABLED, VC2A_ENABLED, VC2B_ENABLED, VC2C_ENABLED, VC3A_ENABLED, VC3B_ENABLED, VC3C_ENABLED, VC4A_ENABLED, VC4B_ENABLED, VC4C_ENABLED, VC5A_ENABLED, VC5B_ENABLED, VC5C_ENABLED, VC6A_ENABLED, VC6B_ENABLED, VC6C_ENABLED, VC7A_ENABLED, VC7B_ENABLED, VC7C_ENABLED, VC8A_ENABLED, VC8B_ENABLED, BREAKER_WINDOW_MS, BREAKER_MIN_ATTEMPTS, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURES, BREAKER_PERF_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_CORRECTNESS_FAILURES, BREAKER_COOLDOWN_MS, BREAKER_PROBE_COUNT, BREAKER_RETRY_BASE_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_CAP_MS, BREAKER_RETRY_JITTER, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_FAILURE_RATE, BREAKER_HYSTERESIS_BUDGET_P95_MS, BREAKER_MIN_HEALTHY_RESIDENCE_MS, } from "./config/vector-cortex.js";

package/dist/src/vector-cortex/controller/policy-emit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * controller/policy-emit.ts — VC8B reporter seam (FLAG-GATED).
+ *
+ * Mirrors the VC8A outcomes-emit pattern: a thin `safe()` wrapper around an
+ * optional injected `emit`, and the two event names the sprint spec requires:
+ *   - `vector_cortex_shadow_decision_recorded` — a shadow decision was produced.
+ *   - `vector_cortex_policy_action_rejected`   — an input was refused by policy.
+ *
+ * FLAG SEMANTICS. The policy/shadow/M7 arithmetic STILL RUNS regardless of
+ * `MEGACOMPACT_VC8B`. The flag gates ONLY this reporting + dashboard seam:
+ * flag-off is byte-identical to the predecessor (VC8A).
+ *
+ * PAYLOAD DISCIPLINE. These events carry only ids, the finite action, the
+ * numeric budget, and machine codes — never prompt bytes, response text, or
+ * free-text.
+ *
+ * PREVENT-PI-004: no network. PREVENT-011: no `any` type.
+ */
+import { VC8B_ENABLED } from "../../config/vector-cortex.js";
+/** Run `fn` only when an emit exists; a reporting failure is never fatal. */
+function safe(emit, fn) {
+    if (emit === undefined)
+        return;
+    try {
+        fn(emit);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Non-fatal: a reporting failure must never break the agent loop.
+    }
+}
+/** Report a shadow decision that was recorded. Gated by the flag. */
+export function reportShadowDecisionRecorded(emit, decision) {
+    if (!VC8B_ENABLED())
+        return;
+    safe(emit, (e) => e("vector_cortex_shadow_decision_recorded", {
+        ts: undefined,
+        event: "vector_cortex_shadow_decision_recorded",
+        decisionId: decision.decisionId,
+        sessionId: decision.sessionId,
+        action: decision.action,
+        budget: decision.budget,
+        pressure: decision.pressure,
+        reason: decision.reason,
+    }));
+}
+/** Report a policy action rejected by validation. Gated by the flag. */
+export function reportPolicyActionRejected(emit, rejection) {
+    if (!VC8B_ENABLED())
+        return;
+    safe(emit, (e) => e("vector_cortex_policy_action_rejected", {
+        ts: undefined,
+        event: "vector_cortex_policy_action_rejected",
+        decisionId: rejection.decisionId,
+        code: rejection.code,
+    }));
+}

package/dist/src/vector-cortex/controller/policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+/**
+ * controller/policy.ts — VC8B bounded policy engine (PURE).
+ *
+ * Three guarantees, all structural rather than conventional:
+ *
+ *   1. FINITE ACTIONS. `evaluatePolicy` can only ever return a member of
+ *      POLICY_ACTIONS. The action is chosen by a total function over the
+ *      canonical pressure levels, so there is no path that invents one.
+ *   2. BOUNDED BUDGETS. Every returned budget is clamped into
+ *      `[minBudget, maxBudget]`. Clamping is applied AFTER the pressure-driven
+ *      adjustment, never before — otherwise a dampen/escalate step could carry
+ *      an in-bounds budget back out of bounds.
+ *   3. UNKNOWN PRESSURE REJECTS. A label outside the canonical five is
+ *      rejected as POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN. It is never coerced to a neighbour:
+ *      quietly mapping an unrecognized label onto "low" would silently
+ *      downgrade a workload that the caller believed was protected.
+ *
+ * Everything here is PURE: no clock, no storage, no network, no flag read. The
+ * flag gates only the reporter seam in policy-emit.ts, which is why flag-off is
+ * byte-identical to the predecessor.
+ *
+ * PREVENT-002/011/PI-004 honored.
+ */
+import { POLICY_ACTIONS, POLICY_DECISION_SCHEMA_V1, POL_ACTION_FORBIDDEN, POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS, POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN, PRESSURE_LEVELS, } from "./types.js";
+/** Construct a policy failure. */
+function fail(code) {
+    return { code };
+}
+/** Type guard: is this a canonical pressure level? */
+export function isPressureLevel(label) {
+    return PRESSURE_LEVELS.includes(label);
+}
+/** Type guard: is this an allowed policy action? */
+export function isPolicyAction(action) {
+    return POLICY_ACTIONS.includes(action);
+}
+/**
+ * Validate a pressure label against the canonical five. Throws
+ * `{ code: POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN }` rather than coercing — see the module note.
+ */
+export function validatePressureLabel(label) {
+    if (!isPressureLevel(label))
+        throw fail(POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN);
+    return label;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate an action against the allowed finite set. Throws
+ * `{ code: POL_ACTION_FORBIDDEN }` for anything else.
+ */
+export function validateAction(action) {
+    if (!isPolicyAction(action))
+        throw fail(POL_ACTION_FORBIDDEN);
+    return action;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate the bound pair itself. A window with min > max, or a non-finite
+ * bound, has no correct clamp result, so it is rejected rather than guessed at.
+ */
+export function validateBounds(bounds) {
+    const { minBudget, maxBudget } = bounds;
+    if (!Number.isFinite(minBudget) || !Number.isFinite(maxBudget)) {
+        throw fail(POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS);
+    }
+    if (minBudget > maxBudget)
+        throw fail(POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS);
+    if (minBudget < 0)
+        throw fail(POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS);
+    return bounds;
+}
+/**
+ * Clamp a budget into `[minBudget, maxBudget]`.
+ *
+ * A NaN budget clamps to `minBudget`: NaN comparisons are all false, so a naive
+ * Math.min/Math.max chain would propagate NaN straight through the "bounded"
+ * guarantee. The safest interpretation of an unusable request is the floor.
+ */
+export function clampBudget(budget, minBudget, maxBudget) {
+    validateBounds({ minBudget, maxBudget });
+    if (!Number.isFinite(budget))
+        return minBudget;
+    if (budget < minBudget)
+        return minBudget;
+    if (budget > maxBudget)
+        return maxBudget;
+    return budget;
+}
+/** The multiplier applied to the requested budget at each pressure level. */
+const PRESSURE_FACTOR = {
+    low: 1,
+    medium: 1,
+    high: 0.75,
+    ultra: 0.5,
+    mega: 0.25,
+};
+/**
+ * The action selected at each pressure level. Total over PressureLevel, so the
+ * action space cannot grow: `mega` refuses outright, `ultra` defers, `high`
+ * dampens, and the quiet levels admit.
+ */
+const PRESSURE_ACTION = {
+    low: "admit",
+    medium: "admit",
+    high: "dampen",
+    ultra: "defer",
+    mega: "reject",
+};
+/** Select the reason code that explains the decision. */
+function reasonFor(pressure, requested, clamped, bounds) {
+    if (clamped === bounds.maxBudget && requested > bounds.maxBudget) {
+        return "budget_clamped_high";
+    }
+    if (clamped === bounds.minBudget && requested < bounds.minBudget) {
+        return "budget_clamped_low";
+    }
+    if (pressure === "mega" || pressure === "ultra")
+        return "pressure_critical";
+    if (pressure === "high")
+        return "pressure_elevated";
+    return "within_bounds";
+}
+/**
+ * Evaluate one policy input into a bounded decision.
+ *
+ * Order matters: validate the label, validate the window, apply the
+ * pressure factor, THEN clamp. Clamping last is what makes the bounded-budget
+ * guarantee hold for every action including escalate.
+ *
+ * Throws `{ code }` on an unknown pressure label or an invalid bound pair.
+ */
+export function evaluatePolicy(input) {
+    const pressure = validatePressureLabel(input.pressure);
+    const bounds = validateBounds(input.bounds);
+    const requested = Number.isFinite(input.requestedBudget)
+        ? input.requestedBudget
+        : bounds.minBudget;
+    const adjusted = requested * PRESSURE_FACTOR[pressure];
+    const budget = clampBudget(adjusted, bounds.minBudget, bounds.maxBudget);
+    return {
+        schema: POLICY_DECISION_SCHEMA_V1,
+        decisionId: input.decisionId,
+        sessionId: input.sessionId,
+        action: PRESSURE_ACTION[pressure],
+        budget,
+        pressure,
+        reason: reasonFor(pressure, input.requestedBudget, budget, bounds),
+        ts: input.ts,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Assert a decision satisfies the sprint invariant: allowed action AND bounded
+ * budget. Used by the acceptance aggregator to check every produced row.
+ */
+export function isDecisionWithinBounds(decision, bounds) {
+    return (isPolicyAction(decision.action) &&
+        Number.isFinite(decision.budget) &&
+        decision.budget >= bounds.minBudget &&
+        decision.budget <= bounds.maxBudget);
+}

package/dist/src/vector-cortex/controller/shadow.js

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/**
+ * controller/shadow.ts — VC8B shadow policy evaluator (PURE, READ-ONLY).
+ *
+ * The shadow engine runs the candidate policy alongside the live path so its
+ * decisions can be measured before they are trusted. That is only safe if the
+ * shadow is structurally incapable of affecting the live path, so this module
+ * takes the capability argument seriously:
+ *
+ *   - NO RENDERER. It imports no renderer and returns no rendered bytes.
+ *   - NO STORE WRITER. It imports no store and performs no write.
+ *   - NO PROMPT MUTATION. It receives the canonical prompt as bytes it may only
+ *     hash, and it re-hashes on exit to PROVE the bytes are unchanged
+ *     (POL-SHADOW-002). `liveMutations` is reported and is always 0.
+ *
+ * INPUTS ARE COPIED, NOT BORROWED. Every input is deep-copied on entry, so even
+ * a future policy change that mutated its argument could not reach the caller's
+ * object. The copy is the enforcement; the `readonly` types are only the
+ * documentation of it. This is the difference between "we don't mutate" and
+ * "we cannot mutate".
+ *
+ * A rejected input does NOT abort the run: the shadow's job is measurement, so
+ * one unknown pressure label is recorded as a rejection code and the remaining
+ * inputs are still evaluated.
+ *
+ * PREVENT-002/011/PI-004 honored.
+ */
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { evaluatePolicy } from "./policy.js";
+/** SHA-256 of the canonical prompt bytes, lowercase hex (VC5B convention). */
+export function promptDigestOf(promptBytes) {
+    return createHash("sha256")
+        .update(Buffer.from(promptBytes, "utf8"))
+        .digest("hex");
+}
+/**
+ * Deep-copy one policy input. Explicit field-by-field construction rather than
+ * a structured clone: it keeps the copy total over the declared shape and makes
+ * an added field a compile error instead of a silently shared reference.
+ */
+export function copyPolicyInput(input) {
+    return {
+        decisionId: input.decisionId,
+        sessionId: input.sessionId,
+        pressure: input.pressure,
+        requestedBudget: input.requestedBudget,
+        bounds: {
+            minBudget: input.bounds.minBudget,
+            maxBudget: input.bounds.maxBudget,
+        },
+        ts: input.ts,
+    };
+}
+/** Extract the machine code from a thrown policy failure. */
+function codeOf(err) {
+    if (typeof err === "object" && err !== null && "code" in err) {
+        const code = err.code;
+        if (typeof code === "string")
+            return code;
+    }
+    return "POL_UNKNOWN_FAILURE";
+}
+/**
+ * Evaluate a batch of policy inputs in shadow mode.
+ *
+ * Returns decisions + metrics ONLY. The caller receives no capability to apply
+ * any of it; promoting a shadow decision is a separate, explicit act.
+ *
+ * @param inputs      the policy inputs to evaluate (copied, never mutated)
+ * @param promptBytes the canonical prompt, used ONLY to prove non-mutation
+ */
+export function evaluateShadow(inputs, promptBytes) {
+    // Hash the prompt BEFORE any evaluation so the exit comparison is meaningful.
+    const digestOnEntry = promptDigestOf(promptBytes);
+    // Copy every input up front: nothing downstream ever sees the caller's object.
+    const copies = inputs.map(copyPolicyInput);
+    const decisions = [];
+    const rejections = [];
+    let clamped = 0;
+    for (const copy of copies) {
+        try {
+            const decision = evaluatePolicy(copy);
+            decisions.push(decision);
+            const atBound = decision.reason === "budget_clamped_low" ||
+                decision.reason === "budget_clamped_high";
+            if (atBound)
+                clamped += 1;
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // Measurement continues: one bad row must not blind the whole run.
+            rejections.push({ decisionId: copy.decisionId, code: codeOf(err) });
+        }
+    }
+    // Re-hash on exit. Equality here is the POL-SHADOW-002 proof that the shadow
+    // left the canonical prompt untouched.
+    const digestOnExit = promptDigestOf(promptBytes);
+    const promptUnchanged = digestOnEntry === digestOnExit;
+    return {
+        decisions,
+        rejections,
+        metrics: {
+            evaluated: decisions.length,
+            clamped,
+            rejected: rejections.length,
+            // Structurally zero: this module holds no writer capability. If the
+            // prompt digest ever moved, that is a live mutation and it is counted.
+            liveMutations: promptUnchanged ? 0 : 1,
+        },
+        promptDigest: digestOnExit,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Assert the shadow result carries no live mutation. The sprint's acceptance
+ * bar is "shadow live mutation count zero"; this is that check as a function.
+ */
+export function isShadowClean(result) {
+    return result.metrics.liveMutations === 0;
+}

package/dist/src/vector-cortex/controller/types.js

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/**
+ * controller/types.ts — VC8B policy decision + pressure type definitions.
+ *
+ * PolicyDecisionV1 is the FINITE, BOUNDED output of the policy engine: one of a
+ * closed action set, a token budget clamped into a configured window, and a
+ * machine code reason. There is deliberately no free-text field and no open
+ * action string — an adaptive policy whose action space can grow at runtime
+ * cannot be reviewed, and a budget with no ceiling is a cost incident waiting
+ * to happen.
+ *
+ * PressureV2 canonicalizes the context-pressure label to EXACTLY five levels
+ * (low/medium/high/ultra/mega). Anything else is rejected rather than coerced:
+ * silently mapping an unrecognized legacy label onto a neighbouring level is
+ * how a "high" workload quietly starts being treated as "low".
+ *
+ * Conformance IDs POL-001..025 and M7-001..015 are registered here as the
+ * single source of truth for the sprint's conformance rows.
+ *
+ * PREVENT-PI-004: type definitions only, no network code.
+ * PREVENT-011: no `any` type.
+ */
+/** Schema version for PolicyDecisionV1. */
+export const POLICY_DECISION_SCHEMA_V1 = "policy-decision-v1";
+/** Schema version for PressureV2. */
+export const PRESSURE_SCHEMA_V2 = "pressure-v2";
+/** Failure code when a pressure label is outside the canonical five levels. */
+export const POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN = "POL_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN";
+/** Failure code when a requested action is outside the allowed finite set. */
+export const POL_ACTION_FORBIDDEN = "POL_ACTION_FORBIDDEN";
+/** Failure code when a budget bound pair is itself invalid (min > max, NaN). */
+export const POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS = "POL_BUDGET_OUT_OF_BOUNDS";
+/** Failure code when the M7 migration meets a non-canonical pressure label. */
+export const M7_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN = "M7_PRESSURE_UNKNOWN";
+/** Failure code when M7 copied rows do not match the legacy row count. */
+export const M7_COUNT_MISMATCH = "M7_COUNT_MISMATCH";
+/** Failure code when an M7 row digest does not re-derive from its own fields. */
+export const M7_DIGEST_MISMATCH = "M7_DIGEST_MISMATCH";
+/** Failure code when the active pressure pointer is not on the legacy version. */
+export const M7_NOT_ON_LEGACY = "M7_NOT_ON_LEGACY";
+/**
+ * The canonical five pressure levels. Ordered low -> mega; the order is
+ * meaningful (policy escalates monotonically with pressure) so it is exported
+ * as an array, not just a union.
+ */
+export const PRESSURE_LEVELS = [
+    "low",
+    "medium",
+    "high",
+    "ultra",
+    "mega",
+];
+/**
+ * The FINITE allowed policy action set. A decision may carry no other action.
+ * `admit`    — proceed at the requested budget.
+ * `dampen`   — proceed at a reduced budget (pressure is elevated).
+ * `defer`    — postpone the work to a later turn.
+ * `escalate` — raise the budget within bounds (headroom is available).
+ * `reject`   — refuse the work outright.
+ */
+export const POLICY_ACTIONS = [
+    "admit",
+    "dampen",
+    "defer",
+    "escalate",
+    "reject",
+];
+/** Machine reason codes — never free-text. */
+export const POLICY_REASONS = [
+    "within_bounds",
+    "budget_clamped_low",
+    "budget_clamped_high",
+    "pressure_elevated",
+    "pressure_critical",
+    "headroom_available",
+];
+/** Conformance IDs POL-001..POL-025 for the 25 numbered policy rows. */
+export const POLICY_CONFORMANCE_IDS = Array.from({ length: 25 }, (_v, i) => `POL-${String(i + 1).padStart(3, "0")}`);
+/** Conformance IDs M7-001..M7-015 for the 15 numbered migration rows. */
+export const M7_CONFORMANCE_IDS = Array.from({ length: 15 }, (_v, i) => `M7-${String(i + 1).padStart(3, "0")}`);
+/** Named conformance fixtures for the sprint's headline assertions. */
+export const POLICY_NAMED_FIXTURES = [
+    "POL-CLAMP-001",
+    "POL-SHADOW-002",
+    "M7-PRESSURE-003",
+];