pi-lean-dimension 0.2.3 → 0.3.0

package/node_modules/pi-lean-portal/core/shared/url-safety.ts

@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * URL Safety Checks
- *
- * Prevents SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) and secret exfiltration
- * by validating URLs before navigation.
- *
- * Patterns from hermes-agent's url_safety.py.
- */
-
-// ─── Blocked hostnames ───────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/** Internal/private network ranges that should never be accessed */
-const BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES = [
-	"localhost",
-	"127.0.0.1",
-	"0.0.0.0",
-	"::1",
-	"169.254.169.254", // AWS/GCP metadata endpoint
-	"metadata.google.internal",
-	"100.100.100.200", // Alibaba Cloud metadata
-];
-
-/** Regex for private IP ranges (10.x, 172.16-31.x, 192.168.x) */
-const PRIVATE_IP_REGEX = /^(10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)/;
-
-// ─── Blocked URL patterns ─────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/** File-like schemes that shouldn't be followed */
-const BLOCKED_SCHEMES = ["file:", "ftp:", "data:", "javascript:", "vbscript:"];
-
-// ─── Secret detection ────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-/**
- * Patterns that look like API keys, tokens, or passwords in URLs.
- * Follows hermes-agent's approach: checks for known key prefixes rather
- * than generic length-based patterns, reducing false positives.
- * Also checks the percent-decoded URL for encoded secrets.
- */
-const SECRET_PATTERNS = [
-	// Generic API keys in query params (specific param names)
-	/[?&](api[_-]?key|token|secret|password|passwd|auth|credential|private[_-]?key|access[_-]?key)=/i,
-	// Bearer tokens in headers (unlikely in URLs but check anyway)
-	/Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9\-._~+/]{20,}=*/i,
-	// GitHub tokens: ghp_, ghs_, ghg_, gho_, ghu_
-	/gh[psogu]_[A-Za-z0-9_]{36}/,
-	// Slack tokens: xoxb-, xoxp-, xoxa-, xoxs-, xoxr-
-	/xox[bpras]-[A-Za-z0-9-]+/,
-	// Stripe: sk_live_, sk_test_, pk_live_, pk_test_, whsec_
-	/(sk|pk)_(live|test)_[A-Za-z0-9]+/,
-	/whsec_[A-Za-z0-9]+/,
-	// AWS access key ID (starts with AKIA)
-	/AKIA[A-Z0-9]{16}/,
-	// Google API keys (AIza prefix)
-	/AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}/,
-	// Discord bot tokens
-	/[MN][A-Za-z\d]{23}\.[XZ][A-Za-z\d]{6}\.[A-Za-z\d]{27}/,
-	// SendGrid API keys (SG. prefix)
-	/SG\.[A-Za-z0-9-_]{22}\.[A-Za-z0-9-_]{43}/,
-	// HubSpot API keys
-	/[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}/,
-	// Generic secret in URL path segment (e.g., "secret=..." in path)
-	/\/secret(?:s)?\//i,
-];
-
-// ─── Types ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-export interface UrlSafetyResult {
-	/** Whether the URL is safe to navigate to */
-	safe: boolean;
-	/** Human-readable reason if not safe */
-	reason?: string;
-	/** The specific issue category */
-	category?: "ssrf" | "scheme" | "secret" | "malformed";
-}
-
-// ─── Validation ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-
-export function validateUrl(rawUrl: string): UrlSafetyResult {
-	let parsed: URL;
-	try {
-		parsed = new URL(rawUrl);
-	} catch {
-		return { safe: false, reason: "Malformed URL", category: "malformed" };
-	}
-
-	// Check scheme
-	const scheme = parsed.protocol.toLowerCase();
-	if (BLOCKED_SCHEMES.includes(scheme)) {
-		return {
-			safe: false,
-			reason: `Blocked scheme: ${scheme}`,
-			category: "scheme",
-		};
-	}
-
-	if (scheme !== "http:" && scheme !== "https:") {
-		return {
-			safe: false,
-			reason: `Unsupported scheme: ${scheme}. Only http and https are allowed.`,
-			category: "scheme",
-		};
-	}
-
-	// Check hostname against blocked list
-	const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
-	for (const blocked of BLOCKED_HOSTNAMES) {
-		if (hostname === blocked || hostname.endsWith("." + blocked)) {
-			return {
-				safe: false,
-				reason: `Blocked hostname: ${hostname} (private/internal network)`,
-				category: "ssrf",
-			};
-		}
-	}
-
-	// Check for private IP ranges
-	if (PRIVATE_IP_REGEX.test(hostname)) {
-		return {
-			safe: false,
-			reason: `Blocked IP range: ${hostname} (private network)`,
-			category: "ssrf",
-		};
-	}
-
-	// Check for IPv6 loopback
-	if (
-		hostname.startsWith("[") &&
-		(hostname.includes("::1") || hostname.includes("::ffff:127"))
-	) {
-		return {
-			safe: false,
-			reason: `Blocked IPv6 address: ${hostname} (loopback)`,
-			category: "ssrf",
-		};
-	}
-
-	// Check for secrets in URL (raw and percent-decoded)
-	const urlStr = parsed.toString();
-	try {
-		const decodedUrl = decodeURIComponent(urlStr);
-		for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
-			if (pattern.test(urlStr) || pattern.test(decodedUrl)) {
-				return {
-					safe: false,
-					reason: `Potential secret detected in URL. Remove sensitive parameters before navigating.`,
-					category: "secret",
-				};
-			}
-		}
-	} catch {
-		// If decoding fails, just check the raw URL
-		for (const pattern of SECRET_PATTERNS) {
-			if (pattern.test(urlStr)) {
-				return {
-					safe: false,
-					reason: `Potential secret detected in URL. Remove sensitive parameters before navigating.`,
-					category: "secret",
-				};
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	return { safe: true };
-}