pi-daddy 0.28.0 → 0.32.0

package/dist/approval-store.d.ts

@@ -1,149 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Persistence for `always`-scoped approvals — the package's only mutable state outside the ledger.
- *
- * DESIGN NOTE, because it is easy to get backwards: this file is a CONVENIENCE CACHE, not a security
- * control. The security decision was already made by a human at the moment of approval. So a failure here
- * must never fail the work — an unwritable file downgrades the approval to session scope (see the boolean
- * return of `saveApproval`), and an unreadable one simply grants nothing.
- *
- * Read on demand, never cached at session start, so **a revoke takes effect at the next gate check** —
- * including a revoke performed from another session while this one is running.
- *
- * That sentence used to read *"takes effect immediately"* and claimed two different things, one of which was
- * false and one of which is impossible:
- *
- *  - **False, and fixed (R-49).** Every write is load → modify → write and it was unlocked, so a save could
- *    restore an entry another session had just revoked. Writes now hold the same file lock the ledger uses
- *    (`src/file-lock.ts`, `underLock` below).
- *  - **Impossible, and stated rather than fixed.** A spawn whose gate check has already passed is not
- *    retracted by a revoke arriving microseconds later. No lock closes that: the read has to finish before
- *    the spawn starts, so there is always an instant where the decision is made and the process is not yet
- *    running. Inherent to revoking anything, not a gap in this one.
- *
- * Reads deliberately take no lock. A read that loses a race sees the previous state, which is exactly what
- * "at the next gate check" already means.
- *
- * **One file per project** (ADR-0020), and **no model-authored text, ever** (ADR-0021) — see `approvalsPath`
- * and `sanitise` for why each of those is a decision rather than a detail.
- *
- * Pruning is deliberately lazy: `loadApprovals` never writes, so a read is a read. Invalid entries are
- * dropped from the file on the next `saveApproval` or `revokeApproval`.
- */
-import { type ApprovalEntry, type EntryVerdict, type SubjectSnapshot } from "./approval.ts";
-export interface DroppedApproval {
-    key: string;
-    entry: ApprovalEntry;
-    verdict: EntryVerdict;
-}
-/**
- * Look up a subject's current ceiling AND body digest; null when the subject no longer exists.
- *
- * One snapshot rather than two callbacks (ADR-0019) — see `SubjectSnapshot`. Was `CeilingLookup`, which
- * could only ever answer half the question `entryVerdict` needs to ask.
- */
-export type SubjectLookup = (subject: string) => SubjectSnapshot | null;
-/**
- * Where persisted approvals live — **outside the governed workspace** (ADR-0014).
- *
- * It used to be `<cwd>/.pi/grants-approvals.json`, which was self-defeating in this package's own
- * recommended configuration: `PI_GRANTS_GATED=tool:write` means *"may use write, may not pass it down
- * without a human"*, and **a session that may use `write` can write the approvals file**. A reviewer
- * demonstrated it end to end, including authoring a matching agent-type file so `grantAtApproval`
- * compared equal — no dialog, and a ledger line reading `approvalSource: "persisted"`, indistinguishable
- * from a real human approval.
- *
- * A narrowed child does not hold write access to the user's home directory, so it cannot forge an entry
- * here. Each entry still carries its own `cwd` and `entryVerdict` still checks it — that check exists for
- * R-27 and refuses an entry copied between checkouts or machines, which per-project files do not make
- * redundant.
- *
- * **This does not defend against a child holding `bash`** — see ADR-0012, which accepts that such a
- * child can escape governance entirely. The point of this change is to close the *self-defeating* case,
- * not to claim a boundary the package does not have.
- *
- * **ONE FILE PER PROJECT since 0.11.0 (ADR-0020).** It was one shared document keyed only by
- * `capability@subject`, which produced four defects in eight lines — approving in one checkout deleted
- * another's entries (R-41), `revoke --all` cleared every project (R-43), two concurrent writes lost both
- * (R-42), and an unlocked read-modify-write could resurrect a revoked entry (R-49, fixed in 0.13.0). The
- * unfixable one was the keyspace: two checkouts holding definitions of the same name — `review`, `deploy`,
- * i.e. what happens the moment an operator reuses their own conventions — could not both hold an approval,
- * so they took turns indefinitely. Per-project files make the collision **inexpressible** rather than
- * handled, and `revoke --all` cannot name another project's file.
- *
- * The `cwd` is hashed as well as named: the basename keeps the file legible to a human reading the
- * directory, and the hash is what makes it unambiguous, since two checkouts can share a basename.
- *
- * **It took a `cwd` parameter and ignored it until 0.10.2**, which was not a harmless vestige: the unit
- * suite passed a `mkdtemp` directory to it, reasonably believed the result was hermetic, and spent every
- * `npm test` rewriting and clearing the developer's real store in `$HOME` (R-40). That was invisible while
- * the store was unwritable and became destructive the day ADR-0019 made it reachable. The parameter is now
- * real and required, which is the opposite failure mode: forgetting it is a type error.
- */
-export declare function approvalsPath(cwd: string): string;
-/**
- * The shared single-file store, so it can be REPORTED rather than read (ADR-0020).
- *
- * Deliberately not migrated. Splitting it by each entry's own `cwd` would be mechanical and lossless — the
- * trust root is unchanged, unlike ADR-0014's move out of the workspace — but it is code that runs once, is
- * exercised on exactly one input per machine, and lives in the layer with nine recorded defects. Re-approving
- * costs a click; a migration bug costs a silently wrong approval.
- */
-export declare function sharedApprovalsPath(): string;
-/**
- * The old in-workspace location, so it can be REPORTED rather than read.
- *
- * Deliberately not migrated. Importing a legacy file would import exactly the entries whose
- * trustworthiness this change exists to remove — a forged approval would survive the fix that was
- * supposed to stop it. The extension names the file and ignores it; re-approving is a few keystrokes and
- * the only honest path.
- */
-export declare function legacyApprovalsPath(cwd: string): string;
-export interface LoadApprovalsInput {
-    cwd: string;
-    now: Date;
-    snapshotOf: SubjectLookup;
-}
-/** Load the approvals valid HERE and NOW, plus the ones that were dropped and why. */
-export declare function loadApprovals(input: LoadApprovalsInput): Promise<{
-    valid: Map<string, ApprovalEntry>;
-    dropped: DroppedApproval[];
-}>;
-/**
- * Persist one approval, pruning anything THIS session can see has become invalid.
- *
- * Returns false when the write failed. The caller must then downgrade to session scope and warn — NOT
- * refuse the delegation. The human already said yes; refusing work because a cache could not be written
- * would be failing closed on the wrong thing.
- */
-export declare function saveApproval(cwd: string, key: string, entry: ApprovalEntry, snapshotOf: SubjectLookup, now: Date): Promise<boolean>;
-/**
- * Remove one approval, pruning any entries that have since become invalid.
- *
- * Like `saveApproval`, this filters invalid entries so a revoke takes the opportunity to clean up stale
- * ones — the lazy-pruning policy applies to both write paths.
- *
- * **Three outcomes, not two (R-49).** It returned a boolean, and the caller printed
- * *"no persisted approval named X"* for false — which was a **false statement** whenever the cause was a
- * failed write. An operator told there is nothing to revoke, while the approval they are revoking survives,
- * has been told the opposite of the truth about a security control. `"absent"` and `"failed"` are different
- * facts and now say so.
- */
-/**
- * **Four, and the fourth is the first fix's own smaller copy of R-61.** `failed` asserts the approval is
- * still in effect, which is verified: we found the entry and could not remove it. A **lock timeout happens
- * before the load**, so nothing was ever looked at — reporting `failed` there asserted a fact about an entry
- * that may not exist, which is R-61's shape at lower severity. It errs alarming rather than reassuring, so
- * it is the safe direction to be wrong in; that is a reason to rank it low, not a reason to keep it.
- */
-export type RevokeOutcome = "revoked" | "absent" | "failed" | "busy";
-export declare function revokeApproval(cwd: string, key: string, snapshotOf: SubjectLookup, now: Date): Promise<RevokeOutcome>;
-/**
- * Clear every approval **for this directory**. Returns false if the write failed.
- *
- * Scoped rather than global, and the old behaviour was the surprising one: `/grants revoke --all` wrote an
- * empty file, so revoking in one project silently revoked every other project's approvals too. An operator
- * running it in one checkout is answering for that checkout — there is no interface for "and everywhere
- * else", and it should not be the default reading of a command that names neither.
- */
-export declare function revokeAll(cwd: string): Promise<boolean>;
-//# sourceMappingURL=approval-store.d.ts.map

package/dist/approval-store.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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package/dist/approval-store.js

@@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Persistence for `always`-scoped approvals — the package's only mutable state outside the ledger.
- *
- * DESIGN NOTE, because it is easy to get backwards: this file is a CONVENIENCE CACHE, not a security
- * control. The security decision was already made by a human at the moment of approval. So a failure here
- * must never fail the work — an unwritable file downgrades the approval to session scope (see the boolean
- * return of `saveApproval`), and an unreadable one simply grants nothing.
- *
- * Read on demand, never cached at session start, so **a revoke takes effect at the next gate check** —
- * including a revoke performed from another session while this one is running.
- *
- * That sentence used to read *"takes effect immediately"* and claimed two different things, one of which was
- * false and one of which is impossible:
- *
- *  - **False, and fixed (R-49).** Every write is load → modify → write and it was unlocked, so a save could
- *    restore an entry another session had just revoked. Writes now hold the same file lock the ledger uses
- *    (`src/file-lock.ts`, `underLock` below).
- *  - **Impossible, and stated rather than fixed.** A spawn whose gate check has already passed is not
- *    retracted by a revoke arriving microseconds later. No lock closes that: the read has to finish before
- *    the spawn starts, so there is always an instant where the decision is made and the process is not yet
- *    running. Inherent to revoking anything, not a gap in this one.
- *
- * Reads deliberately take no lock. A read that loses a race sees the previous state, which is exactly what
- * "at the next gate check" already means.
- *
- * **One file per project** (ADR-0020), and **no model-authored text, ever** (ADR-0021) — see `approvalsPath`
- * and `sanitise` for why each of those is a decision rather than a detail.
- *
- * Pruning is deliberately lazy: `loadApprovals` never writes, so a read is a read. Invalid entries are
- * dropped from the file on the next `saveApproval` or `revokeApproval`.
- */
-import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
-import { mkdir, readFile, rename, unlink, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
-import { withFileLock } from "./file-lock.js";
-import { homedir } from "node:os";
-import { basename, dirname, join } from "node:path";
-import { entryVerdict } from "./approval.js";
-import { isApprovalBinding } from "./correlation.js";
-/**
- * Where persisted approvals live — **outside the governed workspace** (ADR-0014).
- *
- * It used to be `<cwd>/.pi/grants-approvals.json`, which was self-defeating in this package's own
- * recommended configuration: `PI_GRANTS_GATED=tool:write` means *"may use write, may not pass it down
- * without a human"*, and **a session that may use `write` can write the approvals file**. A reviewer
- * demonstrated it end to end, including authoring a matching agent-type file so `grantAtApproval`
- * compared equal — no dialog, and a ledger line reading `approvalSource: "persisted"`, indistinguishable
- * from a real human approval.
- *
- * A narrowed child does not hold write access to the user's home directory, so it cannot forge an entry
- * here. Each entry still carries its own `cwd` and `entryVerdict` still checks it — that check exists for
- * R-27 and refuses an entry copied between checkouts or machines, which per-project files do not make
- * redundant.
- *
- * **This does not defend against a child holding `bash`** — see ADR-0012, which accepts that such a
- * child can escape governance entirely. The point of this change is to close the *self-defeating* case,
- * not to claim a boundary the package does not have.
- *
- * **ONE FILE PER PROJECT since 0.11.0 (ADR-0020).** It was one shared document keyed only by
- * `capability@subject`, which produced four defects in eight lines — approving in one checkout deleted
- * another's entries (R-41), `revoke --all` cleared every project (R-43), two concurrent writes lost both
- * (R-42), and an unlocked read-modify-write could resurrect a revoked entry (R-49, fixed in 0.13.0). The
- * unfixable one was the keyspace: two checkouts holding definitions of the same name — `review`, `deploy`,
- * i.e. what happens the moment an operator reuses their own conventions — could not both hold an approval,
- * so they took turns indefinitely. Per-project files make the collision **inexpressible** rather than
- * handled, and `revoke --all` cannot name another project's file.
- *
- * The `cwd` is hashed as well as named: the basename keeps the file legible to a human reading the
- * directory, and the hash is what makes it unambiguous, since two checkouts can share a basename.
- *
- * **It took a `cwd` parameter and ignored it until 0.10.2**, which was not a harmless vestige: the unit
- * suite passed a `mkdtemp` directory to it, reasonably believed the result was hermetic, and spent every
- * `npm test` rewriting and clearing the developer's real store in `$HOME` (R-40). That was invisible while
- * the store was unwritable and became destructive the day ADR-0019 made it reachable. The parameter is now
- * real and required, which is the opposite failure mode: forgetting it is a type error.
- */
-export function approvalsPath(cwd) {
-    const slug = (basename(cwd) || "root").replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, "_").slice(0, 40);
-    // 16 hex = 64 bits, not the 6 this shipped with. ADR-0020 deleted the `foreign-cwd` carry-through on the
-    // premise that one file means one directory — so inside a hash collision R-41 returns *with its
-    // mitigation removed*: the second project's save deletes the first's entries. At 24 bits a deliberate
-    // collision costs about 16.7M hashes, well under a second, and an accidental one arrives at a few
-    // thousand governed directories. The premise has to be worth what was removed to rely on it.
-    const hash = createHash("sha256").update(cwd, "utf8").digest("hex").slice(0, 16);
-    return join(agentDir(), "grants-approvals", `${slug}-${hash}.json`);
-}
-/**
- * The shared single-file store, so it can be REPORTED rather than read (ADR-0020).
- *
- * Deliberately not migrated. Splitting it by each entry's own `cwd` would be mechanical and lossless — the
- * trust root is unchanged, unlike ADR-0014's move out of the workspace — but it is code that runs once, is
- * exercised on exactly one input per machine, and lives in the layer with nine recorded defects. Re-approving
- * costs a click; a migration bug costs a silently wrong approval.
- */
-export function sharedApprovalsPath() {
-    return join(agentDir(), "grants-approvals.json");
-}
-/**
- * The old in-workspace location, so it can be REPORTED rather than read.
- *
- * Deliberately not migrated. Importing a legacy file would import exactly the entries whose
- * trustworthiness this change exists to remove — a forged approval would survive the fix that was
- * supposed to stop it. The extension names the file and ignores it; re-approving is a few keystrokes and
- * the only honest path.
- */
-export function legacyApprovalsPath(cwd) {
-    return join(cwd, ".pi", "grants-approvals.json");
-}
-/** `$PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR`, or pi's default. Matches how pi-subagents resolves the same directory. */
-function agentDir() {
-    return process.env.PI_CODING_AGENT_DIR ?? join(homedir(), ".pi", "agent");
-}
-/** The subject half of `capability@subject`. Capability ids contain `:` but never `@`. */
-function subjectOf(key) {
-    return key.slice(key.indexOf("@") + 1);
-}
-/** Guard: reject entries that don't have the shape of an ApprovalEntry. */
-function isValidEntryShape(entry) {
-    if (!entry || typeof entry !== "object" || Array.isArray(entry)) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    const obj = entry;
-    return (typeof obj.approvedAt === "string" &&
-        typeof obj.expiresAt === "string" &&
-        typeof obj.cwd === "string" &&
-        Array.isArray(obj.grantAtApproval) &&
-        (obj.binding === undefined || isApprovalBinding(obj.binding)));
-}
-/**
- * Project every entry through its DECLARED fields on the way out (ADR-0021).
- *
- * The instance this closes: `taskAtApproval` stored the model-authored task string, which `src/ledger.ts`
- * forbids in unqualified terms — *"the task is not recorded, anywhere, ever"*. Removing the field from the
- * type is not enough on its own, because entries are parsed from JSON and a rewrite would carry any
- * undeclared property straight back to disk.
- *
- * A whitelist rather than a delete, so this closes the class: no future field can reach the store by being
- * present on a parsed object, and adding one is a deliberate edit here.
- */
-function sanitise(valid) {
-    return Object.fromEntries([...valid].map(([key, e]) => [
-        key,
-        {
-            approvedAt: e.approvedAt,
-            expiresAt: e.expiresAt,
-            cwd: e.cwd,
-            grantAtApproval: e.grantAtApproval,
-            ...(e.bodyAtApproval !== undefined ? { bodyAtApproval: e.bodyAtApproval } : {}),
-            ...(e.binding !== undefined ? { binding: structuredClone(e.binding) } : {}),
-        },
-    ]));
-}
-async function readFileSafely(cwd) {
-    try {
-        const parsed = JSON.parse(await readFile(approvalsPath(cwd), "utf8"));
-        if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== "object")
-            return { version: 1, approvals: {} };
-        const file = parsed;
-        if (file.version !== 1 || !file.approvals || typeof file.approvals !== "object") {
-            return { version: 1, approvals: {} };
-        }
-        return { version: 1, approvals: file.approvals };
-    }
-    catch {
-        // Missing is normal; corrupt grants nothing. Either way the caller re-prompts, which is safe.
-        return { version: 1, approvals: {} };
-    }
-}
-/** Load the approvals valid HERE and NOW, plus the ones that were dropped and why. */
-export async function loadApprovals(input) {
-    const file = await readFileSafely(input.cwd);
-    const valid = new Map();
-    const dropped = [];
-    for (const [key, entry] of Object.entries(file.approvals)) {
-        // Validate entry shape before passing to entryVerdict. Malformed entries cannot take valid ones
-        // with them — one bad shape means that one entry is dropped, the rest are still evaluated.
-        if (!isValidEntryShape(entry)) {
-            dropped.push({ key, entry: entry, verdict: "expired" });
-            continue;
-        }
-        const verdict = entryVerdict({
-            entry,
-            cwd: input.cwd,
-            now: input.now,
-            current: input.snapshotOf(subjectOf(key)),
-        });
-        if (verdict === "valid")
-            valid.set(key, entry);
-        else
-            dropped.push({ key, entry, verdict });
-    }
-    return { valid, dropped };
-}
-/**
- * Write the file atomically, and never through a symlink (ADR-0014).
- *
- * Two defects this closes:
- *
- *  - **B-I6** — writes followed project-controlled symlinks and were not atomic, so a crash or a
- *    concurrent writer could leave a half-written file that the next read discards entirely.
- *  - **A-R2** — a corrupt file made the next legitimate write destroy every other entry, because entries
- *    are validated on read but pruned only on write. Writing to a temp file and renaming makes the
- *    replacement all-or-nothing; `wx` on the temp refuses to follow an existing link.
- *
- * `rename` is atomic within a filesystem, and the temp file is created in the same directory precisely so
- * that holds.
- */
-async function writeFileSafely(cwd, file) {
-    const path = approvalsPath(cwd);
-    // Same directory as the target: `rename` is only atomic within one filesystem.
-    //
-    // **Unique per CALL, not per process.** It was `${path}.${pid}.tmp`, so two concurrent `saveApproval`
-    // calls in one process collided: the second's `wx` failed EEXIST, its `catch` unlinked the *first's*
-    // in-flight temp, and the first's `rename` then failed ENOENT — **both returned false and nothing was
-    // written**, on a perfectly writable file. Measured with two different keys, so it was not limited to
-    // the shared-dialog case: any two concurrent writes lost both. `delegate_all` is exactly that shape, and
-    // both callers would report "could not persist the approval — it applies for this session only", which
-    // named the wrong cause.
-    const temp = `${path}.${process.pid}.${randomUUID()}.tmp`;
-    try {
-        await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
-        // `wx` fails rather than following a pre-existing symlink or clobbering another writer's temp.
-        await writeFile(temp, `${JSON.stringify(file, null, 2)}\n`, { encoding: "utf8", flag: "wx" });
-        await rename(temp, path);
-        return true;
-    }
-    catch {
-        try {
-            await unlink(temp);
-        }
-        catch {
-            /* nothing to clean up */
-        }
-        return false;
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Persist one approval, pruning anything THIS session can see has become invalid.
- *
- * Returns false when the write failed. The caller must then downgrade to session scope and warn — NOT
- * refuse the delegation. The human already said yes; refusing work because a cache could not be written
- * would be failing closed on the wrong thing.
- */
-export async function saveApproval(cwd, key, entry, snapshotOf, now) {
-    return underLock(cwd, false, false, async () => {
-        const { valid } = await loadApprovals({ cwd, now, snapshotOf });
-        valid.set(key, entry);
-        // ADR-0020: this file belongs to ONE project, so there is nothing here that another project could own and
-        // pruning cannot reach across a boundary. The `foreign-cwd` carry-through 0.10.2 needed is gone with the
-        // shared file that made it necessary.
-        return writeFileSafely(cwd, { version: 1, approvals: sanitise(valid) });
-    });
-}
-export async function revokeApproval(cwd, key, snapshotOf, now) {
-    return underLock(cwd, "busy", "failed", async () => {
-        const { valid } = await loadApprovals({ cwd, now, snapshotOf });
-        if (!valid.has(key))
-            return "absent";
-        valid.delete(key);
-        return (await writeFileSafely(cwd, { version: 1, approvals: sanitise(valid) })) ? "revoked" : "failed";
-    });
-}
-/**
- * Clear every approval **for this directory**. Returns false if the write failed.
- *
- * Scoped rather than global, and the old behaviour was the surprising one: `/grants revoke --all` wrote an
- * empty file, so revoking in one project silently revoked every other project's approvals too. An operator
- * running it in one checkout is answering for that checkout — there is no interface for "and everywhere
- * else", and it should not be the default reading of a command that names neither.
- */
-export async function revokeAll(cwd) {
-    return underLock(cwd, false, false, () => writeFileSafely(cwd, { version: 1, approvals: {} }));
-}
-/**
- * Hold the store's lock for one read-modify-write (R-49).
- *
- * **The race it closes.** Every write here is load → modify → write, and it was unlocked, so: session 1
- * loads; session 2 revokes; session 1 saves an unrelated approval and **restores the revoked entry** for the
- * rest of its 30 days, with no error and no warning. `approval-store.ts` documents that *"a revoke takes
- * effect immediately — including one performed from another session while this one is running"*, and that
- * sentence was false. Narrow (ADR-0020 scoped it to two sessions in the same directory) and cheap to close,
- * because the lock already existed for the ledger — `src/file-lock.ts`, one implementation, two callers.
- *
- * **A lock this cannot take does NOT fail the work**, which is the opposite of the ledger's choice with the
- * same lock and follows from what the two files are. The ledger is a security control: no audit line, no
- * spawn. This store is a convenience cache (ADR-0020) — the human already said yes, and refusing their work
- * because a cache was busy would be failing closed on the wrong thing. So a timeout yields `busy`, which the
- * caller reports as an ordinary write failure and downgrades to session scope.
- */
-async function underLock(cwd, onBusy, onError, work) {
-    const path = approvalsPath(cwd);
-    // **The discriminant is whether anything was READ, not which error was thrown.** Keying on
-    // `LockTimeoutError` looked right and was not: `EMFILE` — the classic transient, and one a fan-out of
-    // children plus herdr panes produces — happens before the load just as a timeout does, yet took the
-    // `failed` branch, whose message asserts the approval "is still in effect" about an entry nobody looked
-    // for, and blames a path that is perfectly writable. That is the very defect the fourth outcome was
-    // added to prevent, one error code to the left.
-    let entered = false;
-    try {
-        // The lock lives beside the file, so its directory must exist before the lock can be taken — and on a
-        // first-ever approval it does not. `writeFileSafely` creates it, which is one step too late: every
-        // write failed with ENOENT on the LOCK and was reported as busy. Caught by the existing round-trip
-        // tests within a minute of adding the lock, which is the argument for having them.
-        await mkdir(dirname(path), { recursive: true });
-        return await withFileLock(path, "approvals file", () => {
-            entered = true;
-            return work();
-        });
-    }
-    catch {
-        // Never reached the load, so nothing may be claimed about the entry — whatever the cause.
-        return entered ? onError : onBusy;
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=approval-store.js.map

package/dist/approval-store.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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