pi-crew 0.5.20 → 0.5.21

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,28 @@
 # Changelog
 
+## [0.5.21] — Ultimate Final Sweep: HIGH Security + Correctness Fixes (2026-06-03)
+
+### Highlights
+- **safe-bash line-continuation bypass fixed** — `$\n(evil)` now blocked
+- **scheduledJobs dead code fixed** — settings sanitizer now passes through scheduled jobs
+- **Memory-bounded file reads** — `readIfSmall` uses `fs.readSync` with buffer instead of full file read
+- **Event log corruption detection** — `scanSequence` logs warnings for corrupt JSON lines
+
+### Security
+- `safe-bash.ts`: All structural checks now use `normalized` string (stripped line continuations)
+- `\$\s*\(` regex catches `$<newline>(evil)` → `$(evil)` bypass that bash interprets as command substitution
+- Added 2 regression tests for line-continuation bypass
+
+### Fixes
+- `settings-store.ts`: `sanitizeSettings()` now copies `scheduledJobs` as opaque array
+- `task-output-context.ts`: `readIfSmall` uses `Buffer.alloc` + `fs.readSync` instead of `readFileSync` + `slice`
+- `event-log.ts`: `scanSequence` counts and logs corrupt JSON lines via `logInternalError`
+
+### Stats
+- Test suite: 2703 pass + 1 skip, 0 fail
+- TypeScript: 0 errors
+- Total issues fixed across 37 rounds: ~155+
+
 ## [0.5.20] — Verification Sweep: 7 Fixes (2026-06-03)
 
 ### Highlights

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "pi-crew",
-  "version": "0.5.20",
+  "version": "0.5.21",
   "description": "Pi extension for coordinated AI teams, workflows, worktrees, and async task orchestration",
   "author": "baphuongna",
   "license": "MIT",

package/src/runtime/settings-store.ts

@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ function sanitizeSettings(raw: unknown): CrewSettings {
 	if (typeof r.notifierIntervalMs === "number" && r.notifierIntervalMs >= 1000) {
 		out.notifierIntervalMs = r.notifierIntervalMs;
 	}
+	// Pass through scheduledJobs as opaque array (validated by crewScheduler.add)
+	if (Array.isArray(r.scheduledJobs)) {
+		out.scheduledJobs = r.scheduledJobs;
+	}
 	return out;
 }
 

package/src/runtime/task-output-context.ts

@@ -34,7 +34,17 @@ function readIfSmall(filePath: string, maxBytes = 24_000, baseDir?: string): str
 	try {
 		const safePath = baseDir ? resolveRealContainedPath(baseDir, filePath) : filePath;
 		const stat = fs.statSync(safePath);
-		if (stat.size > maxBytes) return `${fs.readFileSync(safePath, "utf-8").slice(0, maxBytes)}\n\n...(truncated ${stat.size - maxBytes} bytes)`;
+		if (stat.size > maxBytes) {
+			// Use bounded read to avoid loading entire file into memory
+			const buf = Buffer.alloc(maxBytes);
+			const fd = fs.openSync(safePath, "r");
+			try {
+				fs.readSync(fd, buf, 0, maxBytes, 0);
+			} finally {
+				fs.closeSync(fd);
+			}
+			return `${buf.toString("utf-8")}\n\n...(truncated ${stat.size - maxBytes} bytes)`;
+		}
 		return fs.readFileSync(safePath, "utf-8");
 	} catch {
 		return undefined;

package/src/state/event-log.ts

@@ -149,12 +149,18 @@ function parseSequence(raw: string): number | undefined {
 export function scanSequence(eventsPath: string): number {
 	if (!fs.existsSync(eventsPath)) return 0;
 	let max = 0;
+	let skipped = 0;
 	for (const line of fs.readFileSync(eventsPath, "utf-8").split("\n")) {
 		if (!line.trim()) continue;
 		try {
 			const event = JSON.parse(line) as TeamEvent;
 			max = Math.max(max, event.metadata?.seq ?? 0);
-		} catch { /* skip corrupt lines without incrementing sequence */ }
+		} catch {
+			skipped++;
+		}
+	}
+	if (skipped > 0) {
+		logInternalError("event-log.scanSequence.corrupt_lines", undefined, `${eventsPath}: skipped ${skipped} corrupt line(s)`);
 	}
 	return max;
 }

package/src/tools/safe-bash.ts

@@ -201,22 +201,23 @@ export function isDangerous(command: string, options: SafeBashOptions = {}): str
 	}
 
 	// Additional shell injection checks using regex for non-critical patterns
-	// Block command substitution $(...)
-	if (/\$\([^)]*\)/.test(command)) {
+	// Block command substitution $(...)  — use normalized to prevent $\n(evil) bypass
+	// Also match $<space>(...) which is the normalized form of $\n(evil)
+	if (/\$\s*\([^)]*\)/.test(normalized)) {
 		return "Command blocked by safe_bash: command substitution $(...) is not allowed";
 	}
 	// Block backtick substitution
 	const backtickRe = /`[^`]*`/;
-	if (backtickRe.test(command)) {
+	if (backtickRe.test(normalized)) {
 		return "Command blocked by safe_bash: backtick substitution is not allowed";
 	}
 	// Block here-docs <<
-	if (/<<\s*['"]?[\w-]+['"]?/.test(command) || /\$<<\s*['"]?[\w-]+['"]?/.test(command)) {
+	if (/<<\s*['"]?[\w-]+['"]?/.test(normalized) || /\$<<\s*['"]?[\w-]+['"]?/.test(normalized)) {
 		return "Command blocked by safe_bash: here-doc is not allowed";
 	}
-	// Block ${...} variable expansion containing shell metacharacters (pipes, redirects, &&/||)
+	// Block ${...} variable expansion containing shell metacharacters
 	const varExpRe = /\$\{([^}]*)\}/;
-	const varMatch = command.match(varExpRe);
+	const varMatch = normalized.match(varExpRe);
 	if (varMatch && /[|&;<>]/.test(varMatch[1])) {
 		return "Command blocked by safe_bash: variable expansion with shell metacharacters is not allowed";
 	}