pi-codex-marketplace 0.6.0 → 0.6.2

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "pi-codex-marketplace",
-  "version": "0.6.0",
+  "version": "0.6.2",
   "description": "Bridge Package for Codex and Claude Marketplace compatibility in Pi — 極簡 /codex-marketplace 純文字指令（add/list/install/update/disable/enable/remove/forget）、單一 Global Bridge State、當下最新安裝與即時投影",
   "type": "module",
   "keywords": [

package/src/registration/contained.ts

@@ -25,10 +25,10 @@ export function containedPathSyntax(p: string): PathSyntax {
   if (p.includes('\\')) return { ok: false, reason: 'backslash' };
   if (isAbsolute(p)) return { ok: false, reason: 'absolute path' };
   if (!p.startsWith('./')) return { ok: false, reason: 'not ./ relative' };
-  const segments = p.split('/');
-  // "./x" -> segments ['', '.', 'x']; a bare "." or ".." component anywhere is rejected
-  const rest = segments.slice(1);
-  for (const seg of rest) {
+  if (p === './') return { ok: true };
+  // The mandatory "./" prefix is not a path component; validate only the declared remainder.
+  const segments = p.slice(2).split('/');
+  for (const seg of segments) {
     if (seg === '' || seg === '.' || seg === '..') {
       return { ok: false, reason: `dot or parent segment '${seg}'` };
     }

package/src/registration/snapshot.ts

@@ -214,7 +214,14 @@ function walkTree(
   return { fileCount, totalBytes, budgetBlocked };
 }
 
-function checkSymlinkContainment(canonicalRoot: string, entries: SnapshotEntry[], findings: ValidationFinding[]): void {
+function checkSymlinkContainment(root: string, entries: SnapshotEntry[], findings: ValidationFinding[]): void {
+  // Canonicalize the owning root once before building the prefix — the raw root may itself
+  // contain symlink components (macOS TMPDIR: /var → /private/var), which would make every
+  // realpath'd target look like it escapes (same pattern as resolveContained in contained.ts).
+  let canonicalRoot = root;
+  try {
+    canonicalRoot = realpathSync.native(root);
+  } catch {}
   for (const e of entries) {
     if (e.type !== 'symlink') continue;
     const abs = join(canonicalRoot, ...e.relPath.split('/'));
@@ -246,6 +253,28 @@ function checkSymlinkContainment(canonicalRoot: string, entries: SnapshotEntry[]
           outcome: `symlink target '${canonical}' escapes owning root`,
         }),
       );
+      continue;
+    }
+    // CONTEXT: Contained Symlink — canonical target must be a regular file or directory;
+    // special-file targets (FIFO/socket/device) are Blocking Findings (same rule as
+    // resolveContained in contained.ts). statSync follows the symlink.
+    let st: ReturnType<typeof statSync> | undefined;
+    try {
+      st = statSync(abs);
+    } catch {
+      continue; // vanished between walk and check; broken/looping already handled above
+    }
+    if (!st.isFile() && !st.isDirectory()) {
+      findings.push(
+        blocking({
+          code: CODE.CONTAINED_SYMLINK_VIOLATION,
+          phase: 'validation',
+          target: 'source',
+          pointer: e.relPath,
+          rule: RULE.CONTAINED_SYMLINK_VIOLATION,
+          outcome: `contained symlink target is a special file: '${canonical}' (${st.isFIFO() ? 'fifo' : 'other'})`,
+        }),
+      );
     }
   }
 }