pi-agent-browser-native 0.2.76 → 0.3.0

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/presentation/semantic-action.js

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Map successful semanticAction results to the same presentation signals as direct ref commands.
- * Responsibilities: Resolve presentation command names, compact action prose, and navigation-summary probe gates.
- * Scope: semanticAction success presentation only.
- */
 import { getCompiledSemanticActionCommandIndex, isCompiledSemanticActionFindCommand, } from "../../input-modes/semantic-action.js";
 import { isRecord } from "../../parsing.js";
 import { formatNavigationSummary, getNavigationSummary, isNavigationObservableCommand, } from "./navigation.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/presentation/skills.js

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Render upstream agent-browser skills output as native pi tool guidance.
- * Responsibilities: Format skills list/path/get results and translate agent-browser shell snippets to agent_browser tool calls.
- * Scope: Skills command presentation only.
- */
 import { isRecord } from "../../parsing.js";
 import { getStringField, redactModelFacingText, stringifyModelFacing } from "./common.js";
 function formatSkillsListText(skills) {

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/presentation.js

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-/*
- * Purpose: Render parsed agent-browser results into concise pi-facing summaries, text content, and optional inline image attachments.
- * Responsibilities: Orchestrate specialized presentation modules, attach inline images within size limits, and keep generic record formatting distinct from envelope parsing.
- * Scope: Presentation shaping only; upstream stdout parsing and snapshot compaction internals live in separate modules.
- */
 import { isRecord } from "../parsing.js";
 import { extractCommandTokens } from "../runtime.js";
 import { buildAgentBrowserNextActions } from "./action-recommendations.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/recovery-actions.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Centralize recovery-oriented nextAction ids and action construction.
- * Responsibilities: Build tab/about:blank/no-active-page/connected-session follow-ups and rich-input recovery ids.
- * Scope: Recovery action contracts only; result category classification and artifact follow-ups live elsewhere.
- * Usage: Imported by shared result action builders and the extension entrypoint.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Ids are public machine-readable contracts mirrored by docs and tests.
- */
 import { buildNextToolAction, withOptionalSessionArgs } from "./next-actions.js";
 export const AGENT_BROWSER_RECOVERY_NEXT_ACTION_IDS = {
     aboutBlankListTabs: "list-tabs-for-about-blank-recovery",

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/recovery-next-actions.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Build session-aware recovery nextActions that combine result category policy with known session/tab context.
- * Responsibilities: Prefix recovery argv with the active session and adapt tab/about:blank/no-active/stale-ref contexts into stable nextAction lists.
- * Scope: Recovery nextAction assembly only; diagnostic detection and action-list merge ordering stay in the extension entrypoint.
- * Usage: Imported by the extension entrypoint when adding recovery nextActions to tool details.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Action ids and argv ordering are public contracts; session prefixing must not double-prefix explicit --session args.
- */
 import { buildAgentBrowserNextActions } from "./action-recommendations.js";
 import { withOptionalSessionArgs } from "./next-actions.js";
 export function buildConnectedSessionNextActions(sessionName) {

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/selector-recovery.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Own pure selector-miss recovery diagnostics for visible refs and rich editable inputs.
- * Responsibilities: Parse find/semantic action targets, match current snapshot refs, build public diagnostics, text, and safe nextActions.
- * Scope: Selector recovery policy only; subprocess snapshot probing and result orchestration stay in the extension entrypoint.
- * Usage: The extension entrypoint supplies command tokens plus snapshot data after a selector-not-found failure.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Public fill recovery must never echo or auto-submit the user-provided fill text; guarded semanticAction fill pre-resolution may execute only one exact current editable ref.
- */
 import { isRecord } from "../parsing.js";
 import { extractRefSnapshotFromData } from "../session-page-state.js";
 import { getEditableRefEvidence } from "./editable-ref-evidence.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/snapshot-high-value-controls.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Select the omitted snapshot refs most likely to be actionable controls.
- * Responsibilities: Classify editable, surface, primary-action, and role-based control refs with deterministic diversity and top-up rules.
- * Scope: High-value control ranking only; snapshot parsing, noise filtering, and presentation text live in neighboring modules.
- * Usage: Snapshot presentation passes already-visible, non-noise omitted refs and receives the bounded high-value subset to surface.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Ranking must preserve scarce control categories before filling dominant buckets so dense desktop hosts stay navigable.
- */
 import { compareRefIds } from "./text.js";
 const SNAPSHOT_HIGH_VALUE_EDITABLE_REF_FILL_TARGET_LINES = 4;
 const SNAPSHOT_HIGH_VALUE_SURFACE_REF_FILL_TARGET_LINES = 3;

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/snapshot-refs.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Own canonical parsing and enrichment of refs from agent-browser snapshot payloads.
- * Responsibilities: Read structured refs, correlate them with raw snapshot lines, and infer editable/ref role evidence once for consumers.
- * Scope: Snapshot ref metadata only; section preview, high-value ranking, and presentation assembly live in neighboring modules.
- * Usage: Imported by snapshot presentation and recovery diagnostics that need consistent ref/name/role/editable evidence.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Snapshot text parsing is best-effort and must tolerate upstream formatting changes by preserving structured ref data when line parsing fails.
- */
 import { isRecord } from "../parsing.js";
 import { getEditableRefEvidence } from "./editable-ref-evidence.js";
 import { compareRefIds, normalizeWhitespace } from "./text.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/snapshot-segments.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Parse raw agent-browser snapshot text into previewable sections.
- * Responsibilities: Identify signal lines, rank content segments, build structured previews, and provide raw-outline fallback previews.
- * Scope: Snapshot text/section planning only; ref enrichment, high-value control ranking, spill files, and final presentation live elsewhere.
- * Usage: Snapshot presentation uses this module before selecting displayed refs.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Parsing is best-effort and must stay resilient to upstream snapshot text format changes.
- */
 import { normalizeWhitespace, truncateText } from "./text.js";
 const SNAPSHOT_MAX_ADDITIONAL_SECTIONS = 2;
 const SNAPSHOT_FALLBACK_PREVIEW_MAX_LINES = 12;

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/snapshot-spill.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Persist full compacted snapshot payloads when model-facing output is shortened.
- * Responsibilities: Write persistent or secure-temp snapshot spill files and merge spill retention metadata into the session artifact manifest.
- * Scope: Snapshot spill artifact lifecycle only; preview planning and presentation text live in snapshot.ts and sibling modules.
- * Usage: Snapshot presentation calls these helpers after deciding a snapshot is too large for inline output.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Explicit full-output paths are reported but not deleted here; retention state mirrors the backing storage scope.
- */
 import { writePersistentSessionArtifactFile, writeSecureTempFile } from "../temp.js";
 import { buildEvictedSessionArtifactEntries, formatSessionArtifactRetentionSummary, mergeSessionArtifactManifest, } from "./artifact-manifest.js";
 const SNAPSHOT_SPILL_FILE_PREFIX = "pi-agent-browser-snapshot";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/snapshot.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Compact large agent-browser snapshots into actionable pi-facing previews while preserving access to the raw payload when budgets allow.
- * Responsibilities: Parse the current raw snapshot text format, detect when structured parsing is trustworthy, derive primary/additional content sections, rank high-value refs, and fall back to raw-outline previews when the upstream snapshot text format is unfamiliar.
- * Scope: Snapshot-specific rendering only; generic envelope parsing, non-snapshot summaries, and image attachment live in neighboring modules.
- * Usage: Imported by the focused presentation module for snapshot content and summary rendering.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Snapshot compaction should stay helpful even if upstream snapshot text formatting shifts, so structured parsing is best-effort and always has a resilient raw-outline fallback.
- */
 import { isRecord } from "../parsing.js";
 import { isHighValueControlEntry, selectHighValueControlEntries } from "./snapshot-high-value-controls.js";
 import { buildFallbackSnapshotOutline, buildRefLineOrderMap, buildSegmentPreview, buildSnapshotSegments, canUseStructuredSnapshotPreview, chooseAdditionalSegments, choosePrimarySegment, getMeaningfulSegmentLines, getSnapshotRolePriority, isChromeSectionName, isNoiseName, parseSnapshotLines, } from "./snapshot-segments.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/results/text.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Hold tiny text and ref-id helpers shared by result renderers.
- * Responsibilities: Convert unknown values to text, count lines, normalize whitespace, truncate labels, and sort ref ids naturally.
- * Scope: Generic pure utilities only; no agent-browser command policy belongs here.
- * Usage: Imported by envelope, presentation, snapshot, and diagnostic helpers.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Helpers are deterministic and side-effect free.
- */
 export function stringifyUnknown(value) {
     if (typeof value === "string")
         return value;

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/runtime.js

@@ -1,16 +1,7 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Build safe, deterministic agent-browser invocations and persisted session state for the pi-agent-browser extension.
- * Responsibilities: Validate raw tool arguments, derive extension-managed session names from the pi session identity, restore managed-session state from persisted tool details, redact sensitive invocation text, classify browser-oriented prompts, and build the effective CLI argument list passed to the upstream agent-browser binary.
- * Scope: Runtime-planning helpers only; no subprocess execution or filesystem access.
- * Usage: Imported by the extension entrypoint and unit tests before spawning the upstream CLI.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: The wrapper stays thin, preserves upstream command vocabulary, keeps plain-text inspection stateless,
- * and only injects wrapper-owned flags: `--json`, an extension-managed `--session` when appropriate, the narrow
- * site-specific headless compatibility `--user-agent` when that workaround applies.
- */
 import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
 import { basename } from "node:path";
 import { findCommandStartIndex, parseArgvDescriptor, parseCommandInfo, } from "./argv-descriptor.js";
-import { canonicalizeAgentBrowserNamespace, extractExplicitNamespace, extractExplicitSessionName, getAgentBrowserSessionIdentityKey, getBooleanFlagValue, GLOBAL_VALUE_FLAGS_ALLOWING_DASH_VALUE, PREVALIDATED_VALUE_FLAGS, resolveAgentBrowserNamespace, scanUpstreamGlobalFlagOccurrences, } from "./argv-grammar.js";
+import { canonicalizeAgentBrowserNamespace, extractExplicitNamespace, extractExplicitSessionName, getAgentBrowserSessionIdentityKey, getBooleanFlagValue, GLOBAL_VALUE_FLAGS_ALLOWING_DASH_VALUE, isUpstreamEnvFlagEnabled, PREVALIDATED_VALUE_FLAGS, resolveAgentBrowserNamespace, scanUpstreamGlobalFlagOccurrences, } from "./argv-grammar.js";
 import { needsManagedSession } from "./command-policy.js";
 import { isWrapperManagedSessionName, redactManagedSessionRestoreKeys } from "./managed-session-capabilities.js";
 import { isCloseCommand, isOpenNavigationCommand } from "./command-taxonomy.js";
@@ -368,7 +359,7 @@ export function resolveManagedSessionState(options) {
         sessionName: managedSessionName,
     };
 }
-function isRestorableManagedSessionName(sessionName, fallbackSessionName) {
+export function isRestorableManagedSessionName(sessionName, fallbackSessionName) {
     return sessionName === fallbackSessionName || sessionName.startsWith(`${fallbackSessionName}-fresh-`);
 }
 function getManagedSessionRestoreRank(options) {
@@ -699,9 +690,8 @@ export function canUseHeadlessCompatibilityUserAgent(args, env = process.env) {
         return false;
     if (env.AGENT_BROWSER_USER_AGENT !== undefined || env.AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS !== undefined || env.AGENT_BROWSER_CDP !== undefined || env.AGENT_BROWSER_PROVIDER !== undefined)
         return false;
-    const envFlagEnabled = (value) => value !== undefined && !["", "0", "false", "no"].includes(value.toLowerCase());
-    if ((getBooleanFlagValue(args, "--headed") ?? envFlagEnabled(env.AGENT_BROWSER_HEADED))
-        || (getBooleanFlagValue(args, "--auto-connect") ?? envFlagEnabled(env.AGENT_BROWSER_AUTO_CONNECT)))
+    if ((getBooleanFlagValue(args, "--headed") ?? isUpstreamEnvFlagEnabled(env.AGENT_BROWSER_HEADED))
+        || (getBooleanFlagValue(args, "--auto-connect") ?? isUpstreamEnvFlagEnabled(env.AGENT_BROWSER_AUTO_CONNECT)))
         return false;
     const engine = scanUpstreamGlobalFlagOccurrences(args, "--engine").at(-1)?.value ?? env.AGENT_BROWSER_ENGINE;
     return !engine || engine === "chrome";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/session-page-state.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Own wrapper-known per-session browser page target, ref snapshot, invalidation, and pinning state.
- * Responsibilities: Restore state from persisted tool details, apply ordered tab/ref updates atomically, and expose order-free public state views to the extension entrypoint.
- * Scope: Session page state only; browser process execution, tab probing, and presentation policies stay in the extension entrypoint.
- * Usage: `index.ts` creates one store per Pi session lifecycle and records observations through update tokens.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: One tool-call update token must govern all page-state observations from that invocation; stale overlapping updates must not overwrite newer state.
- */
 import { getAgentBrowserSessionIdentityKey } from "./argv-grammar.js";
 import { isCloseCommand, isReadOnlyDiagnosticSessionTargetCommand, isUnverifiedPageTransitionCommand } from "./command-taxonomy.js";
 import { isRecord } from "./parsing.js";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/string-enum-schema.js

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Build compact JSON-schema string enums without importing pi runtime helpers.
- * Responsibilities: Mirror pi-ai StringEnum's `{ type: "string", enum: [...] }` shape while keeping extension startup imports light.
- * Scope: Schema construction only.
- */
 import { JsonSchema } from "./json-schema.js";
 export function StringEnum(values, options) {
     return JsonSchema.Unsafe({

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/temp.js

@@ -1,10 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Create private temporary and persisted spill files for the pi-agent-browser extension without leaking artifacts broadly on disk.
- * Responsibilities: Maintain a process-private temp root, stamp explicit ownership/protected-child markers, enforce an aggregate temp-artifact disk budget, create securely permissioned temp files, create session-scoped persisted spill files for resumable sessions, prune explicitly owned stale temp roots from prior runs without deleting protected children, and best-effort clean all owned roots on process exit.
- * Scope: Artifact lifecycle helpers only; callers decide what data to write and when to delete or retain long-lived references.
- * Usage: Imported by result/process helpers when they need secure spill files instead of world-readable shared tmp paths.
- * Invariants/Assumptions: Temp artifacts live under the OS temp directory, each active run uses a dedicated 0700 directory, files are created with exclusive 0600 permissions, session-scoped persisted artifacts stay under the pi session directory, and stale pruning only touches roots with an explicit pi-agent-browser ownership marker.
- */
 import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
 import { existsSync, readdirSync, rmSync } from "node:fs";
 import { chmod, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, readFile, readdir, rm, stat, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";

package/dist/extensions/agent-browser/lib/web-search.js

@@ -1,8 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Purpose: Provide the optional provider-backed `agent_browser_web_search` companion tool.
- * Responsibilities: Define strict search input schema, resolve configured Brave/Exa credentials lazily, call the selected search API with cancellation/timeout, normalize compact results, and keep secrets out of content/details.
- * Scope: Live web search only; browser automation remains in the `agent_browser` tool.
- */
 import { JsonSchema } from "./json-schema.js";
 import { WEB_SEARCH_PROMPT_GUIDELINE } from "./playbook.js";
 import { StringEnum as localStringEnum } from "./string-enum-schema.js";

package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The extension should:
 - inject `--json`
 - complete each upstream invocation when the direct `agent-browser` child exits even if Node delays `"close"`: piped stdio can stay referenced by longer-lived descendant processes, so `runAgentBrowserProcess` watches `exit` and `close` together, leaves stdio intact during a short post-`exit` grace so normal `close` can still win, destroys streams only when the post-`exit` fallback fires, and prefers `close` codes then wrapper timeout (`124`) over signal-shaped `exit` codes (`watchSpawnedChildCompletion` / `resolveSpawnedChildExitCode` in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/process.ts`) so the tool cannot hang after the CLI process has already terminated
 - support optional stdin only for `eval --stdin`, `batch`, `auth save --password-stdin`, and wrapper-generated `batch` stdin from top-level `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, or `networkSourceLookup`, rejecting other command/stdin combinations before launch; top-level `electron` never accepts caller `stdin` (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#electron))
-- support optional top-level `outputPath` for successful browser results by writing `details.data` (or model-facing text when no structured data exists) to a caller-requested local file and reporting `details.outputFile`, without changing upstream argv semantics
+- support optional top-level `outputPath` for successful browser results by writing `details.data` (or model-facing text when no structured data exists) to a caller-requested local file and reporting `details.outputFile`, without changing upstream argv semantics or overwriting a browser artifact when both destinations resolve to the same file
 - support optional top-level `timeoutMs` as a per-call subprocess watchdog override for browser CLI input modes while keeping Electron-specific timeouts inside the `electron` object
 - accept an optional native `semanticAction` object as a mutually exclusive alternative to `args` on a single tool call (and to `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, `networkSourceLookup`, and `electron` on the same call), compile locator actions into upstream `find` argv, direct selector/ref click/check/fill into upstream command argv, and native dropdown selection into upstream `select <selector> <value...>` argv (with optional `semanticAction.session` expanding to a leading `--session <name>` before the compiled command when targeting a named upstream browser instead of the managed default), and echo the compiled shape in `details.compiledSemanticAction` for observability (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#semanticaction))
 - accept an optional native `job` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, `networkSourceLookup`, and `electron` on the same call) with a small fixed step vocabulary that compiles only to existing upstream `batch` argv rows, generates the JSON batch stdin string internally, defaults to fail-fast `batch --bail` unless `failFast:false` is explicit, supports semantic locator fields on constrained `click`/`fill` steps by reusing the top-level semantic-action compiler, supports human-paced `type` by expanding to a bounded set of existing focus/keyboard/wait/press rows while compacting model-visible batch text, and echoes `details.compiledJob` for observability (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#job))
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ Pi docs use `settings.json` for package/resource loading and filtering, not arbi
 - project-local: `.pi/config/pi-agent-browser-native/config.json`
 - explicit override: `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG=/path/to/config.json`
 
-Config layers merge in that order: global, project, override. The shared policy module (`extensions/agent-browser/lib/config-policy.js`) owns provider descriptors, environment variable names, config keys, credential source parsing, developer-trusted project layer inclusion, layer validation/merge, redacted status projection, and credential summaries for both runtime config loading and the package config helper. Under Pi 0.79+, globally installed or CLI-loaded extensions are developer-trusted code, so this extension reads `.pi/config/pi-agent-browser-native/config.json` by default and skips that project layer when Pi reports the project is untrusted or when launched with `--no-approve`. Global config and explicit `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` overrides remain available either way. The config reader accepts v1 fields for `webSearch.enabled`, `webSearch.preferredProvider`, `webSearch.exaApiKey`, `webSearch.braveApiKey`, and conservative browser defaults such as `browser.defaultProfile` and `browser.executablePath`. Web-search key fields follow Pi model/provider-style value resolution from any loaded layer: literal values, `$ENV_VAR` / `${ENV_VAR}` interpolation, escapes (`$$`, `$!`), and leading `!command` resolved at request time. `EXA_API_KEY` and `BRAVE_API_KEY` remain environment fallbacks when no config credential source exists for that provider. Browser default values keep their source scope; prompt guidance is emitted from the highest-priority loaded layer, including project config when Pi trust/loading allows it.
+Config layers merge in that order: global, project, override. The shared policy module (`extensions/agent-browser/lib/config-policy.js`) owns provider descriptors, environment variable names, config keys, credential source parsing, developer-trusted project layer inclusion, layer validation/merge, redacted status projection, and credential summaries for both runtime config loading and the package config helper. Under Pi 0.84.0+, globally installed or CLI-loaded extensions are developer-trusted code, so this extension reads `.pi/config/pi-agent-browser-native/config.json` by default and skips that project layer when Pi reports the project is untrusted or when launched with `--no-approve`. Global config and explicit `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` overrides remain available either way. The config reader accepts v1 fields for `webSearch.enabled`, `webSearch.preferredProvider`, `webSearch.exaApiKey`, `webSearch.braveApiKey`, and conservative browser defaults such as `browser.defaultProfile` and `browser.executablePath`. Web-search key fields follow Pi model/provider-style value resolution from any loaded layer: literal values, `$ENV_VAR` / `${ENV_VAR}` interpolation, escapes (`$$`, `$!`), and leading `!command` resolved at request time. `EXA_API_KEY` and `BRAVE_API_KEY` remain environment fallbacks when no config credential source exists for that provider. Browser default values keep their source scope; prompt guidance is emitted from the highest-priority loaded layer, including project config when Pi trust/loading allows it.
 
 `agent_browser_web_search` availability is conditional. Startup registration uses global, override, and environment fallback config without reading project-local config before Pi trust context exists; trusted project config can register the companion tool on `session_start`, and every execution reloads the final session config so `webSearch.enabled: false` still prevents a request even if a startup credential made the tool visible. A global disable is the normal user default and can still be overridden by project config or `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG`; a project disable applies to one repo; an explicit `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` file with `webSearch.enabled: false` is the highest-priority hard disable for that run. Literal and env-backed sources must resolve before they make the tool available; command-backed sources are considered configured without running the command until tool execution, so secret managers do not slow startup or prompt unexpectedly. The tool resolves the selected key lazily, chooses Exa or Brave from available credentials (preferring Exa by default unless `webSearch.preferredProvider` says otherwise), then follows one provider-agnostic execution path through provider adapters for request building, HTTP JSON fetch, response normalization, and provider-specific detail fields. It calls Exa `/search` with highlights or Brave Search and returns compact result details without exposing keys.
 
@@ -85,12 +85,12 @@ Tier B guidance lives in `SHARED_BROWSER_PLAYBOOK_GUIDELINES`, generated README/
 Do **not** add reusable browser recipes as a first-class runtime surface yet.
 
 Current evidence does not justify another source of truth for workflows:
-- the deterministic efficiency benchmark in [`scripts/agent-browser-efficiency-benchmark.mjs`](https://github.com/fitchmultz/pi-agent-browser-native/blob/main/scripts/agent-browser-efficiency-benchmark.mjs) models one native `job` scenario (`job-open-assert-screenshot`), one `qa` preset (`qa-open-diagnostics`), one `sourceLookup` (`source-lookup-visible-element`), one `networkSourceLookup` (`network-source-lookup-failed-request`), plus deterministic `electron` lifecycle/probe scenarios (`electron-lifecycle`, `electron-probe`) rather than repeated named job patterns that agents keep re-specifying
+- unit/fake-upstream coverage and real-app dogfood exercise `job`, `qa`, experimental lookups, and `electron` lifecycle without a separate accounting benchmark layer
 - repo-local dogfood evidence does not show repeated project-specific job recipes that need versioning or ownership
 - `qa` already covers the only repeated smoke-test shape with a stable top-level preset
 - docs and prompt guidance can carry examples without adding recipe state, migration rules, or another schema
 
-Revisit this only when benchmark or dogfood data shows at least two repeated, failure-prone job sequences that cannot be represented clearly by `job`, `qa`, top-level `electron`, or raw `batch`. If that happens, define ownership, versioning, schema boundaries, generated docs, and tests before adding executable recipes.
+Revisit this only when dogfood data shows at least two repeated, failure-prone job sequences that cannot be represented clearly by `job`, `qa`, top-level `electron`, or raw `batch`. If that happens, define ownership, versioning, schema boundaries, generated docs, and tests before adding executable recipes.
 
 ### Package layout versus local checkout development
 
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ The published package should load from the `pi` manifest in `package.json`.
 Local checkout validation has two intentional modes:
 
 - **Quick isolated mode:** use explicit CLI loading such as `pi --approve --no-extensions -e .` from the repository root when this checkout is intentionally trusted. This bypasses Pi settings and extension discovery, avoids duplicate `agent_browser` registrations when another source is installed globally, and is the right mode for checkout smoke tests; omit `--approve` only when deliberately testing Pi's Project Trust prompt.
-- **Configured-source lifecycle mode:** configure exactly one active checkout or package source in Pi settings and launch plain `pi` for manual validation, or run the automated harness that launches with `--approve`. This is the right mode for validating `/reload` and exact-session relaunch because those lifecycle checks exercise discovered/configured resources. Focused extension harness tests validate branch-backed `session_tree` rehydration and cleanup ownership. Before shipping, maintainers also run `npm run verify -- lifecycle` (same semantics under automation, using Pi 0.79 `--approve --session-id` to reopen the exact JSONL session) plus the live-site checks in [`RELEASE.md`](RELEASE.md#pre-release-checks); `npm publish` enforces `npm run verify -- release` via `prepublishOnly` unless scripts are skipped.
+- **Configured-source lifecycle mode:** configure exactly one active checkout or package source in Pi settings and launch plain `pi` for manual validation, or run the automated harness that launches with `--approve`. This is the right mode for validating `/reload` and exact-session relaunch because those lifecycle checks exercise discovered/configured resources. Focused extension harness tests validate branch-backed `session_tree` rehydration and cleanup ownership. Before shipping, maintainers also run `npm run verify -- lifecycle` (same semantics under automation, using Pi 0.84.0+ `--approve --session-id` to reopen the exact JSONL session) plus the live-site checks in [`RELEASE.md`](RELEASE.md#pre-release-checks); `npm publish` enforces `npm run verify -- release` via `prepublishOnly` unless scripts are skipped.
 
 The repo should not add a repo-local `.pi/extensions/` autoload shim as the documented checkout path.
 
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ Why:
 - keeps reload and exact-session relaunch validation tied to Pi's configured-source lifecycle instead of an isolated quick-test path, while `session_tree` state changes stay covered by focused extension harness tests
 - keeps the published tarball focused on the package manifest, extension code, canonical docs, and license
 
-The published package should exclude agent-only and internal planning materials such as `AGENTS.md` and `docs/plans/`.
+The published package should exclude agent-only and internal planning materials such as `AGENTS.md`.
 
 ## Session model
 
@@ -137,18 +137,19 @@ V1 ownership rule:
 - extension-managed sessions should be reusable during an active `pi` session and across `/reload`, exact-session relaunch, `/resume`, and Pi branch-tree transitions, while still being cleaned up predictably
 
 Practical policy:
-- preserve the current branch-visible extension-managed session across `/reload`, exact-session relaunch, `/resume`, and Pi 0.79 `session_tree` branch transitions so persisted sessions can keep following the live browser after lifecycle changes
+- preserve the current branch-visible extension-managed session across `/reload`, exact-session relaunch, `/resume`, and Pi 0.84.0+ `session_tree` branch transitions so persisted sessions can keep following the live browser after lifecycle changes
 - close the active extension-managed session when the originating `pi` process quits, while leaving explicit caller-provided sessions alone
 - set an idle timeout on extension-managed sessions as a backstop for abnormal exits or cleanup failures, and apply that same `AGENT_BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS` value to every upstream subprocess (including wrapper helper snapshots, tab lists, and navigation-summary reads) because changing the launch environment between calls can make upstream restart the background browser, discard the active tab, and invalidate fresh refs
-- for wrapper-owned managed sessions only, also set a Git-checkout-generation-stable `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key on every compatible non-close upstream subprocess so cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage autosave/restore across idle shutdowns and later Pi chats in the same checkout generation. The wrapper stores a UUID in the resolved Git admin directory and combines it with the checkout root and Git-admin directory filesystem identities: renames preserve the key, copied or path-replacement checkouts get a new key, non-Git directories fail closed, and cwd-only keys are not adopted. Policy lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/managed-session-restore.ts`; ownership is resolved by `resolveOwnedManagedSessionContext` (injected managed session, or explicit `--session` equal to the current managed name and namespace) and applied through `AsyncLocalStorage` `withOwnedManagedSessionContext` for prepare helpers plus main process/output, with typed `ownedManagedSession` process options for owned main/close spawns rather than an internal marker leaked into the child environment. `buildOwnedManagedSessionRestoreContext` sets call-scoped `restoreSuppressed` from main-plan argv so helper probes skip restore on incompatible plans without sticky-disabling when prepare returns early; sticky disable commits only after an owned-context subprocess actually starts with suppressed restore policy: POSIX commits on child `spawn`, while PowerShell-backed Windows commits after completion unless command-not-found stderr proves `agent-browser.cmd` never started. No-spawn preflight and missing-binary failures never commit an identity. Duplicate `--session` or `--namespace` flags are rejected, as are leading equals forms that upstream 0.33.2 does not recognize; global identity/config scanning follows upstream across the full argv rather than treating `--` as a sentinel. Native Windows command-first launcher adaptation relocates only valid leading global syntax, canonicalizes a valued optional `--restore <name>` to `--restore=<name>`, consumes only exact lowercase boolean literals, and leaves command-scoped, unknown, or unsupported equals-form input untouched so invalid calls cannot become valid browser activity. Namespace values are canonicalized with upstream's lowercase `sanitize_session_component` algorithm before ownership, sticky/page state, details, socket, or restore-directory identity comparisons; every wrapper-owned subprocess also pins that canonical namespace, including an empty default namespace, so parent environment cannot redirect helpers or close. Electron status target reads and current-managed probes acquire the same daemon-policy lock and owned restore context as ordinary commands for their underlying reads. Probe results then persist the same namespace plus top-level tab/ref state, keeping branch replay keyed to the probed identity. Ownership is typed rather than inferred from a name prefix, and `piab-*` live-session names are reserved: an explicit target is accepted only when it is the current/generated managed session or appears in this extension instance's ownership records. `session list` hides those rows, and the same reservation is rechecked at the final process boundary so another Pi process cannot attach to a managed authenticated browser through the shared per-user daemon socket. Skip when the caller already set restore/profile/state/CDP/provider/auto-connect/containment/session-name or a browser mutation surface (custom executable, extension, init script, raw launch args, proxy, plugin, WebGPU, or related engine/device controls) via argv or matching parent env, when the command is `connect`, when raw batch argv is used, when batch stdin contains nested `connect`/`batch`, or when `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_MANAGED_SESSION_RESTORE=0`. The wrapper's own site-specific headless user-agent compatibility injection is excluded from caller-mutation policy and remains pinned across follow-up subprocesses for the active managed session. For those owned sessions only, the process boundary also replaces the otherwise-empty safe `--args` value with a fixed, comma-safe Chrome `--user-agent=...` launch argument so new targets inherit the compatibility value; upstream's normal `--user-agent` flag applies only to the active CDP target. A user-private immutable ticket-claim lock keyed by canonical namespace/session serializes this inspect-through-spawn decision across cooperating Pi processes; every contender publishes a unique claim, deterministic tickets elect one owner, and the winner also holds the legacy v2 path as a bridge. The bridge is transitional for pre-release branch processes and is scheduled for removal after v0.2.74 in [#93](https://github.com/fitchmultz/pi-agent-browser-native/issues/93). Live pre-update processes and their in-flight candidate gaps therefore block new acquisition; an abandoned v2 owner fails closed for manual repair, while current-protocol recovery removes only unique claims and artifacts with proven-dead PID/start identity. Waits are asynchronous and bounded. Every policy-lock winner re-runs `session info` even when this process previously recorded the applied/observed restore key, because another process can restart the same daemon identity between calls. That inspection uses a fixed bounded timeout independent of a caller's shorter `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_PROCESS_TIMEOUT_MS` override. Before an incompatible call, the wrapper reads `session info` for the actual same-identity daemon and fails before the requested spawn when that daemon retains any restore key or cannot be inspected. This covers restore-enabled daemons missing from transcript state after a crash and managed sessions launched with an explicit caller restore key; a confirmed inactive daemon remains reusable; a restore-disabled daemon is reusable only when this process recorded its expected null/custom restore policy after an owned spawn or successful policy match. After reload clears process-only provenance, an inactive old daemon may be restarted without restore and that started subprocess records a null daemon policy for its next follow-up. Same-process `session_tree` branch changes retain that process-owned provenance; a new extension instance after reload, restart, or `/resume` intentionally starts without it and fails closed on a still-live restore-disabled daemon even when the transcript restores sticky-disable state. Close the retained-key daemon first, use a fresh wrapper session, or choose a distinct explicit session. Once a managed session hits any allowed incompatible launch path, restore stays disabled for later bare follow-ups on that same session identity. Sticky identities live in the extension-owned `ManagedSessionRestoreState` instance, persist as `details.managedSessionRestoreDisabled`, and are replaced from current-branch rows during branch restore rather than stored in module-global process state. The opt-out returns before config/storage probes and sticky-records a successfully spawned identity as restore-disabled, allowing later calls to reuse that non-restore daemon without tripping the active restore-enabled conflict gate. This is env-based persistence, not a hidden argv relaunch. Upstream still owns restore file paths/modes under `~/.agent-browser/`; set `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` on multi-user hosts if plaintext session files are unacceptable. Any project `./agent-browser.json`, explicit `--config` / `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG`, or `~/.agent-browser/config.json` discovered while planning disables managed restore without reading caller-selected content in the Pi host; owned spawns sticky-disable that session identity. Each subprocess that receives the wrapper restore key, plus every wrapper-owned close, overrides config discovery with a process-private empty `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` (`0400` on POSIX) inside the canonical marked `0700` secure-temp root, closing the check-to-spawn race without trusting project or user config while retaining normal shutdown cleanup and PID/start-identity stale-root recovery after abnormal exit on POSIX and native Windows; versioned Windows identities treat legacy cross-format markers as unknown instead of incorrectly proving PID reuse, and temp ownership marker schema v2 makes older readers ignore new-format markers. Spawn-time revalidation rejects changed checkout identity, restore storage, unpinned launch-mutator environment, foreign managed-session targets, or forbidden managed-state access before agent-browser starts; the same check runs again after protected-config and socket-directory awaits immediately adjacent to the synchronous spawn. A failed fresh command that started agent-browser triggers an exact-identity daemon probe; an active or uninspectable daemon remains current and wrapper-owned so shutdown cleanup can close it, while pre-aborted and missing-binary calls remain unowned. Wrapper-owned close commands canonicalize upstream argv to JSON plus the known namespace/session and `close`, discarding caller config/restore globals, and do not inject a newly derived restore key into an existing daemon, so checkout replacement cannot make old auth save under the replacement generation; the close path retains the observed wrapper key long enough to record the returned old-generation snapshot safely. Because upstream writes a snapshot per daemon session, a successful wrapper-owned close requests JSON output and persists only the returned state path as an atomic record in a lockless convergent per-key ownership directory beside the snapshots (`0700`, with `0600` records, on POSIX). Cleanup carries that ownership proof across Pi restarts, self-heals malformed or stale regular records without claiming their snapshots, uses immutable atomic record names plus rescan-after-delete convergence so concurrent closers cannot skip ownership recording or exceed the aggregate cap, removes proven snapshots older than 30 days for the exact restore key while retaining the two newest, expires stale ownership-proven snapshots and empty manifests from other restore-key generations after 30 days only when a private lineage record proves the same canonical checkout path, caps young close churn at 256 records per key, and never deletes matching unrecorded files or the current checkout key. Upstream restore files under `~/.agent-browser/` remain plaintext unless `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is set; before automatic managed restore the wrapper requires a durable Git generation and absolute platform home root; it pins the planned encryption-key value after caller env merging; on POSIX it also resolves `HOME` once, validates owner-trusted non-writable ancestry plus stable device/inode/birth-time metadata for both checkout and Git-admin directories, and pins that canonical value, enforces mode `0700` without silently repairing unsafe existing paths, and rejects symlinks/non-directories along the exact `~/.agent-browser[/namespaces/<canonical>/state]/sessions` path and its `.tmp` transactional-write area, while Windows requires an absolute `USERPROFILE` and the documented 64-character hex encryption key because POSIX mode checks cannot verify profile ACLs; malformed keys fail closed on every platform. POSIX process-start probes use absolute `/bin/ps` then `/usr/bin/ps`; if neither is available, managed policy locking fails closed with an actionable validation message. Managed `piab-r2-*` keys and key-bearing paths are redacted from visible/structured/JSON transcript surfaces. Malformed oversized upstream output is discarded after parsing rather than copied into a persistent parse-failure spill, and raw parse-failure stdout is omitted from result details. `session list` and `state list` filter wrapper-managed rows, and the pre-spawn policy blocks foreign managed restore/state references, broad clear/clean operations, and managed save/rename targets while preserving targeted caller-owned state workflows.
+- for wrapper-owned managed sessions only, also set a Git-checkout-generation-stable `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key on every compatible non-close upstream subprocess so cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage autosave/restore across idle shutdowns and later Pi chats in the same checkout generation. The wrapper stores a UUID in the resolved Git admin directory and combines it with the checkout root and Git-admin directory filesystem identities: renames preserve the key, copied or path-replacement checkouts get a new key, non-Git directories fail closed, and cwd-only keys are not adopted. Policy lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/managed-session-restore.ts`; ownership is resolved by `resolveOwnedManagedSessionContext` (injected managed session, or explicit `--session` equal to the current managed name and namespace) and applied through `AsyncLocalStorage` `withOwnedManagedSessionContext` for prepare helpers plus main process/output, with typed `ownedManagedSession` process options for owned main/close spawns rather than an internal marker leaked into the child environment. `buildOwnedManagedSessionRestoreContext` sets call-scoped `restoreSuppressed` from main-plan argv so helper probes skip restore on incompatible plans without sticky-disabling when prepare returns early; sticky disable commits only after an owned-context subprocess actually starts with suppressed restore policy: POSIX commits on child `spawn`, while PowerShell-backed Windows commits after completion unless command-not-found stderr proves `agent-browser.cmd` never started. No-spawn preflight and missing-binary failures never commit an identity. Duplicate `--session` or `--namespace` flags are rejected, as are leading equals forms that upstream 0.33.2 does not recognize; global identity/config scanning follows upstream across the full argv rather than treating `--` as a sentinel. Native Windows command-first launcher adaptation relocates only valid leading global syntax, canonicalizes a valued optional `--restore <name>` to `--restore=<name>`, consumes only exact lowercase boolean literals, and leaves command-scoped, unknown, or unsupported equals-form input untouched so invalid calls cannot become valid browser activity. Namespace values are canonicalized with upstream's lowercase `sanitize_session_component` algorithm before ownership, sticky/page state, details, socket, or restore-directory identity comparisons; every wrapper-owned subprocess also pins that canonical namespace, including an empty default namespace, so parent environment cannot redirect helpers or close. Electron status target reads and current-managed probes acquire the same daemon-policy lock and owned restore context as ordinary commands for their underlying reads. Probe results then persist the same namespace plus top-level tab/ref state, keeping branch replay keyed to the probed identity. Ownership is typed rather than inferred from a name prefix, and `piab-*` live-session names are reserved: an explicit target is accepted only when it is the current/generated managed session or appears in this extension instance's ownership records. `session list` hides those rows, and the same reservation is rechecked at the final process boundary so another Pi process cannot attach to a managed authenticated browser through the shared per-user daemon socket. Skip when the caller already set restore/profile/state/CDP/provider/auto-connect/containment/session-name or a browser mutation surface (custom executable, extension, init script, raw launch args, proxy, plugin, WebGPU, or related engine/device controls) via argv or matching parent env, when the command is `connect`, when raw batch argv is used, when batch stdin contains nested `connect`/`batch`, or when `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_MANAGED_SESSION_RESTORE=0`. The wrapper's own site-specific headless user-agent compatibility injection is excluded from caller-mutation policy and remains pinned across follow-up subprocesses for the active managed session. For those owned sessions only, the process boundary also replaces the otherwise-empty safe `--args` value with a fixed, comma-safe Chrome `--user-agent=...` launch argument so new targets inherit the compatibility value; upstream's normal `--user-agent` flag applies only to the active CDP target. A user-private immutable ticket-claim lock keyed by canonical namespace/session serializes this inspect-through-spawn decision across cooperating Pi processes; every contender publishes a unique claim, deterministic tickets elect one owner, and the winner also holds the legacy v2 path as a bridge. The bridge is transitional for pre-release branch processes and is scheduled for removal after v0.2.74 in [#93](https://github.com/fitchmultz/pi-agent-browser-native/issues/93). Live pre-update processes and their in-flight candidate gaps therefore block new acquisition; an abandoned v2 owner fails closed for manual repair, while current-protocol recovery removes only unique claims and artifacts with proven-dead PID/start identity. Waits are asynchronous and bounded. Ordinary acquisition waits one second and fails with retry guidance rather than queueing behind another process's in-flight command, which may retain the lock through a 35-second daemon inspection and the requested browser operation. Every policy-lock winner re-runs `session info` even when this process previously recorded the applied/observed restore key, because another process can restart the same daemon identity between calls. That inspection uses a fixed bounded timeout independent of a caller's shorter `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_PROCESS_TIMEOUT_MS` override. Before an incompatible call, the wrapper reads `session info` for the actual same-identity daemon and fails before the requested spawn when that daemon retains any restore key or cannot be inspected. This covers restore-enabled daemons missing from transcript state after a crash and managed sessions launched with an explicit caller restore key; a confirmed inactive daemon remains reusable; a restore-disabled daemon is reusable only when this process recorded its expected null/custom restore policy after an owned spawn or successful policy match. After reload clears process-only provenance, an inactive old daemon may be restarted without restore and that started subprocess records a null daemon policy for its next follow-up. Same-process `session_tree` branch changes retain that process-owned provenance; a new extension instance after reload, restart, or `/resume` intentionally starts without it and fails closed on a still-live restore-disabled daemon even when the transcript restores sticky-disable state. Close the retained-key daemon first, use a fresh wrapper session, or choose a distinct explicit session. Once a managed session hits any allowed incompatible launch path, restore stays disabled for later bare follow-ups on that same session identity. Sticky identities live in the extension-owned `ManagedSessionRestoreState` instance, persist as `details.managedSessionRestoreDisabled`, and are replaced from current-branch rows during branch restore rather than stored in module-global process state. The opt-out returns before config/storage probes and sticky-records a successfully spawned identity as restore-disabled, allowing later calls to reuse that non-restore daemon without tripping the active restore-enabled conflict gate. This is env-based persistence, not a hidden argv relaunch. Upstream still owns restore file paths/modes under `~/.agent-browser/`; set `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` on multi-user hosts if plaintext session files are unacceptable. Any project `./agent-browser.json`, explicit `--config` / `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG`, or `~/.agent-browser/config.json` discovered while planning disables managed restore without reading caller-selected content in the Pi host; owned spawns sticky-disable that session identity. Each subprocess that receives the wrapper restore key, plus every wrapper-owned close, overrides config discovery with a process-private empty `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` (`0400` on POSIX) inside the canonical marked `0700` secure-temp root, closing the check-to-spawn race without trusting project or user config while retaining normal shutdown cleanup and PID/start-identity stale-root recovery after abnormal exit on POSIX and native Windows; versioned Windows identities treat legacy cross-format markers as unknown instead of incorrectly proving PID reuse, and temp ownership marker schema v2 makes older readers ignore new-format markers. Spawn-time revalidation rejects changed checkout identity, restore storage, unpinned launch-mutator environment, foreign managed-session targets, or forbidden managed-state access before agent-browser starts; the same check runs again after protected-config and socket-directory awaits immediately adjacent to the synchronous spawn. A failed fresh command that started agent-browser triggers an exact-identity daemon probe; an active or uninspectable daemon remains current and wrapper-owned so shutdown cleanup can close it, while pre-aborted and missing-binary calls remain unowned. Wrapper-owned close commands canonicalize upstream argv to JSON plus the known namespace/session and `close`, discarding caller config/restore globals, and do not inject a newly derived restore key into an existing daemon, so checkout replacement cannot make old auth save under the replacement generation; the close path retains the observed wrapper key long enough to record the returned old-generation snapshot safely. Because upstream writes a snapshot per daemon session, a successful wrapper-owned close requests JSON output and persists only the returned state path as an atomic record in a lockless convergent per-key ownership directory beside the snapshots (`0700`, with `0600` records, on POSIX). Cleanup carries that ownership proof across Pi restarts, self-heals malformed or stale regular records without claiming their snapshots, uses immutable atomic record names plus rescan-after-delete convergence so concurrent closers cannot skip ownership recording or exceed the aggregate cap, removes proven snapshots older than 30 days for the exact restore key while retaining the two newest, expires stale ownership-proven snapshots and empty manifests from other restore-key generations after 30 days only when a private lineage record proves the same canonical checkout path, caps young close churn at 256 records per key, and never deletes matching unrecorded files or the current checkout key. Upstream restore files under `~/.agent-browser/` remain plaintext unless `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is set; before automatic managed restore the wrapper requires a durable Git generation and absolute platform home root; it pins the planned encryption-key value after caller env merging; on POSIX it also resolves `HOME` once, validates owner-trusted non-writable ancestry plus stable device/inode/birth-time metadata for both checkout and Git-admin directories, and pins that canonical value, enforces mode `0700` without silently repairing unsafe existing paths, and rejects symlinks/non-directories along the exact `~/.agent-browser[/namespaces/<canonical>/state]/sessions` path and its `.tmp` transactional-write area, while Windows requires an absolute `USERPROFILE` and the documented 64-character hex encryption key because POSIX mode checks cannot verify profile ACLs; malformed keys fail closed on every platform. POSIX process-start probes use absolute `/bin/ps` then `/usr/bin/ps`; if neither is available, managed policy locking fails closed with an actionable validation message. Managed `piab-r2-*` keys and key-bearing paths are redacted from visible/structured/JSON transcript surfaces. Malformed oversized upstream output is discarded after parsing rather than copied into a persistent parse-failure spill, and raw parse-failure stdout is omitted from result details. `session list` and `state list` filter wrapper-managed rows, and the pre-spawn policy blocks foreign managed restore/state references, broad clear/clean operations, and managed save/rename targets while preserving targeted caller-owned state workflows.
 - clean up process-private temp spill artifacts on shutdown, but keep persisted-session snapshot spill files in a private session-scoped artifact directory with a bounded per-session budget so `details.fullOutputPath` stays usable after reload/resume without unbounded growth
 - keep explicit screenshots, downloads, PDFs, traces, HAR captures, and recordings written to caller-chosen paths on disk after a successful upstream close command (`close`, `quit`, or `exit`); before artifact-producing commands run, create missing parent directories for requested host paths, and for simple loopback HTML anchor downloads with resolvable HTTP(S) hrefs the wrapper may save directly to the requested path before upstream fallback. When the bounded `details.artifactManifest` has entries, successful close commands also surface `details.artifactCleanup` and a compact `Artifact lifecycle` note pointing to structured explicit paths so operators remove files with normal host tools—the native tool does not delete arbitrary user paths (`extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/diagnostics.ts`, `getArtifactCleanupGuidance`); contract in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details), checklist `RQ-0079` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md)
-- reconstruct the current branch-visible extension-managed session, page-scoped refs, newest-revision aggregate artifact manifest, and Electron launch records from the active transcript branch on `session_start` and `session_tree` so later default calls keep following the active managed browser after resume/reload or branch switching; restore also honors successful explicit `--session <wrapper-owned> close` rows and `electron.cleanup` managed-session steps so closed wrapper-owned sessions are not resurrected
+- reconstruct the current branch-visible extension-managed session, every transcript-proven still-active wrapper-owned managed identity, page-scoped refs, newest-revision aggregate artifact manifest, and Electron launch records from the active transcript branch on `session_start` and `session_tree` so later default and explicit off-current calls keep following owned browsers after resume/reload or branch switching; restore also honors successful explicit `--session <wrapper-owned> close` rows and `electron.cleanup` managed-session steps so closed wrapper-owned sessions are not resurrected
 - keep process-owned cleanup registries for extension-managed sessions and wrapper-launched Electron records separate from the current branch-visible view; `session_tree` restore and wrapper-owned browser commands are serialized with managed-session work, while caller-owned explicit-session commands are serialized by process-local queues keyed to effective canonical namespace/session across prepare helpers (explicit namespace argv overrides inherited `AGENT_BROWSER_NAMESPACE`, including an explicit empty default) and main execution. macOS and Windows additionally normalize and case-fold namespace and session components to match case-insensitive daemon identity. Different caller-owned identities remain concurrent, nested helpers never re-enter the outer queue, policy/route/artifact deltas merge across unrelated managed-state commits, and a separate branch-restore generation guard prevents stale completions from overwriting newer branch-visible state; aggregate artifact results use monotonic revisions so transcript replay cannot lose a concurrently completed entry. Branch switches still must not drop resources the current Pi process owns and must keep fresh-session allocation monotonic
+- record successful `connect`, `--cdp`, enabled `--auto-connect`, environment-configured CDP/auto-connect, and wrapper Electron attachment identities in branch-visible state, then run their main commands, helper probes, and cleanup inside an attached-browser process context that omits wrapper launch-only `--args` / `--allow-file-access` defaults. Re-sending those flags makes upstream choose local launch instead of its existing CDP connection and can trigger remote-debugging permission on every call. Block first-use attachment/content combinations until URL verification, and apply the existing live `get url` gate before every later content-bearing read or interaction because attached targets can drift outside Pi. Every child clears `AGENT_BROWSER_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS`, including attached calls that omit the canonical launch flags. Successful close removes the marker; existing config, environment, URL, and protected-path checks still apply
 - when a successful close targets the current extension-managed session, including an explicit `--session <current> close` or an `electron.cleanup` managed-session step, clear page/ref state, mark that session inactive, untrack cleanup ownership, and rotate the next default auto call to a fresh wrapper-generated session name rather than reusing the closed name
 - on non-quit shutdown such as `/reload`, close off-branch owned managed sessions and off-branch owned Electron launches before clearing process-local ownership, but preserve the current branch-visible active managed session and Electron launch plus that launch's isolated `userDataDir` so reload continuity still works from the active transcript branch
 - expose still-owned off-branch Electron launch records to `electron.status { launchId }`, `electron.status { all: true }`, `electron.probe { launchId }`, and `electron.cleanup`, while leaving default `electron.probe` scoped to the current managed session
-- if an unnamed fresh launch replaces an active extension-managed session, best-effort close the old managed session after the switch succeeds
+- if an unnamed fresh launch replaces an active extension-managed session, best-effort close the old managed session after the switch succeeds; `managedSessionOutcome.replacedSessionClosed` records whether that cleanup succeeded, and a failed close keeps the older identity wrapper-owned across transcript resume for explicit follow-up or cleanup
 - leave explicit caller-provided `--session` choices alone unless the caller closes them explicitly, but before any content-bearing read or interaction against a caller-owned explicit session, live-probe that session with `get url` and apply the local-state boundary to the observed target instead of trusting missing or stale transcript page state; hold the effective canonical namespace/session queue from that probe through semantic snapshot resolution and the main command so another same-instance call cannot change tabs in between. Non-bail batch analysis retains every possible page left by a failed transition up to a fixed bound and blocks later content when any such page is local or unverified; exceeding the bound also fails closed to exact `batch --bail` guidance, while exact `batch --bail` or split calls make that dependency fail-safe. Protected Windows paths include drive-relative `C:...` forms, nested `batch` steps fail closed, and raw batch command strings mirror upstream's ASCII-space tokenizer, including quote/backslash handling, rather than splitting on other Unicode whitespace
 - after profiled `open` / `goto` / `navigate` calls, verify the active tab still matches the returned page URL and best-effort switch back when restored profile tabs steal focus
 - once the wrapper observes tab-drift risk for a session (profile restore correction, overlapping stale opens, or restored session state), later active-tab commands may synthesize a tiny upstream `batch` that re-selects that tab and then runs the requested command in the same upstream invocation; routine same-session commands avoid `tab list` preflights to reduce probes that can perturb upstream click behavior
@@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ Practical policy:
 - after successful `tab close`, read the now-active URL/title before updating per-session page state because upstream's close payload identifies the closed tab but does not report the remaining active tab; this keeps subsequent ref guards and interactions aligned without requiring a recovery snapshot solely to repair wrapper state
 - keep a per-session `refSnapshot` aligned with the last successful `snapshot` (including refs merged from a successful `batch` by taking the last successful `snapshot` step in batch result order): restore it from persisted tool `details` when reloading, resuming, or moving to a different Pi session-tree branch, store bounded ref role/name metadata from the same snapshot for wrapper-side current-ref diagnostics, drop it on successful close commands (`close`, `quit`, or `exit`), and refuse mutation-prone `@e…` argv before spawn when the active tab URL no longer matches the snapshot URL, when a ref id was never in that snapshot, or when `batch` stdin would reuse `@e…` on a guarded step after an earlier invalidating step without a later `snapshot` step in the same stdin array. Same-snapshot `fill @e…` rows are guarded but do not themselves set that invalidation latch, so ordinary form fills can precede a click/submit row in one batch—see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details) for the agent-visible contract and failure text; typed per-session tab/ref/pinning state lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/session-page-state.ts` and is updated from `extensions/agent-browser/index.ts` after each tool result
 - for top-level non-Electron direct `click` commands with an eligible target, install a bounded in-page target-specific event probe before upstream runs; if upstream reports success but no trusted pointer/mouse/click event reached the resolved target, fail the tool and report `details.clickDispatch` with explicit retry/inspect next actions (the wrapper does not replay clicks in-page). The probe covers `xpath=` targets and current `@e…` / `ref=` refs whose latest stored `refSnapshot.refs` role is `button`, `checkbox`, `menuitem`, `radio`, `switch`, or `tab`; it uses that role/name metadata, including snapshot-order `duplicateIndex` for duplicate-name refs, instead of taking a fresh pre-click snapshot that could recycle upstream refs. The probe is intentionally skipped for CSS selector clicks, unresolved `find … click` locators, and `batch`/`job`/`qa` click steps
-- derive narrow prompt guards only for concrete evidence invariants: exact required screenshot paths block browser close until the artifact manifest verifies those paths. The wrapper intentionally does not infer broad business/user intent from prompt text such as order/payment/post boundaries; agents must follow those instructions themselves. The artifact guard is bounded preflight policy (`details.promptGuard`, `failureCategory: "policy-blocked"`), not a reusable browser recipe layer
+- derive narrow prompt guards only for concrete evidence invariants: explicitly requested screenshot/recording output paths block browser close until the artifact manifest verifies those paths, while bare inbound attachment paths remain inputs. The wrapper intentionally does not infer broad business/user intent from prompt text such as order/payment/post boundaries; agents must follow those instructions themselves. The artifact guard is bounded preflight policy (`details.promptGuard`, `failureCategory: "policy-blocked"`), not a reusable browser recipe layer
 - after successful `get text` on a qualifying non-ref CSS selector, optionally issue one read-only `eval --stdin` probe per selector when multiple DOM matches or a hidden first match with visible peers could misread tabbed or off-screen content; simple id selectors and sensitive-looking literals skip this probe. Merge `details.selectorTextVisibility` / `selectorTextVisibilityAll`, visible warning lines, and `inspect-visible-text-candidates*` next actions as documented in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details) and `RQ-0074` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md)
 - for local Unix launches, set a short private socket directory so extension-generated session names do not fail on the upstream Unix socket-path length limit; require the selected path to be absolute, owned by the current uid, mode `0700`, under trusted non-replaceable ancestry, and free of symlink, foreign-owner, or special planted entries; reject pre-existing unsafe modes instead of repairing them, then recheck before spawn
 - keep wrapper-spawned upstream CLI calls bounded by clamping `AGENT_BROWSER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT` to the upstream documented 25-second default while deriving a longer subprocess watchdog for explicit long `wait <ms>` / `wait --timeout <ms>` calls; dialog commands, likely dialog-trigger clicks/taps/finds, and `eval --stdin` snippets that look like alert/confirm/prompt/dialog triggers use shorter wrapper subprocess budgets so blocking JavaScript prompts surface recovery actions before the full default watchdog
@@ -168,9 +169,9 @@ This is primarily about ownership clarity and avoiding surprise, not adding a he
 `agent-browser` startup flags are sticky once a session is already running.
 The extension should surface that clearly and avoid hidden restart behavior in v1.
 
-That means explicit startup-scoping flags like `--allowed-domains`, `--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--init-script`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, restore check flags, `--session-name`, and `--state` should remain explicit upstream argv choices instead of being wrapped in extra hidden restart or cloning logic. The one deliberate exception is the env-only managed-session `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key above, which does not inject `--restore` into argv and therefore does not trip launch-scoped `sessionMode: "fresh"` recovery.
+That means explicit startup-scoping flags like `--allowed-domains`, `--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--headed`, `--init-script`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, restore check flags, `--session-name`, and `--state` should remain explicit upstream argv choices instead of being wrapped in extra hidden restart or cloning logic. The one deliberate exception is the env-only managed-session `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key above, which does not inject `--restore` into argv and therefore does not trip launch-scoped `sessionMode: "fresh"` recovery.
 
-The wrapper may still apply narrow compatibility normalizations when observed behavior justifies them and the result remains thin, local, and opt-out. For example, OpenAI web properties and `dash.cloudflare.com` reject the default local `HeadlessChrome` user agent while the same flow works with a normal Chrome UA, so the extension injects a domain-specific fallback only when the caller did not already choose raw Chrome arguments, a custom user agent, headed mode, CDP, auto-connect, a provider-backed launch, or a non-Chrome engine through argv or matching upstream environment. Managed sessions retain the injected value across helper and follow-up subprocesses, including branch reload/resume, because omitting it can make upstream relaunch the browser with a different launch identity. The process boundary also pins the same fixed compatibility value as a comma-safe Chrome launch argument for owned sessions, covering tabs and SSO popups that do not inherit upstream's per-page CDP override.
+The wrapper may still apply narrow compatibility normalizations when observed behavior justifies them and the result remains thin, local, and opt-out. For example, OpenAI web properties and `dash.cloudflare.com` reject the default local `HeadlessChrome` user agent while the same flow works with a normal Chrome UA, so the extension injects a domain-specific fallback only when the caller did not already choose raw Chrome arguments, a custom user agent, headed mode, CDP, auto-connect, a provider-backed launch, or a non-Chrome engine through argv or matching upstream environment. Managed sessions retain the injected value across helper and follow-up subprocesses, including branch reload/resume, because omitting it can make upstream relaunch the browser with a different launch identity. The process boundary also pins the same fixed compatibility value as a comma-safe Chrome launch argument for owned sessions, covering tabs and SSO popups that do not inherit upstream's per-page CDP override. Wrapper-owned headed launches also default upstream periodic restore autosave off because agent-browser 0.33.2 collects non-current origins through visible temporary targets while holding the daemon state lock; save-on-close remains enabled, and an explicit `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` value opts in when the daemon launches. The effective interval is retained in owned-session state and transcript results; changing it in either direction on a running wrapper-owned headed daemon is rejected until close plus a fresh launch.
 
 If the implicit session is already active and one of those startup-scoped flags appears again while `sessionMode` is still `"auto"`, the extension should fail clearly instead of silently sending a command shape that upstream would ignore.
 
@@ -182,13 +183,14 @@ Implementation detail lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/launch-scoped-flags
 - **`--state` disambiguation:** Persisted browser `--state` before the command participates in launch-scoped validation and tab-correction hints. The same flag spelling after a `wait` command is excluded from startup-scoped detection so upstream help examples such as `wait @ref --state hidden` do not spuriously require `sessionMode: "fresh"` while an implicit session is active. As of the current upstream baseline, the parser still does not implement those `wait --state` examples as distinct wait modes, so agent-facing docs recommend `wait --fn` predicates for disappearance checks instead.
 - **`--auto-connect`:** Treated as launch-scoped only when enabled (`--auto-connect` bare or `true`). `--auto-connect false` is ignored for startup-scoped blocking so disabled attach hints do not force a fresh launch.
 - **`--webgpu`:** Treated as launch-scoped for both enabled and explicit `false` values. Enabled WebGPU selects upstream's platform-specific local-launch preset; explicit false can override an environment/config default and still belongs to a fresh browser launch. Upstream rejects enabled WebGPU with CDP, auto-connect, or provider launches.
+- **`--headed`:** Treated as launch-scoped for both enabled and explicit `false` values so a visible-window choice cannot be silently ignored by an already-running managed session.
 - **`--allowed-domains`:** Treated as launch-scoped so containment cannot silently relaunch or reuse the active implicit browser. Upstream 0.32.0 owns request, worker, popup, and WebRTC containment and rejects CDP/auto-connect, profiles, restore/state replay, direct-page providers, iOS/Safari, and unsafe startup/profile Chrome args; the wrapper keeps only a final-URL policy check as defense in depth.
 
 **Sessionless inspection and local commands:** Plain-text global help and version probes (`--help`, `-h`, `--version`, `-V`) must never allocate or bind the extension-managed session. The same session-ownership rule applies to read-only upstream `skills list`, `skills get …`, and `skills path …`, local auth profile management (`auth save/list/show/delete/remove`), plus local/setup surfaces such as `profiles`, `dashboard start/stop`, `device list`, `doctor`, `install`, `upgrade`, `session id`, `session info`, `session list`, and caller-owned local saved-state maintenance (`state list/show`, targeted `state clear <caller-owned-name>`, and `state rename`). Broad clear/clean and managed-state targets remain syntactically sessionless but are rejected by the pre-spawn managed-state boundary. The same boundary rejects any discovered or explicit upstream config for browser-backed native calls without reading it, pins an empty private config for accepted browser-backed spawns to close config-creation races, and rejects browser access to `.agent-browser` local storage through command-specific input/output operands (including dash-prefixed values), their path-bearing environment mirrors (state/profile/config, executable/extension/init-script, action-policy, artifact, skills, and socket paths), encoded, nested-file-scheme, Windows-aliased, or symlinked paths (including nonexistent descendants of symlinked directories), protected top-level `outputPath`, content-returning local-URL calls, any follow-up on a local file page, and persisted unverified top-level or batch tab/attachment/script/state-load transitions, and recursively inspected raw batch command strings. Electron launch handoff, status/probe reads, and capture from a tracked protected target use the same guard; snapshot/tabs handoff and status/probe reads verify the live URL before tab/title/content helpers, while handoff failure or cancellation closes the managed session and host process/profile. Raw artifact destinations use the same command parser as preparation and are checked before it creates parent directories. Enabled `--allow-file-access` argv/env and raw Chrome file-access or protected-path values are rejected; every upstream spawn clears `AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS`, removes caller file-access occurrences, and adds canonical `--args "" --allow-file-access false` defaults so project/user config cannot override the boundary while a validated safe CLI `--args` value remains usable. Post-transition summaries, including forced live probes after arbitrary `eval`, verify URL before reading title and fail an implicit transition that lands on a local file page. Failed/unexecuted navigation stays unverified, stale completions serialize authoritative state only, and replay treats unknown state as dominant over inconsistent target/ref fields. `get url`, `tab list`, non-content `tab <id>` selection, explicit safe HTTP(S) navigation away, and close remain available; tab selection stays unverified until `get url` succeeds. `session list` and `state list` remove wrapper-managed rows, and explicit `piab-*` live-session targets require an ownership record from the current extension instance. Non-plain-text sessionless commands still run with `--json` for machine-readable output, but the planner does not prepend the implicit managed `--session`, so an agent can inspect local capabilities or start/stop the standalone dashboard without consuming the implicit session slot before a real `open`. Browser-backed, context-dependent, or incomplete commands such as root `session`, untargeted `state clear`, bare `state clean`, `auth login`, `state save`, and `state load` keep normal managed-session injection. Command-shape allowlisting lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/command-policy.ts` (`needsManagedSession`), while `extensions/agent-browser/lib/runtime.ts` (`isPlainTextInspectionArgs`, `buildExecutionPlan`) applies that decision to execution planning.
 
 A successful unnamed `sessionMode: "fresh"` launch should become the new extension-managed session so later default calls follow that browser instead of silently snapping back to the older managed session.
 
-When a managed implicit or fresh `--session` plan reaches process execution, `details.managedSessionOutcome` summarizes the managed-session transition: on **success**, statuses such as `created`, `replaced`, `unchanged`, or `closed` describe what became current (including successful close commands: `close`, `quit`, or `exit`); on **failure** (launch error, timeout, missing binary, failed close command, and similar), `preserved` vs `abandoned` captures whether a prior managed session stayed current or no managed session ended up active, plus related names and booleans. Post-launch failures after the fresh browser has already opened the target page—such as **`qa`** reclassification, a later failed `job`/batch step, or a fresh batch timeout with recovered current-page evidence—preserve that fresh session as current and set the visible recovery text to say the fresh launch became current instead of reverting the agent to the old session. Failing calls that used `sessionMode: "fresh"` also append a short `Managed session outcome: …` line to model-visible text so the next default `sessionMode: "auto"` hop is obvious; `"auto"` failures may still populate the struct without that extra line. Implementation and field semantics live in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/session-page-state.ts` and `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/session-state.ts`; agent contract in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details); checklist row `RQ-0077` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md).
+When a managed implicit or fresh `--session` plan reaches process execution, `details.managedSessionOutcome` summarizes the managed-session transition: on **success**, statuses such as `created`, `replaced`, `unchanged`, or `closed` describe what became current (including successful close commands: `close`, `quit`, or `exit`); on **failure** (launch error, timeout, missing binary, failed close command, and similar), `preserved` vs `abandoned` captures whether a prior managed session stayed current or no managed session ended up active, plus related names and booleans. Post-launch failures after the fresh browser has already opened the target page—such as **`qa`** reclassification, a later failed `job`/batch step, or a fresh batch timeout with recovered current-page evidence—preserve that fresh session as current and set the visible recovery text to say the fresh launch became current instead of reverting the agent to the old session. Failing calls that used `sessionMode: "fresh"`, plus otherwise-successful replacements whose automatic old-session close failed, append a short `Managed session outcome: …` line to model-visible text so the next default `sessionMode: "auto"` hop and any retained cleanup ownership are obvious; `"auto"` failures may still populate the struct without that extra line. Implementation and field semantics live in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/session-page-state.ts` and `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/session-state.ts`; agent contract in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details); checklist row `RQ-0077` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md).
 
 ## Preferring the native tool
 
@@ -198,7 +200,7 @@ Keep the handling simple:
 
 This keeps the product centered on native tool usage instead of auxiliary skill wiring.
 
-Upstream restore-state persistence remains upstream-owned. The wrapper passes `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` through unchanged and may set `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` for wrapper-owned managed sessions as described above; the behavior introduced in upstream 0.31.2 periodically saves restore-enabled cookies/localStorage after command quiet time and during idle page changes, while `0` disables periodic saves without disabling save-on-close. The wrapper must not duplicate that timer or treat upstream restore files as wrapper-owned artifacts.
+Upstream restore-state persistence remains upstream-owned. The wrapper passes an explicit `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` through unchanged and may set `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` for wrapper-owned managed sessions as described above. When no interval is set, wrapper-owned headed launches use `0` to avoid upstream 0.33.2's visible temporary multi-origin collector tabs and daemon-lock delays; the owned managed-session record persists that choice across every helper and follow-up subprocess, still-owned off-current session, Electron cleanup close, and transcript reload/resume so upstream never sees per-call daemon-configuration drift. Headless and caller-owned launches retain upstream's 30-second default. `0` preserves native close saves, but upstream exempts headed browsers from idle shutdown, so direct window close can lose changes since the last save. Because upstream reads the interval when its daemon starts, a nonzero explicit value cannot change an already-running wrapper-owned headed daemon; the wrapper preserves the recorded policy and requires close plus a fresh launch. The wrapper must not duplicate that timer or treat upstream restore files as wrapper-owned artifacts.
 
 ## Responsibility split
 
@@ -212,7 +214,6 @@ Upstream restore-state persistence remains upstream-owned. The wrapper passes `A
 - inline screenshots/images for the plain `screenshot` command; other image-like saves (for example `diff screenshot`) still appear in `details.artifacts` and summaries but are not auto-inlined as Pi image attachments (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details))
 - lightweight session convenience
 - docs, including a repo-readable command reference that mirrors the blocked direct-binary help path closely enough for normal agent work
-- a deterministic **agent efficiency benchmark** (`scripts/agent-browser-efficiency-benchmark.mjs`) used to quantify representative agent-facing workflows without invoking upstream; maintainer commands and constraints are in [`AGENTS.md`](https://github.com/fitchmultz/pi-agent-browser-native/blob/main/AGENTS.md) under “Agent browser efficiency benchmark”
 
 ### Upstream `agent-browser` owns
 

package/docs/COMMAND_REFERENCE.md

@@ -22,7 +22,6 @@ This reference is baselined to the locally installed `agent-browser 0.33.2` comm
 
 The lightweight drift check is `npm run verify -- command-reference`. Run it whenever the installed upstream `agent-browser` version changes or this reference is edited.
 
-Use `npm run benchmark:agent-browser` or `npm run verify -- benchmark` before and after agent-facing workflow abstractions to measure task success, tool calls, model-visible output size, stale-ref behavior, artifact success, failure-category coverage, and elapsed-time estimates.
 <!-- agent-browser-capability-baseline:end upstream-baseline -->
 
 ### Upstream 0.33.2 rebaseline
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ The 0.31.2 rebaseline adds a WebGPU launch preset and periodic restore-state aut
 - `--webgpu` (also `AGENT_BROWSER_WEBGPU`; standalone upstream additionally accepts `"webgpu": true` in `agent-browser.json`) enables the upstream platform preset. Browser-backed native calls reject upstream config files, so use the flag or environment form through this tool. It uses Metal on macOS, D3D on Windows, and SwiftShader software Vulkan on Linux. The native Pi wrapper passes it through as a launch-scoped optional boolean, so use `sessionMode: "fresh"` after an implicit session exists; `--webgpu false` explicitly disables a config/environment default.
 - WebGPU requires a local browser launch. Upstream rejects enabled WebGPU with `--cdp`, `--auto-connect`, or `-p` / `--provider`. Use `doctor --webgpu` to pixel-check rendering and screenshot capture; use `doctor --webgpu --headed` when validating the headed capture path.
 - Headless WebGPU screenshots work on macOS. Upstream documents black headless WebGPU canvas captures on Windows and Linux even when in-page rendering succeeds; Windows needs a logged-in headed desktop, while Linux can use `--headed` with automatic Xvfb unless `AGENT_BROWSER_NO_XVFB=1`. Linux software rendering also needs `libvulkan1` and `mesa-vulkan-drivers`.
-- Restore-enabled sessions now save periodically while the browser remains open, including idle page-driven cookie/storage changes. `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` defaults to `30000`; `0` disables periodic saves but keeps save-on-close. The existing `--restore-save` policy still controls whether automatic saves are allowed.
+- Restore-enabled sessions now save periodically while the browser remains open, including idle page-driven cookie/storage changes. `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` defaults to `30000`; `0` disables periodic saves but keeps native close saves. The existing `--restore-save` policy still controls whether automatic saves are allowed. For wrapper-owned headed launches, this extension defaults the interval to `0` because upstream 0.33.2 collects multi-origin storage through visible temporary tabs; upstream exempts headed browsers from idle shutdown, so direct window close can lose newer state unless an explicit interval was set before launch. The wrapper retains the effective launch-time interval across resume and rejects changes in either direction on a running wrapper-owned headed daemon until close plus a fresh launch.
 - Upstream MCP `open` and `doctor` tools now expose typed WebGPU fields. This Pi extension keeps `args` as the thin CLI-parity path; `mcp --help` remains sessionless, while bare long-running MCP server startup is intentionally rejected in a one-shot Pi tool call.
 
 ### Upstream 0.31.1 rebaseline
@@ -157,12 +156,12 @@ Tool parameters (use exactly one of `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `qa`, `sour
 - `networkSourceLookup`: **EXPERIMENTAL — candidates only** for failed request-to-source hints; compiles to generated `batch`, reports `details.compiledNetworkSourceLookup` and `details.networkSourceLookup`, and never assigns blame or edits files.
 - `electron`: optional Electron desktop-app shorthand. `list`, `status`, `cleanup`, and `probe` are wrapper-owned host/session helpers; `launch` starts a wrapper-owned isolated Electron profile and attaches through upstream `connect`.
 - `stdin`: only for `batch`, `eval --stdin`, and `auth save --password-stdin`; other command/stdin combinations are rejected before `agent-browser` is launched. `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, `networkSourceLookup`, and `electron` generate or manage their own input.
-- `outputPath`: optional wrapper-owned local file sink for successful results. Use it for durable `eval`, `get`, `snapshot`, or diagnostic outputs; `details.outputFile` reports the saved path and byte count. If caller argv includes upstream `--json`, the visible JSON content stays parseable and the save notice is only in `details.outputFile`.
-- `timeoutMs`: optional per-call wrapper subprocess watchdog override in milliseconds for browser CLI modes. Use it for known-slow opens/captures rather than relying on repeated retries.
+- `outputPath`: optional wrapper-owned local file sink for successful results. Use it for durable `eval`, `get`, `snapshot`, or diagnostic outputs, not as the destination for screenshots, downloads, recordings, or other browser artifacts; if the paths resolve to the same file, the browser artifact is preserved and the result-data write fails validation. `details.outputFile` reports the saved path and byte count. If caller argv includes upstream `--json`, the visible JSON content stays parseable and the save notice is only in `details.outputFile`.
+- `timeoutMs`: optional per-call wrapper subprocess watchdog override in milliseconds for the requested browser CLI process. Managed-session policy inspection can independently consume up to 35 seconds before that process; this preflight is intentionally not shortened by `timeoutMs` because a busy but valid daemon must remain distinguishable from an unverifiable one.
 - `sessionMode`:
   - `"auto"` reuses the extension-managed session when possible.
-  - `"fresh"` rotates that managed session to a fresh upstream launch so launch-scoped flags (`--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--init-script`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, `--restore-check-url`, `--restore-check-text`, `--restore-check-fn`, `--session-name`, `--state`) apply.
-  - If a fresh launch fails or times out, read `details.managedSessionOutcome` for `preserved` vs `abandoned` (and related fields). A model-visible `Managed session outcome: …` line is appended only for failing calls that used `sessionMode: "fresh"`; `"auto"` failures can still populate the struct without that extra line. If you explicitly close the current wrapper-managed session with `--session <name> close`, later default auto calls rotate to a new wrapper-generated session instead of reusing the closed name; repeated closes and branch restores keep those generated names monotonic.
+  - `"fresh"` rotates that managed session to a fresh upstream launch so launch-scoped flags (`--allowed-domains`, `--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--init-script`, `--idle-timeout`, `--headed`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, `--restore-check-url`, `--restore-check-text`, `--restore-check-fn`, `--session-name`, `--state`) apply.
+  - If a fresh launch fails or times out, read `details.managedSessionOutcome` for `preserved` vs `abandoned` (and related fields). A model-visible `Managed session outcome: …` line is appended for failing calls that used `sessionMode: "fresh"` and when automatic close of a replaced session fails; `"auto"` failures can still populate the struct without that extra line. If you explicitly close the current wrapper-managed session with `--session <name> close`, later default auto calls rotate to a new wrapper-generated session instead of reusing the closed name; repeated closes and branch restores keep those generated names monotonic.
 
 ### Debug, diff, stream, dashboard, and chat families
 
@@ -190,6 +189,8 @@ Use upstream's global `--headed` flag on the first launch when the user needs to
 { "args": ["screenshot", "/tmp/agent-browser-headed-check.png"] }
 ```
 
+`--headed` is launch-scoped, including explicit `false`, so changing an active managed session between headed and headless requires `sessionMode: "fresh"`. Wrapper-owned headed launches default `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` to `0` to avoid upstream 0.33.2's visible temporary storage-collector tabs and related daemon-policy delays, and record the effective launch-time interval and reapply it to every helper/follow-up subprocess, still-owned off-current session, Electron cleanup close, and reload/resume so daemon configuration remains stable. Native close still saves, but direct window close can lose newer state because headed browsers are exempt from idle shutdown; set an explicit interval before launch when periodic preservation matters, and close then relaunch fresh to change an existing daemon.
+
 For a WebGPU page, enable the launch preset before the first navigation. Treat it as local-launch-only and use a fresh managed session when changing an existing browser:
 
 ```json
@@ -816,7 +817,7 @@ When these commands are invoked through the native `agent_browser` tool, structu
 - project-local: `.pi/config/pi-agent-browser-native/config.json`
 - explicit override: `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG=/path/to/config.json`
 
-Get an Exa API key from the [Exa dashboard](https://dashboard.exa.ai/api-keys) or a Brave Search API key from the [Brave Search API dashboard](https://api-dashboard.search.brave.com/). If both keys are available, `agent_browser_web_search` prefers Exa by default because its `/search` endpoint returns token-efficient highlights and agent-oriented search modes; set `webSearch.preferredProvider` to `"brave"` when Brave Search is preferred. You can also disable this package's search tool with `webSearch.enabled: false` when another search tool should win. Config merges global → project → `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` override, so `enabled` is read from the final loaded config: a global disable can be re-enabled by project or override config, while an override file with `enabled: false` is the highest-priority hard disable for that run. Under Pi 0.79+, globally installed or CLI-loaded extensions are developer-trusted code, so this extension reads project-local config under `.pi/config/...` by default and skips that project layer when Pi reports the project is untrusted or when launched with `--no-approve`.
+Get an Exa API key from the [Exa dashboard](https://dashboard.exa.ai/api-keys) or a Brave Search API key from the [Brave Search API dashboard](https://api-dashboard.search.brave.com/). If both keys are available, `agent_browser_web_search` prefers Exa by default because its `/search` endpoint returns token-efficient highlights and agent-oriented search modes; set `webSearch.preferredProvider` to `"brave"` when Brave Search is preferred. You can also disable this package's search tool with `webSearch.enabled: false` when another search tool should win. Config merges global → project → `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` override, so `enabled` is read from the final loaded config: a global disable can be re-enabled by project or override config, while an override file with `enabled: false` is the highest-priority hard disable for that run. Under Pi 0.84.0+, globally installed or CLI-loaded extensions are developer-trusted code, so this extension reads project-local config under `.pi/config/...` by default and skips that project layer when Pi reports the project is untrusted or when launched with `--no-approve`.
 
 `pi install npm:pi-agent-browser-native` loads the extension, but it does **not** usually put the package helper on your shell `PATH`. The clearest setup is to write the config file directly and keep actual keys in the environment that launches `pi`:
 
@@ -903,11 +904,11 @@ Browser default config is conservative: it adds agent guidance for signed-in/acc
 - `--proxy <server>`: proxy server URL. Environments: `AGENT_BROWSER_PROXY`, `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY`, `ALL_PROXY`.
 - `--proxy-bypass <hosts>`: proxy bypass hosts. Environments: `AGENT_BROWSER_PROXY_BYPASS`, `NO_PROXY`.
 - `--ignore-https-errors`: ignore HTTPS certificate errors. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_IGNORE_HTTPS_ERRORS`.
-- `--allow-file-access`: upstream capability, but enabled argv/`AGENT_BROWSER_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS` forms and file-access-enabling `--args` / `AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS` Chrome switches are rejected by this native wrapper. Every spawn adds canonical `--args "" --allow-file-access false` defaults so project/user config cannot re-enable file access; an explicit validated safe CLI `--args` value remains usable. Every spawn removes all caller occurrences before adding one canonical separated `--allow-file-access false`, so unsupported equals forms cannot preserve an earlier enabled flag and config cannot re-enable local filesystem access. Unknown top-level or batch tab/attachment/script/state-load transitions remain blocked for page inspection until `get url` or explicit safe navigation establishes the target. `tab list` and non-content `tab <id>` selection remain available while unknown, but selection stays unverified until `get url`; post-transition summaries (including after arbitrary `eval`) read the live URL before title and stop if the target is a local file page.
+- `--allow-file-access`: upstream capability, but enabled argv/`AGENT_BROWSER_ALLOW_FILE_ACCESS` forms and file-access-enabling `--args` / `AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS` Chrome switches are rejected by this native wrapper. Local-browser spawns add canonical `--args "" --allow-file-access false` defaults so project/user config cannot re-enable file access; an explicit validated safe CLI `--args` value remains usable. Attached-session follow-ups omit those launch-only defaults. Every spawn removes all caller occurrences before any canonical separated `--allow-file-access false` is added, so unsupported equals forms cannot preserve an earlier enabled flag and config cannot re-enable local filesystem access. Unknown top-level or batch tab/attachment/script/state-load transitions remain blocked for page inspection until `get url` or explicit safe navigation establishes the target. `tab list` and non-content `tab <id>` selection remain available while unknown, but selection stays unverified until `get url`; post-transition summaries (including after arbitrary `eval`) read the live URL before title and stop if the target is a local file page.
 - `--hide-scrollbars <bool>`: explicitly show or hide native scrollbars in headless Chromium screenshots.
 - `--headed`: ask upstream to show the browser window. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_HEADED`. Use it on the first launch, normally with `sessionMode: "fresh"` when changing an existing managed session; verify visibility with screenshot/tab evidence because the wrapper cannot yet prove the OS window is visible to the user.
 - `--webgpu`: enable upstream's platform-specific WebGPU launch preset. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_WEBGPU`; config: `"webgpu": true`. Use it on a fresh local launch. It is incompatible while enabled with `--cdp`, `--auto-connect`, and provider launches. `AGENT_BROWSER_NO_XVFB=1` disables upstream's automatic Xvfb for displayless headed Linux sessions.
-- `--cdp <port>`: connect through Chrome DevTools Protocol.
+- `--cdp <port>`: connect through Chrome DevTools Protocol. Use it, `--auto-connect`, or `connect <port|url>` once on a named/fresh session, verify with `get url`, then reuse that session without repeating the attach flag. After a successful attachment the wrapper omits local-launch-only `--args` / `--allow-file-access` defaults on follow-ups and cleanup so upstream keeps one CDP connection instead of requesting Chrome permission again. Content-bearing first use is blocked until URL verification; later page reads/interactions live-check the URL because the attached browser can drift externally. `close` clears attachment state.
 - `--color-scheme <scheme>`: `dark`, `light`, or `no-preference`. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_COLOR_SCHEME`.
 - `--download-path <path>`: default browser download directory. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_DOWNLOAD_PATH`.
 - `--engine <name>`: browser engine, `chrome` by default or `lightpanda`. Environment: `AGENT_BROWSER_ENGINE`.