pi-agent-browser-native 0.2.71 → 0.2.74

package/docs/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ The extension should:
 - accept an optional native `qa` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `sourceLookup`, `networkSourceLookup`, and `electron` on the same call) that compiles to the same fail-fast `batch --bail` path as `job`, runs a fixed diagnostic smoke sequence with bounded visible-text predicates for `expectedText`, preserves existing diagnostics for `qa.attached` while clearing buffers only for URL-opening QA, and echoes `details.compiledQaPreset` plus structured `details.qaPreset` pass/fail evidence (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#qa))
 - accept an optional native `sourceLookup` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `qa`, `networkSourceLookup`, and `electron` on the same call) that compiles to the same `batch` path, gathers evidence-backed local source *candidates* for a selector/fiber/component name, and echoes `details.compiledSourceLookup` plus structured `details.sourceLookup` (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#sourcelookup)); unlike `qa`, it never applies a second pass/fail layer that marks the tool failed when upstream already reported batch success—failed upstream steps still fail the invocation normally, and `details.sourceLookup` may still be present for partial evidence
 - accept an optional native `networkSourceLookup` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, and `electron` on the same call) that compiles to the same `batch` path, correlates failed network requests with initiator metadata and bounded workspace URL literals, and echoes `details.compiledNetworkSourceLookup` plus structured `details.networkSourceLookup` (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#networksourcelookup)); like `sourceLookup`, it never flips a successful upstream batch to failed solely because no source candidates were found
-- accept an optional native `electron` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, and `networkSourceLookup` on the same call) for bounded desktop Electron lifecycle: `list` scans the host for install candidates, `launch` creates a wrapper-owned isolated profile plus OS-chosen remote-debugging port, then attaches through upstream `connect` with `sessionMode: "fresh"`, and `status` / `cleanup` / `probe` operate only on wrapper-tracked launches; host-side spawn and CDP discovery live in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/electron/discovery.ts`, `launch.ts`, and `cleanup.ts`, while compilation, transcript restore for `launchId` records, handoff probes, and merged `details.electron*` fields live under `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/electron-host/` and `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/` (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#electron))
+- accept an optional native `electron` object (mutually exclusive with `args`, `semanticAction`, `job`, `qa`, `sourceLookup`, and `networkSourceLookup` on the same call) for bounded desktop Electron lifecycle: `list` scans the host for install candidates, `launch` creates a wrapper-owned isolated profile plus OS-chosen remote-debugging port, then attaches through upstream `connect` with `sessionMode: "fresh"`, cancellation prevents host spawn or interrupts readiness polling with process/profile cleanup, and `status` / `cleanup` / `probe` operate only on wrapper-tracked launches; host-side spawn and CDP discovery live in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/electron/discovery.ts`, `launch.ts`, and `cleanup.ts`, while compilation, transcript restore for `launchId` records, handoff probes, and merged `details.electron*` fields live under `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/electron-host/` and `extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/` (see [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#electron))
 - when a compiled `find` semantic action fails as `stale-ref`, optionally append a `retry-semantic-action-after-stale-ref` entry to `details.nextActions` after the usual `refresh-interactive-refs` snapshot step so agents can re-issue the same compiled `find` argv only when the failure implies the interaction did not run; `select` shorthands with stale `@refs` get refresh guidance only (contract in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#semanticaction))
 - when the same compiled path fails as `selector-not-found` for the bounded locator/action pairs documented there, optionally append `try-*-candidate` entries to `details.nextActions` and mirror them in visible text as `Agent-browser candidate fallbacks` so agents can retry role/name `find` variants without hand-rebuilding argv (`select` misses are intentionally excluded)
 
@@ -140,15 +140,16 @@ Practical policy:
 - preserve the current branch-visible extension-managed session across `/reload`, exact-session relaunch, `/resume`, and Pi 0.79 `session_tree` branch transitions so persisted sessions can keep following the live browser after lifecycle changes
 - close the active extension-managed session when the originating `pi` process quits, while leaving explicit caller-provided sessions alone
 - set an idle timeout on extension-managed sessions as a backstop for abnormal exits or cleanup failures, and apply that same `AGENT_BROWSER_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS` value to every upstream subprocess (including wrapper helper snapshots, tab lists, and navigation-summary reads) because changing the launch environment between calls can make upstream restart the background browser, discard the active tab, and invalidate fresh refs
+- for wrapper-owned managed sessions only, also set a Git-checkout-generation-stable `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key on every compatible non-close upstream subprocess so cookies, localStorage, and sessionStorage autosave/restore across idle shutdowns and later Pi chats in the same checkout generation. The wrapper stores a UUID in the resolved Git admin directory and combines it with the checkout root and Git-admin directory filesystem identities: renames preserve the key, copied or path-replacement checkouts get a new key, non-Git directories fail closed, and cwd-only keys are not adopted. Policy lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/managed-session-restore.ts`; ownership is resolved by `resolveOwnedManagedSessionContext` (injected managed session, or explicit `--session` equal to the current managed name and namespace) and applied through `AsyncLocalStorage` `withOwnedManagedSessionContext` for prepare helpers plus main process/output, with typed `ownedManagedSession` process options for owned main/close spawns rather than an internal marker leaked into the child environment. `buildOwnedManagedSessionRestoreContext` sets call-scoped `restoreSuppressed` from main-plan argv so helper probes skip restore on incompatible plans without sticky-disabling when prepare returns early; sticky disable commits only after an owned-context subprocess actually starts with suppressed restore policy: POSIX commits on child `spawn`, while PowerShell-backed Windows commits after completion unless command-not-found stderr proves `agent-browser.cmd` never started. No-spawn preflight and missing-binary failures never commit an identity. Duplicate `--session` or `--namespace` flags are rejected, as are leading equals forms that upstream 0.33.2 does not recognize; global identity/config scanning follows upstream across the full argv rather than treating `--` as a sentinel. Native Windows command-first launcher adaptation relocates only valid leading global syntax, canonicalizes a valued optional `--restore <name>` to `--restore=<name>`, consumes only exact lowercase boolean literals, and leaves command-scoped, unknown, or unsupported equals-form input untouched so invalid calls cannot become valid browser activity. Namespace values are canonicalized with upstream's lowercase `sanitize_session_component` algorithm before ownership, sticky/page state, details, socket, or restore-directory identity comparisons; every wrapper-owned subprocess also pins that canonical namespace, including an empty default namespace, so parent environment cannot redirect helpers or close. Electron status target reads and current-managed probes acquire the same daemon-policy lock and owned restore context as ordinary commands for their underlying reads. Probe results then persist the same namespace plus top-level tab/ref state, keeping branch replay keyed to the probed identity. Ownership is typed rather than inferred from a name prefix, and `piab-*` live-session names are reserved: an explicit target is accepted only when it is the current/generated managed session or appears in this extension instance's ownership records. `session list` hides those rows, and the same reservation is rechecked at the final process boundary so another Pi process cannot attach to a managed authenticated browser through the shared per-user daemon socket. Skip when the caller already set restore/profile/state/CDP/provider/auto-connect/containment/session-name or a browser mutation surface (custom executable, extension, init script, raw launch args, proxy, plugin, WebGPU, or related engine/device controls) via argv or matching parent env, when the command is `connect`, when raw batch argv is used, when batch stdin contains nested `connect`/`batch`, or when `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_MANAGED_SESSION_RESTORE=0`. The wrapper's own ChatGPT headless user-agent compatibility injection is excluded from caller-mutation policy. A user-private immutable ticket-claim lock keyed by canonical namespace/session serializes this inspect-through-spawn decision across cooperating Pi processes; every contender publishes a unique claim, deterministic tickets elect one owner, and the winner also holds the legacy v2 path as a bridge. The bridge is transitional for pre-release branch processes and is scheduled for removal after v0.2.74 in [#93](https://github.com/fitchmultz/pi-agent-browser-native/issues/93). Live pre-update processes and their in-flight candidate gaps therefore block new acquisition; an abandoned v2 owner fails closed for manual repair, while current-protocol recovery removes only unique claims and artifacts with proven-dead PID/start identity. Waits are asynchronous and bounded. Every policy-lock winner re-runs `session info` even when this process previously recorded the applied/observed restore key, because another process can restart the same daemon identity between calls. That inspection uses a fixed bounded timeout independent of a caller's shorter `PI_AGENT_BROWSER_PROCESS_TIMEOUT_MS` override. Before an incompatible call, the wrapper reads `session info` for the actual same-identity daemon and fails before the requested spawn when that daemon retains any restore key or cannot be inspected. This covers restore-enabled daemons missing from transcript state after a crash and managed sessions launched with an explicit caller restore key; a confirmed inactive daemon remains reusable; a restore-disabled daemon is reusable only when this process recorded its expected null/custom restore policy after an owned spawn or successful policy match. After reload clears process-only provenance, an inactive old daemon may be restarted without restore and that started subprocess records a null daemon policy for its next follow-up. Same-process `session_tree` branch changes retain that process-owned provenance; a new extension instance after reload, restart, or `/resume` intentionally starts without it and fails closed on a still-live restore-disabled daemon even when the transcript restores sticky-disable state. Close the retained-key daemon first, use a fresh wrapper session, or choose a distinct explicit session. Once a managed session hits any allowed incompatible launch path, restore stays disabled for later bare follow-ups on that same session identity. Sticky identities live in the extension-owned `ManagedSessionRestoreState` instance, persist as `details.managedSessionRestoreDisabled`, and are replaced from current-branch rows during branch restore rather than stored in module-global process state. The opt-out returns before config/storage probes and sticky-records a successfully spawned identity as restore-disabled, allowing later calls to reuse that non-restore daemon without tripping the active restore-enabled conflict gate. This is env-based persistence, not a hidden argv relaunch. Upstream still owns restore file paths/modes under `~/.agent-browser/`; set `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` on multi-user hosts if plaintext session files are unacceptable. Any project `./agent-browser.json`, explicit `--config` / `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG`, or `~/.agent-browser/config.json` discovered while planning disables managed restore without reading caller-selected content in the Pi host; owned spawns sticky-disable that session identity. Each subprocess that receives the wrapper restore key, plus every wrapper-owned close, overrides config discovery with a process-private empty `AGENT_BROWSER_CONFIG` (`0400` on POSIX) inside the canonical marked `0700` secure-temp root, closing the check-to-spawn race without trusting project or user config while retaining normal shutdown cleanup and PID/start-identity stale-root recovery after abnormal exit on POSIX and native Windows; versioned Windows identities treat legacy cross-format markers as unknown instead of incorrectly proving PID reuse, and temp ownership marker schema v2 makes older readers ignore new-format markers. Spawn-time revalidation rejects changed checkout identity, restore storage, unpinned launch-mutator environment, foreign managed-session targets, or forbidden managed-state access before agent-browser starts; the same check runs again after protected-config and socket-directory awaits immediately adjacent to the synchronous spawn. A failed fresh command that started agent-browser triggers an exact-identity daemon probe; an active or uninspectable daemon remains current and wrapper-owned so shutdown cleanup can close it, while pre-aborted and missing-binary calls remain unowned. Wrapper-owned close commands canonicalize upstream argv to JSON plus the known namespace/session and `close`, discarding caller config/restore globals, and do not inject a newly derived restore key into an existing daemon, so checkout replacement cannot make old auth save under the replacement generation; the close path retains the observed wrapper key long enough to record the returned old-generation snapshot safely. Because upstream writes a snapshot per daemon session, a successful wrapper-owned close requests JSON output and persists only the returned state path as an atomic record in a lockless convergent per-key ownership directory beside the snapshots (`0700`, with `0600` records, on POSIX). Cleanup carries that ownership proof across Pi restarts, self-heals malformed or stale regular records without claiming their snapshots, uses immutable atomic record names plus rescan-after-delete convergence so concurrent closers cannot skip ownership recording or exceed the aggregate cap, removes proven snapshots older than 30 days for the exact restore key while retaining the two newest, expires stale ownership-proven snapshots and empty manifests from other restore-key generations after 30 days only when a private lineage record proves the same canonical checkout path, caps young close churn at 256 records per key, and never deletes matching unrecorded files or the current checkout key. Upstream restore files under `~/.agent-browser/` remain plaintext unless `AGENT_BROWSER_ENCRYPTION_KEY` is set; before automatic managed restore the wrapper requires a durable Git generation and absolute platform home root; it pins the planned encryption-key value after caller env merging; on POSIX it also resolves `HOME` once, validates owner-trusted non-writable ancestry plus stable device/inode/birth-time metadata for both checkout and Git-admin directories, and pins that canonical value, enforces mode `0700` without silently repairing unsafe existing paths, and rejects symlinks/non-directories along the exact `~/.agent-browser[/namespaces/<canonical>/state]/sessions` path and its `.tmp` transactional-write area, while Windows requires an absolute `USERPROFILE` and the documented 64-character hex encryption key because POSIX mode checks cannot verify profile ACLs; malformed keys fail closed on every platform. POSIX process-start probes use absolute `/bin/ps` then `/usr/bin/ps`; if neither is available, managed policy locking fails closed with an actionable validation message. Managed `piab-r2-*` keys and key-bearing paths are redacted from visible/structured/JSON transcript surfaces. Malformed oversized upstream output is discarded after parsing rather than copied into a persistent parse-failure spill, and raw parse-failure stdout is omitted from result details. `session list` and `state list` filter wrapper-managed rows, and the pre-spawn policy blocks foreign managed restore/state references, broad clear/clean operations, and managed save/rename targets while preserving targeted caller-owned state workflows.
 - clean up process-private temp spill artifacts on shutdown, but keep persisted-session snapshot spill files in a private session-scoped artifact directory with a bounded per-session budget so `details.fullOutputPath` stays usable after reload/resume without unbounded growth
 - keep explicit screenshots, downloads, PDFs, traces, HAR captures, and recordings written to caller-chosen paths on disk after a successful upstream close command (`close`, `quit`, or `exit`); before artifact-producing commands run, create missing parent directories for requested host paths, and for simple loopback HTML anchor downloads with resolvable HTTP(S) hrefs the wrapper may save directly to the requested path before upstream fallback. When the bounded `details.artifactManifest` has entries, successful close commands also surface `details.artifactCleanup` and a compact `Artifact lifecycle` note pointing to structured explicit paths so operators remove files with normal host tools—the native tool does not delete arbitrary user paths (`extensions/agent-browser/lib/orchestration/browser-run/diagnostics.ts`, `getArtifactCleanupGuidance`); contract in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details), checklist `RQ-0079` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md)
-- reconstruct the current branch-visible extension-managed session, page-scoped refs, artifact manifest, and Electron launch records from the active transcript branch on `session_start` and `session_tree` so later default calls keep following the active managed browser after resume/reload or branch switching; restore also honors successful explicit `--session <wrapper-owned> close` rows and `electron.cleanup` managed-session steps so closed wrapper-owned sessions are not resurrected
-- keep process-owned cleanup registries for extension-managed sessions and wrapper-launched Electron records separate from the current branch-visible view; `session_tree` restore and wrapper-owned browser commands are serialized with managed-session work, while independent caller-owned explicit-session commands keep their parallel tab-target behavior but use a branch-state generation guard so stale completions cannot overwrite newer branch-visible managed/artifact state after a branch switch; branch switches still must not drop resources the current Pi process owns and must keep fresh-session allocation monotonic
+- reconstruct the current branch-visible extension-managed session, page-scoped refs, newest-revision aggregate artifact manifest, and Electron launch records from the active transcript branch on `session_start` and `session_tree` so later default calls keep following the active managed browser after resume/reload or branch switching; restore also honors successful explicit `--session <wrapper-owned> close` rows and `electron.cleanup` managed-session steps so closed wrapper-owned sessions are not resurrected
+- keep process-owned cleanup registries for extension-managed sessions and wrapper-launched Electron records separate from the current branch-visible view; `session_tree` restore and wrapper-owned browser commands are serialized with managed-session work, while caller-owned explicit-session commands are serialized by process-local queues keyed to effective canonical namespace/session across prepare helpers (explicit namespace argv overrides inherited `AGENT_BROWSER_NAMESPACE`, including an explicit empty default) and main execution. macOS and Windows additionally normalize and case-fold namespace and session components to match case-insensitive daemon identity. Different caller-owned identities remain concurrent, nested helpers never re-enter the outer queue, policy/route/artifact deltas merge across unrelated managed-state commits, and a separate branch-restore generation guard prevents stale completions from overwriting newer branch-visible state; aggregate artifact results use monotonic revisions so transcript replay cannot lose a concurrently completed entry. Branch switches still must not drop resources the current Pi process owns and must keep fresh-session allocation monotonic
 - when a successful close targets the current extension-managed session, including an explicit `--session <current> close` or an `electron.cleanup` managed-session step, clear page/ref state, mark that session inactive, untrack cleanup ownership, and rotate the next default auto call to a fresh wrapper-generated session name rather than reusing the closed name
 - on non-quit shutdown such as `/reload`, close off-branch owned managed sessions and off-branch owned Electron launches before clearing process-local ownership, but preserve the current branch-visible active managed session and Electron launch plus that launch's isolated `userDataDir` so reload continuity still works from the active transcript branch
 - expose still-owned off-branch Electron launch records to `electron.status { launchId }`, `electron.status { all: true }`, `electron.probe { launchId }`, and `electron.cleanup`, while leaving default `electron.probe` scoped to the current managed session
 - if an unnamed fresh launch replaces an active extension-managed session, best-effort close the old managed session after the switch succeeds
-- leave explicit caller-provided `--session` choices alone unless the caller closes them explicitly
+- leave explicit caller-provided `--session` choices alone unless the caller closes them explicitly, but before any content-bearing read or interaction against a caller-owned explicit session, live-probe that session with `get url` and apply the local-state boundary to the observed target instead of trusting missing or stale transcript page state; hold the effective canonical namespace/session queue from that probe through semantic snapshot resolution and the main command so another same-instance call cannot change tabs in between. Non-bail batch analysis retains every possible page left by a failed transition up to a fixed bound and blocks later content when any such page is local or unverified; exceeding the bound also fails closed to exact `batch --bail` guidance, while exact `batch --bail` or split calls make that dependency fail-safe. Protected Windows paths include drive-relative `C:...` forms, nested `batch` steps fail closed, and raw batch command strings mirror upstream's ASCII-space tokenizer, including quote/backslash handling, rather than splitting on other Unicode whitespace
 - after profiled `open` / `goto` / `navigate` calls, verify the active tab still matches the returned page URL and best-effort switch back when restored profile tabs steal focus
 - once the wrapper observes tab-drift risk for a session (profile restore correction, overlapping stale opens, or restored session state), later active-tab commands may synthesize a tiny upstream `batch` that re-selects that tab and then runs the requested command in the same upstream invocation; routine same-session commands avoid `tab list` preflights to reduce probes that can perturb upstream click behavior
 - for sessions with observed tab-drift risk, after a successful command on a known tab target, the wrapper may best-effort restore that same target again if restored/background tabs steal focus after the command returns; routine same-session commands skip this post-command `tab list` probe
@@ -157,7 +158,7 @@ Practical policy:
 - for top-level non-Electron direct `click` commands with an eligible target, install a bounded in-page target-specific event probe before upstream runs; if upstream reports success but no trusted pointer/mouse/click event reached the resolved target, fail the tool and report `details.clickDispatch` with explicit retry/inspect next actions (the wrapper does not replay clicks in-page). The probe covers `xpath=` targets and current `@e…` / `ref=` refs whose latest stored `refSnapshot.refs` role is `button`, `checkbox`, `menuitem`, `radio`, `switch`, or `tab`; it uses that role/name metadata, including snapshot-order `duplicateIndex` for duplicate-name refs, instead of taking a fresh pre-click snapshot that could recycle upstream refs. The probe is intentionally skipped for CSS selector clicks, unresolved `find … click` locators, and `batch`/`job`/`qa` click steps
 - derive narrow prompt guards only for concrete evidence invariants: exact required screenshot paths block browser close until the artifact manifest verifies those paths. The wrapper intentionally does not infer broad business/user intent from prompt text such as order/payment/post boundaries; agents must follow those instructions themselves. The artifact guard is bounded preflight policy (`details.promptGuard`, `failureCategory: "policy-blocked"`), not a reusable browser recipe layer
 - after successful `get text` on a qualifying non-ref CSS selector, optionally issue one read-only `eval --stdin` probe per selector when multiple DOM matches or a hidden first match with visible peers could misread tabbed or off-screen content; simple id selectors and sensitive-looking literals skip this probe. Merge `details.selectorTextVisibility` / `selectorTextVisibilityAll`, visible warning lines, and `inspect-visible-text-candidates*` next actions as documented in [`TOOL_CONTRACT.md`](TOOL_CONTRACT.md#details) and `RQ-0074` in [`SUPPORT_MATRIX.md`](SUPPORT_MATRIX.md)
-- for local Unix launches, set a short private socket directory so extension-generated session names do not fail on the upstream Unix socket-path length limit
+- for local Unix launches, set a short private socket directory so extension-generated session names do not fail on the upstream Unix socket-path length limit; require the selected path to be absolute, owned by the current uid, mode `0700`, under trusted non-replaceable ancestry, and free of symlink, foreign-owner, or special planted entries; reject pre-existing unsafe modes instead of repairing them, then recheck before spawn
 - keep wrapper-spawned upstream CLI calls bounded by clamping `AGENT_BROWSER_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT` to the upstream documented 25-second default while deriving a longer subprocess watchdog for explicit long `wait <ms>` / `wait --timeout <ms>` calls; dialog commands, likely dialog-trigger clicks/taps/finds, and `eval --stdin` snippets that look like alert/confirm/prompt/dialog triggers use shorter wrapper subprocess budgets so blocking JavaScript prompts surface recovery actions before the full default watchdog
 
 This is primarily about ownership clarity and avoiding surprise, not adding a heavy safety wrapper. If the extension invented the session, the extension should own its lifecycle without breaking reload, resume, or branch-tree semantics. If the caller explicitly chose the upstream session model, the extension should stay out of the way.
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ This is primarily about ownership clarity and avoiding surprise, not adding a he
 `agent-browser` startup flags are sticky once a session is already running.
 The extension should surface that clearly and avoid hidden restart behavior in v1.
 
-That means explicit startup-scoping flags like `--allowed-domains`, `--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--init-script`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, restore check flags, `--session-name`, and `--state` should remain explicit upstream choices instead of being wrapped in extra hidden restart or cloning logic.
+That means explicit startup-scoping flags like `--allowed-domains`, `--auto-connect`, `--cdp`, `--enable`, `--executable-path`, `--webgpu`, `--init-script`, `--device`, `--namespace`, `--profile`, `--provider`, `-p`, `--restore`, `--restore-save`, restore check flags, `--session-name`, and `--state` should remain explicit upstream argv choices instead of being wrapped in extra hidden restart or cloning logic. The one deliberate exception is the env-only managed-session `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` key above, which does not inject `--restore` into argv and therefore does not trip launch-scoped `sessionMode: "fresh"` recovery.
 
 The wrapper may still apply narrow compatibility normalizations when observed behavior justifies them and the result remains thin, local, and opt-out. For example, if a specific site starts rejecting the default local headless Chrome user agent while the same flow works with a normal Chrome UA, the extension may inject a domain-specific fallback UA only when the caller did not already choose `--user-agent`, `--headed`, `--cdp`, `--auto-connect`, or a provider-backed launch.
 
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@ Implementation detail lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/launch-scoped-flags
 - **`--webgpu`:** Treated as launch-scoped for both enabled and explicit `false` values. Enabled WebGPU selects upstream's platform-specific local-launch preset; explicit false can override an environment/config default and still belongs to a fresh browser launch. Upstream rejects enabled WebGPU with CDP, auto-connect, or provider launches.
 - **`--allowed-domains`:** Treated as launch-scoped so containment cannot silently relaunch or reuse the active implicit browser. Upstream 0.32.0 owns request, worker, popup, and WebRTC containment and rejects CDP/auto-connect, profiles, restore/state replay, direct-page providers, iOS/Safari, and unsafe startup/profile Chrome args; the wrapper keeps only a final-URL policy check as defense in depth.
 
-**Sessionless inspection and local commands:** Plain-text global help and version probes (`--help`, `-h`, `--version`, `-V`) must never allocate or bind the extension-managed session. The same session-ownership rule applies to read-only upstream `skills list`, `skills get …`, and `skills path …`, local auth profile management (`auth save/list/show/delete/remove`), plus local/setup surfaces such as `profiles`, `dashboard start/stop`, `device list`, `doctor`, `install`, `upgrade`, `session id`, `session info`, `session list`, and targeted/all local saved-state maintenance (`state list/show`, `state clear --all`, `state clear -a`, `state clear <session-name>`, `state clean --older-than <days>`, `state rename`). Non-plain-text sessionless commands still run with `--json` for machine-readable output, but the planner does not prepend the implicit managed `--session`, so an agent can inspect local capabilities or start/stop the standalone dashboard without consuming the implicit session slot before a real `open`. Browser-backed, context-dependent, or incomplete commands such as root `session`, untargeted `state clear`, bare `state clean`, `auth login`, `state save`, and `state load` keep normal managed-session injection. Command-shape allowlisting lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/command-policy.ts` (`needsManagedSession`), while `extensions/agent-browser/lib/runtime.ts` (`isPlainTextInspectionArgs`, `buildExecutionPlan`) applies that decision to execution planning.
+**Sessionless inspection and local commands:** Plain-text global help and version probes (`--help`, `-h`, `--version`, `-V`) must never allocate or bind the extension-managed session. The same session-ownership rule applies to read-only upstream `skills list`, `skills get …`, and `skills path …`, local auth profile management (`auth save/list/show/delete/remove`), plus local/setup surfaces such as `profiles`, `dashboard start/stop`, `device list`, `doctor`, `install`, `upgrade`, `session id`, `session info`, `session list`, and caller-owned local saved-state maintenance (`state list/show`, targeted `state clear <caller-owned-name>`, and `state rename`). Broad clear/clean and managed-state targets remain syntactically sessionless but are rejected by the pre-spawn managed-state boundary. The same boundary rejects any discovered or explicit upstream config for browser-backed native calls without reading it, pins an empty private config for accepted browser-backed spawns to close config-creation races, and rejects browser access to `.agent-browser` local storage through command-specific input/output operands (including dash-prefixed values), their path-bearing environment mirrors (state/profile/config, executable/extension/init-script, action-policy, artifact, skills, and socket paths), encoded, nested-file-scheme, Windows-aliased, or symlinked paths (including nonexistent descendants of symlinked directories), protected top-level `outputPath`, content-returning local-URL calls, any follow-up on a local file page, and persisted unverified top-level or batch tab/attachment/script/state-load transitions, and recursively inspected raw batch command strings. Electron launch handoff, status/probe reads, and capture from a tracked protected target use the same guard; snapshot/tabs handoff and status/probe reads verify the live URL before tab/title/content helpers, while handoff failure or cancellation closes the managed session and host process/profile. Raw artifact destinations use the same command parser as preparation and are checked before it creates parent directories. Enabled `--allow-file-access` argv/env and raw Chrome file-access or protected-path values are rejected; every upstream spawn clears `AGENT_BROWSER_ARGS`, removes caller file-access occurrences, and adds canonical `--args "" --allow-file-access false` defaults so project/user config cannot override the boundary while a validated safe CLI `--args` value remains usable. Post-transition summaries, including forced live probes after arbitrary `eval`, verify URL before reading title and fail an implicit transition that lands on a local file page. Failed/unexecuted navigation stays unverified, stale completions serialize authoritative state only, and replay treats unknown state as dominant over inconsistent target/ref fields. `get url`, `tab list`, non-content `tab <id>` selection, explicit safe HTTP(S) navigation away, and close remain available; tab selection stays unverified until `get url` succeeds. `session list` and `state list` remove wrapper-managed rows, and explicit `piab-*` live-session targets require an ownership record from the current extension instance. Non-plain-text sessionless commands still run with `--json` for machine-readable output, but the planner does not prepend the implicit managed `--session`, so an agent can inspect local capabilities or start/stop the standalone dashboard without consuming the implicit session slot before a real `open`. Browser-backed, context-dependent, or incomplete commands such as root `session`, untargeted `state clear`, bare `state clean`, `auth login`, `state save`, and `state load` keep normal managed-session injection. Command-shape allowlisting lives in `extensions/agent-browser/lib/command-policy.ts` (`needsManagedSession`), while `extensions/agent-browser/lib/runtime.ts` (`isPlainTextInspectionArgs`, `buildExecutionPlan`) applies that decision to execution planning.
 
 A successful unnamed `sessionMode: "fresh"` launch should become the new extension-managed session so later default calls follow that browser instead of silently snapping back to the older managed session.
 
@@ -197,7 +198,7 @@ Keep the handling simple:
 
 This keeps the product centered on native tool usage instead of auxiliary skill wiring.
 
-Upstream restore-state persistence remains upstream-owned. The wrapper passes `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` through unchanged; the behavior introduced in upstream 0.31.2 periodically saves restore-enabled cookies/localStorage after command quiet time and during idle page changes, while `0` disables periodic saves without disabling save-on-close. The wrapper must not duplicate that timer or treat upstream restore files as wrapper-owned artifacts.
+Upstream restore-state persistence remains upstream-owned. The wrapper passes `AGENT_BROWSER_AUTOSAVE_INTERVAL_MS` through unchanged and may set `AGENT_BROWSER_RESTORE` for wrapper-owned managed sessions as described above; the behavior introduced in upstream 0.31.2 periodically saves restore-enabled cookies/localStorage after command quiet time and during idle page changes, while `0` disables periodic saves without disabling save-on-close. The wrapper must not duplicate that timer or treat upstream restore files as wrapper-owned artifacts.
 
 ## Responsibility split