phasegate 0.161.0 → 0.162.0

package/scripts/harness/validator-system/infrastructure/adapters/phase-dependency-phase-gate-policy-adapter.ts

@@ -51,9 +51,35 @@ export class PhaseDependencyPhaseGatePolicyAdapter implements PhaseGatePolicyPor
         };
       }
 
-      return { satisfied: true, violations: [] };
-    } catch {
-      return { satisfied: true, violations: [] };
+      // Fail-closed: an unexpected exit code means prerequisites could not be confirmed.
+      console.error(`[validator-system] phase gate check returned unexpected exit code ${result.exitCode}`);
+      return {
+        satisfied: false,
+        violations: [
+          {
+            code: { value: 'L2-002', toString: () => 'L2-002' },
+            severity: { value: 'error', toString: () => 'error' },
+            message: `phase gate check returned unexpected exit code ${result.exitCode}; prerequisites cannot be confirmed`,
+            suggestion: 'phase gate prerequisites could not be evaluated; treating as NOT satisfied (fail-closed)',
+          },
+        ],
+      };
+    } catch (err) {
+      // Fail-closed: if the phase-dependency-model could not be loaded/executed we cannot
+      // confirm prerequisites are met, so treat them as NOT satisfied rather than opening the gate.
+      const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+      console.error(`[validator-system] phase gate prerequisite check failed to run: ${message}`);
+      return {
+        satisfied: false,
+        violations: [
+          {
+            code: { value: 'L2-002', toString: () => 'L2-002' },
+            severity: { value: 'error', toString: () => 'error' },
+            message: `phase gate prerequisite check could not be evaluated: ${message}`,
+            suggestion: 'phase gate prerequisites could not be evaluated; treating as NOT satisfied (fail-closed)',
+          },
+        ],
+      };
     }
   }
 }

package/templates/.claude/scripts/deny-check.sh

@@ -4,14 +4,33 @@
 # Reads JSON from stdin, exits with code 2 to block dangerous commands.
 # Deny patterns are read from .claude/settings.json permissions.deny.
 
-DEBUG_LOG="/tmp/claude_deny_check_debug.log"
-echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] deny-check.sh started" >> "$DEBUG_LOG"
+# Debug logging is OFF by default to avoid leaking command contents to a
+# world-readable file. Set CLAUDE_DENY_CHECK_DEBUG=1 to enable. When enabled,
+# the log is created with restrictive (owner-only) permissions.
+DEBUG_LOG="${CLAUDE_DENY_CHECK_DEBUG_LOG:-$HOME/.cache/claude/deny-check-debug.log}"
+
+debug_log() {
+    if [[ "$CLAUDE_DENY_CHECK_DEBUG" == "1" ]]; then
+        local dir
+        dir=$(dirname "$DEBUG_LOG")
+        mkdir -p "$dir" 2>/dev/null || return 0
+        # Restrict permissions before writing anything sensitive.
+        ( umask 077; touch "$DEBUG_LOG" 2>/dev/null ) || return 0
+        chmod 600 "$DEBUG_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true
+        printf '[%s] %s\n' "$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')" "$1" >> "$DEBUG_LOG" 2>/dev/null || true
+    fi
+}
+
+debug_log "deny-check.sh started"
 
 INPUT_JSON=$(cat)
-echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] Input JSON: $INPUT_JSON" >> "$DEBUG_LOG"
+debug_log "input received (${#INPUT_JSON} bytes)"
 
+# Fail CLOSED: without jq we cannot parse the deny policy, so deny the command
+# rather than silently allowing it.
 if ! command -v jq &> /dev/null; then
-    exit 0
+    echo "Security policy: jq is required to evaluate the deny policy but was not found; command blocked." >&2
+    exit 2
 fi
 
 TOOL_NAME=$(echo "$INPUT_JSON" | jq -r '.tool_name // empty')
@@ -43,13 +62,55 @@ if [[ ${#DENY_PATTERNS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
     exit 0
 fi
 
-for pattern in "${DENY_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
-    regex_pattern=$(echo "$pattern" | sed 's/\*/.*/')
-    if echo "$COMMAND" | grep -E "^$regex_pattern" &>/dev/null; then
-        echo "[$(date '+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S')] BLOCKED: '$COMMAND' matches '$pattern'" >> "$DEBUG_LOG"
-        echo "Security policy violation: command '$COMMAND' is denied by pattern '$pattern'" >&2
-        exit 2
-    fi
-done
+# Split a shell command line into individual command segments so that denied
+# commands smuggled behind chaining/grouping/substitution operators are still
+# inspected. Operators handled: ; && || | & newline $( ) ` { } ( )
+# We replace each operator with a newline, then treat each line as a segment.
+split_command_segments() {
+    local cmd="$1"
+    # Order matters: multi-char operators first.
+    cmd=${cmd//&&/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//||/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//|/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//;/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//&/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//\$(/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//\`/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//(/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//)/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//\{/$'\n'}
+    cmd=${cmd//\}/$'\n'}
+    # Trailing newline ensures the final segment is emitted as a complete line
+    # so that `while read` does not drop an unterminated last segment.
+    printf '%s\n' "$cmd"
+}
+
+# Convert a settings glob pattern to an anchored regex. ALL '*' become '.*'.
+glob_to_regex() {
+    printf '%s' "$1" | sed 's/\*/.*/g'
+}
+
+check_segment() {
+    local segment="$1"
+    # Strip leading whitespace so "^pattern" anchors match after operators.
+    segment="${segment#"${segment%%[![:space:]]*}"}"
+    [[ -z "$segment" ]] && return 0
+    for pattern in "${DENY_PATTERNS[@]}"; do
+        local regex_pattern
+        regex_pattern=$(glob_to_regex "$pattern")
+        if printf '%s' "$segment" | grep -E "^$regex_pattern" &>/dev/null; then
+            debug_log "BLOCKED segment '$segment' matches '$pattern'"
+            echo "Security policy violation: command segment '$segment' is denied by pattern '$pattern'" >&2
+            exit 2
+        fi
+    done
+    return 0
+}
+
+# Inspect the whole command AND each chained/substituted segment.
+check_segment "$COMMAND"
+while IFS= read -r segment; do
+    check_segment "$segment"
+done < <(split_command_segments "$COMMAND")
 
 exit 0