permdock 0.7.0 → 0.9.0

package/dist/{manifest-B79YuF2T.js → manifest-wg8WkkpD.js}

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-import { n as freezeDeep } from "./freeze-CrU8nQeX.js";
-import { n as PermDockValidationError } from "./validation-error-ZfUHbKvf.js";
-import { n as copyJson, t as checkSchema } from "./json-schema-B-vAwlde.js";
-import { t as supabaseManifestSchema } from "./manifest-schema-Cv492Qev.js";
+import { n as freezeDeep } from "./freeze-jjan0lCv.js";
+import { n as PermDockValidationError } from "./validation-error-CYg2kJEw.js";
+import { n as copyJson, t as checkSchema } from "./json-schema-BPGa-RjQ.js";
+import { t as supabaseManifestSchema } from "./manifest-schema-2r37XRhD.js";
 //#region src/supabase/manifest.ts
 /** Whether the manifest describes a token hook. */
 function hasTokenHook(manifest) {
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ function hasTokenHook(manifest) {
 /**
 * Reads a `permdock.manifest.json` document (parsed, or the JSON text) and
 * validates it against `schemas/supabase-manifest-v1.json`. Returns a
-* deep-frozen copy built from own keys; throws `PermDockValidationError`
-* with every issue, so a manifest of another major is refused.
+* deep-frozen copy built from own keys; throws `PermDockValidationError` with
+* every issue, so a manifest of another major is refused.
 */
 function parseSupabaseManifest(json) {
 	const issues = [];

package/dist/{map-claims-etGIS_Dv.js → map-claims-C-nv08_n.js}

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 import { r as isRecord, t as compact } from "./compact-CAf557ZB.js";
-import { n as freezeDeep } from "./freeze-CrU8nQeX.js";
-import { n as isForbiddenKey, o as readPath } from "./paths-DXSHAMIa.js";
-import { n as expirySeconds } from "./expiry-D4_YKRKD.js";
-import { r as validateRecord } from "./thenable-yD7SabqG.js";
+import { n as freezeDeep } from "./freeze-jjan0lCv.js";
+import { n as isForbiddenKey, o as readPath } from "./paths-CUvURzHp.js";
+import { n as expirySeconds } from "./expiry-6XByK0dm.js";
+import { r as validateRecord } from "./thenable-BNSM1U2R.js";
 import { t as anonymousSubject } from "./subject-BGoM5o8B.js";
-import { t as readClaim } from "./claims-map-7oQ3ue4X.js";
-import { t as clientNameOf } from "./clients-DjU5ABMy.js";
+import { t as readClaim } from "./claims-map-CKkoAAYF.js";
+import { t as clientNameOf } from "./clients-DYr3U86j.js";
 //#region src/jwt/map-claims.ts
 /** OpenID Connect Core section 5.1: profile data the provider owns. */
 const PROFILE_CLAIMS = [
@@ -180,7 +180,10 @@ function membershipsFromClaim(value) {
 	});
 	return out;
 }
-/** Zitadel's `role -> { orgId: orgDomain }` form: string values and no `roles` key. */
+/**
+* Zitadel's `role -> { orgId: orgDomain }` form: string values and no `roles`
+* key.
+*/
 function isRoleToOrganisations(value) {
 	const entries = Object.entries(value);
 	return entries.length > 0 && !("roles" in value) && entries.every(([key, item]) => typeof item === "string" && !isForbiddenKey(key));
@@ -332,13 +335,17 @@ function mapClaimsToSubject(claims, options) {
 			delegation: options.accept === "id-token" ? void 0 : delegationOf(claims, options, act.status === "ok" ? act.chain : void 0),
 			context: {},
 			session: typeof sessionValue === "string" ? sessionValue : void 0,
-			expiresAt
+			expiresAt,
+			issuedAt: typeof claims.iat === "number" && Number.isFinite(claims.iat) ? claims.iat : void 0
 		})),
 		invalidClaims,
 		invalidChain: false
 	};
 }
-/** `true` when a verified token is not an OpenID Connect ID token for one of `clients`. */
+/**
+* `true` when a verified token is not an OpenID Connect ID token for one of
+* `clients`.
+*/
 function idTokenMismatch(claims, headerTyp, clients) {
 	const typ = headerTyp?.toLowerCase();
 	if (typ !== void 0 && typ !== "jwt" && typ !== "application/jwt") return true;

package/dist/{map-error-BQGyDm_M.js → map-error-pasIGqMT.js}

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 import { t as compact } from "./compact-CAf557ZB.js";
-import { n as PermDockValidationError } from "./validation-error-ZfUHbKvf.js";
-import { n as PermDockDeniedError, r as PermDockRevokedError, t as PermDockApprovalRequiredError } from "./errors-BKy0EfhN.js";
-import { c as problemResponse, i as decisionResponse } from "./problem-CTviyH5L.js";
-import { l as InvalidSignatureError } from "./evaluations-DReoiVBw.js";
+import { n as PermDockValidationError } from "./validation-error-CYg2kJEw.js";
+import { n as PermDockDeniedError, r as PermDockRevokedError, t as PermDockApprovalRequiredError } from "./errors-B6R_lg2a.js";
+import { a as decisionResponse, l as problemResponse } from "./problem-BVLHFK33.js";
+import { l as InvalidSignatureError } from "./evaluations-IBceAeKT.js";
 //#region src/server/map-error.ts
 /**
 * Turns a thrown PermDock error into its Problem Details response, with the
-* status, `WWW-Authenticate` and rate-limit fields `protect` sends for the
-* same decision. Returns `undefined` for anything else so the framework's own
-* error path takes over.
+* status, `WWW-Authenticate` and rate-limit fields `protect` sends for the same
+* decision. Returns `undefined` for anything else so the framework's own error
+* path takes over.
 */
 function problemFromError(error, options = {}) {
 	if (error instanceof InvalidSignatureError) return error.response;

package/dist/{markers-C6joDI3o.js → markers-BeHZ4x9Q.js}

@@ -3,13 +3,25 @@ import { t as beforeFirst } from "./text-BMFRfBqc.js";
 const HOOK_MARKER = "-- permdock:hook v1";
 /** The first line of a `--grants-out` file. */
 const GRANTS_MARKER = "-- permdock:grants v1";
-/** The first line of the `seeds` part: the `role_permissions` rows, a versioned migration. */
+/**
+* The first line of the `seeds` part: the `role_permissions` rows, a versioned
+* migration.
+*/
 const SEEDS_MARKER = "-- permdock:seeds v1";
-/** The first line of the `indexes` part: the indexes the policies and helpers read through. */
+/**
+* The first line of the `indexes` part: the indexes the policies and helpers
+* read through.
+*/
 const INDEXES_MARKER = "-- permdock:indexes v1";
-/** The first line of a `--backfill-out` migration: existing custom roles copied into the custom-role tables. */
+/**
+* The first line of a `--backfill-out` migration: existing custom roles copied
+* into the custom-role tables.
+*/
 const BACKFILL_MARKER = "-- permdock:backfill v1";
-/** The first line of a `rls migrate --retire-out` migration: a materialised permissions table and its refresh triggers dropped. */
+/**
+* The first line of a `rls migrate --retire-out` migration: a materialised
+* permissions table and its refresh triggers dropped.
+*/
 const RETIRE_MARKER = "-- permdock:retire v1";
 const HOOK_LINE = /^-- permdock:hook v(?<version>[1-9]\d*)(?: (?<rest>.*))?$/u;
 const GRANTS_LINE = /^-- permdock:grants v(?<version>[1-9]\d*)(?: (?<rest>.*))?$/u;
@@ -25,7 +37,10 @@ function pairs(rest) {
 	}
 	return fields;
 }
-/** The fields of a hook marker line, or undefined when `sql` does not start with one. */
+/**
+* The fields of a hook marker line, or undefined when `sql` does not start with
+* one.
+*/
 function hookMarkerFields(sql) {
 	const line = firstLine(sql);
 	return line.startsWith(`-- permdock:hook v1 `) ? pairs(line.slice(20)) : void 0;

package/dist/mcp/index.d.ts

@@ -1,24 +1,30 @@
-import { T as Policy, Y as JwtClaims, dt as TokenVerifier, lr as Subject, rr as Delegation, sr as Principal } from "../policy-types-B-F-qAZk.js";
-import { u as Permission } from "../permission-types-DhNEmoRG.js";
-import { m as ApprovalStore } from "../types-DC44-hqb.js";
-import { t as ApprovalHint } from "../errors-B_Qg9D3e.js";
-import { t as InstanceOptions } from "../instance-options-CU0YQCLH.js";
+import { T as Policy, Z as JwtClaims, hr as Subject, ht as TokenVerifier, lr as Delegation, pr as Principal } from "../policy-types-DGIO_gxq.js";
+import { u as Permission } from "../permission-types-CAY-GU7e.js";
+import { m as ApprovalStore } from "../types-DLvhVm1r.js";
+import { t as ApprovalHint } from "../errors-BIM4MFsJ.js";
+import { t as InstanceOptions } from "../instance-options-CoHn-0e8.js";
 import { t as RequestContext } from "../request-context-C2_1lchh.js";
-import { n as PermDockWrap } from "../wrap-B6R0cMRL.js";
-import { o as OtelWrap } from "../types-CIeZcG8v.js";
-import { n as DeniedTextEvent, t as DeniedText } from "../denied-text-D4qkEtFz.js";
-import { t as ClientNames } from "../clients-C7zLFuWT.js";
-import { U as JwtSubjectOptions } from "../types-cTos-H7p.js";
+import { n as PermDockWrap } from "../wrap-DxXB54Wu.js";
+import { o as OtelWrap } from "../types-B6ExllNo.js";
+import { n as DeniedTextEvent, t as DeniedText } from "../denied-text-DHldhVUv.js";
+import { t as ClientNames } from "../clients-C_NOET3z.js";
+import { U as JwtSubjectOptions } from "../types-DsHGPtkR.js";
 import { CacheHint, Icon, McpServer, PromptCallback, ReadResourceCallback, ReadResourceTemplateCallback, RegisteredPrompt, RegisteredResource, RegisteredResourceTemplate, RegisteredTool, ResourceMetadata, ResourceTemplate, ScopeChallengeHandler, StandardSchemaWithJSON, ToolAnnotations, ToolCallback, Variables } from "@modelcontextprotocol/server";
 //#region src/mcp/types.d.ts
-/** The verified `AuthInfo` the MCP SDK's bearer auth puts on `ctx.http.authInfo`. */
+/**
+ * The verified `AuthInfo` the MCP SDK's bearer auth puts on
+ * `ctx.http.authInfo`.
+ */
 type McpAuthInfo = {
   readonly token?: string;
   readonly clientId?: string;
   readonly scopes?: readonly string[];
   readonly expiresAt?: number;
   readonly resource?: URL;
-  /** Stamped by the SDK's bearer-auth helpers from their `resourceMetadataUrl` option. */
+  /**
+   * Stamped by the SDK's bearer-auth helpers from their `resourceMetadataUrl`
+   * option.
+   */
   readonly resourceMetadataUrl?: string;
   readonly extra?: Readonly<Record<string, unknown>>;
 };
@@ -44,9 +50,9 @@ type McpToolConfig<TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined
   readonly oauthScopes?: readonly string[];
   readonly _meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
   /**
-   * Decide again when the handler resolves, without consuming quota, and
-   * return the refusal instead of the result unless the call is still
-   * allowed. The re-check withholds the result; it cannot undo the work.
+   * Decide again when the handler resolves, without consuming quota, and return
+   * the refusal instead of the result unless the call is still allowed. The
+   * re-check withholds the result; it cannot undo the work.
    */
   readonly longRunning?: boolean;
 };
@@ -56,7 +62,8 @@ type McpResourceConfig<TArgs extends readonly unknown[]> = Guard<TArgs> & Resour
 };
 /**
  * An MCP Apps view (`ui://`). Without `permission` it takes the permission of
- * the tool whose `_meta.ui.resourceUri` names it, and denies while no tool does.
+ * the tool whose `_meta.ui.resourceUri` names it, and denies while no tool
+ * does.
  */
 type McpUiResourceConfig = Omit<McpResourceConfig<[uri: URL]>, "permission"> & {
   readonly permission?: Permission;
@@ -71,45 +78,57 @@ type McpPromptConfig<TArgs extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefine
 };
 /** `McpServer` whose `register*` methods take a `permission` and decide first. */
 type GuardedMcpServer = Omit<McpServer, "registerTool" | "registerResource" | "registerPrompt"> & {
-  registerTool<TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined, TOutput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpToolConfig<TInput, TOutput>, handler: ToolCallback<TInput>): RegisteredTool;
-  registerResource(name: string, uri: `ui://${string}`, config: McpUiResourceConfig, read: ReadResourceCallback): RegisteredResource;
-  registerResource(name: string, uri: string, config: McpResourceConfig<[uri: URL]>, read: ReadResourceCallback): RegisteredResource;
-  registerResource(name: string, template: ResourceTemplate, config: McpResourceConfig<[uri: URL, variables: Variables]>, read: ReadResourceTemplateCallback): RegisteredResourceTemplate;
-  registerPrompt<TArgs extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpPromptConfig<TArgs>, handler: PromptCallback<TArgs>): RegisteredPrompt;
+  registerTool: <TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined, TOutput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpToolConfig<TInput, TOutput>, handler: ToolCallback<TInput>) => RegisteredTool;
+  registerResource: {
+    (name: string, uri: `ui://${string}`, config: McpUiResourceConfig, read: ReadResourceCallback): RegisteredResource;
+    (name: string, uri: string, config: McpResourceConfig<[uri: URL]>, read: ReadResourceCallback): RegisteredResource;
+    (name: string, template: ResourceTemplate, config: McpResourceConfig<[uri: URL, variables: Variables]>, read: ReadResourceTemplateCallback): RegisteredResourceTemplate;
+  };
+  registerPrompt: <TArgs extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpPromptConfig<TArgs>, handler: PromptCallback<TArgs>) => RegisteredPrompt;
 };
 /** A tool config when the tool's own procedure decides: no loader, no re-check. */
 type McpProcedureToolConfig<TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined, TOutput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined> = Omit<McpToolConfig<TInput, TOutput>, "permission" | "data" | "longRunning"> & {
   /** Overrides `permissionFor(name)`. */
   readonly permission?: Permission;
 };
-/** `GuardedMcpServer` whose tools are listed and annotated by permission but decided by the procedure they call. */
+/**
+ * `GuardedMcpServer` whose tools are listed and annotated by permission but
+ * decided by the procedure they call.
+ */
 type ProcedureMcpServer = Omit<GuardedMcpServer, "registerTool"> & {
-  registerTool<TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined, TOutput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpProcedureToolConfig<TInput, TOutput>, handler: ToolCallback<TInput>): RegisteredTool;
+  registerTool: <TInput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined, TOutput extends StandardSchemaWithJSON | undefined = undefined>(name: string, config: McpProcedureToolConfig<TInput, TOutput>, handler: ToolCallback<TInput>) => RegisteredTool;
 };
 /**
- * Tools whose handler calls a procedure that already runs `protect`, such as
- * an oRPC procedure through `call()`. `tools/list` and annotations use the
+ * Tools whose handler calls a procedure that already runs `protect`, such as an
+ * oRPC procedure through `call()`. `tools/list` and annotations use the
  * permission; the call itself is not guarded, so each call decides once.
  */
 type McpProcedureEnforcement = {
   readonly enforce: "procedure";
-  /** The permission of the tool `name`; `permissionOf(procedure)` from `permdock/orpc` reads it. `undefined` throws at registration. */
+  /**
+   * The permission of the tool `name`; `permissionOf(procedure)` from
+   * `permdock/orpc` reads it. `undefined` throws at registration.
+   */
   readonly permissionFor: (name: string) => Permission | undefined;
   readonly oauthScopesFor?: (name: string) => readonly string[] | undefined;
 };
 type McpPermDockOptions<TUser = unknown> = InstanceOptions & {
-  /** Receives the verified auth info, or `{}` on a transport without one (stdio). */
+  /**
+   * Receives the verified auth info, or `{}` on a transport without one
+   * (stdio).
+   */
   readonly subject: (authInfo: McpAuthInfo) => TUser | Promise<TUser>;
   /**
-   * The `kind` of the actor built from `authInfo.clientId`; `'mcp-client'`
-   * when absent. `'oauth-client'` decides the token under the kind
+   * The `kind` of the actor built from `authInfo.clientId`; `'mcp-client'` when
+   * absent. `'oauth-client'` decides the token under the kind
    * `subjectFromSupabase`, `subjectFromJwt` and `permdock/a2a` give an OAuth
    * client, so one policy delegation covers the token on every surface.
    */
   readonly actorKind?: string;
   /**
    * Replaces the actor built from `authInfo.clientId`, `actorKind` and
-   * `clients`. Read it from the verified `authInfo`, never from tool arguments.
+   * `clients`. Read it from the verified `authInfo`, never from tool
+   * arguments.
    */
   readonly actor?: (authInfo: McpAuthInfo) => unknown;
   /**
@@ -117,28 +136,36 @@ type McpPermDockOptions<TUser = unknown> = InstanceOptions & {
    * `authInfo.extra.authorization_details`.
    */
   readonly delegation?: (authInfo: McpAuthInfo) => Delegation | undefined | Promise<Delegation | undefined>;
-  /** Names for OAuth client ids (`ClientNames`): the actor gets `client` set to the name of `authInfo.clientId`, which a policy delegation matches with `to: { kind, client }`. */
+  /**
+   * Names for OAuth client ids (`ClientNames`): the actor gets `client` set to
+   * the name of `authInfo.clientId`, which a policy delegation matches with
+   * `to: { kind, client }`.
+   */
   readonly clients?: ClientNames;
   readonly tenant?: string | ((authInfo: McpAuthInfo) => string | undefined | Promise<string | undefined>);
   /** Deny every call and list nothing when the transport carries no auth info. */
   readonly requireAuthInfo?: boolean;
   /**
    * This server's RFC 8707 resource identifier. A token whose
-   * `authInfo.resource` is absent or different is refused with `invalid_token`.
+   * `authInfo.resource` is absent or different is refused with
+   * `invalid_token`.
    */
   readonly resource?: string | URL;
   /**
-   * Where a human approves. With `at` set, `approval-required` answers a
-   * client that supports URL elicitation with an `input_required` result.
+   * Where a human approves. With `at` set, `approval-required` answers a client
+   * that supports URL elicitation with an `input_required` result.
    */
   readonly approval?: ApprovalHint;
-  /** Where the user re-authenticates; `acr_values` and `max_age` are appended to `at`. */
+  /**
+   * Where the user re-authenticates; `acr_values` and `max_age` are appended to
+   * `at`.
+   */
   readonly stepUp?: {
     readonly at: string;
   };
   /**
-   * Seals the approval token into `requestState`. Pass the codec from the
-   * SDK's `createRequestStateCodec` when the server verifies request state.
+   * Seals the approval token into `requestState`. Pass the codec from the SDK's
+   * `createRequestStateCodec` when the server verifies request state.
    */
   readonly requestState?: {
     readonly mint: (token: string, context?: never) => Promise<string>;
@@ -146,11 +173,14 @@ type McpPermDockOptions<TUser = unknown> = InstanceOptions & {
   readonly store?: ApprovalStore;
   /** `(permdock) => withOtel(permdock, options)` from `permdock/otel`. */
   readonly otel?: OtelWrap;
-  /** Wraps each instance after `otel`; build it with `wrapPermDock` to cover derived instances. */
+  /**
+   * Wraps each instance after `otel`; build it with `wrapPermDock` to cover
+   * derived instances.
+   */
   readonly wrap?: PermDockWrap;
   /**
-   * Request values merged into `subject.context`, under `policy.context`.
-   * Read them from the verified `authInfo`, never from tool arguments.
+   * Request values merged into `subject.context`, under `policy.context`. Read
+   * them from the verified `authInfo`, never from tool arguments.
    */
   readonly context?: (authInfo: McpAuthInfo) => RequestContext | undefined | Promise<RequestContext | undefined>;
   /**
@@ -160,7 +190,10 @@ type McpPermDockOptions<TUser = unknown> = InstanceOptions & {
   readonly deniedText?: DeniedText;
 };
 type McpPermDock = {
-  /** Call before registering anything: later `register*` calls must carry a `permission`. */
+  /**
+   * Call before registering anything: later `register*` calls must carry a
+   * `permission`.
+   */
   readonly protectServer: {
     (server: McpServer): GuardedMcpServer;
     (server: McpServer, options: McpProcedureEnforcement): ProcedureMcpServer;
@@ -171,21 +204,36 @@ type McpPermDock = {
 export declare function createPermDock<TUser, TPrincipal extends Principal = Principal>(policy: Policy<TUser, TPrincipal>, given: McpPermDockOptions<TUser>): McpPermDock;
 //#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/mcp-auth.d.ts
-/** `_meta` key on `tools/call`, `resources/read` and `prompts/get` carrying an approval token. */
+/**
+ * `_meta` key on `tools/call`, `resources/read` and `prompts/get` carrying an
+ * approval token.
+ */
 export declare const APPROVAL_META_KEY = "dev.permdock/approval";
 //#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/resource-guard.d.ts
 type McpResourceGuardOptions = {
-  /** The MCP server's resource identifier (RFC 8707); a token's `aud` must contain it. */
+  /**
+   * The MCP server's resource identifier (RFC 8707); a token's `aud` must
+   * contain it.
+   */
   readonly resource: string | URL;
-  /** Scopes every request needs; a token without one of them gets `403 insufficient_scope`. */
+  /**
+   * Scopes every request needs; a token without one of them gets `403
+   * insufficient_scope`.
+   */
   readonly scopes?: readonly string[];
   readonly verifier: TokenVerifier;
-  /** The authorization server's issuer, when the verifier does not check `iss` itself. */
+  /**
+   * The authorization server's issuer, when the verifier does not check `iss`
+   * itself.
+   */
   readonly issuer?: string;
   /** `true` for a revoked token; a throw also refuses it. */
   readonly revoked?: (claims: JwtClaims) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
-  /** The RFC 9728 metadata URL in challenges; default `<origin>/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>`. */
+  /**
+   * The RFC 9728 metadata URL in challenges; default
+   * `<origin>/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>`.
+   */
   readonly resourceMetadataUrl?: string;
 };
 type McpResourceGuardResult = {
@@ -199,41 +247,46 @@ type ProtectedResourceMetadataOptions = {
   readonly resource: string | URL;
   /** `authorization_servers`: the issuers whose tokens the resource accepts. */
   readonly authorizationServers: readonly string[];
-  /** `scopes_supported`; list every permission's `scope` so clients can ask for them up front. */
+  /**
+   * `scopes_supported`; list every permission's `scope` so clients can ask for
+   * them up front.
+   */
   readonly scopesSupported?: readonly string[];
   readonly resourceName?: string;
   readonly resourceDocumentation?: string;
 };
 /**
- * The resource-server check in front of an MCP endpoint (MCP authorization,
- * RFC 6750, RFC 9728): reads the bearer token from `Authorization`, verifies
- * it for `resource`, refuses a revoked one and checks `scopes`. It answers
- * the `McpAuthInfo` the SDK's handlers read, or the `401` or `403` response
- * with a `WWW-Authenticate` challenge naming the metadata URL. A token in the
- * query string is never read. Never throws.
+ * The resource-server check in front of an MCP endpoint (MCP authorization, RFC
+ * 6750, RFC 9728): reads the bearer token from `Authorization`, verifies it for
+ * `resource`, refuses a revoked one and checks `scopes`. It answers the
+ * `McpAuthInfo` the SDK's handlers read, or the `401` or `403` response with a
+ * `WWW-Authenticate` challenge naming the metadata URL. A token in the query
+ * string is never read. Never throws.
  */
 export declare function mcpResourceGuard(options: McpResourceGuardOptions): (request: Request) => Promise<McpResourceGuardResult>;
 /**
  * The RFC 9728 Protected Resource Metadata document as a Fetch handler, for
- * `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>`. `bearer_methods_supported`
- * is `header`, the only method `mcpResourceGuard` reads. Any origin may read it.
+ * `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource<path>`. `bearer_methods_supported` is
+ * `header`, the only method `mcpResourceGuard` reads. Any origin may read it.
  */
 export declare function protectedResourceMetadata(options: ProtectedResourceMetadataOptions): (request: Request) => Response;
 //#endregion
 //#region src/mcp/subject.d.ts
 type McpSubjectOptions = Pick<JwtSubjectOptions, "claims" | "groupRoles" | "schema" | "delegation"> & {
-  /** The `kind` of the actor built from `authInfo.clientId`; `'mcp-client'` when absent. Match `createPermDock`'s `actorKind`. */
+  /**
+   * The `kind` of the actor built from `authInfo.clientId`; `'mcp-client'` when
+   * absent. Match `createPermDock`'s `actorKind`.
+   */
   readonly actorKind?: string;
   /** Names for OAuth client ids; match `createPermDock`'s `clients`. */
   readonly clients?: ClientNames;
 };
 /**
  * Maps the `AuthInfo` the MCP SDK's bearer verification produced to a
- * `Subject`: the principal from the verified claims in `extra`, the client
- * as an actor of kind `actorKind` (`mcp-client` by default), the granted
- * scopes as the delegation. Never verifies and never throws; anything
- * unusable, including an `actorKind` that is not a non-empty string, is
- * the anonymous subject.
+ * `Subject`: the principal from the verified claims in `extra`, the client as
+ * an actor of kind `actorKind` (`mcp-client` by default), the granted scopes as
+ * the delegation. Never verifies and never throws; anything unusable, including
+ * an `actorKind` that is not a non-empty string, is the anonymous subject.
  */
 export declare function subjectFromMcp(authInfo: McpAuthInfo | undefined, options?: McpSubjectOptions): Subject<McpPrincipal>;
 //#endregion