permdock 0.13.0 → 0.15.0

package/skills/permdock-wire/references/adapters.md

@@ -501,7 +501,7 @@ const subject = subjectFromSupabase(claims, {
 
 Write the claims with `permdock supabase hook generate`; `permdock supabase inspect --out` writes the manifest (helper names, tenant claim, budget, claims written) that `authorizationProvider` from `permdock/better-supabase` turns into better-supabase's `authorization` config. No `@supabase/supabase-js` peer. Pair with `permdock rls generate`, or keep SQL as authority and run `permdock rls verify --db-url-stdin` against `sqlFunction` twins ([database-first](https://permdock.com/docs/adapters/rls)); the generic RLS workflow is in the `permdock-data` skill.
 
-With better-supabase, set `auth.authorization: authorizationProvider({ manifest, catalog })` in `better-supabase.config.ts` (top-level `authorization` before 0.15) (with `rls.customRoles` its `canAssign` and `canAssignFor` call `permdock_can_assign_any` and its `_for` form, so custom roles are assignable through better-supabase; regenerate the manifest after turning custom roles on), pass `authorizer({ policy })` to the server (`createNext`, `createHono`, `createMcp`) so every `permission` a resource, action, route guard or tool declares is decided by PermDock from the verified claims (`operations` maps tables for `permissions: true`; a missing or anonymous claim denies), build bucket and topic `access` policies with `bucketPolicy` and `topicPolicy`, and map its session with `subjectFromBetterSupabase(session)` (all from `permdock/better-supabase`): the active tenant's `features` become `principal.plans`. Pass `plans: { keys }` when better-supabase's `entitlements.claim.keys` shortens feature keys, and `apiKeys: { permissions, manifest }` so an `apiKey` session maps to the key's credential subject instead of the anonymous one. For `createMcp` tools, put the permission in `meta` and spread `toolPolicy({ permdock })` into the options: tools without one are hidden and refused, and approval-required calls are refused because `createMcp` collects no approvals. Wrap a `CredentialProvider` with `credentialGuard(provider, { permdock, use, revoke? })` so PermDock decides each token use. `authorizationProvider({ ..., approver })` lets holders of that permission approve AI tool calls, never their own. `approvers: { 'ai-tool': holder(p), 'support-session': ..., 'invoice.send': ... }` fills `isApprover` through `permdock_is_approver` (needs `rls.approvals`); only `user()`, `holder()` and `anyOf()` approvers, and a kind it does not name has no approver. `accessReviewApplier({ client, reviews, policy, demoteTo?, email?, permdockFor? })` applies a review's revoked items: `update_member_role` to the `demoteTo` role when that role lacks the permission, else `remove_member`, plus `revoke_invitation` for the member's matching invitations, then `markApplied`; pass the reviewer's client so the blocks' own checks run. better-supabase's `createAgentRuntime({ toolApproval })` takes `toolApproval` from `permdock/ai-sdk` as it is. Validate its claims with `betterSupabase.claims(supabaseClaims().extend(appSchema))` (`supabaseClaims` from `permdock/supabase`, any Standard Schema as `appSchema`) instead of a hand-written copy of the claim shape. A `supabase.hook.claims` function that needs the user's organizations calls `<schema>.member_organization_ids_for(user_id)` (generated by `rls generate`, executable by `supabase_auth_admin` only) instead of querying the membership tables itself. With a scope named `team` or `teams`, `authorizationProvider` fills better-supabase's `teamIdsOf` with `<schema>.member_team_ids_of(user)`, which answers only for the caller, so with `blocks.permissions.model: 'provider'` (`blocks.access` before 0.15) better-supabase's `team_ids_of()` and team-sharing policies read PermDock's memberships. A token Supabase's OAuth server issued to a third-party app (`client_id`) becomes an `oauth-client` actor limited to its `scope`; `deny(permission, { to: actor('oauth-client') })` keeps such apps out, in the app and, through `rls generate`, in Postgres. A better-supabase support session (`act.kind: 'support'`) is actor kind `support` with `sessionId` and `readOnly`, and `actingAs` (`act.kind: 'impersonation'`) is kind `impersonation`; neither has a delegation, so they reach nothing until a policy delegation names `actor('support')` or `actor('impersonation')`, and `readOnly: true` (also when `read_only` is absent) narrows that to read-only permissions. Generated RLS reads memberships, not `act`, so a support token sent to the Data API writes as the user: add a restrictive `for update` (and `insert` / `delete`) policy per writable table that requires `act ->> 'read_only' = 'false'` when `act` is a support or session level ([support access](https://permdock.com/docs/guides/support-access)). With `rls.anonymousSignIns: 'deny'`, pass `anonymousSignIns: 'deny'` to the subject mapper too (doctor PD057). Check a deployed database against the generated policies with `permdock rls verify --introspect`.
+With better-supabase, set `auth.authorization: authorizationProvider({ manifest, catalog })` in `better-supabase.config.ts` (with `rls.customRoles` its `canAssign` and `canAssignFor` call `permdock_can_assign_any` and its `_for` form, so custom roles are assignable through better-supabase; regenerate the manifest after turning custom roles on), pass `authorizer({ policy })` to the server (`createNext`, `createHono`, `createMcp`) so every `permission` a resource, action, route guard or tool declares is decided by PermDock from the verified claims (`operations` maps tables for `permissions: true`; a missing or anonymous claim denies), build bucket and topic `access` policies with `bucketPolicy` and `topicPolicy`, and map its session with `subjectFromBetterSupabase(session)` (all from `permdock/better-supabase`): the active tenant's `features` become `principal.plans`. Pass `plans: { keys }` when better-supabase's `entitlements.claim.keys` shortens feature keys, and `apiKeys: { permissions, manifest }` so an `apiKey` session maps to the key's credential subject instead of the anonymous one. For `createMcp` tools, put the permission in `meta` and spread `toolPolicy({ permdock })` into the options: tools without one are hidden and refused, and approval-required calls are refused because `createMcp` collects no approvals. Wrap a `CredentialProvider` with `credentialGuard(provider, { permdock, use, revoke? })` so PermDock decides each token use. `authorizationProvider({ ..., approver })` lets holders of that permission approve AI tool calls, never their own. `approvers: { 'ai-tool': holder(p), 'support-session': ..., 'invoice.send': ... }` fills `isApprover` through `permdock_is_approver` (needs `rls.approvals`); only `user()`, `holder()` and `anyOf()` approvers, and a kind it does not name has no approver. `accessReviewApplier({ client, reviews, policy, demoteTo?, email?, permdockFor? })` applies a review's revoked items: `update_member_role` to the `demoteTo` role when that role lacks the permission, else `remove_member`, plus `revoke_invitation` for the member's matching invitations, then `markApplied`; pass the reviewer's client so the blocks' own checks run. better-supabase's `createAgentRuntime({ toolApproval })` takes `toolApproval` from `permdock/ai-sdk` as it is. Validate its claims with `betterSupabase.claims(supabaseClaims().extend(appSchema))` (`supabaseClaims` from `permdock/supabase`, any Standard Schema as `appSchema`) instead of a hand-written copy of the claim shape. A `supabase.hook.claims` function that needs the user's organizations calls `<schema>.member_organization_ids_for(user_id)` (generated by `rls generate`, executable by `supabase_auth_admin` only) instead of querying the membership tables itself. With a scope named `team` or `teams`, `authorizationProvider` fills better-supabase's `teamIdsOf` with `<schema>.member_team_ids_of(user)`, which answers only for the caller, so with `blocks.permissions.model: 'provider'` better-supabase's `team_ids_of()` and team-sharing policies read PermDock's memberships. A token Supabase's OAuth server issued to a third-party app (`client_id`) becomes an `oauth-client` actor limited to its `scope`; `deny(permission, { to: actor('oauth-client') })` keeps such apps out, in the app and, through `rls generate`, in Postgres. A better-supabase support session (`act.kind: 'support'`) is actor kind `support` with `sessionId` and `readOnly`, and `actingAs` (`act.kind: 'impersonation'`) is kind `impersonation`; neither has a delegation, so they reach nothing until a policy delegation names `actor('support')` or `actor('impersonation')`, and `readOnly: true` (also when `read_only` is absent) narrows that to read-only permissions. Generated RLS reads memberships, not `act`, so a support token sent to the Data API writes as the user: add a restrictive `for update` (and `insert` / `delete`) policy per writable table that requires `act ->> 'read_only' = 'false'` when `act` is a support or session level ([support access](https://permdock.com/docs/guides/support-access)). With `rls.anonymousSignIns: 'deny'`, pass `anonymousSignIns: 'deny'` to the subject mapper too (doctor PD057). Check a deployed database against the generated policies with `permdock rls verify --introspect`.
 
 The other better-supabase slots, all from `permdock/better-supabase` ([better-supabase](https://permdock.com/docs/adapters/better-supabase)): `hookCan(permdock)` and `handlerCan({ getPermDock })` are the `can` options of `authorizeHook` and `protectWebHandler` in `better-supabase/workflow-sdk`; they decide with no row unless the `data` option loads one (`hookCan(permdock, { data: (tenant, key) => row })`, `handlerCan(source, { data: (request, key) => row })`), so without it a permission with a row condition denies, and `handlerCan` answers `undefined` (401) without a signed-in principal. `supportPolicy({ policy, options?, writable?, approval?, approved? })` is the `authorize` option of `supportSessions`; it decides each start with `decideSupportSession` as the admin, and an `approval-required` start passes only once `approved(input, pending)` returns `{ approvedBy }` for an approver other than the admin. `subscriberPolicy({ policy, principals, events, row?, sender? })` filters outbox, webhook or realtime subscribers to those who may read the event (exact type, then the longest `prefix.*`, then `*`; a type with no entry reaches no one). `principalSource({ claims, identities? })` is a `PrincipalSource` over the claims better-supabase mints, for `decideFor`, `subscribersFor` and delivery; only links the app created through a signed-in flow or a verified address go in `identities`. `authorizationHooks({ policy, claims, service?, principals?, events?, approvers?, support?, tickets? })` is the `authorization` option of `createServer`: it answers automation publish and run-as, delegated OAuth scopes, `approverOf`, identities, delivery audiences, support sessions and run tickets from the claims better-supabase mints now, never from the request.
 

package/dist/powersync-CObULVRk.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { n as runPowerSync } from "./powersync-BTLk8GSl.js";

package/dist/pull-3OQCgxUf.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { n as runCloudPull } from "./pull-iVPQZsnI.js";

package/dist/run-BqW8S5TM.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { t as run } from "./run-CjFdAzqE.js";

package/dist/supabase-hook-CWvEpdCh.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { i as runSupabase } from "./supabase-hook-CyuD9Wau.js";

package/dist/usage-BDiTP763.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { t as runUsage } from "./usage-hMYVFsN5.js";

package/dist/watch-COuvly20.js

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-export { i as watchCollect } from "./watch-Bpci3hBY.js";

package/dist/{core-DzVINFbU.js → core-lxoANyai.js}

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import { y as membershipsClaim } from "./evaluate-BAmf_AQd.js";
 import { n as parseSnapshot } from "./snapshot-CXlzi69u.js";
 import { n as fromSnapshot } from "./from-snapshot-DCakWRsr.js";
 import { t as getPermDock } from "./permdock-BvjivVb9.js";
-import { c as quoteSqlTable, n as defaultSqlCommand, o as quoteSqlIdent, t as SQL_IDENT } from "./sql-0WjxIp9g.js";
 import "./budget-BELja5A9.js";
+import { c as quoteSqlTable, n as defaultSqlCommand, o as quoteSqlIdent, t as SQL_IDENT } from "./sql-0WjxIp9g.js";
 //#region src/testing/policy-matrix.ts
 function isOutcomeCell(value) {
 	return value === "granted" || value === "denied" || value === "approval-required" || value !== null && typeof value === "object" && ("denials" in value || "outcome" in value || "alternatives" in value || "obligations" in value || "deniedBy" in value);

package/dist/{supabase-CC6rIri4.js → supabase-CDHMsDD0.js}

@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ import { s as ApprovalError } from "./types-CcUXciSj.js";
 import { c as decodeApprovalCursor, l as encodeApprovalCursor, s as approvalPageSize, t as applyApprovalVerdict } from "./store-RNFvaJJv.js";
 import { a as parseCapability } from "./capability-BqX94r07.js";
 import { t as loadJose } from "./load-jose-DZ4dnjri.js";
-import { a as quoteQualifiedTable, c as quoteSqlTable, d as sqlTextArray, i as qualifySqlTable, o as quoteSqlIdent, s as quoteSqlLiteral } from "./sql-0WjxIp9g.js";
 import "./budget-BELja5A9.js";
+import { a as quoteQualifiedTable, c as quoteSqlTable, d as sqlTextArray, i as qualifySqlTable, o as quoteSqlIdent, s as quoteSqlLiteral } from "./sql-0WjxIp9g.js";
 import { d as keptKeys, l as roleColumn } from "./sources-C4vkzZJV.js";
 import { t as callRpc } from "./postgrest-DAxFltvO.js";
 //#region src/supabase/capability.ts