patchwarden 0.4.0 → 0.6.1

package/src/logging.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+import { redactSensitiveContent } from "./security/contentRedaction.js";
+
+// ── Types ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+export type LogLevel = "info" | "warn" | "error" | "audit";
+
+export interface LogEntry {
+  timestamp: string;
+  level: LogLevel;
+  message: string;
+  [key: string]: unknown;
+}
+
+// ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Returns true when PATCHWARDEN_VERBOSE_LOG is set to "true".
+ * Verbose mode enables logging of sanitized tool-call arguments.
+ */
+export function isVerboseLogging(): boolean {
+  return process.env.PATCHWARDEN_VERBOSE_LOG === "true";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize a value to a JSON string, falling back to String() on failure
+ * (e.g. circular references, functions, symbols).
+ */
+function safeStringify(value: unknown): string {
+  try {
+    const result = JSON.stringify(value);
+    return result === undefined ? String(value) : result;
+  } catch {
+    return String(value);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Write a single JSON log line to stderr.
+ *
+ * All log output goes to stderr — NEVER stdout — so that MCP JSON-RPC
+ * traffic on stdout is never polluted by log messages.
+ */
+function emit(entry: LogEntry): void {
+  process.stderr.write(JSON.stringify(entry) + "\n");
+}
+
+// ── Logger ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Structured logger that emits JSON lines to stderr.
+ *
+ * Each entry contains `timestamp`, `level`, `message`, plus any optional
+ * context fields supplied by the caller.
+ */
+export class Logger {
+  info(message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>): void {
+    emit({ timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), level: "info", message, ...context });
+  }
+
+  warn(message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>): void {
+    emit({ timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), level: "warn", message, ...context });
+  }
+
+  error(message: string, context?: Record<string, unknown>): void {
+    emit({ timestamp: new Date().toISOString(), level: "error", message, ...context });
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Emit a tool-call audit log entry.
+   *
+   * Required fields: `tool`, `ok`, `duration_ms`.
+   * Optional fields: `error_reason`, `task_id`.
+   *
+   * By default raw arguments are NOT logged. When verbose mode is enabled
+   * (PATCHWARDEN_VERBOSE_LOG=true) and `args` is provided, the arguments
+   * are serialized and sanitized via `redactSensitiveContent` before being
+   * included in the `args` field.
+   */
+  audit(
+    tool: string,
+    ok: boolean,
+    durationMs: number,
+    errorReason?: string,
+    taskId?: string,
+    args?: unknown,
+  ): void {
+    const entry: LogEntry = {
+      timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+      level: "audit",
+      message: "tool_call_audit",
+      tool,
+      ok,
+      duration_ms: durationMs,
+    };
+    if (errorReason !== undefined) entry.error_reason = errorReason;
+    if (taskId !== undefined) entry.task_id = taskId;
+    if (args !== undefined && isVerboseLogging()) {
+      const redacted = redactSensitiveContent(safeStringify(args));
+      entry.args = redacted.content;
+    }
+    emit(entry);
+  }
+}
+
+/** Default singleton logger instance. */
+export const logger = new Logger();
+
+// ── Unhandled error helpers ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+/**
+ * Produce a structured error log entry for an unhandled rejection or
+ * uncaught exception. Writes JSON to stderr.
+ */
+export function logUnhandledError(error: unknown): void {
+  const entry: LogEntry = {
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    level: "error",
+    message: "unhandled_error",
+    error: error instanceof Error
+      ? error.message
+      : typeof error === "string"
+        ? error
+        : safeStringify(error),
+    error_name: error instanceof Error ? error.name : typeof error,
+  };
+  if (error instanceof Error && error.stack) {
+    entry.stack = error.stack;
+  }
+  emit(entry);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Register process-level handlers for `unhandledRejection` and
+ * `uncaughtException`.
+ *
+ * Both handlers log structured error output to stderr. The
+ * `uncaughtException` handler does NOT swallow the fatal error — after
+ * logging it exits with a non-zero status code to preserve the default
+ * crash behaviour required for truly fatal failures.
+ */
+export function installGlobalHandlers(): void {
+  process.on("unhandledRejection", (reason: unknown) => {
+    logUnhandledError(reason);
+  });
+
+  process.on("uncaughtException", (error: Error) => {
+    logUnhandledError(error);
+    // Do not swallow: exit with failure so the process does not continue
+    // in an undefined state.
+    process.exit(1);
+  });
+}

package/src/runner/agentInvocation.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+import { basename } from "node:path";
+import { PatchWardenConfig } from "../config.js";
+import { guardAgentCommand, sanitizePromptArg, type AllowedCommand } from "../security/commandGuard.js";
+
+export interface AgentInvocation {
+  command: string;
+  args: string[];
+  cwd: string;
+  commandLabel: string;
+  promptMode: "inline" | "file";
+  promptFilePath?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build agent invocation parameters from config.
+ * Replaces {repo}, {prompt}, and {prompt_file} placeholders.
+ * runTask and agentAssessor share this function to ensure consistent agent startup.
+ */
+export function buildAgentInvocation(
+  agentName: string,
+  repoPath: string,
+  prompt: string,
+  config: PatchWardenConfig,
+  promptFilePath?: string
+): AgentInvocation {
+  const agentCmd = guardAgentCommand(agentName, config);
+  const sanitizedPrompt = sanitizePromptArg(prompt);
+
+  const hasPromptFilePlaceholder = agentCmd.args.includes("{prompt_file}");
+  const promptMode: "inline" | "file" = hasPromptFilePlaceholder && promptFilePath ? "file" : "inline";
+
+  const resolvedArgs = agentCmd.args.map((arg) => {
+    if (arg === "{repo}") return repoPath;
+    if (arg === "{prompt}") return sanitizedPrompt;
+    if (arg === "{prompt_file}" && promptMode === "file" && promptFilePath) return promptFilePath;
+    return arg;
+  });
+
+  return {
+    command: agentCmd.command,
+    args: resolvedArgs,
+    cwd: repoPath,
+    commandLabel: `${basename(agentCmd.command)} (configured agent command)`,
+    promptMode,
+    ...(promptMode === "file" && promptFilePath ? { promptFilePath } : {}),
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build task execution prompt. Mechanically extracted from runTask.ts.
+ */
+export function buildExecutionPrompt(plan: string, repoPath: string, testCommand: string): string {
+  let prompt = `You are executing a pre-written plan in a local repository.
+
+## Repository
+${repoPath}
+
+## Plan
+${plan}
+
+## Instructions
+1. Read the plan carefully.
+2. Implement the changes in this repository only.
+3. Do NOT modify files outside this repository.
+4. Leave repository changes uncommitted for review; remote operations are outside this task.
+5. After implementing, describe what you changed.
+6. Output a summary with what was done, files modified, and issues encountered.
+`;
+  if (testCommand) {
+    prompt += `\n7. You may run ${testCommand}; PatchWarden will independently run it again for verification.`;
+  }
+  return prompt;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build agentAssessor inspect-only prompt.
+ */
+export function buildAssessmentPrompt(goal: string, planContent: string, repoPath: string): string {
+  return `You are performing a READ-ONLY risk assessment of a planned task. Do NOT modify any files.
+
+## Repository
+${repoPath}
+
+## Goal
+${goal}
+
+## Plan
+${planContent}
+
+## Instructions
+1. Read the plan and goal carefully.
+2. Inspect the repository to understand the scope of changes.
+3. Do NOT create, edit, delete, rename, or generate any files.
+4. Assess the risk level of executing this plan.
+5. Identify affected file paths within the repository.
+6. Check for destructive actions, sensitive file access, or out-of-scope changes.
+7. Output your assessment as JSON after the marker ===ASSESSMENT_JSON=== on a new line.
+
+## Required JSON output format
+After your analysis, output exactly this format:
+
+===ASSESSMENT_JSON===
+{
+  "risk_level": "low" | "medium" | "high",
+  "reason_codes": ["short", "descriptive", "codes"],
+  "affected_paths": ["relative/path/to/file"],
+  "destructive_actions": ["description of any destructive actions"],
+  "requires_user_confirm": false,
+  "confidence": 0.0,
+  "notes": "Brief summary of findings"
+}
+
+## Risk level guidelines
+- low: Small source change, no sensitive files, no destructive actions
+- medium: Multiple files, build artifacts, dependency changes, or uncertain scope
+- high: Destructive actions, sensitive file access, out-of-scope changes, or large-scale deletion
+
+## Constraints
+- affected_paths must be relative paths within the repository (no absolute paths)
+- reason_codes: max 50 entries, each max 100 chars
+- destructive_actions: max 20 entries, each max 200 chars
+- notes: max 2000 chars
+- confidence: number from 0.0 to 1.0
+`;
+}