pantheon-opencode 1.5.0-beta.1 → 1.5.0-beta.10

package/src/pantheon/delegation.ts

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ import {
 import { finalizeIdleChildrenWithoutMd } from './delegation-notify.ts'
 import { createPantheonLogger } from './logger.ts'
 import { buildAgentListDescription } from './permission-globs.ts'
+import { safeSessionPath } from './session-guard.ts'
 import { buildStopInstruction, cappedSummary, DEFAULT_MAX_STEPS } from './step-cap.ts'
 
 export type {
@@ -96,6 +97,40 @@ function readIntegerEnv(
   return Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= minimum ? value : fallback
 }
 
+// ─── B1: unresolved session template guard ─────────────────────────────
+//
+// The TUI/runtime can hand a plugin surface the UNSUBSTITUTED template literal
+// `{sessionID}` (URL-encoded `%7BsessionID%7D`) when no session is focused.
+// Forwarding it to a session API makes the opencode server reject every call
+// (`Expected a string starting with "ses", got "%7BsessionID%7D"`), which the
+// beta.7 E2E recorded at ~1k errors/s. The delegation layer is a defensive
+// choke point too: it is downstream of the plugin adapter in production, but
+// tests, older hosts, and direct embedders can inject a raw client.
+//
+// This guard targets the placeholder ONLY. It is deliberately NOT the full
+// `isValidSessionId` contract: structural test hosts use non-"ses" ids on
+// purpose (delegation-bootstrap.test.ts), and rejecting those would be a
+// behavior change unrelated to this bug. `session-guard.ts` remains the
+// strict choke point for the plugin adapters.
+const UNRESOLVED_SESSION_TEMPLATE = /(?:\{sessionID\}|%7BsessionID%7D)/i
+
+/** True when a session id is an unresolved `{sessionID}` template placeholder. */
+export function isUnresolvedSessionTemplate(id: unknown): boolean {
+  return typeof id === 'string' && UNRESOLVED_SESSION_TEMPLATE.test(id)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refuse a placeholder session id before it reaches a session API. Returns
+ * true (and logs a clear warning) when the caller must skip the operation.
+ */
+function refuseUnresolvedSessionTemplate(id: unknown, operation: string): boolean {
+  if (!isUnresolvedSessionTemplate(id)) return false
+  log.warn(
+    `[pantheon-delegate] ${operation} skipped: unresolved session template "${String(id)}" — the host did not substitute the session id`,
+  )
+  return true
+}
+
 type BootstrapOutcome =
   | { status: 'started'; elapsedMs: number; reason: string }
   | { status: 'startup_failed' | 'bootstrap_unknown'; elapsedMs: number; reason: string }
@@ -115,6 +150,9 @@ async function promptWithTimeout(
   input: Parameters<DelegationClient['session']['promptAsync']>[0],
   timeoutMs: number,
 ): Promise<PromptOutcome> {
+  if (refuseUnresolvedSessionTemplate(input.path.id, 'promptAsync')) {
+    return { status: 'rejected', reason: `invalid sessionID: ${input.path.id}` }
+  }
   const controller = new AbortController()
   let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | undefined
   const operation = client.session.promptAsync({ ...input, signal: controller.signal }).then(
@@ -190,6 +228,14 @@ async function bootstrapChild(
   const hasStatusAPI = typeof client.session.get === 'function'
   const acceptedRunning = isRunningSession(accepted)
 
+  if (refuseUnresolvedSessionTemplate(childSessionID, 'bootstrap probe')) {
+    return {
+      status: 'bootstrap_unknown',
+      elapsedMs: 0,
+      reason: `invalid child sessionID "${childSessionID}"`,
+    }
+  }
+
   if (!hasMessagesAPI && !hasStatusAPI) {
     return acceptedRunning
       ? {
@@ -403,6 +449,72 @@ function stateLabel(state: BackgroundJobRecord['state']): string {
   }
 }
 
+// ─── B2: session-scoped delegation target resolution ───────────────────
+//
+// Board aliases restart per parent session (apo-1 in every root), so an alias
+// lookup MUST be scoped to the calling session. `pantheon_delegation_read`
+// previously delegated to the board's first-match resolver and, when the id
+// was not found in the current session, the generic "Unknown delegation"
+// message hid the real cause (the alias belonged to another session). This
+// helper makes the scoping explicit and returns a CLEAR error for each
+// cross-session / ambiguous case.
+
+/** Resolution outcome for a delegation read by task ID or alias. */
+export type DelegationTargetResolution =
+  | { kind: 'found'; job: BackgroundJobRecord }
+  | { kind: 'error'; message: string }
+
+/**
+ * Resolve a `pantheon_delegation_read` target with strict session scoping:
+ *   - exact task-ID match first (must belong to `sessionID`);
+ *   - then alias matches WITHIN `sessionID` (exactly one required);
+ *   - an alias that exists only in another session → clear cross-session
+ *     error (never another session's job);
+ *   - two matches in this session → clear ambiguity error.
+ */
+export function resolveDelegationTarget(
+  board: Pick<BackgroundJobBoard, 'list'>,
+  sessionID: string,
+  idOrAlias: string,
+): DelegationTargetResolution {
+  const jobs = board.list()
+
+  const byTaskID = jobs.find((job) => job.taskID === idOrAlias)
+  if (byTaskID !== undefined) {
+    if (byTaskID.parentSessionID === sessionID) return { kind: 'found', job: byTaskID }
+    return {
+      kind: 'error',
+      message:
+        `Delegation "${idOrAlias}" belongs to a different session ` +
+        `(${byTaskID.parentSessionID}) and cannot be read from ${sessionID}.`,
+    }
+  }
+
+  const aliasMatches = jobs.filter((job) => job.alias === idOrAlias)
+  const inSession = aliasMatches.filter((job) => job.parentSessionID === sessionID)
+  if (inSession.length === 1) return { kind: 'found', job: inSession[0]! }
+  if (inSession.length > 1) {
+    return {
+      kind: 'error',
+      message:
+        `Delegation alias "${idOrAlias}" is ambiguous in session ${sessionID} ` +
+        `(${inSession.length} matches); read it by task ID instead.`,
+    }
+  }
+  if (aliasMatches.length > 0) {
+    return {
+      kind: 'error',
+      message:
+        `Delegation alias "${idOrAlias}" belongs to a different session — ` +
+        'aliases are session-scoped. Use pantheon_delegation_list in the session that created it.',
+    }
+  }
+  return {
+    kind: 'error',
+    message: `Unknown delegation "${idOrAlias}" for this session. Use pantheon_delegation_list to see active delegations.`,
+  }
+}
+
 /** Normalize the SDK-provided caller agent without inventing an identity. */
 const normalizeToolAgent = normalizeDelegationAgent
 
@@ -509,6 +621,7 @@ async function sampleChildActivity(
   collector: ActivityCollector,
 ): Promise<void> {
   if (typeof client.session.messages !== 'function') return
+  if (refuseUnresolvedSessionTemplate(childSessionID, 'activity sample')) return
   try {
     const bundles = await client.session.messages({ path: { id: childSessionID } })
     if (!Array.isArray(bundles)) return
@@ -534,6 +647,7 @@ async function lastChildActivity(
   childSessionID: string,
 ): Promise<string | undefined> {
   if (typeof client.session.messages !== 'function') return undefined
+  if (refuseUnresolvedSessionTemplate(childSessionID, 'last activity fetch')) return undefined
   try {
     const bundles = await client.session.messages({ path: { id: childSessionID } })
     if (!Array.isArray(bundles)) return undefined
@@ -740,10 +854,59 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
     return finalizeDelegationReport(deps, childSessionID, opts)
   }
 
+  // Kill-switch gate: when delegationEnabled is explicitly false (mirrors
+  // PANTHEON_DELEGATION=off from the native manager), all legacy tools throw.
+  function guardEnabled(): void {
+    if (options.delegationEnabled === false) {
+      throw new Error('pantheon delegation disabled (PANTHEON_DELEGATION=off)')
+    }
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Best-effort teardown of a child session whose `registerLaunch` was refused
+   * because the per-agent concurrency limit was hit between the pre-check and
+   * the registration (a race with another concurrent dispatch). Removes every
+   * side effect of the aborted dispatch — known-child marker, read-only
+   * registry entry and any reserved budget slot — then deletes the session when
+   * the host client exposes `session.delete`. Never throws: cleanup must not
+   * mask the original rejection.
+   */
+  async function abortRejectedLaunch(
+    childSessionID: string,
+    wasReadOnly: boolean,
+    refund?: { key: string | undefined; reserved: boolean },
+  ): Promise<void> {
+    knownChildren.delete(childSessionID)
+    if (wasReadOnly) readOnlyRegistry.unregister(childSessionID)
+    if (refund?.reserved && refund.key !== undefined) {
+      budgetUsage.set(refund.key, Math.max(0, (budgetUsage.get(refund.key) ?? 1) - 1))
+    }
+    // The plugin's adapted client (adaptDelegationClient) does not expose
+    // session.delete, and older hosts may not either. Delete best-effort so the
+    // abandoned session is not left behind; the registry cleanup above already
+    // removes the side effects that matter for read-only enforcement.
+    const session = client.session as {
+      delete?: (input: { path: { id: string } }) => Promise<unknown>
+    }
+    if (typeof session.delete !== 'function') return
+    const sessionPath = safeSessionPath(childSessionID)
+    if (sessionPath === null) {
+      log.warn(`[pantheon-delegate] session.delete skipped: invalid sessionID "${childSessionID}"`)
+      return
+    }
+    try {
+      await session.delete(sessionPath)
+    } catch (err: unknown) {
+      const reason = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+      log.warn(`[pantheon-delegate] failed to delete orphan session ${childSessionID}: ${reason}`)
+    }
+  }
+
   const pantheon_delegate: DelegationTool<typeof delegateArgs> = {
     description: buildDelegateDescription(options),
     args: delegateArgs,
     execute: async (args, ctx) => {
+      guardEnabled()
       if (!isRootSession(ctx.sessionID)) {
         throw new Error(
           `pantheon_delegate rejected: session ${ctx.sessionID} is a sub-session — only root sessions can delegate`,
@@ -855,6 +1018,18 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
         return `pantheon_delegate failed to create child session: ${reason}`
       }
       const childSessionID = created.id
+      // B1: a host that passes through the unresolved template must never
+      // produce a board job / bootstrap poll — reject it here with a clear
+      // message and refund the reserved budget (no child was started).
+      if (isUnresolvedSessionTemplate(childSessionID)) {
+        if (budgetReserved && budgetKey !== undefined) {
+          budgetUsage.set(budgetKey, Math.max(0, (budgetUsage.get(budgetKey) ?? 1) - 1))
+        }
+        log.warn(
+          `[pantheon-delegate] session.create returned unresolved session template "${childSessionID}" — child ignored`,
+        )
+        return `pantheon_delegate failed: host returned an unresolved child session template ("${childSessionID}"); expected an id starting with "ses".`
+      }
       knownChildren.add(childSessionID)
       options.registerChildSession?.(childSessionID, ctx.sessionID)
 
@@ -871,13 +1046,27 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
         readOnlyRegistry.register(childSessionID, entry)
       }
 
-      const job = await board.registerLaunch({
-        taskID: childSessionID,
-        parentSessionID: ctx.sessionID,
-        agent: args.agent,
-        description: args.description ?? effectivePrompt,
-        objective: effectivePrompt,
-      })
+      let job: BackgroundJobRecord
+      try {
+        job = await board.registerLaunch({
+          taskID: childSessionID,
+          parentSessionID: ctx.sessionID,
+          agent: args.agent,
+          description: args.description ?? effectivePrompt,
+          objective: effectivePrompt,
+        })
+      } catch (err: unknown) {
+        // Concurrency race: another dispatch claimed the last slot after the
+        // pre-check above but before this registration. Undo every side effect
+        // of the aborted dispatch so no orphan session/registry survives, then
+        // surface a clear rejection.
+        const reason = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+        await abortRejectedLaunch(childSessionID, readOnly, {
+          key: budgetKey,
+          reserved: budgetReserved,
+        })
+        return `pantheon_delegate rejected: ${reason}`
+      }
 
       // Timeout manager: cleared on finalize, unref'd so the timer never
       // keeps the process alive on its own.
@@ -966,15 +1155,42 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
         return `[STARTUP FAILED] ${bootstrap.status}: ${bootstrap.reason}; retry creation failed: ${reason}`
       }
       const retryID = retry.id
+      if (isUnresolvedSessionTemplate(retryID)) {
+        log.warn(
+          `[pantheon-delegate] retry session.create returned unresolved session template "${retryID}" — retry ignored`,
+        )
+        return `[STARTUP FAILED] ${bootstrap.status}: ${bootstrap.reason}; host returned an unresolved retry session template ("${retryID}")`
+      }
       knownChildren.add(retryID)
       options.registerChildSession?.(retryID, ctx.sessionID)
-      const retryJob = await board.registerLaunch({
-        taskID: retryID,
-        parentSessionID: ctx.sessionID,
-        agent: args.agent,
-        description: args.description ?? effectivePrompt,
-        objective: effectivePrompt,
-      })
+
+      // Phase 4 read-only enforcement for the retry: recalculate readOnly
+      // (same logic as the initial child at :866-872) and register the retry
+      // session so the plugin's tool.execute.before guard enforces it.
+      const retryReadOnly =
+        args.read_only === true || (options.readOnlyAgents?.has(args.agent.toLowerCase()) ?? false)
+      if (retryReadOnly) {
+        const entry: { agent: string; readOnlyFlag?: boolean } = { agent: args.agent }
+        if (args.read_only !== undefined) entry.readOnlyFlag = args.read_only
+        readOnlyRegistry.register(retryID, entry)
+      }
+
+      let retryJob: BackgroundJobRecord
+      try {
+        retryJob = await board.registerLaunch({
+          taskID: retryID,
+          parentSessionID: ctx.sessionID,
+          agent: args.agent,
+          description: args.description ?? effectivePrompt,
+          objective: effectivePrompt,
+        })
+      } catch (err: unknown) {
+        // Same race as the initial child: the retry registration can be
+        // refused. Clean up the retry session + registry entry before failing.
+        const reason = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)
+        await abortRejectedLaunch(retryID, retryReadOnly)
+        return `pantheon_delegate rejected: ${reason} (retry)`
+      }
       const retryTimer = setTimeout(() => {
         timers.delete(retryID)
         void finalize(retryID, {
@@ -1035,10 +1251,10 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
       'Resolves by alias or task ID.',
     args: readArgs,
     execute: async (args, ctx) => {
-      const job = board.resolve(ctx.sessionID, args.id)
-      if (!job) {
-        return `Unknown delegation "${args.id}" for this session. Use pantheon_delegation_list to see active delegations.`
-      }
+      guardEnabled()
+      const resolution = resolveDelegationTarget(board, ctx.sessionID, args.id)
+      if (resolution.kind === 'error') return resolution.message
+      const job = resolution.job
 
       // Sample the child's messages while waiting so the caller sees what the
       // agent is doing — fail-open: no messages support → report as before.
@@ -1093,6 +1309,7 @@ export function createDelegationTools(input: CreateDelegationToolsInput): Delega
       'List background delegations for the current session, with [unread] for finished jobs.',
     args: listArgs,
     execute: async (_args, ctx) => {
+      guardEnabled()
       const jobs = board.list(ctx.sessionID)
       if (jobs.length === 0) return 'No background delegations for this session.'
 

package/src/pantheon/file-persistence-salvage.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/**
+ * Best-effort salvage of complete top-level JSON objects from a corrupt
+ * `state.json`. The file is normally a JSON array; a torn write can leave a
+ * truncated tail (or interleaved NUL bytes). We scan for balanced `{…}`
+ * objects, parsing each independently, so every intact record survives.
+ *
+ * Extracted from file-persistence.ts to keep that module within the 300-line
+ * ceiling. Exported for tests.
+ */
+import type { BackgroundJobRecord } from './background-job-board.ts'
+
+export function salvageRecords(content: string): BackgroundJobRecord[] {
+  const records: BackgroundJobRecord[] = []
+  let depth = 0
+  let start = -1
+  let inString = false
+  let escaped = false
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < content.length; i++) {
+    const ch = content[i]
+
+    if (inString) {
+      if (escaped) {
+        escaped = false
+      } else if (ch === '\\') {
+        escaped = true
+      } else if (ch === '"') {
+        inString = false
+      }
+      continue
+    }
+
+    if (ch === '"') {
+      inString = true
+      continue
+    }
+    if (ch === '{') {
+      if (depth === 0) start = i
+      depth++
+      continue
+    }
+    if (ch === '}') {
+      if (depth > 0) depth--
+      if (depth === 0 && start >= 0) {
+        const candidate = content.slice(start, i + 1)
+        try {
+          const parsed: unknown = JSON.parse(candidate)
+          if (
+            parsed !== null &&
+            typeof parsed === 'object' &&
+            typeof (parsed as BackgroundJobRecord).taskID === 'string'
+          ) {
+            records.push(parsed as BackgroundJobRecord)
+          }
+        } catch {
+          // Incomplete/partial object — skip it, keep scanning.
+        }
+        start = -1
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  return records
+}