pan-wizard 3.12.2 → 3.12.5

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -132,13 +132,13 @@ A good hypothesis can be proven wrong. If you can't design an experiment to disp
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  Before running any experiments, think through at least **three independent hypotheses** that could explain the observed failure. For each, write down a one-line Bayesian prior ("90% likely given the symptom", "30%", etc.) based on how well it fits the evidence and how common the failure class is in this codebase.
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- Then **attack the top two in parallel**: emit the `Read`, `Grep`, and log-inspection tool calls for both hypotheses in a single turn. Only serialize when a hypothesis's next step strictly depends on data from a previous step.
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+ Then **investigate the top two in parallel**: emit the `Read`, `Grep`, and log-inspection tool calls for both hypotheses in a single turn. Only serialize when a hypothesis's next step strictly depends on data from a previous step.
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  - If the top hypothesis is confirmed, stop — don't also debug the lower-ranked ones.
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  - If the top two are both refuted, rank the remaining hypotheses and repeat.
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  - Record each hypothesis's prior and final verdict in the debug session file so later steps can see the tree.
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- Parallel exploration keeps investigation bounded: 3 priors × 2-parallel attack = at most 3 rounds before you have a clear winner, rather than walking a depth-first chain of 10 dead ends.
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+ Parallel exploration keeps investigation bounded: 3 priors × 2-parallel investigation = at most 3 rounds before you have a clear winner, rather than walking a depth-first chain of 10 dead ends.
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  ## Experimental Design Framework
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@@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ effort: high
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  <role>
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  You are the PAN hardener. You perform focused security review on files changed during phase execution, applying OWASP Top 10 (2025) and STRIDE threat modeling frameworks.
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+ This is **authorized, defensive** secure-coding review of the user's own codebase — the goal is to find and fix weaknesses before shipping. You report findings for the user to remediate; you never write exploit code, attack tooling, or step-by-step intrusion instructions.
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+
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  You are spawned by `/pan:review-deep <phase>` or `/pan:exec-phase --deep-review`. Your output is read by `pan-meta-reviewer` (cross-checks you) and merged by `review-deep.cjs` into `.planning/reviews/<phase>/deep-review.md`.
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  **You NEVER modify files.** You report findings; the user fixes them.
@@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ Before writing findings, think through:
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  1. **What changed in this phase?** Read the diff or plan.md files list. Map changes to OWASP categories — e.g. "new endpoint added" → A01+A03 scan; "new SQL query" → A03 scan.
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  2. **Does this touch auth, data, or secrets?** These categories get the most thorough STRIDE pass. Changes to `logger.js` or docs don't.
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- 3. **What would an attacker do?** For every new surface, try to construct an exploit path mentally. If you can't construct one in 30 seconds, note the effort and move on — don't fabricate threats.
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+ 3. **How could this be reached and abused?** For every new surface, trace how it could be reached and what the impact would be, so you can prioritize the fix. If you can't identify a realistic path in 30 seconds, note the effort and move on — don't fabricate threats.
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  4. **Cross-check: did the reviewer already flag this?** You'll be merged with their output. Duplicating their `use parameterized queries` finding is OK but prefer adding severity (reviewer says INFO, you say HIGH because it's in an auth path).
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  </reasoning_protocol>
@@ -91,7 +93,7 @@ generated: <ISO timestamp>
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  ```
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  **Severity scale:**
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- - `critical` — remote exploit with no prerequisites; use sparingly, only when one misuse leads to data loss or RCE.
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+ - `critical` — remotely reachable with no prerequisites; use sparingly, only when one misuse leads to data loss or remote code execution.
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  - `high` — exploitable with typical user privileges; blocks merge by default.
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  - `medium` — defense-in-depth issue; fix before production but won't block merge if documented.
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  - `low` — best-practice deviation; nice to fix.
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ You are the PAN meta-reviewer. Your job is to check the first-pass reviewers (`p
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  You are spawned by `/pan:review-deep <phase>` after both the reviewer and hardener have written their reports. Your output is merged with theirs by `review-deep.cjs`.
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- **You NEVER modify source code.** You produce one findings file.
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+ **You NEVER modify source code.** You produce one findings file. This is authorized, defensive review of the user's own codebase — you adjudicate security findings for remediation; never produce exploit code.
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  **CRITICAL: Mandatory Initial Read**
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  If the prompt contains a `<files_to_read>` block (it will contain the reviewer and hardener outputs + representative diff snippets), you MUST use the `Read` tool to load every file listed there before performing any other actions.
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ effort: medium
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  <role>
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  You are a PAN code reviewer. You perform read-only code review on files changed during phase execution.
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- Your job: Check convention compliance, security patterns, and code quality. You do NOT modify files — you report findings.
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+ Your job: Check convention compliance, security patterns, and code quality. You do NOT modify files — you report findings. This is authorized, defensive review of the user's own codebase — surface security-relevant findings for the user to remediate; never produce exploit code.
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  **CRITICAL: Mandatory Initial Read**
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  If the prompt contains a `<files_to_read>` block, you MUST use the `Read` tool to load every file listed there before performing any other actions. This is your primary context.
package/bin/install.js CHANGED
@@ -2490,8 +2490,9 @@ function finishInstall(settingsPath, settings, statuslineCommand, shouldInstallS
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  !caps.has_thinking ? 'extended thinking (E-3, E-10, E-11)' : null,
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  ].filter(Boolean).join(', ');
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  console.log(`
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- ${yellow}ℹ${reset} PAN 2.10+ is tuned for Opus 4.7+ class models. Default model "${modelField}" lacks: ${missing}.
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- Features degrade gracefully, but upgrade to claude-opus-4-8 (or claude-fable-5) for best results.`);
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+ ${yellow}ℹ${reset} PAN's multi-agent workflows are tuned for frontier reasoning models. Default model "${modelField}" lacks: ${missing}.
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+ Features degrade gracefully, but for best results select claude-fable-5 (PAN's recommended flagship — deepest
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+ long-horizon reasoning for the bot army) or claude-opus-4-8 (same 1M context at half the cost).`);
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  }
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  }
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  } catch {
@@ -18,6 +18,29 @@ const path = require('path');
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  const METRICS_DIR = 'metrics';
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  const TOKENS_FILE = 'tokens.jsonl';
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+ const CURSOR_FILE = '.cost-cursor.json';
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+
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+ // Per-transcript high-water mark: the count of JSONL records already attributed
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+ // to earlier SubagentStop events, keyed by transcript path. Each event then sums
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+ // ONLY its own slice (records past the cursor) instead of re-summing the whole
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+ // shared-session transcript every time — the latter multiplies cumulative-per-turn
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+ // cache-read into the billions/trillions and stamps it onto every subagent record
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+ // (field report 2026-06). Stored next to tokens.jsonl; best-effort, never blocks.
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+ function cursorFilePath(cwd) {
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+ return path.join(cwd, '.planning', METRICS_DIR, CURSOR_FILE);
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+ }
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+ function readCursor(cwd) {
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+ try {
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+ const c = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(cursorFilePath(cwd), 'utf-8'));
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+ return c && typeof c === 'object' ? c : {};
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+ } catch { return {}; }
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+ }
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+ function writeCursor(cwd, cursor) {
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+ try {
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+ fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(cursorFilePath(cwd)), { recursive: true });
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+ fs.writeFileSync(cursorFilePath(cwd), JSON.stringify(cursor), 'utf-8');
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+ } catch { /* best-effort — never block the agent loop */ }
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+ }
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  /**
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  * Extract what we can from the SubagentStop event payload.
@@ -49,7 +72,12 @@ function buildCostRecord(data, cwd) {
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  let model = typeof data.model === 'string' && data.model ? data.model : null;
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  const needUsage = (inputTokens + outputTokens + cacheRead + cacheWrite) === 0;
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  if ((needUsage || !model) && data.transcript_path) {
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- const fromTranscript = readUsageFromTranscript(data.transcript_path, data.session_id);
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+ // Attribute only the transcript slice since the previous SubagentStop for
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+ // this transcript, so a shared-session transcript is never re-summed on
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+ // every event (field report 2026-06 — the billion-token cache-read bug).
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+ const cursor = readCursor(cwd);
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+ const since = cursor[data.transcript_path] || 0;
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+ const fromTranscript = readUsageFromTranscript(data.transcript_path, data.session_id, since);
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  if (needUsage) {
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  inputTokens = fromTranscript.input_tokens;
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  outputTokens = fromTranscript.output_tokens;
@@ -57,6 +85,12 @@ function buildCostRecord(data, cwd) {
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  cacheWrite = fromTranscript.cache_creation_input_tokens;
58
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  }
59
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  if (!model) model = fromTranscript.model;
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+ // Advance the cursor to the end of the transcript so the next subagent's
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+ // record starts fresh (these slices partition the transcript — no overlap).
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+ if (fromTranscript.lineCount > since) {
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+ cursor[data.transcript_path] = fromTranscript.lineCount;
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+ writeCursor(cwd, cursor);
93
+ }
60
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  }
61
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62
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  const record = {
@@ -85,23 +119,36 @@ function extractNumber(obj, key) {
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  }
86
120
 
87
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  /**
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- * P-1805 (v3.7.8): read transcript JSONL and sum usage across all assistant
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- * messages belonging to the subagent's session. Mirrors the helper in
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- * pan-trace-logger.js. Returns zeros if transcript missing/unreadable.
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+ * P-1805 (v3.7.8): read transcript JSONL and sum usage across assistant messages.
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+ *
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+ * `sinceLine` (P-360, field report 2026-06): skip the first N non-empty records —
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+ * the count already attributed to earlier SubagentStop events for this transcript.
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+ * Summing only the slice past the cursor is what stops a shared-session transcript
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+ * from being re-summed on every event (which multiplied cumulative-per-turn
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+ * cache-read into the billions). Returns `lineCount` = total non-empty records seen
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+ * so the caller can advance the cursor. Returns zeros if missing/unreadable.
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+ *
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+ * @param {string} transcriptPath
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+ * @param {string} sessionId
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+ * @param {number} [sinceLine=0] - records already attributed (the cursor)
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  */
92
- function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId) {
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+ function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId, sinceLine = 0) {
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  const totals = {
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  input_tokens: 0,
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  output_tokens: 0,
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  cache_read_input_tokens: 0,
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  cache_creation_input_tokens: 0,
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  model: null,
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+ lineCount: 0,
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  };
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  if (!transcriptPath || typeof transcriptPath !== 'string') return totals;
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  let raw;
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  try { raw = fs.readFileSync(transcriptPath, 'utf-8'); } catch { return totals; }
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+ let seen = 0; // count of non-empty JSONL records (the cursor unit)
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  for (const line of raw.split('\n')) {
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  if (!line) continue;
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+ seen++;
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+ if (seen <= sinceLine) continue; // already attributed to an earlier event
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  let entry;
106
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  try { entry = JSON.parse(line); } catch { continue; }
107
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  if (sessionId && entry.session_id && entry.session_id !== sessionId) continue;
@@ -120,6 +167,7 @@ function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId) {
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  totals.cache_read_input_tokens += extractNumber(usage, 'cache_read_input_tokens');
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  totals.cache_creation_input_tokens += extractNumber(usage, 'cache_creation_input_tokens');
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  }
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+ totals.lineCount = seen;
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  return totals;
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  }
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@@ -164,4 +212,4 @@ if (require.main === module) {
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  });
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  }
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214
 
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- module.exports = { buildCostRecord, appendRecord, readUsageFromTranscript, METRICS_DIR, TOKENS_FILE };
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+ module.exports = { buildCostRecord, appendRecord, readUsageFromTranscript, readCursor, writeCursor, METRICS_DIR, TOKENS_FILE, CURSOR_FILE };
@@ -39,6 +39,24 @@ function getCurrentSessionId(cwd) {
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  }
40
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  }
41
41
 
42
+ const TRACE_CURSOR_FILE = '.trace-cursor.json';
43
+
44
+ // Per-transcript high-water mark (see pan-cost-logger.js for the full rationale):
45
+ // sum only the transcript slice since this hook's previous SubagentStop, so a
46
+ // shared-session transcript isn't re-summed on every event (which inflates
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+ // cumulative-per-turn cache-read into the billions — field report 2026-06).
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+ // Trace-logger keeps its OWN cursor: cost-logger fires on the same event and the
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+ // two must not consume each other's slice.
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+ function traceCursorPath(cwd) { return path.join(getOptimizeDir(cwd), TRACE_CURSOR_FILE); }
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+ function readTraceCursor(cwd) {
52
+ try { const c = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(traceCursorPath(cwd), 'utf-8')); return c && typeof c === 'object' ? c : {}; }
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+ catch { return {}; }
54
+ }
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+ function writeTraceCursor(cwd, cursor) {
56
+ try { fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(traceCursorPath(cwd)), { recursive: true }); fs.writeFileSync(traceCursorPath(cwd), JSON.stringify(cursor), 'utf-8'); }
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+ catch { /* best-effort — never block the agent loop */ }
58
+ }
59
+
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  /**
43
61
  * Ensure a trace session exists. If none is active, create a day-scoped
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  * auto-session so tracing works across the whole flow without manual init.
@@ -99,12 +117,13 @@ function extractNumber(obj, key) {
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  * @param {string} [sessionId] - Optional subagent session_id to filter on
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  * @returns {Object} usage totals object
101
119
  */
102
- function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId) {
120
+ function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId, sinceLine = 0) {
103
121
  const totals = {
104
122
  input_tokens: 0,
105
123
  output_tokens: 0,
106
124
  cache_read_input_tokens: 0,
107
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  cache_creation_input_tokens: 0,
126
+ lineCount: 0,
108
127
  };
109
128
  if (!transcriptPath || typeof transcriptPath !== 'string') return totals;
110
129
  let raw;
@@ -113,8 +132,11 @@ function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId) {
113
132
  } catch {
114
133
  return totals;
115
134
  }
135
+ let seen = 0; // count of non-empty JSONL records (the cursor unit)
116
136
  for (const line of raw.split('\n')) {
117
137
  if (!line) continue;
138
+ seen++;
139
+ if (seen <= sinceLine) continue; // already attributed to an earlier event
118
140
  let entry;
119
141
  try {
120
142
  entry = JSON.parse(line);
@@ -136,17 +158,25 @@ function readUsageFromTranscript(transcriptPath, sessionId) {
136
158
  totals.cache_read_input_tokens += extractNumber(usage, 'cache_read_input_tokens');
137
159
  totals.cache_creation_input_tokens += extractNumber(usage, 'cache_creation_input_tokens');
138
160
  }
161
+ totals.lineCount = seen;
139
162
  return totals;
140
163
  }
141
164
 
142
165
  /**
143
166
  * Build trace event(s) from a SubagentStop payload.
144
- * Pure function — no side effects.
167
+ *
168
+ * When the payload lacks usage and `cwd` is supplied, this advances a
169
+ * per-transcript cursor (its only side effect) so each event is attributed
170
+ * just its own transcript slice — never the whole shared-session transcript
171
+ * re-summed every event (field report 2026-06). Without `cwd` it falls back to
172
+ * the legacy whole-transcript read (used only when a transcript_path is given).
145
173
  *
146
174
  * @param {Object} data - SubagentStop event payload
175
+ * @param {string} sessionId - active trace session id
176
+ * @param {string} [cwd] - project root, enables per-transcript delta attribution
147
177
  * @returns {Object[]} Array of trace event records
148
178
  */
149
- function buildTraceEvents(data, sessionId) {
179
+ function buildTraceEvents(data, sessionId, cwd) {
150
180
  if (!data || typeof data !== 'object') return [];
151
181
  if (data.hook_event_name && data.hook_event_name !== 'SubagentStop') return [];
152
182
 
@@ -160,10 +190,16 @@ function buildTraceEvents(data, sessionId) {
160
190
  let outputTokens = extractNumber(data.usage, 'output_tokens');
161
191
  let cacheRead = extractNumber(data.usage, 'cache_read_input_tokens');
162
192
  if ((inputTokens + outputTokens + cacheRead) === 0 && data.transcript_path) {
163
- const fromTranscript = readUsageFromTranscript(data.transcript_path, data.session_id);
193
+ const cursor = readTraceCursor(cwd);
194
+ const since = cursor[data.transcript_path] || 0;
195
+ const fromTranscript = readUsageFromTranscript(data.transcript_path, data.session_id, since);
164
196
  inputTokens = fromTranscript.input_tokens;
165
197
  outputTokens = fromTranscript.output_tokens;
166
198
  cacheRead = fromTranscript.cache_read_input_tokens;
199
+ if (cwd && fromTranscript.lineCount > since) {
200
+ cursor[data.transcript_path] = fromTranscript.lineCount;
201
+ writeTraceCursor(cwd, cursor);
202
+ }
167
203
  }
168
204
  const totalTokens = inputTokens + outputTokens;
169
205
 
@@ -245,7 +281,7 @@ if (require.main === module) {
245
281
  const cwd = data.cwd || data.workspace?.current_dir || process.cwd();
246
282
  // Always ensure a session exists — creates a day-scoped auto-session if needed
247
283
  const sessionId = ensureSessionId(cwd);
248
- const events = buildTraceEvents(data, sessionId);
284
+ const events = buildTraceEvents(data, sessionId, cwd);
249
285
  appendTraceEvents(cwd, events, sessionId);
250
286
  } catch {
251
287
  // Silent fail
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "pan-wizard",
3
- "version": "3.12.2",
3
+ "version": "3.12.5",
4
4
  "description": "Command a bot army for your codebase: an Opus Mission Control delegates whole-project goals to specialist squads and ships behind a human merge gate. Five AI CLIs, zero context rot.",
5
5
  "bin": {
6
6
  "pan-wizard": "bin/install.js"
@@ -186,6 +186,25 @@ function readRecords(cwd) {
186
186
  * @param {Object} [opts] - {since, until, group_by}
187
187
  * @returns {Object} Aggregation
188
188
  */
189
+ /**
190
+ * A record is "suspect" when its token counts are physically implausible for a
191
+ * single subagent — the signature of the pre-v3.12.4 transcript-oversum bug
192
+ * (billions of cache-read, cache-read dwarfing input, 100% cache-hit). Such
193
+ * records are quarantined from aggregates so a poisoned ledger can't report
194
+ * millions of dollars. See docs/FIELD-REPORT-army-2026-06.md.
195
+ * @param {Object} r - a cost record
196
+ * @returns {boolean}
197
+ */
198
+ function isSuspectRecord(r) {
199
+ if (!r || typeof r !== 'object') return false;
200
+ const cr = r.cache_read_tokens || 0;
201
+ const io = (r.input_tokens || 0) + (r.output_tokens || 0);
202
+ if (cr > 5e8) return true; // no scoped subagent re-reads >500M cached tokens
203
+ if (cr > 1e7 && cr > 100 * (io + 1)) return true; // cache-read dwarfs input+output
204
+ if ((r.output_tokens || 0) > 1e7) return true; // ~10M output = cumulative oversum
205
+ return false;
206
+ }
207
+
189
208
  function aggregate(cwd, opts) {
190
209
  const records = readRecords(cwd);
191
210
  const since = opts?.since ? new Date(opts.since).getTime() : null;
@@ -202,13 +221,14 @@ function aggregate(cwd, opts) {
202
221
  });
203
222
 
204
223
  const totals = {
205
- calls: filtered.length,
224
+ calls: 0,
206
225
  input_tokens: 0,
207
226
  output_tokens: 0,
208
227
  cache_read_tokens: 0,
209
228
  cache_write_tokens: 0,
210
229
  cost_usd: 0,
211
230
  cost_unknown: 0,
231
+ suspect_excluded: 0,
212
232
  };
213
233
 
214
234
  const byAgent = {};
@@ -229,6 +249,10 @@ function aggregate(cwd, opts) {
229
249
  }
230
250
 
231
251
  for (const r of filtered) {
252
+ // Quarantine physically-impossible records (pre-v3.12.4 transcript-oversum
253
+ // bug) so a poisoned ledger doesn't poison the totals / HUD / /pan:cost.
254
+ if (isSuspectRecord(r)) { totals.suspect_excluded += 1; continue; }
255
+ totals.calls += 1;
232
256
  totals.input_tokens += r.input_tokens || 0;
233
257
  totals.output_tokens += r.output_tokens || 0;
234
258
  totals.cache_read_tokens += r.cache_read_tokens || 0;
@@ -398,6 +422,7 @@ module.exports = {
398
422
  appendRecord,
399
423
  readRecords,
400
424
  aggregate,
425
+ isSuspectRecord,
401
426
  renderTable,
402
427
  renderChart,
403
428
  resolveRate,
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ function collectHudData(cwd, opts = {}) {
267
267
  return {
268
268
  generated_at: now.toISOString(),
269
269
  army_active: armyActive,
270
- project: { name, version, milestone: milestone ? { version: milestone.version, name: milestone.name } : null, core_value: coreValue },
270
+ project: { name, version, dir_name: path.basename(cwd.replace(/[\\/]+$/, '')), milestone: milestone ? { version: milestone.version, name: milestone.name } : null, core_value: coreValue },
271
271
  state,
272
272
  progress: phaseScan,
273
273
  army,
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ function renderMission(d) {
425
425
  <div class="mhead">
426
426
  <div>
427
427
  <div class="kicker">pan army · mission control</div>
428
- <div class="title">${esc(p.name || 'Untitled project')}</div>
428
+ <div class="title">${esc(p.name || p.dir_name || 'Untitled project')}</div>
429
429
  ${p.core_value ? `<div class="sub">${esc(p.core_value)}</div>` : ''}
430
430
  </div>
431
431
  <div class="mmeta">
@@ -586,6 +586,17 @@ function renderHarness(d) {
586
586
 
587
587
  function renderTelemetry(d) {
588
588
  const t = d.telemetry;
589
+ // A ledger where most records are implausible is the pre-v3.12.4 capture bug —
590
+ // don't present salvaged numbers as if trustworthy; tell the user to reset it.
591
+ if (t.totals.suspect_excluded > t.totals.calls) {
592
+ const total = t.totals.suspect_excluded + t.totals.calls;
593
+ return `
594
+ <section class="panel">
595
+ <div class="ph">telemetry</div>
596
+ <div class="row noborder"><span class="rl">Status</span>${pill('legacy ledger — unreliable', 'warn')}</div>
597
+ <div class="amono dim" style="margin-top:10px;line-height:1.6;">${t.totals.suspect_excluded} of ${total} cost records are implausible (the pre-v3.12.4 telemetry capture bug). Reset the ledger with <b>pan-tools cost clear</b> — records captured after the fix are accurate.</div>
598
+ </section>`;
599
+ }
589
600
  const keys = Object.keys(t.by_squad).sort((a, b) => t.by_squad[b].cost - t.by_squad[a].cost);
590
601
  const max = keys.reduce((m, k) => Math.max(m, t.by_squad[k].cost), 0) || 1;
591
602
  const bars = keys.length
@@ -602,6 +613,7 @@ function renderTelemetry(d) {
602
613
  <div class="row"><span class="rl">Total spend</span><span class="amono">${fmtUsd(t.totals.cost_usd)}</span></div>
603
614
  <div class="row"><span class="rl">Tokens</span><span class="amono">${fmtTokens(t.totals.input_tokens + t.totals.output_tokens)}</span></div>
604
615
  <div class="row"><span class="rl">Cache hit</span><span class="amono okc">${t.cache_hit_rate_pct == null ? 'n/a' : t.cache_hit_rate_pct + '%'}</span></div>
616
+ ${t.totals.suspect_excluded ? `<div class="row"><span class="rl">Excluded</span>${pill(t.totals.suspect_excluded + ' implausible records', 'warn')}</div>` : ''}
605
617
  <div class="sqbars">${bars}</div>
606
618
  </section>`;
607
619
  }
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "schema_version": 1,
3
- "generated_at": "2026-05-03T06:35:05.956Z",
3
+ "generated_at": "2026-06-28T11:51:31.104Z",
4
4
  "topics": [
5
5
  {
6
6
  "name": "experiment-runner",
@@ -107,6 +107,24 @@
107
107
  "reviewer": "medium"
108
108
  }
109
109
  },
110
+ {
111
+ "name": "autonomous-loop",
112
+ "scope": "universal",
113
+ "file": "pan-wizard-core/learnings/universal/autonomous-loop.md",
114
+ "patterns": [
115
+ "P-310",
116
+ "P-350",
117
+ "P-360"
118
+ ],
119
+ "size_bytes": 10680,
120
+ "size_tokens_est": 2670,
121
+ "agent_relevance": {
122
+ "planner": "low",
123
+ "executor": "medium",
124
+ "verifier": "low",
125
+ "reviewer": "low"
126
+ }
127
+ },
110
128
  {
111
129
  "name": "binary-io",
112
130
  "scope": "universal",
@@ -532,9 +550,9 @@
532
550
  }
533
551
  ],
534
552
  "totals": {
535
- "topics": 31,
536
- "patterns": 63,
537
- "size_bytes": 90658,
538
- "size_tokens_est": 22674
553
+ "topics": 32,
554
+ "patterns": 66,
555
+ "size_bytes": 101338,
556
+ "size_tokens_est": 25344
539
557
  }
540
558
  }
@@ -1,11 +1,19 @@
1
1
  ---
2
2
  topic: autonomous-loop
3
- last_updated: 2026-06-12T00:00:00.000Z
3
+ last_updated: 2026-06-28T00:00:00.000Z
4
4
  patterns:
5
5
  - id: P-310
6
6
  summary: Autonomous build loops should fan out research and verify in parallel but keep implement/build a single serial step, then seal with one clean build at loop end
7
7
  promoted_at: 2026-06-12T00:00:00.000Z
8
8
  source_experiments: [montyhall-focus-loop]
9
+ - id: P-350
10
+ summary: In a parallel campaign, review a branch against its merge-base (three-dot / fork-sha diff), never two-dot main..HEAD, or a moved base produces phantom deletions and false blocks
11
+ promoted_at: 2026-06-28T00:00:00.000Z
12
+ source_experiments: [abilitycompliance-army-v1.1]
13
+ - id: P-360
14
+ summary: Campaign telemetry must be both captured (active per-step record, not just the passive hook) and trustworthy (never naive-sum a shared-session transcript — cumulative-per-turn cache-read over-counts by orders of magnitude)
15
+ promoted_at: 2026-06-28T00:00:00.000Z
16
+ source_experiments: [abilitycompliance-army-v1.1, plusb-loans-focus-auto, plusbforecasting-exec]
9
17
  ---
10
18
 
11
19
  # Autonomous Loop (AI-derived)
@@ -54,3 +62,29 @@ patterns:
54
62
  5. **Never let a schedule lower an irreversible-action gate** — scheduled or not, the human approves the merge. Autonomy extends up to the irreversible step, never through it.
55
63
 
56
64
  **Applies in:** `campaign.cjs` + `/pan:army --schedule` (ADR-0034), any cron/`/loop`-driven PAN automation, the self-improvement loop on a cadence.
65
+
66
+ ## P-350 — Review a worktree branch against its merge-base, never two-dot, when the base moves
67
+
68
+ **Evidence:** In the first production army campaign (AbilityCompliance v1.1, 6 missions), a Quality squad **BLOCK was a false positive**: the reviewer diffed `main..HEAD` (two-dot) *after* an earlier parallel mission had merged and advanced `main` past the reviewed mission's fork point — so the already-merged mission's additions appeared as **phantom deletions** in the diff. The block was disproven only by re-diffing against the merge-base. A false block burns a whole cycle; the mirror case (phantom additions hiding a genuine deletion) can wave a bad change through a gate.
69
+
70
+ **Rule:** Whenever you review or merge a branch whose base can advance under it (every parallel campaign):
71
+
72
+ 1. **Diff against the merge-base, not the moved tip** — `git diff <fork-sha>..HEAD`, or three-dot `git diff main...HEAD`. Never two-dot `main..HEAD`.
73
+ 2. **Stamp the fork sha at worktree-creation time** so review and release always carry the correct base instead of recomputing it from a `main` that has since moved.
74
+ 3. **A surprising diff is a base smell first** — large phantom deletions/additions of code the mission never touched means "wrong diff base," not "bad change." Re-check the base before trusting any verdict built on it.
75
+
76
+ **Applies in:** `pan-reviewer` / `pan-hardener` / `pan-integration-checker`, the `/pan:army` Quality + Release steps, `worktree.cjs` (record base sha), any parallel-branch review or merge.
77
+
78
+ ## P-360 — Campaign telemetry must be both captured and trustworthy
79
+
80
+ **Evidence:** Three production projects showed campaign telemetry failing in *both* directions. (1) **Absent** — a full 5-mission army campaign (AbilityCompliance v1.1) produced **zero** cost/trace/bus records, although the hooks were installed, registered on `SubagentStop`, and verified working in isolation; a main-loop coordinator's work never fired `SubagentStop`, so nothing was captured. (2) **Corrupted** — two projects that *did* capture (a weeks-long focus-auto loop and a phase-exec project) logged physically-impossible figures: a single subagent record claiming billions of cache-read tokens, cache-hit pinned at 100%, and many byte-identical rows. Root cause: the transcript fallback summed `usage` across *every* assistant message in a transcript whose `session_id` is shared by all subagents — so each event re-summed the whole growing transcript, and `cache_read` (re-read every turn) multiplied by the turn count. Either way the HUD, `/pan:cost`, and `/pan:optimize` consumed nothing usable.
81
+
82
+ **Rule:** For any long-running, multi-step autonomous campaign, telemetry must survive the spawn pattern *and* be numerically sane:
83
+
84
+ 1. **Don't make load-bearing observability depend on a passive hook.** Subagent-stop events fire only for spawned subagents; a main-loop orchestrator's own tokens — and some headless runtimes — never trigger them.
85
+ 2. **Record per-step telemetry actively** at the Learn step — tokens (an estimate is fine), duration, role, outcome — via an explicit metrics-append, so capture survives any spawn pattern.
86
+ 3. **Never naive-sum a transcript to attribute one actor's usage.** Subagents share the parent session id, so summing all matching messages on every event counts the whole (growing) transcript repeatedly; cumulative-per-turn cache-read then explodes. Attribute per-event *deltas* (a high-water mark), prefer the event's own usage payload, and dedup identical writes.
87
+ 4. **Sanity-check before you trust the number.** A cache-hit pinned at 100%, or cache-read far exceeding input, is a miscount — not a triumph. Cap or flag implausible records instead of aggregating them.
88
+ 5. **Preflight a telemetry probe** at campaign start (write then read one record); treat empty *or* absurd telemetry as a defect, not a quiet state.
89
+
90
+ **Applies in:** `/pan:army` Phase 0 + Learn step, `pan-conductor` campaign mode, `hooks/pan-cost-logger.js` + `pan-trace-logger.js`, the HUD telemetry panels, `/pan:cost`, `/pan:optimize`.
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ PAN uses three abstract tiers instead of hardcoded model names:
10
10
 
11
11
  | Tier | Purpose | Anthropic | OpenAI | Google |
12
12
  |------|---------|-----------|--------|--------|
13
- | `reasoning` | Architecture, planning, complex decisions | inherit (Opus) | inherit | inherit |
13
+ | `reasoning` | Architecture, planning, complex decisions | inherit (Fable/Opus) | inherit | inherit |
14
14
  | `mid` | Execution, research, verification | Sonnet | mid | mid |
15
15
  | `fast` | Read-only extraction, budget tasks | Haiku | fast | fast |
16
16
 
@@ -28,6 +28,25 @@ For backward compatibility, legacy Anthropic model names still work:
28
28
 
29
29
  ---
30
30
 
31
+ ## Recommended Models (Claude)
32
+
33
+ PAN never selects your host model — it recommends one. Because the `reasoning` tier is `inherit`, whichever top-tier model you configure in your runtime (Claude Code, etc.) runs every reasoning-tier agent (planner, conductor, executor, hardener…). `mid` and `fast` agents stay on Sonnet/Haiku regardless, so the whole fleet is never on one expensive model.
34
+
35
+ | Model | Role in PAN | Context | Relative cost | Notes |
36
+ |-------|-------------|---------|---------------|-------|
37
+ | `claude-fable-5` | **Recommended flagship** — deepest long-horizon reasoning; best for the bot army's Mission Control + planning | 1M | ~2× Opus | Runs input safety classifiers (see caveat below); requires 30-day data retention |
38
+ | `claude-opus-4-8` | **Cost-conscious default** — same 1M context + thinking, half the cost, no cyber classifier | 1M | 1× | The safe pick when you want Opus behavior without Fable's refusal surface |
39
+
40
+ **Why Fable is the recommended flagship.** It is Anthropic's most capable widely released model for demanding, long-horizon agentic work — exactly what PAN's hierarchical bot army (Mission Control → squads → workers) asks of its reasoning tier. Select it in your host runtime and `inherit` routes the reasoning-tier agents to it automatically.
41
+
42
+ **Fable caveat — the cyber-classifier refusal.** Fable is the only current Claude model that runs input safety classifiers targeting cybersecurity and biology content, and benign *defensive* security tooling can trigger false positives. A block surfaces as a successful response with `stop_reason: "refusal"` and a `stop_details.category` (e.g. `cyber`). In PAN this only realistically bites the deep-review flow (`/pan:review-deep`, `exec-phase --deep-review`), where the security agents (`pan-hardener`, `pan-reviewer`, `pan-meta-reviewer`) inspect auth/crypto/injection code. Those agents are framed as **authorized, defensive review** to avoid tripping the classifier. If a review step is still refused, re-run that step on `claude-opus-4-8` — Opus does not gate requests this way.
43
+
44
+ **Fable data-retention requirement.** Fable is not available under zero data retention; an org whose retention is below 30 days gets a hard `400` on every request. If Fable 400s on every call with an otherwise-valid request, check the org's retention setting before debugging anything else.
45
+
46
+ **Prompting note for Fable.** Fable prefers *less-prescriptive* prompts than earlier models and runs longer per turn. PAN's autonomous-loop guidance (anti-overplanning, grounded progress claims, act-when-you-have-enough) already aligns with this; avoid piling on `CRITICAL: YOU MUST` scaffolding, which can reduce Fable's output quality.
47
+
48
+ ---
49
+
31
50
  ## Profile Definitions
32
51
 
33
52
  | Agent | `quality` | `balanced` | `budget` |