owenloop 0.5.23 → 0.5.25
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +14 -0
- package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/claude.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/claude.js +165 -27
- package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/gatekeeper.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/gatekeeper.js +55 -8
- package/dist/src/defs.js +106 -11
- package/dist/src/engine.d.ts +2 -8
- package/dist/src/engine.js +40 -28
- package/dist/src/model.d.ts +12 -2
- package/dist/src/model.js +29 -22
- package/dist/src/order-resolver.js +1 -0
- package/dist/src/types.d.ts +8 -0
- package/docs/agent-runner.md +34 -3
- package/docs/authoring.md +22 -1
- package/docs/design.md +27 -2
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/claude-code/plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/claude-code/plugin/.mcp.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/codex/plugins/owenloop/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
- package/plugins/codex/plugins/owenloop/.mcp.json +1 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -4,6 +4,20 @@ All notable changes to this project are documented here. The format is based on
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[Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/), and this project
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adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html).
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## [0.5.25](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/compare/v0.5.24...v0.5.25) (2026-08-23)
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### Features
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* **engine:** scope native judges to workflow modifiers ([#295](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/issues/295)) ([d1cb9d5](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/commit/d1cb9d5f711b7ea5ed545202a0d2e37189ba1d06))
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## [0.5.24](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/compare/v0.5.23...v0.5.24) (2026-08-23)
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### Bug Fixes
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* **work:** enforce exact-root Claude tool gating ([#293](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/issues/293)) ([d79da0d](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/commit/d79da0dc6fac28e641695ab099f9f5f98b439b95))
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## [0.5.23](https://github.com/typicalday/owenloop/compare/v0.5.22...v0.5.23) (2026-08-23)
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@@ -1,12 +1,17 @@
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-
import type { Options, Query, SDKMessage } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
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import type { HookCallback, Options, Query, SDKMessage } from '@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk';
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import { type GatePolicy } from './gatekeeper.ts';
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import type { ApprovalRequester } from './contract.ts';
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import type { AgentEvent, DeliverArgs, HarnessAdapter, HarnessRecoveryPolicy, HarnessSessionRef, StartArgs, StepPermissions } from './contract.ts';
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/** Host-only opt-in liveness controller. Never admitted to the child env. */
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export declare const CLAUDE_IDLE_TIMEOUT_VAR = "OWENLOOP_CLAUDE_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS";
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/** Host-only opt-in for the exact snapshot-root Claude audit profile. */
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export declare const CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR = "OWENLOOP_CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR";
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/** Parse the one adapter-owned recovery setting without silently opting out. */
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export declare function parseClaudeIdleTimeout(value: string | undefined): HarnessRecoveryPolicy | undefined;
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export declare function claudeRecoveryPolicy(env?: Record<string, string | undefined>): HarnessRecoveryPolicy | undefined;
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/** Parse the strict profile as a boolean rather than passing its host spelling onward. */
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export declare function parseClaudeExactWorkdir(value: string | undefined): boolean;
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export declare function claudeExactWorkdir(env?: Record<string, string | undefined>): boolean;
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/**
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* Build the environment the harness child runs under.
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*
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* future SDK that does route it must not find it silently widened here.
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*/
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export declare function gatePolicyFor(authoredMode: string | undefined): GatePolicy;
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/** Programmatic PreToolUse guard for every path-bearing exposed built-in. */
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export declare function buildExactWorkdirPreToolUse(cwd: string): HookCallback;
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/** Everything `buildClaudeOptions` reads for either cold start or resume. */
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export interface ClaudeOptionInputs {
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cwd: string;
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* refuse-and-route-to-`ask` behavior — see `buildCanUseTool`. */
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approvals?: ApprovalRequester;
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recoveryPolicy?: HarnessRecoveryPolicy;
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/** Host-parsed policy bit. Its environment spelling never enters Options. */
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exactWorkdir?: boolean;
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}
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/** The non-declarative bits a caller supplies per invocation. */
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export interface ClaudeOptionExtras {
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now?: () => number;
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setTimer?: (callback: () => void, ms: number) => ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>;
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clearTimer?: (timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout>) => void;
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/** Strict profile's literal provider identity check, never a public arg. */
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expectedModel?: string;
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}
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/**
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* Drive the SDK message stream to TURN END and map it onto `AgentEvent`s.
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import { randomUUID } from 'node:crypto';
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import { accessSync, constants, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
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import { delimiter, join } from 'node:path';
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import { classifyToolCall, READ_ONLY_TOOLS } from "./gatekeeper.js";
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import { classifyExactWorkdirPath, classifyToolCall, EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE, PATH_BEARING_TOOL_NAMES, READ_ONLY_TOOLS, } from "./gatekeeper.js";
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import { register } from "./registry.js";
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import { filterOwenloopEnv } from "./child-env.js";
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import { normalizeStepPermissions, validateHarnessOptions } from "./permissions.js";
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@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ const ALLOW_API_BILLING_VAR = 'OWENLOOP_ALLOW_API_BILLING';
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const BIN_OVERRIDE_VAR = 'OWENLOOP_CLAUDE_BIN';
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/** Host-only opt-in liveness controller. Never admitted to the child env. */
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export const CLAUDE_IDLE_TIMEOUT_VAR = 'OWENLOOP_CLAUDE_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS';
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/** Host-only opt-in for the exact snapshot-root Claude audit profile. */
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export const CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR = 'OWENLOOP_CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR';
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const MIN_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 1_000;
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const MAX_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS = 3_600_000;
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/** Parse the one adapter-owned recovery setting without silently opting out. */
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@@ -87,6 +89,17 @@ export function parseClaudeIdleTimeout(value) {
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export function claudeRecoveryPolicy(env = process.env) {
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return parseClaudeIdleTimeout(env[CLAUDE_IDLE_TIMEOUT_VAR]);
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}
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/** Parse the strict profile as a boolean rather than passing its host spelling onward. */
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export function parseClaudeExactWorkdir(value) {
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if (value === undefined)
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return false;
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if (value === '1')
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return true;
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throw new HarnessTurnError('configuration', true, `${CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR} must be exactly 1 when present`);
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}
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export function claudeExactWorkdir(env = process.env) {
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return parseClaudeExactWorkdir(env[CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR]);
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}
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/**
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* Build the environment the harness child runs under.
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*
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* the behavior is exactly what it was before: deny, and name `ask` as the
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* channel that does reach someone.
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*/
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function buildCanUseTool(cwd, policy, filesystem, onEvent, approvals) {
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function buildCanUseTool(cwd, policy, filesystem, onEvent, approvals, exactWorkdir = false) {
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return async (toolName, input, options) => {
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let verdict;
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try {
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verdict = classifyToolCall({
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verdict = classifyToolCall({
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toolName,
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input,
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workdir: cwd,
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blockedPath: options.blockedPath,
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filesystem,
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exactWorkdir,
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}, policy);
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}
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catch (err) {
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verdict = { decision: 'escalate', reason: `the gatekeeper could not judge this call (${errText(err)})` };
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}
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if (verdict.decision === 'allow')
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return { behavior: 'allow' };
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// This is a host boundary, not a legacy escalation. It never enters the
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// approval channel and its fixed message cannot serialize a model path.
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if (verdict.decision === 'deny') {
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onEvent({ kind: 'progress', text: `exact work-root policy: ${toolName} denied` });
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return { behavior: 'deny', message: verdict.reason };
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}
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if (approvals !== undefined) {
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const title = approvalTitle(toolName, input, options.title);
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onEvent({
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const BORN_BOUND_OWENLOOP_TOOL_NAMES = ['get_order', 'submit', 'ask'];
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const BORN_BOUND_OWENLOOP_TOOLS = BORN_BOUND_OWENLOOP_TOOL_NAMES.map((name) => `mcp__owenloop__${name}`);
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const RESTRICTED_OWENLOOP_DENIED_TOOLS = ['mcp__owenloop__reject'];
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const EXACT_WORKDIR_BUILTINS = new Set(['Read', 'Glob', 'Grep']);
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const OWENLOOP_CONTROL_TOOLS = new Set([
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...BORN_BOUND_OWENLOOP_TOOLS,
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'mcp__plugin_owenloop_owenloop__get_order',
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'mcp__plugin_owenloop_owenloop__*',
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'mcp__*',
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]);
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function effectiveClaudeTools(permissions) {
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return permissions.tools;
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? READ_ONLY_OWENLOOP_ONLY_NETWORK_TOOLS
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: [...READ_ONLY_TOOLS];
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}
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return [...OWENLOOP_ONLY_NETWORK_TOOLS];
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return undefined;
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}
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function strictWorkdirToolIssue(permissions) {
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const effective = effectiveClaudeTools(permissions);
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if (effective === undefined) {
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return {
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field: 'tools',
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message: `${CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR}=1 requires an explicit or derived built-in surface containing only Read, Glob, and Grep`,
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};
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}
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const unsafe = effective.filter((tool) => !EXACT_WORKDIR_BUILTINS.has(tool) && !BORN_BOUND_OWENLOOP_TOOLS.includes(tool));
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if (unsafe.length === 0)
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return undefined;
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return {
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field: 'tools',
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message: `${CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR}=1 permits only Read, Glob, Grep, and born-bound Owenloop controls; remove: ${unsafe.join(', ')}`,
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};
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}
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function claudePreflight(permissions) {
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const issues = [];
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let exactWorkdir = false;
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try {
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exactWorkdir = claudeExactWorkdir(process.env);
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}
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catch (error) {
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issues.push({ field: CLAUDE_EXACT_WORKDIR_VAR, message: errText(error) });
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}
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const authoredMode = permissions.permissionMode;
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if (authoredMode !== undefined) {
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if (!ACCEPTED_PERMISSION_MODES.includes(authoredMode)) {
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message: `the born-bound Owenloop control plane must retain get_order/submit access; remove: ${deniedControl.join(', ')}`,
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});
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}
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if (exactWorkdir) {
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const strictIssue = strictWorkdirToolIssue(permissions);
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if (strictIssue !== undefined)
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issues.push(strictIssue);
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}
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return issues;
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}
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/**
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function isPlainMap(v) {
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return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
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/** Programmatic PreToolUse guard for every path-bearing exposed built-in. */
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export function buildExactWorkdirPreToolUse(cwd) {
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return async (input) => {
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const deny = {
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continue: true,
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hookSpecificOutput: {
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hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
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permissionDecision: 'deny',
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permissionDecisionReason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE,
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},
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};
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try {
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if (input.hook_event_name !== 'PreToolUse' || !PATH_BEARING_TOOL_NAMES.has(input.tool_name))
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return deny;
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if (!isPlainMap(input.tool_input))
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return deny;
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const verdict = classifyExactWorkdirPath({
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toolName: input.tool_name,
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input: input.tool_input,
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workdir: cwd,
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});
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if (verdict.decision === 'deny')
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return deny;
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return {
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continue: true,
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hookSpecificOutput: {
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hookEventName: 'PreToolUse',
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permissionDecision: 'allow',
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},
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};
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}
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catch {
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return deny;
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}
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};
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}
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/** The mount for owenloop's own work-holder MCP surface, built from the worker's
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* verbatim argv. `alwaysLoad` forces its tools into the turn-1 prompt instead of
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* deferring them behind tool search — a step agent that cannot see `submit` on
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function owenloopMount(mount) {
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return { type: 'stdio', command: mount.command, args: mount.args, alwaysLoad: true };
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/** Restricted sessions register a positive
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/** Restricted sessions register a positive born-bound subset. The selector is
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* derived from the same names used by `allowedTools`, so the declared exception
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* and the MCP server's actual `tools/list` cannot drift within this adapter. */
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function restrictedOwenloopMount(mount) {
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@@ -617,8 +720,16 @@ function mergeMcpServers(bagServers, mount) {
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*/
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export function buildClaudeOptions(inputs, extra) {
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const { permissions } = inputs;
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const exactWorkdir = inputs.exactWorkdir === true;
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const effectiveTools = effectiveClaudeTools(permissions);
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if (exactWorkdir) {
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const issue = strictWorkdirToolIssue(permissions);
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if (issue !== undefined)
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throw new HarnessTurnError('configuration', true, issue.message);
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|
+
}
|
|
620
730
|
const diagnosticEvent = inputs.recoveryPolicy === undefined ? extra.onEvent : (_event) => { };
|
|
621
|
-
const isolated =
|
|
731
|
+
const isolated = exactWorkdir ||
|
|
732
|
+
permissions.tools !== undefined ||
|
|
622
733
|
permissions.filesystem === 'read-only' ||
|
|
623
734
|
permissions.network === 'owenloop-only';
|
|
624
735
|
const options = {
|
|
@@ -638,8 +749,13 @@ export function buildClaudeOptions(inputs, extra) {
|
|
|
638
749
|
// Set here, before the `permissionMode` block below, because it is not
|
|
639
750
|
// conditional on that block running: a step naming no mode at all is exactly
|
|
640
751
|
// the case that used to reach the SDK's `default` and be denied wholesale.
|
|
641
|
-
canUseTool: buildCanUseTool(inputs.cwd, gatePolicyFor(permissions.permissionMode), permissions.filesystem, diagnosticEvent, inputs.approvals),
|
|
752
|
+
canUseTool: buildCanUseTool(inputs.cwd, gatePolicyFor(permissions.permissionMode), permissions.filesystem, diagnosticEvent, inputs.approvals, exactWorkdir),
|
|
642
753
|
};
|
|
754
|
+
if (exactWorkdir) {
|
|
755
|
+
options.hooks = {
|
|
756
|
+
PreToolUse: [{ matcher: [...PATH_BEARING_TOOL_NAMES].join('|'), hooks: [buildExactWorkdirPreToolUse(inputs.cwd)] }],
|
|
757
|
+
};
|
|
758
|
+
}
|
|
643
759
|
// Partial messages are provider transport only: they reset liveness below but
|
|
644
760
|
// are never mapped into progress/evidence output.
|
|
645
761
|
if (inputs.recoveryPolicy !== undefined)
|
|
@@ -703,19 +819,8 @@ export function buildClaudeOptions(inputs, extra) {
|
|
|
703
819
|
// exception: the audited built-in list becomes explicit, and `allowedTools`
|
|
704
820
|
// also auto-allows the born-bound get_order/submit MCP tools so the restricted
|
|
705
821
|
// agent can inspect and finish its order without an unattended permission prompt.
|
|
706
|
-
// The restricted MCP child itself registers exactly those
|
|
822
|
+
// The restricted MCP child itself registers exactly those born-bound tools; allowedTools
|
|
707
823
|
// is permission automation, not an MCP visibility filter.
|
|
708
|
-
let effectiveTools = permissions.tools;
|
|
709
|
-
if (effectiveTools === undefined && permissions.filesystem === 'read-only') {
|
|
710
|
-
// Filesystem and network are independent. A read-only filesystem still gets
|
|
711
|
-
// audited network readers unless the step separately restricts the network.
|
|
712
|
-
effectiveTools = permissions.network === 'owenloop-only'
|
|
713
|
-
? READ_ONLY_OWENLOOP_ONLY_NETWORK_TOOLS
|
|
714
|
-
: [...READ_ONLY_TOOLS];
|
|
715
|
-
}
|
|
716
|
-
else if (effectiveTools === undefined && permissions.network === 'owenloop-only') {
|
|
717
|
-
effectiveTools = [...OWENLOOP_ONLY_NETWORK_TOOLS];
|
|
718
|
-
}
|
|
719
824
|
if (effectiveTools !== undefined) {
|
|
720
825
|
options.tools = effectiveTools.filter((tool) => !OWENLOOP_CONTROL_TOOLS.has(tool));
|
|
721
826
|
options.allowedTools = [
|
|
@@ -761,7 +866,7 @@ export function buildClaudeOptions(inputs, extra) {
|
|
|
761
866
|
// Outside isolation, `settingSources` and `strictMcpConfig` stay unset so the
|
|
762
867
|
// SDK preserves its normal settings and MCP behavior, including the full
|
|
763
868
|
// get_order/submit/reject work-holder server. Isolation sets `settingSources: []`
|
|
764
|
-
// and `strictMcpConfig: true` above, mounts the positive
|
|
869
|
+
// and `strictMcpConfig: true` above, mounts the positive born-bound work-holder
|
|
765
870
|
// subset, and removes settings, hooks, skills, or external MCP that could bypass
|
|
766
871
|
// the authored restriction.
|
|
767
872
|
// `persistSession` always stays unset: its default is `true`, and disabling it
|
|
@@ -918,6 +1023,7 @@ function emitUser(message, onEvent) {
|
|
|
918
1023
|
*/
|
|
919
1024
|
export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control = {}) {
|
|
920
1025
|
let sessionId;
|
|
1026
|
+
let sawInit = false;
|
|
921
1027
|
let finalResponse;
|
|
922
1028
|
let terminalFailure;
|
|
923
1029
|
let timer;
|
|
@@ -926,6 +1032,7 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
926
1032
|
let timerGeneration = 0;
|
|
927
1033
|
let controlledQueryClosed = false;
|
|
928
1034
|
const recoveryEnabled = control.idleTimeoutMs !== undefined;
|
|
1035
|
+
const strictModelIdentity = control.expectedModel !== undefined;
|
|
929
1036
|
const sanitizeProviderTelemetry = control.sanitizeProviderTelemetry === true;
|
|
930
1037
|
const now = control.now ?? Date.now;
|
|
931
1038
|
const setTimer = control.setTimer ?? setTimeout;
|
|
@@ -998,7 +1105,10 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
998
1105
|
const next = iterator.next();
|
|
999
1106
|
const item = timeout === undefined ? await next : await Promise.race([next, timeout]);
|
|
1000
1107
|
if (item.done) {
|
|
1001
|
-
if (
|
|
1108
|
+
if (strictModelIdentity && !sawInit) {
|
|
1109
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('model-unavailable', true, 'provider did not confirm the configured literal model');
|
|
1110
|
+
}
|
|
1111
|
+
if ((recoveryEnabled || strictModelIdentity) && terminalFailure !== undefined)
|
|
1002
1112
|
throw terminalFailure;
|
|
1003
1113
|
return { sessionId, sawResult: false };
|
|
1004
1114
|
}
|
|
@@ -1007,12 +1117,16 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
1007
1117
|
// proof of provider liveness.
|
|
1008
1118
|
arm();
|
|
1009
1119
|
if (message.type === 'system' && message.subtype === 'init') {
|
|
1120
|
+
sawInit = true;
|
|
1010
1121
|
if (expectedSessionId !== undefined && message.session_id !== expectedSessionId) {
|
|
1011
1122
|
if (sanitizeProviderTelemetry) {
|
|
1012
1123
|
throw new HarnessTurnError('provider', false, 'provider session identity mismatch (details redacted)');
|
|
1013
1124
|
}
|
|
1014
1125
|
throw new Error(`provider session id mismatch: expected ${expectedSessionId}, received ${message.session_id}`);
|
|
1015
1126
|
}
|
|
1127
|
+
if (strictModelIdentity && message.model !== control.expectedModel) {
|
|
1128
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('model-unavailable', true, 'provider did not honor the configured literal model');
|
|
1129
|
+
}
|
|
1016
1130
|
sessionId = message.session_id;
|
|
1017
1131
|
// The ONLY place these are observable. The live smoke asserts on the
|
|
1018
1132
|
// `apiKeySource` here (subscription OAuth vs. an API key), and a later
|
|
@@ -1029,8 +1143,14 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
1029
1143
|
}
|
|
1030
1144
|
onInit?.(sessionId);
|
|
1031
1145
|
}
|
|
1146
|
+
else if (message.type === 'system' && message.subtype === 'model_refusal_fallback' && strictModelIdentity) {
|
|
1147
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('model-unavailable', true, 'provider attempted a model fallback');
|
|
1148
|
+
}
|
|
1032
1149
|
else if (message.type === 'result') {
|
|
1033
|
-
|
|
1150
|
+
if (strictModelIdentity && !sawInit) {
|
|
1151
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('model-unavailable', true, 'provider did not confirm the configured literal model');
|
|
1152
|
+
}
|
|
1153
|
+
const classified = recoveryEnabled || strictModelIdentity ? terminalFailure ?? classifyResult(message) : undefined;
|
|
1034
1154
|
if (!sanitizeProviderTelemetry && finalResponse !== undefined) {
|
|
1035
1155
|
onEvent({ kind: 'assistant_response', text: finalResponse });
|
|
1036
1156
|
}
|
|
@@ -1047,7 +1167,7 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
1047
1167
|
});
|
|
1048
1168
|
}
|
|
1049
1169
|
onEvent({ kind: 'turn_ended' });
|
|
1050
|
-
if (recoveryEnabled && classified !== undefined)
|
|
1170
|
+
if ((recoveryEnabled || strictModelIdentity) && classified !== undefined)
|
|
1051
1171
|
throw classified;
|
|
1052
1172
|
return { sessionId, sawResult: true };
|
|
1053
1173
|
}
|
|
@@ -1056,10 +1176,10 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
1056
1176
|
emitAssistant(message, onEvent);
|
|
1057
1177
|
finalResponse = assistantResponse(message) ?? finalResponse;
|
|
1058
1178
|
}
|
|
1059
|
-
if (recoveryEnabled)
|
|
1179
|
+
if (recoveryEnabled || strictModelIdentity)
|
|
1060
1180
|
terminalFailure ??= classifyAssistantError(message.error);
|
|
1061
1181
|
}
|
|
1062
|
-
else if (recoveryEnabled && message.type === 'auth_status' && message.error !== undefined) {
|
|
1182
|
+
else if ((recoveryEnabled || strictModelIdentity) && message.type === 'auth_status' && message.error !== undefined) {
|
|
1063
1183
|
// `error` is a structured SDK field. Its prose is deliberately neither
|
|
1064
1184
|
// logged nor parsed for recovery decisions.
|
|
1065
1185
|
throw new HarnessTurnError('authentication', true, 'provider authentication status failed');
|
|
@@ -1079,7 +1199,7 @@ export async function consumeTurn(q, onEvent, onInit, expectedSessionId, control
|
|
|
1079
1199
|
}
|
|
1080
1200
|
}
|
|
1081
1201
|
catch (error) {
|
|
1082
|
-
if (!recoveryEnabled)
|
|
1202
|
+
if (!recoveryEnabled && !strictModelIdentity)
|
|
1083
1203
|
throw error;
|
|
1084
1204
|
if (terminalFailure?.terminal === true)
|
|
1085
1205
|
throw terminalFailure;
|
|
@@ -1115,6 +1235,14 @@ function errText(err) {
|
|
|
1115
1235
|
return err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
|
|
1116
1236
|
}
|
|
1117
1237
|
export async function startClaude(args, onEvent, dependencies = DEFAULT_START_DEPENDENCIES) {
|
|
1238
|
+
// Parse and validate host policy before even emitting a start marker: a bad
|
|
1239
|
+
// audit configuration must not construct a provider query or a resumable row.
|
|
1240
|
+
const exactWorkdir = claudeExactWorkdir(process.env);
|
|
1241
|
+
if (exactWorkdir) {
|
|
1242
|
+
const issue = strictWorkdirToolIssue(args.permissions);
|
|
1243
|
+
if (issue !== undefined)
|
|
1244
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('configuration', true, issue.message);
|
|
1245
|
+
}
|
|
1118
1246
|
// The provider token exists before any SDK work. `started` is synchronous by
|
|
1119
1247
|
// contract, so the caller's fsynced active-row append must return before the
|
|
1120
1248
|
// query factory can initialize a process or receive prompt bytes.
|
|
@@ -1134,7 +1262,7 @@ export async function startClaude(args, onEvent, dependencies = DEFAULT_START_DE
|
|
|
1134
1262
|
}
|
|
1135
1263
|
const env = buildChildEnv(process.env, { allowApiBilling: allowApiBillingFrom(process.env) });
|
|
1136
1264
|
const abortController = new AbortController();
|
|
1137
|
-
const options = buildClaudeOptions(args, { env, abortController, onEvent, sessionId });
|
|
1265
|
+
const options = buildClaudeOptions({ ...args, exactWorkdir }, { env, abortController, onEvent, sessionId });
|
|
1138
1266
|
let q;
|
|
1139
1267
|
try {
|
|
1140
1268
|
// A plain STRING prompt, not an AsyncIterable. Query construction is the
|
|
@@ -1201,6 +1329,7 @@ export async function startClaude(args, onEvent, dependencies = DEFAULT_START_DE
|
|
|
1201
1329
|
sanitizeProviderTelemetry: args.recoveryPolicy !== undefined,
|
|
1202
1330
|
abortController,
|
|
1203
1331
|
close: closeExact,
|
|
1332
|
+
...(exactWorkdir && options.model !== undefined ? { expectedModel: options.model } : {}),
|
|
1204
1333
|
onActivity: (activity) => onEvent({ kind: 'activity', ...activity }),
|
|
1205
1334
|
});
|
|
1206
1335
|
}
|
|
@@ -1231,6 +1360,14 @@ export async function startClaude(args, onEvent, dependencies = DEFAULT_START_DE
|
|
|
1231
1360
|
return ref;
|
|
1232
1361
|
}
|
|
1233
1362
|
export async function deliverClaude(ref, message, args, onEvent, dependencies = DEFAULT_DELIVER_DEPENDENCIES) {
|
|
1363
|
+
// This must precede the session-info preflight too: an incompatible strict
|
|
1364
|
+
// profile is a configuration error, not a reason to ask the provider first.
|
|
1365
|
+
const exactWorkdir = claudeExactWorkdir(process.env);
|
|
1366
|
+
if (exactWorkdir) {
|
|
1367
|
+
const issue = strictWorkdirToolIssue(args.permissions);
|
|
1368
|
+
if (issue !== undefined)
|
|
1369
|
+
throw new HarnessTurnError('configuration', true, issue.message);
|
|
1370
|
+
}
|
|
1234
1371
|
// Session lookup is scoped to the PROJECT DIRECTORY, so a deleted worktree can
|
|
1235
1372
|
// never resume no matter how good the token is. Distinct message on purpose —
|
|
1236
1373
|
// the caller reads these to tell the two failures apart.
|
|
@@ -1275,7 +1412,7 @@ export async function deliverClaude(ref, message, args, onEvent, dependencies =
|
|
|
1275
1412
|
// A resumed turn does not inherit permission mode / tool lists / model from the
|
|
1276
1413
|
// session — they are per-invocation flags — which is exactly why they must be
|
|
1277
1414
|
// re-mapped here.
|
|
1278
|
-
const options = buildClaudeOptions(args, {
|
|
1415
|
+
const options = buildClaudeOptions({ ...args, exactWorkdir }, {
|
|
1279
1416
|
env,
|
|
1280
1417
|
abortController,
|
|
1281
1418
|
onEvent,
|
|
@@ -1337,6 +1474,7 @@ export async function deliverClaude(ref, message, args, onEvent, dependencies =
|
|
|
1337
1474
|
sanitizeProviderTelemetry: args.recoveryPolicy !== undefined,
|
|
1338
1475
|
abortController,
|
|
1339
1476
|
close: closeExact,
|
|
1477
|
+
...(exactWorkdir && options.model !== undefined ? { expectedModel: options.model } : {}),
|
|
1340
1478
|
onActivity: (activity) => onEvent({ kind: 'activity', ...activity }),
|
|
1341
1479
|
});
|
|
1342
1480
|
}
|
|
@@ -94,6 +94,13 @@ export interface GateCall {
|
|
|
94
94
|
* `unrestricted` declaration may widen audited filesystem reads only.
|
|
95
95
|
*/
|
|
96
96
|
filesystem?: FilesystemPermission;
|
|
97
|
+
/**
|
|
98
|
+
* The host-owned exact-work-root boundary. This is deliberately separate from
|
|
99
|
+
* an authored filesystem permission: the latter may describe an unrestricted
|
|
100
|
+
* legacy workflow, while this flag is the narrow audit profile that must never
|
|
101
|
+
* be widened by an approval or an SDK shortcut.
|
|
102
|
+
*/
|
|
103
|
+
exactWorkdir?: boolean;
|
|
97
104
|
}
|
|
98
105
|
/** The gatekeeper's answer. `reason` is written to be shown to a person and to
|
|
99
106
|
* the agent, so it names the specific thing that triggered it. */
|
|
@@ -102,12 +109,26 @@ export type GateVerdict = {
|
|
|
102
109
|
} | {
|
|
103
110
|
decision: 'escalate';
|
|
104
111
|
reason: string;
|
|
112
|
+
} | {
|
|
113
|
+
decision: 'deny';
|
|
114
|
+
reason: string;
|
|
105
115
|
};
|
|
106
116
|
/** Audited built-ins that cannot mutate the filesystem. WebFetch/WebSearch
|
|
107
117
|
* can read the unrestricted network without weakening a read-only filesystem.
|
|
108
118
|
* This is the canonical audited read-tool set used by both the adapter's tool
|
|
109
119
|
* surface and the explicit unrestricted-filesystem containment exception. */
|
|
110
120
|
export declare const READ_ONLY_TOOLS: ReadonlySet<string>;
|
|
121
|
+
/** The path-bearing built-ins, derived from the same metadata as extraction. */
|
|
122
|
+
export declare const PATH_BEARING_TOOL_NAMES: ReadonlySet<string>;
|
|
123
|
+
/** Fixed, payload-free guidance for the exact audit boundary. */
|
|
124
|
+
export declare const EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE = "The exact work-root policy denied this path-bearing tool call. Work inside the assigned directory, or call the born-bound `ask` tool on the mounted `owenloop` MCP server if the order cannot be completed there.";
|
|
125
|
+
/**
|
|
126
|
+
* Classify a path-bearing call for the host-controlled exact-work-root policy.
|
|
127
|
+
* It deliberately catches model-authored getters/Proxies and path-normalization
|
|
128
|
+
* errors so an unexpected input cannot make a hook throw and leave the SDK
|
|
129
|
+
* waiting for a response.
|
|
130
|
+
*/
|
|
131
|
+
export declare function classifyExactWorkdirPath(call: GateCall): GateVerdict;
|
|
111
132
|
/**
|
|
112
133
|
* Whether `candidate` resolves inside `root`.
|
|
113
134
|
*
|
|
@@ -63,14 +63,20 @@ export const READ_ONLY_TOOLS = new Set(['Read', 'Glob', 'Grep', 'WebFetch', 'Web
|
|
|
63
63
|
* guessed at.
|
|
64
64
|
*/
|
|
65
65
|
const PATH_ARGS = Object.freeze({
|
|
66
|
-
Read: { args: ['file_path'], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
67
|
-
Write: { args: ['file_path'] },
|
|
68
|
-
Edit: { args: ['file_path'] },
|
|
69
|
-
NotebookRead: { args: ['notebook_path'], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
70
|
-
NotebookEdit: { args: ['notebook_path'] },
|
|
71
|
-
Glob
|
|
72
|
-
|
|
66
|
+
Read: { args: [{ key: 'file_path' }], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
67
|
+
Write: { args: [{ key: 'file_path' }] },
|
|
68
|
+
Edit: { args: [{ key: 'file_path' }] },
|
|
69
|
+
NotebookRead: { args: [{ key: 'notebook_path' }], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
70
|
+
NotebookEdit: { args: [{ key: 'notebook_path' }] },
|
|
71
|
+
// Glob/Grep schemas deliberately default an omitted path to cwd.
|
|
72
|
+
// Empty, non-string, or inaccessible values are NOT that omission.
|
|
73
|
+
Glob: { args: [{ key: 'path', optional: true }], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
74
|
+
Grep: { args: [{ key: 'path', optional: true }], humanGateSafeRead: true },
|
|
73
75
|
});
|
|
76
|
+
/** The path-bearing built-ins, derived from the same metadata as extraction. */
|
|
77
|
+
export const PATH_BEARING_TOOL_NAMES = new Set(Object.keys(PATH_ARGS));
|
|
78
|
+
/** Fixed, payload-free guidance for the exact audit boundary. */
|
|
79
|
+
export const EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE = 'The exact work-root policy denied this path-bearing tool call. Work inside the assigned directory, or call the born-bound `ask` tool on the mounted `owenloop` MCP server if the order cannot be completed there.';
|
|
74
80
|
/**
|
|
75
81
|
* The owenloop MCP mount, which is ALWAYS allowed under every policy.
|
|
76
82
|
*
|
|
@@ -121,6 +127,40 @@ function stringArg(input, key) {
|
|
|
121
127
|
const v = input[key];
|
|
122
128
|
return typeof v === 'string' && v !== '' ? v : undefined;
|
|
123
129
|
}
|
|
130
|
+
/**
|
|
131
|
+
* Classify a path-bearing call for the host-controlled exact-work-root policy.
|
|
132
|
+
* It deliberately catches model-authored getters/Proxies and path-normalization
|
|
133
|
+
* errors so an unexpected input cannot make a hook throw and leave the SDK
|
|
134
|
+
* waiting for a response.
|
|
135
|
+
*/
|
|
136
|
+
export function classifyExactWorkdirPath(call) {
|
|
137
|
+
const spec = PATH_ARGS[call.toolName];
|
|
138
|
+
if (spec === undefined)
|
|
139
|
+
return ALLOW;
|
|
140
|
+
try {
|
|
141
|
+
if (call.blockedPath !== undefined && call.blockedPath !== '') {
|
|
142
|
+
return { decision: 'deny', reason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE };
|
|
143
|
+
}
|
|
144
|
+
for (const arg of spec.args) {
|
|
145
|
+
const present = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(call.input, arg.key);
|
|
146
|
+
if (!present && arg.optional === true)
|
|
147
|
+
continue;
|
|
148
|
+
if (!present)
|
|
149
|
+
return { decision: 'deny', reason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE };
|
|
150
|
+
const value = call.input[arg.key];
|
|
151
|
+
if (typeof value !== 'string' || value === '') {
|
|
152
|
+
return { decision: 'deny', reason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE };
|
|
153
|
+
}
|
|
154
|
+
if (!isInside(call.workdir, value)) {
|
|
155
|
+
return { decision: 'deny', reason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE };
|
|
156
|
+
}
|
|
157
|
+
}
|
|
158
|
+
return ALLOW;
|
|
159
|
+
}
|
|
160
|
+
catch {
|
|
161
|
+
return { decision: 'deny', reason: EXACT_WORKDIR_DENIAL_MESSAGE };
|
|
162
|
+
}
|
|
163
|
+
}
|
|
124
164
|
/**
|
|
125
165
|
* Whether `candidate` resolves inside `root`.
|
|
126
166
|
*
|
|
@@ -166,6 +206,13 @@ export function dangerousCommand(command) {
|
|
|
166
206
|
export function classifyToolCall(call, policy) {
|
|
167
207
|
if (call.toolName.startsWith(OWENLOOP_MCP_PREFIX))
|
|
168
208
|
return ALLOW;
|
|
209
|
+
// This host profile runs before legacy policy semantics. It is intentionally
|
|
210
|
+
// not an escalation: no human approval can widen the exact snapshot boundary.
|
|
211
|
+
if (call.exactWorkdir === true) {
|
|
212
|
+
const exact = classifyExactWorkdirPath(call);
|
|
213
|
+
if (exact.decision === 'deny')
|
|
214
|
+
return exact;
|
|
215
|
+
}
|
|
169
216
|
if (policy === 'deny-unapproved') {
|
|
170
217
|
return { decision: 'escalate', reason: `permissionMode denies unapproved tool calls` };
|
|
171
218
|
}
|
|
@@ -178,7 +225,7 @@ export function classifyToolCall(call, policy) {
|
|
|
178
225
|
}
|
|
179
226
|
const pathArgs = PATH_ARGS[call.toolName];
|
|
180
227
|
const paths = (pathArgs?.args ?? [])
|
|
181
|
-
.map((key) => stringArg(call.input, key))
|
|
228
|
+
.map(({ key }) => stringArg(call.input, key))
|
|
182
229
|
.filter((p) => p !== undefined);
|
|
183
230
|
// An explicit unrestricted filesystem declaration widens only the declared
|
|
184
231
|
// boundary of the shared audited read set. It does not change which operation
|