owenloop 0.5.1 → 0.5.3

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (88) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +30 -0
  2. package/README.md +9 -2
  3. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/brief.d.ts +21 -0
  4. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/brief.js +42 -1
  5. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/capability-model.d.ts +123 -0
  6. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/capability-model.js +148 -0
  7. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/loop.d.ts +47 -4
  8. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/loop.js +83 -53
  9. package/dist/packages/work/src/exec/loop.d.ts +17 -0
  10. package/dist/packages/work/src/exec/loop.js +195 -34
  11. package/dist/packages/work/src/exec/runner.js +15 -5
  12. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/claude.js +69 -9
  13. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/codex.js +56 -8
  14. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/contract.d.ts +65 -1
  15. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/contract.js +56 -0
  16. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/session-store.d.ts +3 -1
  17. package/dist/packages/work/src/harness/session-store.js +46 -22
  18. package/dist/packages/work/src/hold/mcp.js +9 -2
  19. package/dist/packages/work/src/hub/client.d.ts +7 -1
  20. package/dist/packages/work/src/hub/client.js +1 -0
  21. package/dist/packages/work/src/hub/types.d.ts +71 -3
  22. package/dist/packages/work/src/roles/agent-run.js +8 -9
  23. package/dist/packages/work/src/roles/hold.d.ts +2 -0
  24. package/dist/packages/work/src/roles/hold.js +39 -8
  25. package/dist/packages/work/src/roles/settings.js +18 -6
  26. package/dist/packages/work/src/roles/shift.js +13 -1
  27. package/dist/packages/work/src/settings/settings.d.ts +60 -7
  28. package/dist/packages/work/src/settings/settings.js +69 -22
  29. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/logretention.d.ts +253 -0
  30. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/logretention.js +407 -0
  31. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/logsink.d.ts +14 -0
  32. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/logsink.js +98 -0
  33. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/loop.d.ts +18 -1
  34. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/loop.js +250 -12
  35. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/protocol.d.ts +124 -1
  36. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/protocol.js +14 -0
  37. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/runtime.d.ts +14 -0
  38. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/runtime.js +229 -6
  39. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/server.d.ts +13 -0
  40. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/server.js +61 -36
  41. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/spawn.d.ts +78 -5
  42. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/spawn.js +158 -12
  43. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/state.d.ts +25 -0
  44. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/state.js +29 -5
  45. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/truncate.d.ts +35 -0
  46. package/dist/packages/work/src/shift/truncate.js +73 -0
  47. package/dist/packages/work/src/submit-proof.d.ts +31 -6
  48. package/dist/packages/work/src/submit-proof.js +33 -7
  49. package/dist/packages/work/src/submit-value.d.ts +48 -0
  50. package/dist/packages/work/src/submit-value.js +118 -0
  51. package/dist/packages/work/src/usage.d.ts +1 -1
  52. package/dist/packages/work/src/usage.js +11 -0
  53. package/dist/src/bundle/runtime.d.ts +1 -1
  54. package/dist/src/bundle/runtime.js +9 -0
  55. package/dist/src/capabilities.d.ts +93 -0
  56. package/dist/src/capabilities.js +101 -0
  57. package/dist/src/cli.js +37 -11
  58. package/dist/src/crypto/records.d.ts +3 -0
  59. package/dist/src/crypto/records.js +11 -0
  60. package/dist/src/defs.js +192 -4
  61. package/dist/src/engine.d.ts +112 -3
  62. package/dist/src/engine.js +224 -28
  63. package/dist/src/hub.d.ts +27 -11
  64. package/dist/src/hub.js +24 -18
  65. package/dist/src/index.d.ts +3 -1
  66. package/dist/src/index.js +4 -1
  67. package/dist/src/mcp/serve.js +11 -4
  68. package/dist/src/model.d.ts +36 -0
  69. package/dist/src/model.js +46 -0
  70. package/dist/src/schemas/index.d.ts +17 -0
  71. package/dist/src/schemas/order.v1.schema.json +17 -3
  72. package/dist/src/store.d.ts +33 -1
  73. package/dist/src/store.js +57 -4
  74. package/dist/src/types.d.ts +102 -2
  75. package/docs/agent-runner.md +26 -1
  76. package/docs/authoring.md +7 -0
  77. package/docs/bundles.md +103 -3
  78. package/docs/cli.md +127 -9
  79. package/docs/crypto.md +23 -7
  80. package/docs/shift-logs.md +642 -0
  81. package/docs/wire-contracts.md +34 -19
  82. package/package.json +1 -1
  83. package/plugins/claude-code/plugin/.claude-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  84. package/plugins/claude-code/plugin/.mcp.json +1 -1
  85. package/plugins/codex/plugins/owenloop/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  86. package/plugins/codex/plugins/owenloop/.mcp.json +1 -1
  87. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/model-policy.d.ts +0 -49
  88. package/dist/packages/work/src/agent/model-policy.js +0 -138
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
63
63
  * `{kind:'exited'}` and rejects with the underlying error.
64
64
  */
65
65
  import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
66
- import { ResumeUnavailableError } from "./contract.js";
66
+ import { ResumeUnavailableError, NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES, isNeutralPermissionMode } from "./contract.js";
67
67
  import { register } from "./registry.js";
68
68
  import { normalizeStepPermissions, validateHarnessOptions } from "./permissions.js";
69
69
  import { ADMITTED_OWENLOOP_KEYS, filterOwenloopEnv } from "./child-env.js";
@@ -135,6 +135,36 @@ const SANDBOX_MODES = new Set(['read-only', 'workspace-write', 'danger-full-acce
135
135
  const DEFAULT_SANDBOX = 'workspace-write';
136
136
  /** `AskForApproval` values this adapter passes through untouched. */
137
137
  const NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES = new Set(['untrusted', 'on-request', 'never']);
138
+ /**
139
+ * This adapter's neutral-vocabulary translation. Every value maps: Codex's
140
+ * `AskForApproval` draws all three distinctions itself, so none is refused here.
141
+ *
142
+ * - `ask` → `untrusted` (`AskForApproval::UnlessTrusted`). It escalates every
143
+ * command to the user except a small trusted read-only allowlist — `ls`,
144
+ * `cat`, `sed`. The allowlist is why this is "consults a human before
145
+ * anything beyond trivially safe reads" rather than a literal every-call
146
+ * prompt, which is exactly how the neutral value is worded.
147
+ * - `auto-safe` → `on-request`. The model decides when to escalate. That is the
148
+ * model-side-judgment position, matching the neutral value's meaning.
149
+ * - `full-access` → `never`. Never asks; a failed command is returned to the
150
+ * model instead of raising a prompt.
151
+ *
152
+ * SEPARATE AXIS, DELIBERATELY. None of these touches `sandbox`. What the step
153
+ * may REACH comes from neutral `filesystem` (and the legacy `sandbox`
154
+ * extension); this field only decides who approves reaching it. `full-access`
155
+ * therefore means "never ask", not "unsandboxed" — a step wanting both states
156
+ * both.
157
+ */
158
+ const NEUTRAL_TO_APPROVAL_POLICY = Object.freeze({
159
+ 'ask': 'untrusted',
160
+ 'auto-safe': 'on-request',
161
+ 'full-access': 'never',
162
+ });
163
+ /** Values `codexPreflight` accepts: this adapter's own set plus the neutral vocabulary. */
164
+ const ACCEPTED_APPROVAL_POLICIES = new Set([
165
+ ...NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES,
166
+ ...NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES,
167
+ ]);
138
168
  const UNRESTRICTED_SANDBOX = 'danger-full-access';
139
169
  function unsupportedFilesystemMessage(filesystem) {
140
170
  return (`filesystem '${filesystem}' is unsupported by this adapter because Codex app-server ` +
@@ -173,12 +203,24 @@ function codexPreflight(permissions) {
173
203
  "use sandbox 'workspace-write' or 'danger-full-access'",
174
204
  });
175
205
  }
176
- if (permissions.permissionMode !== undefined &&
177
- !NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES.has(permissions.permissionMode)) {
178
- issues.push({
179
- field: 'permissionMode',
180
- message: `permissionMode must be one of ${[...NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES].join('|')}`,
181
- });
206
+ const authoredMode = permissions.permissionMode;
207
+ if (authoredMode !== undefined) {
208
+ if (!ACCEPTED_APPROVAL_POLICIES.has(authoredMode)) {
209
+ issues.push({
210
+ field: 'permissionMode',
211
+ message: `permissionMode must be one of ${[...ACCEPTED_APPROVAL_POLICIES].join('|')}`,
212
+ });
213
+ }
214
+ else if (isNeutralPermissionMode(authoredMode) &&
215
+ NEUTRAL_TO_APPROVAL_POLICY[authoredMode] === null) {
216
+ // Unreachable today — every neutral value maps here. Kept because the
217
+ // table's `null` arm is a real contract option, and a refusal that only
218
+ // exists once someone uses it is a refusal nobody has tested.
219
+ issues.push({
220
+ field: 'permissionMode',
221
+ message: `permissionMode '${authoredMode}' is unsupported by this adapter`,
222
+ });
223
+ }
182
224
  }
183
225
  const sandbox = permissions.extensions['sandbox'];
184
226
  if (sandbox !== undefined && (typeof sandbox !== 'string' || !SANDBOX_MODES.has(sandbox))) {
@@ -203,9 +245,15 @@ function codexPreflight(permissions) {
203
245
  function toApprovalPolicy(mode) {
204
246
  if (mode === undefined)
205
247
  return 'never';
248
+ if (isNeutralPermissionMode(mode)) {
249
+ const mapped = NEUTRAL_TO_APPROVAL_POLICY[mode];
250
+ if (mapped !== null)
251
+ return mapped;
252
+ throw new Error(`permissionMode '${mode}' is unsupported by this adapter`);
253
+ }
206
254
  if (NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES.has(mode))
207
255
  return mode;
208
- throw new Error(`permissionMode must be one of ${[...NATIVE_APPROVAL_POLICIES].join('|')}`);
256
+ throw new Error(`permissionMode must be one of ${[...ACCEPTED_APPROVAL_POLICIES].join('|')}`);
209
257
  }
210
258
  function isPlainMap(v) {
211
259
  return typeof v === 'object' && v !== null && !Array.isArray(v);
@@ -97,7 +97,11 @@ export interface StepPermissions {
97
97
  filesystem?: FilesystemPermission;
98
98
  /** Network authority requested by the workflow definition. */
99
99
  network?: NetworkPermission;
100
- /** Opaque adapter permission mode. Each adapter validates its own vocabulary. */
100
+ /**
101
+ * Adapter permission mode. Each adapter validates its own vocabulary, PLUS the
102
+ * neutral values every adapter must either translate or refuse — see
103
+ * `NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES`.
104
+ */
101
105
  permissionMode?: string;
102
106
  /** Only ever a positive integer; anything else was dropped in normalization. */
103
107
  maxTurns?: number;
@@ -108,6 +112,66 @@ export interface StepPermissions {
108
112
  * no adapter needs a null check. */
109
113
  extensions: Record<string, unknown>;
110
114
  }
115
+ /**
116
+ * The HARNESS-NEUTRAL `permissionMode` vocabulary: three distinct positions on
117
+ * ONE axis — how much a step may do before a human is consulted.
118
+ *
119
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS. `permissionMode` sits in `NEUTRAL_KEYS` (see
120
+ * `./permissions.ts`) alongside `filesystem` and `network`, but it did not
121
+ * behave like them. `filesystem: unrestricted` is an INTENT the step states and
122
+ * each adapter translates into its own dialect — one shipped adapter turns it
123
+ * into that vendor's own sandbox setting. `permissionMode` had no translation
124
+ * layer at all: the authored string went to the adapter verbatim, and the
125
+ * shipped adapters accept DISJOINT vocabularies for the same ideas, each
126
+ * refusing the other's at preflight. A step therefore had to name one vendor's
127
+ * word, which pinned it to that vendor as surely as an explicit `id:` would
128
+ * have. That is exactly the pin the neutral-key contract exists to prevent.
129
+ *
130
+ * THE THREE POSITIONS ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE. Both shipped harnesses draw the
131
+ * same three distinctions, so collapsing any two would lose a real one:
132
+ *
133
+ * - `ask` — the harness consults a human before anything beyond trivially safe
134
+ * reads. The human is the gate.
135
+ * - `auto-safe` — a model-side classifier judges each action: it proceeds on
136
+ * ordinary work and consults a human only when an action is potentially
137
+ * dangerous. The classifier is the gate; a human is the exception path.
138
+ * - `full-access` — nothing is gated. The harness never consults a human, and
139
+ * a failed action is simply reported back to the model.
140
+ *
141
+ * `auto-safe` is NOT a milder `full-access`: it can still stop and ask. A
142
+ * headless step that must not stall wants `full-access`, and the two exist
143
+ * separately so that choice is stated rather than inferred.
144
+ *
145
+ * `ask` and `auto-safe` are meaningful only where something can answer a
146
+ * prompt. In a Shift-dispatched run nothing can, so a prompt is a stall: the
147
+ * Step Agent stops mid-turn, submits nothing, and the hub re-arms the step into
148
+ * a retry storm whose every worker dies in the same place. That is a reason for
149
+ * a definition author to choose `full-access` for unattended steps, not a
150
+ * reason for an adapter to silently upgrade one value into another.
151
+ *
152
+ * WHAT AN ADAPTER OWES THIS VOCABULARY. For each value an adapter must either
153
+ * map it onto the vendor mode with the same meaning, or refuse it in
154
+ * `preflight` with a `PermissionIssue` naming `permissionMode`. Refusing is a
155
+ * legitimate answer and fails closed: the worker releases its claim and starts
156
+ * no model process. Mapping a value onto a mode that grants MORE than the value
157
+ * describes is never legitimate.
158
+ *
159
+ * VENDOR VALUES ARE UNCHANGED. Each adapter still accepts its own native
160
+ * vocabulary and still refuses every other adapter's. These values are an
161
+ * ADDITION, so no already-published definition changes meaning.
162
+ */
163
+ export declare const NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES: readonly ["ask", "auto-safe", "full-access"];
164
+ export type NeutralPermissionMode = (typeof NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES)[number];
165
+ /**
166
+ * An adapter's neutral-vocabulary translation table.
167
+ *
168
+ * EXHAUSTIVE BY TYPE, and that is the point: adding a fourth neutral value
169
+ * breaks compilation in every adapter until each one decides what it means
170
+ * there. `null` is the explicit "this adapter has no equivalent" decision and
171
+ * makes `preflight` refuse — distinct from an adapter that simply forgot.
172
+ */
173
+ export type NeutralPermissionModeMap = Readonly<Record<NeutralPermissionMode, string | null>>;
174
+ export declare function isNeutralPermissionMode(value: string): value is NeutralPermissionMode;
111
175
  /** One fail-closed adapter preflight refusal. */
112
176
  export interface PermissionIssue {
113
177
  /** The normalized permission field or extension key responsible, when one exists. */
@@ -1,3 +1,59 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * The HARNESS-NEUTRAL `permissionMode` vocabulary: three distinct positions on
3
+ * ONE axis — how much a step may do before a human is consulted.
4
+ *
5
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS. `permissionMode` sits in `NEUTRAL_KEYS` (see
6
+ * `./permissions.ts`) alongside `filesystem` and `network`, but it did not
7
+ * behave like them. `filesystem: unrestricted` is an INTENT the step states and
8
+ * each adapter translates into its own dialect — one shipped adapter turns it
9
+ * into that vendor's own sandbox setting. `permissionMode` had no translation
10
+ * layer at all: the authored string went to the adapter verbatim, and the
11
+ * shipped adapters accept DISJOINT vocabularies for the same ideas, each
12
+ * refusing the other's at preflight. A step therefore had to name one vendor's
13
+ * word, which pinned it to that vendor as surely as an explicit `id:` would
14
+ * have. That is exactly the pin the neutral-key contract exists to prevent.
15
+ *
16
+ * THE THREE POSITIONS ARE NOT INTERCHANGEABLE. Both shipped harnesses draw the
17
+ * same three distinctions, so collapsing any two would lose a real one:
18
+ *
19
+ * - `ask` — the harness consults a human before anything beyond trivially safe
20
+ * reads. The human is the gate.
21
+ * - `auto-safe` — a model-side classifier judges each action: it proceeds on
22
+ * ordinary work and consults a human only when an action is potentially
23
+ * dangerous. The classifier is the gate; a human is the exception path.
24
+ * - `full-access` — nothing is gated. The harness never consults a human, and
25
+ * a failed action is simply reported back to the model.
26
+ *
27
+ * `auto-safe` is NOT a milder `full-access`: it can still stop and ask. A
28
+ * headless step that must not stall wants `full-access`, and the two exist
29
+ * separately so that choice is stated rather than inferred.
30
+ *
31
+ * `ask` and `auto-safe` are meaningful only where something can answer a
32
+ * prompt. In a Shift-dispatched run nothing can, so a prompt is a stall: the
33
+ * Step Agent stops mid-turn, submits nothing, and the hub re-arms the step into
34
+ * a retry storm whose every worker dies in the same place. That is a reason for
35
+ * a definition author to choose `full-access` for unattended steps, not a
36
+ * reason for an adapter to silently upgrade one value into another.
37
+ *
38
+ * WHAT AN ADAPTER OWES THIS VOCABULARY. For each value an adapter must either
39
+ * map it onto the vendor mode with the same meaning, or refuse it in
40
+ * `preflight` with a `PermissionIssue` naming `permissionMode`. Refusing is a
41
+ * legitimate answer and fails closed: the worker releases its claim and starts
42
+ * no model process. Mapping a value onto a mode that grants MORE than the value
43
+ * describes is never legitimate.
44
+ *
45
+ * VENDOR VALUES ARE UNCHANGED. Each adapter still accepts its own native
46
+ * vocabulary and still refuses every other adapter's. These values are an
47
+ * ADDITION, so no already-published definition changes meaning.
48
+ */
49
+ export const NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES = Object.freeze([
50
+ 'ask',
51
+ 'auto-safe',
52
+ 'full-access',
53
+ ]);
54
+ export function isNeutralPermissionMode(value) {
55
+ return NEUTRAL_PERMISSION_MODES.includes(value);
56
+ }
1
57
  /** The `code` every `ResumeUnavailableError` carries. Match on THIS, not on the class. */
2
58
  export const RESUME_UNAVAILABLE = 'RESUME_UNAVAILABLE';
3
59
  /**
@@ -40,7 +40,9 @@ export interface SessionRecord {
40
40
  updatedAt: number;
41
41
  }
42
42
  export interface SessionStoreOptions {
43
- /** Called once per skipped corrupt line. Default writes to stderr. */
43
+ /** Called once per skipped line — either corrupt bytes that would not parse
44
+ * ("skipping corrupt record") or a parsed object that failed the schema
45
+ * ("skipping invalid record"). Default writes to stderr. */
44
46
  warn?: (line: string) => void;
45
47
  /** Test barrier invoked under the writer lock after a retirement snapshot. */
46
48
  afterWriterSnapshot?: () => void;
@@ -18,9 +18,10 @@
18
18
  *
19
19
  * FAILURE STANCE, three different answers on purpose:
20
20
  * - READ is fail-open: a missing file reads as `[]` (mirrors `readChildRecords`
21
- * in `src/shift/state.ts`), and a corrupt line is skipped and reported
22
- * through the injectable `warn` callback, never thrown. A store that cannot
23
- * be parsed must degrade a resume into a replay, not break the worker.
21
+ * in `src/shift/state.ts`), and an unusable line — corrupt bytes that will
22
+ * not parse, or a parsed object that fails the schema — is skipped and
23
+ * reported through the injectable `warn` callback, never thrown. A store that
24
+ * cannot be parsed must degrade a resume into a replay, not break the worker.
24
25
  * - APPEND PROPAGATES. Unlike the shift's advisory metering records, a lost
25
26
  * session token silently degrades a Phase 4 resume into a cold replay — real
26
27
  * work thrown away — so the caller must see the failure.
@@ -79,28 +80,44 @@ function isNonEmptyString(v) {
79
80
  return typeof v === 'string' && v !== '';
80
81
  }
81
82
  /**
82
- * Validate one parsed line. Checks exactly the fields whose absence would make
83
- * the record unusable for a resume: the three key fields plus the harness and
84
- * token it exists to carry, and a `status` inside the four literals. Everything
85
- * else is carried verbatim.
83
+ * The non-empty-string fields `isSessionRecord` requires, in the order it checks
84
+ * them. Declared once and kept stable so a record failing several checks always
85
+ * reports the SAME field, which keeps the skip message deterministic.
86
+ * `status` is not here — its check is a membership test, not a string test — and
87
+ * is applied after these, preserving the original check order.
86
88
  */
87
- function isSessionRecord(v) {
89
+ const SESSION_RECORD_STRING_FIELDS = ['workflow', 'run', 'step', 'harness', 'token'];
90
+ /**
91
+ * Name of the first field of `v` that fails the `SessionRecord` schema, or
92
+ * `null` when the record is valid. `'<root>'` means `v` is not a plain object at
93
+ * all, so no field could be read from it.
94
+ *
95
+ * THE SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for record validity: `isSessionRecord` is defined
96
+ * in terms of this function, so the accept/reject decision and the reported
97
+ * field name can never drift apart.
98
+ *
99
+ * Checks exactly the fields whose absence would make the record unusable for a
100
+ * resume: the three key fields plus the harness and token it exists to carry,
101
+ * and a `status` inside the four literals. Everything else is carried verbatim.
102
+ */
103
+ function firstInvalidSessionRecordField(v) {
88
104
  if (typeof v !== 'object' || v === null || Array.isArray(v))
89
- return false;
105
+ return '<root>';
90
106
  const r = v;
91
- if (!isNonEmptyString(r['workflow']))
92
- return false;
93
- if (!isNonEmptyString(r['run']))
94
- return false;
95
- if (!isNonEmptyString(r['step']))
96
- return false;
97
- if (!isNonEmptyString(r['harness']))
98
- return false;
99
- if (!isNonEmptyString(r['token']))
100
- return false;
107
+ for (const field of SESSION_RECORD_STRING_FIELDS) {
108
+ if (!isNonEmptyString(r[field]))
109
+ return field;
110
+ }
101
111
  if (typeof r['status'] !== 'string' || !STATUSES.has(r['status']))
102
- return false;
103
- return true;
112
+ return 'status';
113
+ return null;
114
+ }
115
+ /**
116
+ * Validate one parsed line. A type predicate, so a `true` return narrows `v` to
117
+ * `SessionRecord` at the call site.
118
+ */
119
+ function isSessionRecord(v) {
120
+ return firstInvalidSessionRecordField(v) === null;
104
121
  }
105
122
  /** Flush a directory entry update where the platform exposes directory fsync. */
106
123
  function syncDirectory(dir, sync = fsyncSync) {
@@ -262,7 +279,14 @@ export function readSessions(file, opts = {}) {
262
279
  continue;
263
280
  }
264
281
  if (!isSessionRecord(parsed)) {
265
- warn(`owenloop work sessions: skipping corrupt record at ${file}:${i + 1}`);
282
+ // DISTINCT WORDING ON PURPOSE — "invalid", not "corrupt". These bytes
283
+ // parsed fine; they just failed the schema. 36 records once whose only
284
+ // fault was an empty `token` were all reported as "corrupt", which sent
285
+ // debugging after a file-integrity problem that did not exist. The second
286
+ // pass runs only on this failure branch, so valid records pay nothing.
287
+ // The field NAME only, never its value — `token` is credential-shaped.
288
+ const badField = firstInvalidSessionRecordField(parsed) ?? '<unknown>';
289
+ warn(`owenloop work sessions: skipping invalid record at ${file}:${i + 1}: field "${badField}" failed schema check`);
266
290
  continue;
267
291
  }
268
292
  out.push(parsed);
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
28
28
  */
29
29
  import { textResult } from "../mcp/server.js";
30
30
  import { buildSubmitProof } from "../submit-proof.js";
31
+ import { normalizeSubmitValue } from "../submit-value.js";
31
32
  import { createHoldLoop } from "./loop.js";
32
33
  export const HOLD_MCP_TOOL_NAMES = ['get_order', 'submit', 'reject'];
33
34
  function errMsg(e) {
@@ -173,6 +174,12 @@ export function createHoldMcp(deps) {
173
174
  return textResult({ error: 'submit requires a "value"' }, true);
174
175
  }
175
176
  const done = args['done'];
177
+ // Normalize a JSON-encoded string value to the object the hub would
178
+ // store BEFORE signing it. Signing the string instead makes the hub drop
179
+ // the proof (it stores normalized bytes the signature does not cover),
180
+ // silently, on both sides — see `../submit-value.ts`. One value is used
181
+ // for both the proof and the wire so the two can never diverge.
182
+ const value = normalizeSubmitValue(args['value']);
176
183
  try {
177
184
  // Submit is also a dynamic-data boundary. Fetch and gate the bound
178
185
  // packet even when no origin was supplied for submit-proof signing;
@@ -192,7 +199,7 @@ export function createHoldMcp(deps) {
192
199
  origin: deps.origin,
193
200
  order: orderResponse.order,
194
201
  path,
195
- value: args['value'],
202
+ value,
196
203
  now: deps.now,
197
204
  warn: deps.err,
198
205
  ...(deps.principalKeys !== undefined ? { principalKeys: deps.principalKeys } : {}),
@@ -204,7 +211,7 @@ export function createHoldMcp(deps) {
204
211
  workflow,
205
212
  run,
206
213
  path,
207
- value: args['value'],
214
+ value,
208
215
  ...(typeof done === 'boolean' ? { done } : {}),
209
216
  ...(proof !== undefined ? { proof } : {}),
210
217
  ...holderReq,
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
1
- import type { GetOrderRequest, GetOrderResponse, HeartbeatRequest, HeartbeatResponse, PresencePingRequest, PresencePingResponse, ReleaseRequest, ReleaseResponse, RejectRequest, RejectResponse, SubmitRequest, SubmitResponse, WakeResponse, WhatsNextRequest, WhatsNextResponse, WhoamiResponse } from './types.ts';
1
+ import type { GetOrderRequest, GetOrderResponse, HeartbeatRequest, HeartbeatResponse, PresencePingRequest, PresencePingResponse, ReleaseRequest, ReleaseResponse, RejectRequest, RejectResponse, ReportResolutionRequest, ReportResolutionResponse, SubmitRequest, SubmitResponse, WakeResponse, WhatsNextRequest, WhatsNextResponse, WhoamiResponse } from './types.ts';
2
2
  export interface HubClientOptions {
3
3
  /** Hub origin, e.g. `https://hub.owenloop.dev` (no trailing slash needed). */
4
4
  origin: string;
@@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ export interface HubClient {
14
14
  release(req: ReleaseRequest): Promise<ReleaseResponse>;
15
15
  submit(req: SubmitRequest): Promise<SubmitResponse>;
16
16
  reject(req: RejectRequest): Promise<RejectResponse>;
17
+ /**
18
+ * Plan §6: record what this shift resolved the order's compound capability to,
19
+ * BEFORE the harness launches. Idempotent on the hub by order id, so a
20
+ * re-dispatch no-ops rather than overwriting the first (pre-spend) record.
21
+ */
22
+ reportResolution(req: ReportResolutionRequest): Promise<ReportResolutionResponse>;
17
23
  whoami(): Promise<WhoamiResponse>;
18
24
  /** B5 cheap wake pre-check; `cursor` rides the query string only when set. */
19
25
  wake(cursor?: number): Promise<WakeResponse>;
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ export function createHubClient(opts) {
82
82
  release: (req) => post('release', req),
83
83
  submit: (req) => post('submit', req),
84
84
  reject: (req) => post('reject', req),
85
+ reportResolution: (req) => post('report_resolution', req),
85
86
  whoami: () => get('whoami'),
86
87
  // Cursor is an opaque non-negative integer; omit it entirely to bootstrap
87
88
  // (the hub treats missing/invalid as a `changed: true` first sweep).
@@ -31,7 +31,13 @@ export interface WorkOrder {
31
31
  consumedFingerprint?: Record<string, number>;
32
32
  owes?: Array<{
33
33
  path: string;
34
- /** Claim-time committed version when a version-aware hub projects it. */
34
+ /**
35
+ * The TARGET version for this owed output when a version-aware hub
36
+ * projects it: the version the next successful producer commit lands
37
+ * (claim-time committed version + 1), NOT the currently-committed one.
38
+ * It is what a producer signs in its submission proof and what a
39
+ * downstream consumer checks that proof against.
40
+ */
35
41
  version?: number;
36
42
  judgmentRejects: number;
37
43
  schemaRejects: number;
@@ -176,6 +182,29 @@ export interface OrderPacket {
176
182
  outputs: string[];
177
183
  /** Opaque location hint — the worker's cwd when set. */
178
184
  workdir?: string;
185
+ /**
186
+ * THE COMPOSED CAPABILITIES this order was offered under, in the step's
187
+ * authored order — `['build:deep']` for a `build` step on a `deep` run. This
188
+ * is the key into the shift's `capabilityModels` map (see
189
+ * `src/agent/capability-model.ts`), and therefore what decides which model and
190
+ * effort run. Absent from a pre-modifier hub, which is why the worker treats
191
+ * an empty list as "nothing to resolve against" and refuses rather than
192
+ * guessing.
193
+ */
194
+ capabilities?: string[];
195
+ /** The run's routing modifier (`deep`), as the caller asked for at start_run. */
196
+ modifier?: string;
197
+ /**
198
+ * `true` when the engine re-offered this step at its escalation target instead
199
+ * of the run's own modifier. The worker does not act on it; it goes in the
200
+ * brief so the agent knows it is on the recovery path.
201
+ */
202
+ escalated?: boolean;
203
+ /**
204
+ * DEPRECATED, and no longer read by the agent loop. The def's authored tier
205
+ * name (`strong`) from the pre-modifier scheme. The hub still projects it for
206
+ * older workers; this one resolves from `capabilities` alone.
207
+ */
179
208
  model?: string;
180
209
  /** Worker kind; `'command'` for command orders, absent means agent. */
181
210
  worker?: string;
@@ -186,12 +215,18 @@ export interface OrderPacket {
186
215
  consumes: Record<string, unknown>;
187
216
  /** Claim-time consumed versions when a compatible hub preserves the map. */
188
217
  consumedFingerprint?: Record<string, number>;
189
- /** Target-protocol proof map; the deployed hub currently omits this field. */
218
+ /** Serialized submission proof for the consumed values, projected by a
219
+ * proof-aware hub. Absent from any hub that does not store submit proofs;
220
+ * consume-side verification then reports the artifact as unproven. */
190
221
  consumesProof?: string;
191
222
  /** The owed outputs and their reason threads. */
192
223
  owes: Array<{
193
224
  path: string;
194
- /** Claim-time committed version when a version-aware hub projects it. */
225
+ /** Target version for this output's next successful commit (claim-time
226
+ * committed version + 1), issued by a version-aware hub inside the claim
227
+ * transaction. This is what a producer signs in its submission proof.
228
+ * Absent from a hub that is not version-aware, which leaves the producer
229
+ * submit unsigned. */
195
230
  version?: number;
196
231
  judgmentRejects: number;
197
232
  schemaRejects: number;
@@ -223,6 +258,39 @@ export interface HeartbeatRequest {
223
258
  holder?: ContactHolder;
224
259
  }
225
260
  export type HeartbeatResponse = HubResponse;
261
+ /**
262
+ * Which settings row served the order, mirroring hub-core's `ResolutionMatch`.
263
+ * `refused` is a real, reportable outcome: the shift found no row and will not
264
+ * launch anything, and that is exactly the fact worth recording.
265
+ */
266
+ export type ResolutionMatch = 'exact' | 'bare' | 'refused';
267
+ export interface ResolutionPayload {
268
+ /** The settings key that matched (`build:deep`, or `build` on a bare match). */
269
+ capability: string;
270
+ match: ResolutionMatch;
271
+ /** Absent on `refused`, and on a command order, which selects no model. */
272
+ model?: string;
273
+ effort?: string;
274
+ harness?: string;
275
+ }
276
+ export interface ReportResolutionRequest {
277
+ workflow: string;
278
+ run: string;
279
+ resolution: ResolutionPayload;
280
+ }
281
+ /**
282
+ * The hub is idempotent by order id: `recorded: false` means a report for this
283
+ * run already stood and was left unchanged. `claimed` is the live lease state,
284
+ * disclosed and never enforced — a `false` here means the order is no longer
285
+ * this worker's to run.
286
+ */
287
+ export interface ReportResolutionResponse extends HubResponse {
288
+ workflow: string;
289
+ run: string;
290
+ step: string;
291
+ recorded: boolean;
292
+ claimed: boolean;
293
+ }
226
294
  export type ReleaseRequest = {
227
295
  session: string;
228
296
  } | {
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ import "../harnesses.js";
87
87
  import { hostname } from 'node:os';
88
88
  import { resolveCacheDir } from "../bundle/cache.js";
89
89
  import { createAgentRunLoop } from "../agent/loop.js";
90
- import { createModelPolicy } from "../agent/model-policy.js";
91
90
  import { createDefaultStoreInstructionResolver } from "../exec/instructions.js";
92
91
  import { createConsumedVerifier } from "../consumed-verifier.js";
93
92
  import { createHubClient } from "../hub/client.js";
@@ -199,6 +198,7 @@ export function exitCodeFor(outcome) {
199
198
  case 'no-template':
200
199
  case 'no-harness':
201
200
  case 'incompatible-harness-policy':
201
+ case 'unresolvable-capability':
202
202
  case 'unverified-consumed':
203
203
  case 'session-store-failed':
204
204
  case 'no-submit':
@@ -264,13 +264,12 @@ export async function run(args, deps = {}) {
264
264
  err(`owenloop work agent-run: ${errMsg(e)}`);
265
265
  return 1;
266
266
  }
267
- const modelPolicy = createModelPolicy({
268
- ...(settings.tierMap !== undefined ? { tierMap: settings.tierMap } : {}),
269
- ...(settings.escalateAt !== undefined ? { escalateAt: settings.escalateAt } : {}),
270
- ...(settings.escalationExtensionKey !== undefined
271
- ? { escalationExtensionKey: settings.escalationExtensionKey }
272
- : {}),
273
- });
267
+ // Passed through verbatim. `loadSettings` already validated every row (shape,
268
+ // effort on the ladder, effort accepted by a known model), so there is nothing
269
+ // left to normalize here — and nothing to default: an absent map means the
270
+ // loop refuses capability-bearing orders, which is the intended answer for a
271
+ // shift that never declared what serves what.
272
+ const capabilityModels = settings.capabilityModels;
274
273
  const origin = parsed.origin ?? settings.hubOrigin;
275
274
  if (origin === undefined || origin.trim() === '') {
276
275
  err('owenloop work agent-run: no hub origin — pass --origin <url> or set hubOrigin in settings');
@@ -498,7 +497,7 @@ export async function run(args, deps = {}) {
498
497
  cwd: workCwd,
499
498
  loadStep,
500
499
  resolveAdapter,
501
- modelPolicy,
500
+ ...(capabilityModels !== undefined ? { capabilityModels } : {}),
502
501
  consumedVerifier,
503
502
  appendSession: writeSession,
504
503
  nextAttempt: (workflow, run, step) => {
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ interface ParsedArgs {
15
15
  ignoreStdin: boolean;
16
16
  mcp: boolean;
17
17
  mcpTools?: HoldMcpToolName[];
18
+ /** Never hand the claim back — another process is the holder of record. */
19
+ neverRelease?: boolean;
18
20
  error?: string;
19
21
  }
20
22
  /** Parse `--flag value` and `--flag=value`; unknown flags are an error. */