owenloop 0.3.1 → 0.4.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +13 -0
- package/README.md +6 -0
- package/dist/cli.d.ts +3 -7
- package/dist/cli.js +184 -128
- package/dist/hub.d.ts +230 -6
- package/dist/hub.js +379 -4
- package/dist/index.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/docs/cli.md +74 -11
- package/docs/embedding.md +34 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/hub.d.ts
CHANGED
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@@ -10,6 +10,34 @@
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* etc.) so this module stays trivially testable and `cli.ts` doesn't widen its
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* export surface.
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*
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* The keychain backend selection and the read side of credential storage also
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* live here (`defaultKeychain` / `resolveKeychain` / `credentialBackend` /
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* `readStoredCredential`): the `security` shell-out is synchronous and
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* injectable, so it stays consistent with this module's network-free, testable
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* charter, and it lets the public barrel (`src/index.ts`) export a supported
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* read-only `readStoredCredential` without pulling in `cli.ts` (which the
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* core/hub boundary lint forbids). `cli.ts` keeps thin wrappers so there is one
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* implementation of backend selection, not two.
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*
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* Backend precedence is **external → keychain → file**, resolved once in
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* `credentialBackend`. The external backend is an OPTIONAL, explicitly
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* configured command (`OWENLOOP_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND`) that prints a credential
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* for the requested `(origin, slot)` — it gives non-macOS workers, CI, and
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* users whose secrets live in a secret manager a supported way to feed owenloop
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* a credential without owenloop learning about any specific manager. When it is
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* configured it is AUTHORITATIVE: a failure of any kind is a loud error and
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* never a fallthrough to a store (see `runCredentialCommand`). When it is not
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* configured, behaviour is byte-for-byte what it was before it existed.
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*
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* Credentials are keyed by **slot**, not by origin alone: one stored credential
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* per `(normalized origin, principal-account)` pair, the slot being `human` or
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* `agent:<account>` (account defaults to `default`). See `CredentialSlotSelector`
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* and `credentialSlot`. A reader must always name the slot it wants — it can
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* never guess — so a host or CLI verb can never accidentally read the wrong
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* principal's credential. There is deliberately NO migration from the older
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* one-slot-per-origin keying: entries written under it are simply never found
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* and read as absent; the upgrade step is re-running `login`.
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*
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* `.owenloop/hub.json` is a pure binding (which hub this project publishes to)
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* — there is no client-side push ledger. `push` diffs local defs against the
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* server's own `hash` (`GET /api/workflows`, see `computeServerDiff`), and
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@@ -106,9 +134,11 @@ export declare function pkcePair(): PkcePair;
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/** A random anti-CSRF `state` token for the authorization request. */
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export declare function randomState(): string;
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/**
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-
* Stored per
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*
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*
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* Stored per **slot** — one credential per `(normalized origin, slot)` pair,
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* the slot being `human` or `agent:<account>` (see `CredentialSlotSelector`).
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* Never logged or echoed. `oauth` carries a refreshable pair (loopback flow);
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* `agent` is a pasted `olp_` token and `oauth-pasted` a pasted `mcpat_` access
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* token — neither refreshes.
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*/
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export type Credential = {
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kind: 'oauth';
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@@ -123,14 +153,82 @@ export type Credential = {
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kind: 'oauth-pasted';
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accessToken: string;
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};
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/**
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* Which stored credential to address: the human's, or a named agent account's.
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*
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* A credential lives in a **slot** — `human`, or `agent:<account>` with
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* `account` defaulting to `'default'`. The slot is part of the storage key on
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* both backends (keychain account, and the second level of the credential
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* file's `hubs` map), so `human` and `agent:default` on the same origin are
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* distinct entries that never collide, and neither does `agent:ci` with
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* `agent:release`.
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*
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* The discriminator is an **account**, never a "label" — labels are a different
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* axis of the system and the word is reserved.
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*/
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export type CredentialSlotSelector = {
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principal: 'human';
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} | {
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principal: 'agent';
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account?: string;
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};
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/**
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* The credential file (`~/.config/owenloop/credentials.json`), v2: origin →
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* slot → credential. `version` is `2`; a file carrying any other version reads
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* as an EMPTY store (see `readCredentialFile`) — that is how entries under the
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* older one-slot-per-origin keying become invisible without any migration code.
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*/
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export interface CredentialFile {
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version:
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hubs: Record<string, Credential
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version: 2;
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hubs: Record<string, Record<string, Credential>>;
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}
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/**
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* Resolve a selector to its slot string: `'human'` or `` `agent:${account}` ``.
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*
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* This is the ONE place account defaulting and validation happen — every read,
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* write, and delete path funnels through it, so no call site re-implements the
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* `agent:` concatenation. Throws on an invalid account name, and on `account`
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* supplied alongside `principal: 'human'`: TypeScript's excess-property check
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* does not reliably reject that against a union, so it is a runtime error too
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* rather than a silently ignored argument.
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*
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* `agent:human` cannot collide with `human` by construction — the `agent:`
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* prefix differs — so no extra guard is needed.
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*/
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export declare function credentialSlot(sel: CredentialSlotSelector): string;
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/**
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* The keychain SERVICE for a hub origin; the slot is the keychain ACCOUNT.
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* `origin` must already be `normalizeOrigin`d — every call site normalizes
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* first, so SEC-2 (remote plaintext rejected) happens before any keychain or
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* filesystem access.
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*/
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export declare function keychainServiceFor(normalizedOrigin: string): string;
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/**
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* Shape-guard a stored credential value, returning `null` when it is not a
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* well-formed `Credential`. Used on BOTH backends so "a corrupt entry reads as
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* absent" is symmetric: previously the keychain path did an unchecked
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* `JSON.parse(...) as Credential` and the file path validated nothing at all,
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* so a truncated or hand-edited entry could surface as a bogus credential
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* instead of a clean miss.
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*/
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export declare function parseCredential(raw: unknown): Credential | null;
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/** The user-level config dir (never the project dir). Derives from the caller's env. */
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export declare function configDir(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): string;
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export declare function credentialFilePath(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): string;
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-
/**
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/**
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* Read the credential file; a missing file is an empty store, not an error.
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*
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* A file whose `version` is not `2` also reads as an EMPTY store — no throw, no
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* migration, no hybrid write. That is how entries under the older
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* one-slot-per-origin keying become invisible (there are no external users, so
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* the documented upgrade step is re-running `login`). Stated deliberately: the
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* next write then replaces such a file wholesale, which is acceptable because
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* its entries are unreachable by design.
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*
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* Genuinely broken JSON, or a `hubs` that is not an object, still throws —
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* "corrupt reads as absent" is about a corrupt ENTRY (see `parseCredential`),
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* not a destroyed file.
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*/
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export declare function readCredentialFile(path: string): CredentialFile;
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/**
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* Write `data` to `path` atomically, refusing a symlinked (or directory)
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@@ -165,6 +263,132 @@ export declare function writeFileAtomic(path: string, data: string, opts?: {
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* is refused (SEC-3).
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*/
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export declare function writeCredentialFile(path: string, file: CredentialFile): void;
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/**
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* An OS keychain backend, keyed by `(service, account)` — the service is
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* `keychainServiceFor(origin)` (`owenloop:<origin>`) and the account is the
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* credential slot (`human` / `agent:<name>`). The pair mirrors macOS
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* `security`'s own `-s`/`-a` arguments. The default implementation (macOS
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* `security` generic passwords) is `defaultKeychain`; tests and embedding hosts
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* inject their own. Never logs or echoes the secret.
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*/
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export interface Keychain {
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get(service: string, account: string): string | null;
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set(service: string, account: string, value: string): void;
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delete(service: string, account: string): void;
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}
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/**
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* The default macOS keychain backend (generic passwords under service
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* `owenloop:<origin>`, account = the credential slot). The secret is fed through
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* the `security -i` command stream on stdin, never as a `-w` argv value, so it
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* never appears in `ps`/shell history. Returns `undefined` off macOS or when
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* `OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN=1`, so callers fall back to the 0600 credential file.
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*/
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export declare function defaultKeychain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): Keychain | undefined;
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/**
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* The configured external credential command, or `undefined` when it is unset
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* or blank.
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*
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* Configuration is a single environment variable, `OWENLOOP_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND`,
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* read off the caller-supplied `env` record like every other knob in this module
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* (`OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN`, `OWENLOOP_HUB`, the `*_TIMEOUT_MS` overrides) — never
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* `process.env` directly, so hosts and tests stay hermetic. Explicit config
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* only: there is deliberately no discovery, no scanning for helper binaries, and
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* no implicit default.
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*
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* An all-whitespace value is treated as NOT configured, and that decision is
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* made HERE rather than at each call site, so "is the external backend active?"
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* has exactly one answer.
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*/
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export declare function externalCredentialCommand(env: Record<string, string | undefined>): string | undefined;
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/**
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* Resolve the keychain backend for this env, honoring the hard override:
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* `OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN=1` forces the file backend (`undefined`) EVEN when a
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* keychain is injected; otherwise the injected backend wins, else the platform
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* default.
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*/
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export declare function resolveKeychain(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, injected?: Keychain): Keychain | undefined;
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/**
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* The credential backend, decided ONCE from env/config and then used
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* consistently for read and write. Deciding once — rather than per-operation —
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* is the REL-6 fix: the old error-driven fallback let a write land in the file
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* while a later read hit the (absent/stale) keychain, so a credential could
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* shadow itself across backends.
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*
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* Precedence is **external → keychain → file**. Resolving all three here, in one
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* place, is what makes "decided once" and "a configured external command wins
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* over a populated keychain or file entry" the same fact, with no second
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* decision point that could drift.
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*/
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export type CredentialBackend = {
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kind: 'external';
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command: string;
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} | {
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kind: 'keychain';
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kc: Keychain;
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} | {
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kind: 'file';
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};
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/**
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* `OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN=1` deliberately does NOT affect the external branch: it
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* selects between the two LOCAL stores, and the external command sits in front
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* of both.
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*/
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export declare function credentialBackend(env: Record<string, string | undefined>, injected?: Keychain): CredentialBackend;
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/**
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* Options for `readStoredCredential`. The slot selector is REQUIRED (it is
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* spread into this type, not optional): the caller must name which principal's
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* credential it wants.
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*/
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export type ReadStoredCredentialOpts = CredentialSlotSelector & {
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/** Environment to consult (OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN, HOME/XDG_CONFIG_HOME). Default: `process.env`. */
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env?: Record<string, string | undefined>;
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/** Injectable keychain backend (tests / embedding hosts). Ignored when OWENLOOP_NO_KEYCHAIN=1. */
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keychain?: Keychain;
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};
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/**
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* Read the stored hub credential for `origin` **in the named slot** from the
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* chosen backend ONLY — the supported, read-only programmatic surface
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* (owenwork's CredentialReader seam wires to this once released). Secret hygiene
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* is unchanged: this function never logs or echoes the returned credential, and
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* there is deliberately no write/delete companion on the public surface —
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* `login` / `logout` remain the only way to store or remove a credential.
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*
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* `opts` and its `principal` are both required, so a caller can never
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* accidentally read the wrong principal's credential:
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*
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* ```ts
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* readStoredCredential(origin, { principal: 'human' });
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* readStoredCredential(origin, { principal: 'agent' }); // agent:default
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* readStoredCredential(origin, { principal: 'agent', account: 'ci' }); // agent:ci
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* ```
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*
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* Passing `account` with `principal: 'human'` throws (see `credentialSlot`),
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* because TypeScript's excess-property check does not reliably reject it
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* against a union.
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*
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* `origin` is normalized (idempotent on already-normalized input, so the CLI's
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* pre-normalized callers are unaffected) BEFORE any keychain or filesystem
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* access, so the storage key matches what `login` persisted and an invalid or
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* plaintext-remote origin throws at normalization (SEC-2), exactly as the CLI
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* would.
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*
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* Backend is selected once (`credentialBackend`), with precedence external →
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* keychain → file. A keychain-backed read NEVER falls through to the file (that
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* fallback was the REL-6 shadowing bug), and a corrupt entry reads as absent
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* (`null`) on either store — never as a reason to consult the other. The file
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* backend derives its path from the supplied `env` (HOME / XDG_CONFIG_HOME),
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* never `process.env` directly, so a caller passing `opts.env` stays hermetic;
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* only the top-level default falls back to `process.env`.
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*
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* **When `OWENLOOP_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND` is configured this function can THROW
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* instead of returning `null`**, and it does not consult a store at all. The
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* command is authoritative, so a nonzero exit, a timeout, empty output, or
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* output that is not a well-formed credential is a loud error naming the origin
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* and the slot — never a silent fallthrough to a stale local entry. See
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* `runCredentialCommand`. When it is NOT configured, behaviour is exactly what
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* it has always been.
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*/
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export declare function readStoredCredential(origin: string, opts: ReadStoredCredentialOpts): Credential | null;
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/**
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* `.owenloop/hub.json` — written by `connect`. Safe to commit: contains no
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170
394
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* secrets, only the bound hub origin. Purely a binding — `push` diffs against
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