otto-execute 0.1.0

package/dist/vendor/otto-intel-mcp/execution-errors.js

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+export const EXECUTION_REFUSAL_CODES = [
+    'ATTRIBUTION_MISSING',
+    /**
+     * The total take on the route exceeds the configured aggregate cap, while Otto's own
+     * attribution is present, exactly-valued, and correctly addressed.
+     *
+     * Kept distinct from `ATTRIBUTION_MISSING` on purpose: the configured cap sits exactly on the
+     * live aggregate (LI.FI platform 15 bps + Otto 10 bps = the 25 bps cap), so any upstream
+     * pricing move — a platform rate change, a relay fee appearing on a route, a new finality
+     * tier — takes the route over the cap. That is an upstream repricing to investigate, not a
+     * fee-integrity attack, and reporting both under one code would make a total outage
+     * indistinguishable from someone tampering with Otto's fee.
+     */
+    'LIFI_FEE_CAP_EXCEEDED',
+    'ACCOUNT_BINDING_MISMATCH',
+    'DIGEST_MISMATCH',
+    'ARTIFACT_INVALID',
+    'STALE_ARTIFACT',
+    'EXECUTION_RATE_LIMITED',
+    'EXECUTION_CONCURRENCY_FULL',
+    'UNSUPPORTED_ACCOUNT_PROFILE',
+    'LIFI_QUOTE_FAILED',
+    'LIFI_QUOTE_INVALID',
+    'UNSUPPORTED_LIFI_ROUTE',
+    /** A public Polymarket CLOB metadata read failed outright (transport, HTTP, or non-JSON). */
+    'POLYMARKET_METADATA_FAILED',
+    /** The read succeeded but the body is not a shape the constructor may act on. */
+    'POLYMARKET_METADATA_INVALID',
+    /** The market, tick size, price, or size is outside what this constructor supports by name. */
+    'UNSUPPORTED_POLYMARKET_MARKET',
+    /** The constructed order failed a decode-back assertion on the exact bytes to be signed. */
+    'POLYMARKET_ORDER_INVALID',
+    /**
+     * The live builder registry no longer carries the RULED rates. Distinct from
+     * `ATTRIBUTION_MISSING` on purpose: Otto's attribution is present and enabled, but the rate value
+     * in force is not the one the config version documents, and the value itself is a Founder ruling
+     * (spec §13 — the taker-rate flip waits on the `/builder/trades` volume pull). The constructor
+     * refuses rather than guessing which rate the caller is about to pay.
+     */
+    'POLYMARKET_BUILDER_FEE_UNRULED',
+    /** A public Hyperliquid info read failed outright (transport, HTTP, or non-JSON). */
+    'HYPERLIQUID_META_FAILED',
+    /** The read succeeded but the perp universe is not a shape the constructor may act on. */
+    'HYPERLIQUID_META_INVALID',
+    /**
+     * The asset, price, or size is outside what the venue accepts, by name: an unknown or delisted
+     * perp, a price off the venue's own significant-figure/decimal grid, or a size finer than the
+     * asset's `szDecimals`. Refused rather than rounded — a rounded price is a different order than
+     * the one the caller asked for, and this constructor never signs the caller into one.
+     */
+    'UNSUPPORTED_HYPERLIQUID_MARKET',
+    /**
+     * The constructed L1 action failed a decode-back assertion against the SDK's own normalized
+     * action, its canonical msgpack key order, or the declared EIP-712 signing fields.
+     *
+     * NOTE for the Hyperliquid rail: `ATTRIBUTION_MISSING` is deliberately NOT raised for an absent
+     * builder field. The builder `{b, f}` is spec'd and VALUELESS today (spec §7.2/§12, Founder-ruled
+     * 2026-08-17): its value waits on the Step-0 `approveBuilderFee` reversal. An absent builder is
+     * therefore the ruled state, not a defect, and refusing a well-formed order over it would violate
+     * P0 liveness (§7.0). The pending state is disclosed in the envelope instead.
+     */
+    'HYPERLIQUID_ORDER_INVALID',
+    /* ── Delegated send (`otto_submit_under_delegation`, Model B browser plane) ─────────────────── */
+    /** The server holds no CDP developer credentials; the tool does not register without them. */
+    'DELEGATION_UNAVAILABLE',
+    /** The per-request caller header is missing or not accepted — refused before anything is parsed or read. */
+    'DELEGATION_UNAUTHORIZED',
+    /** The input does not satisfy the delegated-send schema (floor stated, Base, EOA). */
+    'DELEGATION_INPUT_INVALID',
+    /** One delegated plan at a time per end user; another is in flight. */
+    'DELEGATION_BUSY',
+    /** The SAME artifact is being submitted right now (a retry raced its first submission). */
+    'DELEGATION_ARTIFACT_IN_FLIGHT',
+    /**
+     * The artifact was not prepared by THIS server process (or its freshness window has passed): the submission
+     * record that makes a retry safe cannot exist here — prepare again. Fail-closed across a rolling replacement.
+     */
+    'ARTIFACT_NOT_PREPARED_HERE',
+    /**
+     * The prepare was refused: this process already holds its maximum of LIVE prepared artifacts (the delegated
+     * tool's prepared-here registry). Nothing already issued is dropped to make room — retry after some expire.
+     */
+    'PREPARED_ARTIFACT_CAPACITY',
+    /** The prepare minted an id this process already holds for DIFFERENT content (an entropy collision): refused, never issued unregistered. */
+    'ARTIFACT_ID_COLLISION',
+    /** The artifact was already submitted on this server with a DIFFERENT request (user, account or intent); nothing is re-sent — prepare again. */
+    'DELEGATION_REPLAY_MISMATCH',
+    /** The Model-B project policy is not in force — absent, renamed, or its rules no longer digest to v1. */
+    'DELEGATION_FENCE_ABSENT',
+    /** A DIFFERENT project-scope policy is installed (Coinbase allows one); never overwritten or deleted — refused by name. */
+    'DELEGATION_FENCE_FOREIGN',
+    /** More than one project-scope policy read back (Coinbase allows one): an anomalous snapshot — nothing judged, nothing written. */
+    'DELEGATION_FENCE_AMBIGUOUS',
+    /** The installed fence is a NEWER version of our lineage than this server knows; never downgraded. */
+    'DELEGATION_FENCE_NEWER',
+    /** The CDP access token does not resolve to an end user; no upstream detail is relayed. */
+    'DELEGATION_TOKEN_INVALID',
+    /** The revoke was issued but the grant still reads back; the user is fail-closed on this server regardless. */
+    'DELEGATION_REVOKE_NOT_CONFIRMED',
+    /** No active delegation for the end user, or it expires before the envelope does, or revocation was requested here. */
+    'DELEGATION_NOT_ACTIVE',
+    /**
+     * The grant's REMAINING validity is longer than the ruled maximum. The mint happens browser→Coinbase with
+     * no Otto hop, so a modified client or a skewed clock can mint any expiry Coinbase accepts; the bound is
+     * therefore enforceable only here, at use.
+     */
+    'DELEGATION_EXPIRY_EXCEEDS_BOUND',
+    /** CDP reports no end user with this id. */
+    'DELEGATION_USER_UNKNOWN',
+    /** A verified plan the fence would refuse anyway: input token not allow-listed, spender not the reviewed diamond, gross over the per-swap cap. */
+    'DELEGATION_OUTSIDE_FENCE',
+    /** The user-side verifier refused the envelope with an adapter code the constructor does not share; the message carries `[CODE]`. */
+    'DELEGATED_PLAN_REFUSED',
+    /** The plan halted mid-way; the message reports the failed step and whether the allowance clear read back zero. */
+    'DELEGATED_PLAN_HALTED',
+    /** A CDP or chain read/write failed outright; no upstream body is relayed. */
+    'DELEGATION_UPSTREAM_FAILED',
+];
+/** A fail-closed, machine-readable refusal. No upstream response bodies or secrets are retained. */
+export class ExecutionRefusal extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(code, message) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = 'ExecutionRefusal';
+    }
+}
+export function refuse(code, message) {
+    throw new ExecutionRefusal(code, message);
+}
+export function isExecutionRefusal(error) {
+    return error instanceof ExecutionRefusal;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=execution-errors.js.map

package/dist/vendor/otto-intel-mcp/execution-index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/**
+ * execution-index.ts — the CONSUMER-SIDE entry (`otto-intel-mcp/execution`): what a signing adapter
+ * needs to verify and bind a prepare-only artifact — schemas, digest/commitment/freshness/binding
+ * assertions, the refusal class, the ruled attribution constants, and the intent normalizer — and
+ * NOTHING that constructs: no tool catalog, no prepare functions, no quote clients, no venue SDKs.
+ * (The root index pulls the hosted app and is not importable from a published install.)
+ */
+export { EXECUTION_ARTIFACT_SCHEMA, EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA, PREPARE_SWAP_INPUT_SCHEMA, } from './execution-tool-definitions.js';
+export type { PrepareSwapInput } from './execution-tool-definitions.js';
+export { swapIntentDigestInput } from './execution-intent.js';
+export { artifactCommitmentDigest, assertArtifactAccountBinding, assertArtifactCommitment, assertArtifactEnvelope, assertArtifactFresh, assertArtifactPayloadDigest, executionDigest, MAX_ARTIFACT_TTL_MS, } from './execution-types.js';
+export type { AccountProfile, ExecutionArtifact, ExecutionEnvelope, ExecutionPayload, } from './execution-types.js';
+export { ExecutionRefusal, EXECUTION_REFUSAL_CODES } from './execution-errors.js';
+export { MODEL_B_DELEGATION_EXPIRY_DEFAULT_DAYS, MODEL_B_DELEGATION_EXPIRY_MAX_DAYS, MODEL_B_INPUT_TOKENS_V1, MODEL_B_PER_SWAP_CAP_USD, boundedDelegationExpiry, MODEL_B_POLICY_DIGEST_V1, MODEL_B_POLICY_NAME_V1, modelBProjectPolicyBody, modelBProjectPolicyRules, policyRulesDigest, readBackModelBFence, type DelegationPolicyRecord, type ModelBFenceReadBack, } from './execution-delegation-policy.js';
+export { DELEGATED_EXECUTION_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_AUTH_HEADER, SUBMIT_UNDER_DELEGATION_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATED_SEND_RESULT_SCHEMA, type DelegatedSendResult, type SubmitUnderDelegationInput, } from './execution-delegated-definition.js';
+export { DEFAULT_LIFI_AGGREGATE_FEE_CAP_RATE, DEFAULT_LIFI_FEE_BPS, DEFAULT_LIFI_FEE_CONFIG_VERSION, DEFAULT_LIFI_PLATFORM_FEE_RECIPIENT, DEFAULT_OTTO_LIFI_FEE_RECIPIENT, LIFI_DIAMOND_ADDRESS, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDERS_BY_CHAIN, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V1, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V1_MAINNET, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V2, LIFI_INTEGRATOR, isReviewedLiFiFeeForwarder, reviewedLiFiFeeForwarders, unreviewedFeeForwarderMessage, } from './execution-config.js';
+export { DELEGATION_ADMIN_TOOL_NAMES, DELEGATION_FENCE_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_FENCE_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_REVOKE_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_REVOKE_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_REVOKE_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_STATUS_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_STATUS_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, type DelegationFenceResult, type DelegationFenceStatusResult, type DelegationRevokeResult, type DelegationStatusResult, } from './execution-delegation-admin-definition.js';

package/dist/vendor/otto-intel-mcp/execution-index.js

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/**
+ * execution-index.ts — the CONSUMER-SIDE entry (`otto-intel-mcp/execution`): what a signing adapter
+ * needs to verify and bind a prepare-only artifact — schemas, digest/commitment/freshness/binding
+ * assertions, the refusal class, the ruled attribution constants, and the intent normalizer — and
+ * NOTHING that constructs: no tool catalog, no prepare functions, no quote clients, no venue SDKs.
+ * (The root index pulls the hosted app and is not importable from a published install.)
+ */
+export { EXECUTION_ARTIFACT_SCHEMA, EXECUTION_ENVELOPE_SCHEMA, PREPARE_SWAP_INPUT_SCHEMA, } from './execution-tool-definitions.js';
+export { swapIntentDigestInput } from './execution-intent.js';
+export { artifactCommitmentDigest, assertArtifactAccountBinding, assertArtifactCommitment, assertArtifactEnvelope, assertArtifactFresh, assertArtifactPayloadDigest, executionDigest, MAX_ARTIFACT_TTL_MS, } from './execution-types.js';
+export { ExecutionRefusal, EXECUTION_REFUSAL_CODES } from './execution-errors.js';
+export { MODEL_B_DELEGATION_EXPIRY_DEFAULT_DAYS, MODEL_B_DELEGATION_EXPIRY_MAX_DAYS, MODEL_B_INPUT_TOKENS_V1, MODEL_B_PER_SWAP_CAP_USD, boundedDelegationExpiry, MODEL_B_POLICY_DIGEST_V1, MODEL_B_POLICY_NAME_V1, modelBProjectPolicyBody, modelBProjectPolicyRules, policyRulesDigest, readBackModelBFence, } from './execution-delegation-policy.js';
+export { DELEGATED_EXECUTION_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_AUTH_HEADER, SUBMIT_UNDER_DELEGATION_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATED_SEND_RESULT_SCHEMA, } from './execution-delegated-definition.js';
+export { DEFAULT_LIFI_AGGREGATE_FEE_CAP_RATE, DEFAULT_LIFI_FEE_BPS, DEFAULT_LIFI_FEE_CONFIG_VERSION, DEFAULT_LIFI_PLATFORM_FEE_RECIPIENT, DEFAULT_OTTO_LIFI_FEE_RECIPIENT, LIFI_DIAMOND_ADDRESS, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDERS_BY_CHAIN, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V1, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V1_MAINNET, LIFI_FEE_FORWARDER_V2, LIFI_INTEGRATOR, isReviewedLiFiFeeForwarder, reviewedLiFiFeeForwarders, unreviewedFeeForwarderMessage, } from './execution-config.js';
+export { DELEGATION_ADMIN_TOOL_NAMES, DELEGATION_FENCE_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_FENCE_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_FENCE_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_REVOKE_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_REVOKE_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_REVOKE_TOOL_NAME, DELEGATION_STATUS_INPUT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_STATUS_RESULT_SCHEMA, DELEGATION_STATUS_TOOL_NAME, } from './execution-delegation-admin-definition.js';
+//# sourceMappingURL=execution-index.js.map

package/dist/vendor/otto-intel-mcp/execution-intent.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * execution-intent.ts — the normalized swap intent whose digest is the envelope's `intent_digest`.
+ *
+ * Dependency-light on purpose (schema + viem address normalization only) so a consuming adapter can
+ * import it through `otto-intel-mcp/execution` without pulling the constructor's quote clients or
+ * venue SDKs. The constructor (`execution-tools.ts`) uses THIS function, so there is exactly one
+ * implementation of the normalization on both sides of the seam.
+ */
+/**
+ * Parse the raw `otto_prepare_swap` input exactly as the constructor does (strict schema, trimmed
+ * strings, checksummed addresses) and return the object the constructor digests. A caller that kept
+ * its exact request can recompute `intent_digest` from it.
+ */
+export declare function swapIntentDigestInput(rawInput: unknown): Record<string, unknown>;

package/dist/vendor/otto-intel-mcp/execution-intent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/**
+ * execution-intent.ts — the normalized swap intent whose digest is the envelope's `intent_digest`.
+ *
+ * Dependency-light on purpose (schema + viem address normalization only) so a consuming adapter can
+ * import it through `otto-intel-mcp/execution` without pulling the constructor's quote clients or
+ * venue SDKs. The constructor (`execution-tools.ts`) uses THIS function, so there is exactly one
+ * implementation of the normalization on both sides of the seam.
+ */
+import { getAddress } from 'viem';
+import { PREPARE_SWAP_INPUT_SCHEMA } from './execution-tool-definitions.js';
+/**
+ * Parse the raw `otto_prepare_swap` input exactly as the constructor does (strict schema, trimmed
+ * strings, checksummed addresses) and return the object the constructor digests. A caller that kept
+ * its exact request can recompute `intent_digest` from it.
+ */
+export function swapIntentDigestInput(rawInput) {
+    const input = PREPARE_SWAP_INPUT_SCHEMA.parse(rawInput);
+    const address = getAddress(input.accountProfile.address);
+    return {
+        accountProfile: {
+            kind: input.accountProfile.kind,
+            address,
+            chainId: input.accountProfile.chainId,
+        },
+        chainId: input.chainId,
+        fromToken: getAddress(input.fromToken),
+        toToken: getAddress(input.toToken),
+        fromAmount: input.fromAmount,
+        slippage: {
+            maxBps: input.slippage.maxBps,
+            ...(input.slippage.minAmountOut ? { minAmountOut: input.slippage.minAmountOut } : {}),
+        },
+        ...(input.client_ref ? { client_ref: input.client_ref } : {}),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=execution-intent.js.map