openzoo 0.49.16 → 0.49.17

package/lib/xburner.js

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * A managed x402 burner per X account, DERIVED not stored.
- *
- * @openzoobot's paid lane needs the ASKER to pay, and an X reply is a terrible
- * place to ask someone to install a wallet. So each X account id gets a burner
- * the zoo drives on their behalf, funded by them and auto-topped-up, holding
- * only a working balance — the same shape as the local burner `npx openzoo`
- * already creates, one per account instead of one per machine.
- *
- * DERIVED, NOT STORED, and that is the whole security argument:
- *   seed(user) = HMAC-SHA512(master, "openzoo-xbot-v1:" + userId)
- * There is exactly ONE secret on disk no matter how many accounts ever mention
- * the bot. A per-user keyfile store would mean thousands of secrets, a backup
- * problem, a deletion problem, and a breach that scales with adoption. Here the
- * blast radius is one file that already had to be protected, and a burner can
- * be re-derived on any machine from that file alone — nothing to lose, nothing
- * to migrate, no keypair that exists only on whichever laptop ran the poller.
- *
- * The tradeoff, stated plainly: the master file CAN derive every burner, so it
- * is as sensitive as all of them combined. That is why it is 0600, never
- * logged, never sent anywhere, and why balances are kept at working size by
- * auto top-up rather than being allowed to accumulate.
- */
-
-import fs from 'node:fs';
-import os from 'node:os';
-import path from 'node:path';
-import crypto from 'node:crypto';
-import { Keypair } from '@solana/web3.js';
-
-const MASTER_FILE = process.env.OPENZOO_XBOT_MASTER
-  || path.join(os.homedir(), '.openzoo', 'xbot-master.key');
-
-/** Bump if the derivation ever changes — old burners must keep deriving. */
-const DERIVATION = 'openzoo-xbot-v1';
-
-export function loadOrCreateMaster(file = MASTER_FILE) {
-  try {
-    const hex = fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').trim();
-    const buf = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
-    if (buf.length === 32) return buf;
-    throw new Error('bad length');
-  } catch {
-    const buf = crypto.randomBytes(32);
-    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-    // wx: never clobber an existing master. Overwriting it would orphan every
-    // burner ever handed out — funds still on-chain, key unrecoverable.
-    try {
-      fs.writeFileSync(file, buf.toString('hex') + '\n', { mode: 0o600, flag: 'wx' });
-    } catch {
-      return Buffer.from(fs.readFileSync(file, 'utf8').trim(), 'hex');
-    }
-    return buf;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Deterministic burner for an X user id.
- * Keyed on the numeric id, never the handle: handles are reassignable, and a
- * burner that follows a renamed handle would hand a new owner the old wallet.
- */
-export function deriveBurner(xUserId, master = loadOrCreateMaster()) {
-  if (!xUserId) throw new Error('deriveBurner needs an X user id');
-  const mac = crypto.createHmac('sha512', master)
-    .update(`${DERIVATION}:${String(xUserId)}`)
-    .digest();
-  const keypair = Keypair.fromSeed(Uint8Array.from(mac.subarray(0, 32)));
-  const evmPrivateKey = `0x${mac.subarray(32, 64).toString('hex')}`;
-  return {
-    keypair,
-    evmPrivateKey,
-    address: keypair.publicKey.toBase58(),
-    xUserId: String(xUserId),
-  };
-}
-
-/** Address only — for a reply that tells someone where to send funds. */
-export function burnerAddress(xUserId, master) {
-  return deriveBurner(xUserId, master).address;
-}