opencode-workflow-guard 1.12.1 → 1.13.1

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
package/test/test.mts CHANGED
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import {
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  WorkflowGuard,
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  buildCompactionContext,
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  detectVerifyCommand,
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+ resolveVerifyTimeoutMs,
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  runVerify,
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  getCleanEnv,
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  resetVerifyState,
@@ -442,6 +443,11 @@ check("block auth with global flags (--dir)", blocked(await shell(`${ocCli} --di
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  check("block config with global flags (-d)", blocked(await shell(`${ocCli} -d . ${"con" + "fig"} edit`)));
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  check("block permission with global flags (--workspace)", blocked(await shell(`${ocCli} --workspace . ${"perm" + "ission"} grant`)));
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  check("allow normal command", !(await shell("ls -la && git status")));
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+ const ocDir = ".open" + "code/plans/";
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+ check("allow gh issue create mentioning .opencode paths (not tamper)", !(await shell(`gh issue create --repo example/proj --title t --body 'see <project>/${ocDir}'`)));
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+ check("compound collaboration + tamper still blocked", blocked(await shell(`gh issue create --repo example/proj --title t && echo x > open${"code.json"}`)));
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+ check("collaboration command with real redirect to global config still blocked", blocked(await shell(`gh issue list > /var/home/x/.config/open${"code"}/opencode.json`)));
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+ check("collaboration command with redirect outside workspace still blocked", blocked(await shell(`gh pr create --title t > /tmp/wg-escape-probe`)));
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  console.log("- Policy 6: tamper via edit tools (path protection) -");
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  check("block edit of project opencode.json", blocked(await call("edit", { filePath: join(root, "opencode.json"), oldString: "a", newString: "b" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
@@ -449,6 +455,22 @@ check("block write of .opencode/project config", blocked(await call("write", { f
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  check("block write of global opencode config path", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: "/var/home/x/.config/opencode/opencode.json", content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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  check("block apply_patch to opencode.json", blocked(await call("apply_patch", { patchText: "*** Update File: opencode.json\n" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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  check("allow edit of normal source file", !(await call("edit", { filePath: join(root, "src", "index.ts"), oldString: "a", newString: "b" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("allow write of docs mentioning .opencode paths (not tamper)", !(await call("write", { filePath: join(root, "docs", "guard.md"), content: "see `<project>/" + ocDir + "` and -> isProtectedPath" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("allow write of project plan file under .opencode/plans", !(await call("write", { filePath: join(root, ".opencode", "plans", "1789589538371-plan.md"), content: "# plan" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("block write escaping plans dir via .. (still tamper)", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: join(root, ".opencode", "plans", "..", "opencode.json"), content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("block write of the plans directory itself (no trailing-slash exemption)", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: join(root, ".opencode", "plans"), content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("block write under .opencode/plansx prefix (still tamper)", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: join(root, ".opencode", "plansx", "x.md"), content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ check("block write to user-level config plans path (exemption is project-only)", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: "/var/home/x/.config/opencode/plans/x.md", content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ // Plans dir symlinked at a config-shaped real location: lexical target is
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+ // exempt but the realpath fallback must still block via the user-config check.
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+ const plansAliasDir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "wg-plans-alias-"));
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+ mkdirSync(join(plansAliasDir, ".config", "opencode"), { recursive: true });
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+ mkdirSync(join(plansAliasDir, ".opencode"), { recursive: true });
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+ symlinkSync(join(plansAliasDir, ".config", "opencode"), join(plansAliasDir, ".opencode", "plans"), "dir");
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+ setWorkspaceRoot(plansAliasDir);
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+ check("write through plans symlink into config real path blocked (realpath fallback)", blocked(await call("write", { filePath: join(plansAliasDir, ".opencode", "plans", "x.md"), content: "{}" }, { sessionID: "s-active" })));
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+ setWorkspaceRoot(root);
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+ rmSync(plansAliasDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
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  console.log("- Policy 7: branch guard -");
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  // Non-git workspace (current `root` is a plain temp dir): git writes allowed.
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  check("non-git workspace: git commit allowed", !(await shell("git commit -m test")));
@@ -464,7 +486,8 @@ check("on main: git merge blocked", blocked(await shell("git merge feature/x")))
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  check("on main: git checkout path mutation without separator blocked", blocked(await shell("git checkout tracked.txt")));
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  check("on main: git checkout -B reset blocked", blocked(await shell("git checkout -B main HEAD~1")));
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  check("on main: git add blocked", blocked(await shell("git add tracked.txt")));
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- check("on main: git tag blocked", blocked(await shell("git tag release-test")));
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+ check("on main: git tag creation allowed", !blocked(await shell("git tag release-test")));
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+ check("on main: git tag -d blocked", blocked(await shell("git tag -d release-test")));
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  check("on main: git tag --list allowed", !blocked(await shell("git tag --list")));
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  check("on main: git switch -c allowed (branch creation)", !(await shell("git switch -c feat/x")));
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  check("on main: git status allowed", !(await shell("git status")));
@@ -1357,6 +1380,24 @@ rmSync(pipelineTimeoutMarker, { force: true });
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  await runVerify(`node -e "setTimeout(() => require('fs').writeFileSync('${pipelineTimeoutMarker}', 'orphan'), 300)" | cat`, root, 50);
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  await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 450));
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  check("runVerify timeout terminates descendants behind shell pipelines", !existsSync(pipelineTimeoutMarker));
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+
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+ console.log("- Policy 10: verification timeout resolution -");
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+ const previousVerifyTimeoutEnv = process.env.WORKFLOW_GUARD_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS;
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+ if (previousVerifyTimeoutEnv !== undefined) delete process.env.WORKFLOW_GUARD_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS;
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+ check("verification timeout resolution defaults to 30s", resolveVerifyTimeoutMs(root) === 30_000);
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+ const verifyTimeoutConfigRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "wg-verify-timeout-"));
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+ mkdirSync(join(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot, ".opencode"));
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+ writeFileSync(join(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot, ".opencode", "workflow-guard.json"), JSON.stringify({ verifyTimeoutMs: 60000 }));
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+ reloadProjectConfig(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot);
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+ check("verification timeout honors project config", resolveVerifyTimeoutMs(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot) === 60_000);
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+ writeFileSync(join(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot, ".opencode", "workflow-guard.json"), JSON.stringify({ verifyTimeoutMs: -5 }));
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+ reloadProjectConfig(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot);
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+ check("verification timeout ignores invalid project config values", resolveVerifyTimeoutMs(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot) === 30_000);
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+ process.env.WORKFLOW_GUARD_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS = "120000";
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+ check("verification timeout env overrides a valid project config", resolveVerifyTimeoutMs(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot) === 120_000);
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+ delete process.env.WORKFLOW_GUARD_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS;
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+ if (previousVerifyTimeoutEnv !== undefined) process.env.WORKFLOW_GUARD_VERIFY_TIMEOUT_MS = previousVerifyTimeoutEnv;
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+ rmSync(verifyTimeoutConfigRoot, { recursive: true, force: true });
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  let windowsCleanupFinished = false;
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  const windowsCleanup = terminateProcessTree(1234, () => {}, "win32", async (pid) => {
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  check("Windows timeout cleanup receives the child pid", pid === 1234);
@@ -2271,6 +2312,12 @@ const mergedCheck = isBranchAlreadyMergedOrClosed(conflictRepo, "feat/already-me
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  check("isBranchAlreadyMergedOrClosed identifies branch with 0 diff from main", mergedCheck.merged);
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  check("git push on already merged branch is blocked", blocked(await shell("git push origin feat/already-merged")));
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+ // Tag pushes are release operations, not branch mutations (#134).
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+ spawnSync("git", ["tag", "v0.3.0"], { cwd: conflictRepo });
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+ check("git push origin v0.3.0 allowed from merged branch", !blocked(await shell("git push origin v0.3.0")));
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+ check("git push origin refs/tags/v0.3.0 allowed", !blocked(await shell("git push origin refs/tags/v0.3.0")));
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+ check("git push origin :refs/tags/v0.3.0 still blocked", blocked(await shell("git push origin :refs/tags/v0.3.0")));
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+
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  // Create a branch with a genuine merge conflict against main
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  spawnSync("git", ["switch", "main"], { cwd: conflictRepo });
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  spawnSync("git", ["switch", "-c", "feat/conflict-branch"], { cwd: conflictRepo });
@@ -3080,6 +3127,20 @@ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "message.updated", properties:
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  await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-cap" } } } as any);
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  check("genuine user message resets continuation budget", continuationPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-resume-cap").length === 4);
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+ console.log("- Policy 1: user interrupt stops automatic continuation -");
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+ todo("s-resume-abort", item("work the user stopped", "pending"));
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-abort" } } } as any);
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.error", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-abort", error: { name: "MessageAbortedError", data: { message: "aborted by user" } } } } } as any);
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-abort" } } } as any);
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+ check("user interrupt (Esc / MessageAbortedError) stops automatic continuation", continuationPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-resume-abort").length === 1);
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "message.updated", properties: { info: { id: "genuine-restart", role: "user", sessionID: "s-resume-abort" } } } } as any);
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-abort" } } } as any);
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+ check("genuine user input after an interrupt re-enables automatic continuation", continuationPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-resume-abort").length === 2);
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+ todo("s-resume-api-error", item("work behind a flaky provider", "pending"));
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.error", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-api-error", error: { name: "APIError", data: { message: "provider overloaded" } } } } } as any);
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+ await continuationPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-resume-api-error" } } } as any);
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+ check("non-abort session errors do not disable automatic continuation", continuationPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-resume-api-error").length === 1);
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+
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  const ralphRoot = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "wg-ralph-"));
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  mkdirSync(join(ralphRoot, ".opencode"));
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  writeFileSync(join(ralphRoot, ".opencode", "workflow-guard.json"), JSON.stringify({ ralphMode: true, ralphMaxIterations: 2 }));
@@ -3118,6 +3179,11 @@ check("duplicate genuine user events leave an active ralph run stopped", ralphPr
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  await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "message.updated", properties: { info: { id: "human-restart", role: "user", sessionID: "s-ralph-stop" } } } } as any);
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  await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-ralph-stop" } } } as any);
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  check("distinct later user input can establish a fresh ralph run", ralphPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-ralph-stop").length === 2 && runWithRuntimeState(ralphRoot, ralphClient as any, () => getRalphOutcome("s-ralph-stop")) === "running");
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+ todo("s-ralph-abort", item("ralph work the user stopped", "pending"));
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+ await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-ralph-abort" } } } as any);
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+ await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.error", properties: { sessionID: "s-ralph-abort", error: { name: "MessageAbortedError", data: { message: "aborted by user" } } } } } as any);
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+ await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-ralph-abort" } } } as any);
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+ check("user interrupt stops an active ralph run as user_stopped", ralphPrompts.filter((id) => id === "s-ralph-abort").length === 1 && runWithRuntimeState(ralphRoot, ralphClient as any, () => getRalphOutcome("s-ralph-abort")) === "user_stopped");
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  todo("s-ralph-complete", item("completable work", "pending"));
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  await ralphPlugin.event?.({ event: { type: "session.idle", properties: { sessionID: "s-ralph-complete" } } } as any);
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  todo("s-ralph-complete", item("completable work", "completed"));