opencode-skills-collection 4.0.68 → 4.0.69

package/bundled-skills/aws-iam/SKILL.md

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+---
+name: aws-iam
+description: Manage IAM users, roles, and policies. Implement least-privilege access
+  and security best practices. Use when configuring AWS identity and access management.
+category: devops
+risk: critical
+source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills
+source_repo: BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills
+source_type: community
+date_added: '2026-09-20'
+license: MIT
+license_source: https://github.com/BagelHole/DevOps-Security-Agent-Skills/blob/main/LICENSE
+compatibility: Requires the relevant OS/platform tooling and privileged access where
+  noted. Docs-only; helper scripts and templates not bundled.
+metadata:
+  author: devops-skills
+  version: '1.0'
+---
+
+# AWS IAM
+
+Manage identity and access in AWS with least-privilege policies, roles, federation, and permission boundaries.
+
+## When to Use This Skill
+
+- Creating roles for EC2 instances, Lambda functions, or ECS tasks
+- Writing custom IAM policies with least-privilege access
+- Setting up OIDC federation for GitHub Actions or other CI/CD systems
+- Implementing permission boundaries for delegated administration
+- Auditing access with IAM Access Analyzer and credential reports
+- Configuring cross-account access with assume-role patterns
+- Enforcing MFA and session policies
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- AWS CLI v2 installed and configured
+- IAM permissions: `iam:*` (or scoped to specific actions for least privilege)
+- For OIDC: ability to create identity providers (`iam:CreateOpenIDConnectProvider`)
+- AWS Organizations access for Service Control Policies (SCPs)
+
+## IAM Policy Structure
+
+Every IAM policy follows the same JSON structure. Always specify the minimum actions and resources required.
+
+```json
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [
+    {
+      "Sid": "AllowS3ReadWrite",
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": [
+        "s3:GetObject",
+        "s3:PutObject",
+        "s3:ListBucket"
+      ],
+      "Resource": [
+        "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket",
+        "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*"
+      ],
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringEquals": {
+          "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption": "aws:kms"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "Sid": "DenyUnencryptedUploads",
+      "Effect": "Deny",
+      "Action": "s3:PutObject",
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringNotEquals": {
+          "s3:x-amz-server-side-encryption": "aws:kms"
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+## Create and Manage Roles
+
+```bash
+# Create an EC2 instance role with trust policy
+aws iam create-role \
+  --role-name EC2AppRole \
+  --assume-role-policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [{
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Principal": {"Service": "ec2.amazonaws.com"},
+      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
+    }]
+  }' \
+  --tags '[{"Key":"Team","Value":"platform"},{"Key":"Environment","Value":"production"}]'
+
+# Create and attach an inline policy
+aws iam put-role-policy \
+  --role-name EC2AppRole \
+  --policy-name s3-access \
+  --policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [{
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Action": ["s3:GetObject", "s3:PutObject"],
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/*"
+    }]
+  }'
+
+# Attach a managed policy
+aws iam attach-role-policy \
+  --role-name EC2AppRole \
+  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/CloudWatchAgentServerPolicy
+
+# Create instance profile and associate the role
+aws iam create-instance-profile --instance-profile-name EC2AppProfile
+aws iam add-role-to-instance-profile \
+  --instance-profile-name EC2AppProfile \
+  --role-name EC2AppRole
+
+# Create a Lambda execution role
+aws iam create-role \
+  --role-name LambdaExecRole \
+  --assume-role-policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [{
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Principal": {"Service": "lambda.amazonaws.com"},
+      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole"
+    }]
+  }'
+
+aws iam attach-role-policy \
+  --role-name LambdaExecRole \
+  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::aws:policy/service-role/AWSLambdaBasicExecutionRole
+```
+
+## Cross-Account Access
+
+```bash
+# In Account B: create role that Account A can assume
+aws iam create-role \
+  --role-name CrossAccountReadRole \
+  --assume-role-policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [{
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Principal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::111111111111:root"},
+      "Action": "sts:AssumeRole",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringEquals": {"sts:ExternalId": "unique-external-id-12345"}
+      }
+    }]
+  }'
+
+# In Account A: assume the role
+aws sts assume-role \
+  --role-arn arn:aws:iam::222222222222:role/CrossAccountReadRole \
+  --role-session-name cross-account-session \
+  --external-id unique-external-id-12345
+
+# Use the temporary credentials
+export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID="ASIAXXX"
+export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY="xxx"
+export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN="xxx"
+```
+
+## OIDC Federation for GitHub Actions
+
+```bash
+# Create the GitHub OIDC identity provider
+aws iam create-open-id-connect-provider \
+  --url https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com \
+  --client-id-list sts.amazonaws.com \
+  --thumbprint-list "6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1"
+
+# Create a role for GitHub Actions with repo-scoped trust
+aws iam create-role \
+  --role-name GitHubActionsDeployRole \
+  --assume-role-policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [{
+      "Effect": "Allow",
+      "Principal": {
+        "Federated": "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:oidc-provider/token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
+      },
+      "Action": "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringEquals": {
+          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud": "sts.amazonaws.com"
+        },
+        "StringLike": {
+          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub": "repo:my-org/my-repo:ref:refs/heads/main"
+        }
+      }
+    }]
+  }'
+
+# Attach deployment permissions to the role
+aws iam attach-role-policy \
+  --role-name GitHubActionsDeployRole \
+  --policy-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DeploymentPolicy
+```
+
+GitHub Actions workflow usage:
+
+```yaml
+# .github/workflows/deploy.yml
+permissions:
+  id-token: write
+  contents: read
+
+jobs:
+  deploy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
+        with:
+          role-to-assume: arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/GitHubActionsDeployRole
+          aws-region: us-east-1
+      - run: aws sts get-caller-identity
+```
+
+## Permission Boundaries
+
+```bash
+# Create a permission boundary policy
+aws iam create-policy \
+  --policy-name DeveloperBoundary \
+  --policy-document '{
+    "Version": "2012-10-17",
+    "Statement": [
+      {
+        "Sid": "AllowedServices",
+        "Effect": "Allow",
+        "Action": [
+          "s3:*",
+          "lambda:*",
+          "dynamodb:*",
+          "sqs:*",
+          "sns:*",
+          "logs:*",
+          "cloudwatch:*",
+          "ecr:*",
+          "ecs:*"
+        ],
+        "Resource": "*"
+      },
+      {
+        "Sid": "DenyIAMChanges",
+        "Effect": "Deny",
+        "Action": [
+          "iam:CreateUser",
+          "iam:DeleteUser",
+          "iam:CreateRole",
+          "iam:DeleteRole",
+          "iam:AttachRolePolicy",
+          "iam:PutRolePermissionsBoundary",
+          "iam:DeleteRolePermissionsBoundary"
+        ],
+        "Resource": "*"
+      },
+      {
+        "Sid": "DenyOutsideRegion",
+        "Effect": "Deny",
+        "Action": "*",
+        "Resource": "*",
+        "Condition": {
+          "StringNotEquals": {
+            "aws:RequestedRegion": ["us-east-1", "us-west-2"]
+          },
+          "ForAnyValue:StringNotLike": {
+            "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:role/admin-*"
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    ]
+  }'
+
+# Create a role with the permission boundary
+aws iam create-role \
+  --role-name DeveloperRole \
+  --assume-role-policy-document file://trust-policy.json \
+  --permissions-boundary "arn:aws:iam::123456789012:policy/DeveloperBoundary"
+```
+
+## IAM Access Analyzer and Auditing
+
+```bash
+# Create an IAM Access Analyzer
+aws accessanalyzer create-analyzer \
+  --analyzer-name account-analyzer \
+  --type ACCOUNT
+
+# List findings (externally accessible resources)
+aws accessanalyzer list-findings \
+  --analyzer-arn arn:aws:access-analyzer:us-east-1:123456789012:analyzer/account-analyzer
+
+# Generate credential report
+aws iam generate-credential-report
+aws iam get-credential-report --output text --query Content | base64 -d > credential-report.csv
+
+# Find users with console access but no MFA
+aws iam list-users --query "Users[].UserName" --output text | while read user; do
+  mfa=$(aws iam list-mfa-devices --user-name "$user" --query "MFADevices" --output text)
+  if [ -z "$mfa" ]; then
+    echo "NO MFA: $user"
+  fi
+done
+
+# List all policies attached to a role
+aws iam list-attached-role-policies --role-name EC2AppRole
+aws iam list-role-policies --role-name EC2AppRole
+
+# Get the last-accessed services for a role
+aws iam generate-service-last-accessed-details --arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EC2AppRole
+# Then retrieve results with the returned JobId
+aws iam get-service-last-accessed-details --job-id "job-id-from-above"
+
+# Simulate a policy to test access
+aws iam simulate-principal-policy \
+  --policy-source-arn arn:aws:iam::123456789012:role/EC2AppRole \
+  --action-names s3:GetObject s3:PutObject \
+  --resource-arns arn:aws:s3:::my-app-bucket/data.json
+```
+
+## Terraform IAM Role with OIDC
+
+```hcl
+# OIDC provider for GitHub Actions
+resource "aws_iam_openid_connect_provider" "github" {
+  url             = "https://token.actions.githubusercontent.com"
+  client_id_list  = ["sts.amazonaws.com"]
+  thumbprint_list = ["6938fd4d98bab03faadb97b34396831e3780aea1"]
+}
+
+# Role for GitHub Actions
+resource "aws_iam_role" "github_actions" {
+  name = "GitHubActionsDeployRole"
+
+  assume_role_policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [{
+      Effect = "Allow"
+      Principal = {
+        Federated = aws_iam_openid_connect_provider.github.arn
+      }
+      Action = "sts:AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity"
+      Condition = {
+        StringEquals = {
+          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:aud" = "sts.amazonaws.com"
+        }
+        StringLike = {
+          "token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub" = "repo:my-org/my-repo:*"
+        }
+      }
+    }]
+  })
+
+  permissions_boundary = aws_iam_policy.boundary.arn
+}
+
+resource "aws_iam_role_policy_attachment" "deploy" {
+  role       = aws_iam_role.github_actions.name
+  policy_arn = aws_iam_policy.deployment.arn
+}
+
+# Permission boundary
+resource "aws_iam_policy" "boundary" {
+  name = "DeveloperBoundary"
+  policy = jsonencode({
+    Version = "2012-10-17"
+    Statement = [
+      {
+        Sid      = "AllowedServices"
+        Effect   = "Allow"
+        Action   = ["s3:*", "lambda:*", "dynamodb:*", "ecs:*", "logs:*"]
+        Resource = "*"
+      },
+      {
+        Sid      = "DenyIAMEscalation"
+        Effect   = "Deny"
+        Action   = ["iam:CreateUser", "iam:CreateRole", "iam:AttachRolePolicy"]
+        Resource = "*"
+      }
+    ]
+  })
+}
+```
+
+## Service Control Policies (Organizations)
+
+```json
+{
+  "Version": "2012-10-17",
+  "Statement": [
+    {
+      "Sid": "DenyRootAccount",
+      "Effect": "Deny",
+      "Action": "*",
+      "Resource": "*",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringLike": {
+          "aws:PrincipalArn": "arn:aws:iam::*:root"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "Sid": "RequireIMDSv2",
+      "Effect": "Deny",
+      "Action": "ec2:RunInstances",
+      "Resource": "arn:aws:ec2:*:*:instance/*",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringNotEquals": {
+          "ec2:MetadataHttpTokens": "required"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    {
+      "Sid": "DenyRegionsOutsideUS",
+      "Effect": "Deny",
+      "Action": "*",
+      "Resource": "*",
+      "Condition": {
+        "StringNotEquals": {
+          "aws:RequestedRegion": ["us-east-1", "us-west-2"]
+        },
+        "ForAnyValue:StringNotLike": {
+          "aws:PrincipalArn": ["arn:aws:iam::*:role/OrganizationAdmin"]
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  ]
+}
+```
+
+## Troubleshooting
+
+| Problem | Cause | Fix |
+|---|---|---|
+| Access Denied on API call | Missing or incorrect policy | Use `simulate-principal-policy` to test; check resource ARN format |
+| Role cannot be assumed | Trust policy does not include the caller | Verify Principal in trust policy matches caller ARN |
+| OIDC federation fails | Thumbprint or audience mismatch | Verify OIDC provider URL, client ID list, and condition keys |
+| Permission boundary blocks action | Boundary does not include the action | Add the action to the boundary; effective = identity AND boundary |
+| Credential report shows stale keys | Keys not rotated in 90+ days | Rotate keys; disable unused access keys |
+| Service-linked role creation fails | Organization SCP blocks iam:CreateServiceLinkedRole | Add exception in SCP for the specific service |
+| Cross-account assume role fails | Missing ExternalId or wrong account | Verify ExternalId matches; check account number in Principal |
+| MFA condition not enforced | Condition key not in policy | Add `aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent` condition |
+
+## Related Skills
+
+- terraform-aws (`terraform-aws`) - IaC deployment of IAM resources
+- aws-ec2 (`aws-ec2`) - Instance profiles and roles
+- aws-lambda (`aws-lambda`) - Lambda execution roles
+- aws-ecs-fargate (`aws-ecs-fargate`) - ECS task and execution roles
+- access-review (`access-review`) - Access auditing and governance
+
+## Limitations
+
+- Infrastructure commands can disrupt services: confirm target host/scope and have backups/snapshots before mutating state.
+- Docs-only import: upstream scripts and templates not bundled.
+