open-multi-agent-kit 0.80.7 → 0.90.0

package/dist/core/command-safety-parser.js

@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+/**
+ * Lane SA3 - Command Safety Parser V2.
+ *
+ * Pure, side-effect-free shell command analysis layered on top of the existing
+ * `classifyShellCommand` engine. It adds quoting-aware detection of:
+ *   - command substitution: `$(...)` and backticks
+ *   - subshell grouping: `(...)`
+ *   - process substitution: `<(...)` and `>(...)`
+ *   - environment assignment injection: `VAR=... cmd`, `export VAR=...`, `env VAR=...`
+ *   - dynamic expansions: `$VAR`, `${VAR}`
+ *   - decoder pipelines: `base64 -d` / `xxd -r` / `openssl enc -d` feeding a shell
+ *   - wrapper nesting depth and parser diagnostics (fail-closed)
+ *
+ * It does NOT execute, decode, or normalize away the original command. The
+ * classifier composes the existing verdict with V2 detections and never lowers
+ * the existing risk tier.
+ */
+import { classifyShellCommand } from "./command-safety.js";
+/** Maximum structural recursion depth ($() inside $(...) inside ...). */
+const MAX_SCAN_DEPTH = 6;
+/** Executables that decode and/or execute an encoded payload. */
+const DECODER_EXECUTABLES = new Set([
+    "sh",
+    "bash",
+    "zsh",
+    "dash",
+    "ksh",
+    "ash",
+    "eval",
+    "source",
+    ".",
+    "python",
+    "python2",
+    "python3",
+    "node",
+    "perl",
+    "ruby",
+    "php",
+    "lua",
+    "expect",
+    "env",
+    "xargs",
+]);
+/**
+ * Environment variable names that inject code or redirect runtime loader
+ * behavior. Assigning any of these on a command line is treated as a loader /
+ * runtime injection attempt.
+ */
+const LOADER_INJECTION_ENV = new Set([
+    "LD_PRELOAD",
+    "LD_LIBRARY_PATH",
+    "LD_AUDIT",
+    "LD_BIND_NOW",
+    "LD_PROFILE",
+    "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES",
+    "DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH",
+    "DYLD_FALLBACK_LIBRARY_PATH",
+    "NODE_OPTIONS",
+    "NODE_PATH",
+    "NODE_REPL_EXTERNAL_MODULE",
+    "NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
+    "NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED",
+    "PYTHONPATH",
+    "PYTHONHOME",
+    "PYTHONSTARTUP",
+    "PYTHONINSPECT",
+    "PERL5LIB",
+    "PERLLIB",
+    "PERL5OPT",
+    "RUBYLIB",
+    "RUBYOPT",
+    "RUBYPATH",
+    "JAVA_TOOL_OPTIONS",
+    "_JAVA_OPTIONS",
+    "JDK_JAVA_OPTIONS",
+    "MAVEN_OPTS",
+]);
+/** Exact sensitive variable names (do not end in a standard suffix). */
+const SENSITIVE_NAME_EXACT = new Set([
+    "AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID",
+    "AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY",
+    "AWS_SESSION_TOKEN",
+    "GITHUB_TOKEN",
+    "GH_TOKEN",
+    "GITLAB_TOKEN",
+    "NPM_TOKEN",
+    "NODE_AUTH_TOKEN",
+]);
+/** Sensitive variable name suffixes. */
+const SENSITIVE_NAME_REGEX = /(^|_)(API_KEY|API_TOKEN|ACCESS_TOKEN|SECRET|SECRET_KEY|PRIVATE_KEY|PASSWORD|PASSWD|TOKEN)$/i;
+/**
+ * Commands whose arguments become filesystem or history targets. An
+ * unresolved `$VAR` expansion in their argument position is treated as a
+ * dynamic target (could expand to /, ~, or a sensitive path).
+ */
+const RISKY_EXPANSION_EXEC = new Set([
+    "rm",
+    "dd",
+    "mkfs",
+    "find",
+    "git",
+    "chmod",
+    "chown",
+    "cp",
+    "mv",
+    "install",
+    "rsync",
+    "scp",
+]);
+const ACTION_RANK = {
+    allow: 0,
+    confirm: 1,
+    escalate: 2,
+    block: 3,
+};
+function isWhitespace(ch) {
+    return ch === " " || ch === "\t" || ch === "\n" || ch === "\r" || ch === "\f" || ch === "\v";
+}
+function isSensitiveEnvName(name) {
+    if (SENSITIVE_NAME_EXACT.has(name))
+        return true;
+    return SENSITIVE_NAME_REGEX.test(name);
+}
+/** Split a command into top-level command segments on `;`, `&&`, `||`, `&`, newline. */
+function splitTopLevelCommands(command) {
+    const segments = [];
+    let buf = "";
+    let quote;
+    let escaped = false;
+    const flush = () => {
+        const trimmed = buf.trim();
+        if (trimmed)
+            segments.push(trimmed);
+        buf = "";
+    };
+    for (let i = 0; i < command.length; i += 1) {
+        const ch = command[i];
+        const next = command[i + 1];
+        if (escaped) {
+            buf += ch;
+            escaped = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\\" && quote !== "'") {
+            escaped = true;
+            buf += ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (quote) {
+            buf += ch;
+            if (ch === quote)
+                quote = undefined;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
+            quote = ch;
+            buf += ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === ";") {
+            flush();
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "&") {
+            flush();
+            if (next === "&")
+                i += 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "|") {
+            if (next === "|") {
+                flush();
+                i += 1;
+            }
+            else {
+                // single pipe stays within the segment (decoder pipeline detection)
+                buf += ch;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\n" || ch === "\r") {
+            flush();
+            continue;
+        }
+        buf += ch;
+    }
+    flush();
+    return segments;
+}
+/** Coarse quote-aware tokenizer for one segment. */
+function tokenize(segment) {
+    const tokens = [];
+    let cur = "";
+    let quote;
+    let escaped = false;
+    for (const ch of segment) {
+        if (escaped) {
+            cur += ch;
+            escaped = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\\" && quote !== "'") {
+            escaped = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (quote) {
+            if (ch === quote) {
+                quote = undefined;
+            }
+            else {
+                cur += ch;
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
+            quote = ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (isWhitespace(ch)) {
+            if (cur) {
+                tokens.push(cur);
+                cur = "";
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
+        cur += ch;
+    }
+    if (cur)
+        tokens.push(cur);
+    return tokens;
+}
+/** Split a segment on single `|` (pipe stages), quote-aware. `||` is gone already. */
+function splitPipeStages(segment) {
+    const stages = [];
+    let buf = "";
+    let quote;
+    let escaped = false;
+    const flush = () => {
+        const trimmed = buf.trim();
+        if (trimmed)
+            stages.push(trimmed);
+        buf = "";
+    };
+    for (let i = 0; i < segment.length; i += 1) {
+        const ch = segment[i];
+        if (escaped) {
+            buf += ch;
+            escaped = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\\" && quote !== "'") {
+            escaped = true;
+            buf += ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (quote) {
+            buf += ch;
+            if (ch === quote)
+                quote = undefined;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
+            quote = ch;
+            buf += ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "|") {
+            flush();
+            continue;
+        }
+        buf += ch;
+    }
+    flush();
+    return stages;
+}
+/** Return the index of the `)` matching the `(` at `openIndex`, or -1. */
+function findMatchingParen(text, openIndex) {
+    if (text[openIndex] !== "(")
+        return -1;
+    let depth = 0;
+    let quote;
+    let escaped = false;
+    for (let i = openIndex; i < text.length; i += 1) {
+        const ch = text[i];
+        if (escaped) {
+            escaped = false;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\\" && quote !== "'") {
+            escaped = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (quote) {
+            if (ch === quote)
+                quote = undefined;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
+            quote = ch;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "(")
+            depth += 1;
+        else if (ch === ")") {
+            depth -= 1;
+            if (depth === 0)
+                return i;
+        }
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+/** Read a `$VAR` or `${VAR}` expansion starting at `dollarIndex`. Returns null for `${...}` ops we do not model. */
+function readExpansion(text, dollarIndex) {
+    const next = text[dollarIndex + 1];
+    if (next === "{") {
+        const close = text.indexOf("}", dollarIndex + 2);
+        if (close === -1)
+            return null;
+        const name = text.slice(dollarIndex + 2, close);
+        if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(name))
+            return null;
+        return { kind: "brace", name, end: close + 1 };
+    }
+    if (next && /[A-Za-z_]/.test(next)) {
+        const match = /^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*/.exec(text.slice(dollarIndex + 1));
+        if (match)
+            return { kind: "var", name: match[0], end: dollarIndex + 1 + match[0].length };
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/** Recursively scan `text` for structural shell nodes, quote-aware. */
+function scanStructural(text, state, depth) {
+    if (depth > MAX_SCAN_DEPTH) {
+        state.diagnostics.push({
+            code: "parser.depth_exceeded",
+            message: `Wrapper nesting exceeded depth ${MAX_SCAN_DEPTH}.`,
+            fatal: false,
+        });
+        return;
+    }
+    let i = 0;
+    let quote;
+    let escaped = false;
+    const n = text.length;
+    while (i < n) {
+        const ch = text[i];
+        const next = text[i + 1];
+        if (escaped) {
+            escaped = false;
+            i += 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "\\" && quote !== "'") {
+            escaped = true;
+            i += 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (quote) {
+            // Inside double quotes, $() and backticks still expand; `(` alone is literal.
+            if (quote === '"' && ch === "$" && next === "(") {
+                const end = findMatchingParen(text, i + 1);
+                if (end === -1) {
+                    state.diagnostics.push({
+                        code: "parser.unterminated_dollar_paren",
+                        message: "Unterminated $( ... ).",
+                        fatal: true,
+                    });
+                    return;
+                }
+                const inner = text.slice(i + 2, end);
+                state.subcommands.push({ kind: "dollar_paren", inner, depth });
+                state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+                scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+                i = end + 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (quote === '"' && ch === "`") {
+                const end = text.indexOf("`", i + 1);
+                if (end === -1) {
+                    state.diagnostics.push({
+                        code: "parser.unterminated_backtick",
+                        message: "Unterminated backtick.",
+                        fatal: true,
+                    });
+                    return;
+                }
+                const inner = text.slice(i + 1, end);
+                state.subcommands.push({ kind: "backtick", inner, depth });
+                state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+                scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+                i = end + 1;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (quote === '"' && ch === "$") {
+                const exp = readExpansion(text, i);
+                if (exp) {
+                    state.expansions.push({ kind: exp.kind, name: exp.name, depth });
+                    i = exp.end;
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            if (ch === quote)
+                quote = undefined;
+            i += 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        // unquoted
+        if (ch === "'" || ch === '"') {
+            quote = ch;
+            i += 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "$" && next === "(") {
+            const end = findMatchingParen(text, i + 1);
+            if (end === -1) {
+                state.diagnostics.push({
+                    code: "parser.unterminated_dollar_paren",
+                    message: "Unterminated $( ... ).",
+                    fatal: true,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            const inner = text.slice(i + 2, end);
+            state.subcommands.push({ kind: "dollar_paren", inner, depth });
+            state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+            scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+            i = end + 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "`") {
+            const end = text.indexOf("`", i + 1);
+            if (end === -1) {
+                state.diagnostics.push({
+                    code: "parser.unterminated_backtick",
+                    message: "Unterminated backtick.",
+                    fatal: true,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            const inner = text.slice(i + 1, end);
+            state.subcommands.push({ kind: "backtick", inner, depth });
+            state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+            scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+            i = end + 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if ((ch === "<" || ch === ">") && next === "(") {
+            const end = findMatchingParen(text, i + 1);
+            if (end === -1) {
+                state.diagnostics.push({
+                    code: "parser.unterminated_process_sub",
+                    message: "Unterminated process substitution.",
+                    fatal: true,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            const inner = text.slice(i + 2, end);
+            state.processSubs.push({ direction: ch === "<" ? "in" : "out", inner, depth });
+            state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+            scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+            i = end + 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "(") {
+            const end = findMatchingParen(text, i);
+            if (end === -1) {
+                state.diagnostics.push({
+                    code: "parser.unterminated_subshell",
+                    message: "Unterminated subshell.",
+                    fatal: true,
+                });
+                return;
+            }
+            const inner = text.slice(i + 1, end);
+            state.subshells.push({ inner, depth });
+            state.maxDepth = Math.max(state.maxDepth, depth);
+            scanStructural(inner, state, depth + 1);
+            i = end + 1;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (ch === "$") {
+            const exp = readExpansion(text, i);
+            if (exp) {
+                state.expansions.push({ kind: exp.kind, name: exp.name, depth });
+                i = exp.end;
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        i += 1;
+    }
+    if (quote !== undefined) {
+        state.diagnostics.push({
+            code: "parser.unterminated_quote",
+            message: `Unterminated ${quote} quote.`,
+            fatal: true,
+        });
+    }
+}
+/** Detect leading `VAR=value` assignments, including `export` / `env` prefixes. */
+function detectAssignments(segment) {
+    const tokens = tokenize(segment);
+    if (tokens.length === 0)
+        return [];
+    const assignments = [];
+    let idx = 0;
+    let position = "prefix";
+    const head = tokens[0]?.toLowerCase();
+    if (head === "export" || head === "set") {
+        position = "export";
+        idx = 1;
+    }
+    else if (head === "env") {
+        position = "env";
+        idx = 1;
+        // skip leading env options (-i, -u NAME, -C, ...). -u / --unset consume a name token.
+        while (idx < tokens.length) {
+            const tok = tokens[idx];
+            if (!tok || !tok.startsWith("-") || tok === "--") {
+                if (tok === "--")
+                    idx += 1;
+                break;
+            }
+            idx += 1;
+            const lower = tok.toLowerCase();
+            if (lower === "-u" || lower === "--unset" || lower === "-s" || lower === "--ignore-environment") {
+                if (idx < tokens.length && !tokens[idx].includes("="))
+                    idx += 1;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const assignRegex = /^([A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*)=(.*)$/;
+    while (idx < tokens.length) {
+        const tok = tokens[idx];
+        const match = assignRegex.exec(tok);
+        if (!match)
+            break;
+        const name = match[1];
+        assignments.push({
+            name,
+            value: match[2],
+            position,
+            loaderInjection: LOADER_INJECTION_ENV.has(name),
+            sensitiveName: isSensitiveEnvName(name),
+        });
+        idx += 1;
+    }
+    return assignments;
+}
+function isDecoderStage(exec, tokens) {
+    if (exec === "base64") {
+        return tokens.slice(1).some((t) => t === "-d" || t === "--decode" || t === "-D");
+    }
+    if (exec === "xxd") {
+        return tokens.slice(1).some((t) => t === "-r" || t === "-rp" || t === "-r -p");
+    }
+    if (exec === "openssl") {
+        const lower = tokens.map((t) => t.toLowerCase());
+        return lower.includes("enc") && lower.some((t) => t === "-d" || t === "-decrypt" || t === "-aes-256-cbc");
+    }
+    return exec === "printf" || exec === "uudecode" || exec === "mmencode" || exec === "recode";
+}
+function detectDecoderPipeline(segment) {
+    const stages = splitPipeStages(segment);
+    if (stages.length < 2)
+        return null;
+    let decoderIndex = -1;
+    let executorIndex = -1;
+    let executor = "";
+    for (let i = 0; i < stages.length; i += 1) {
+        const toks = tokenize(stages[i]);
+        const exec = toks[0]?.toLowerCase();
+        if (!exec)
+            continue;
+        if (decoderIndex === -1 && isDecoderStage(exec, toks))
+            decoderIndex = i;
+        if (executorIndex === -1 && DECODER_EXECUTABLES.has(exec)) {
+            executorIndex = i;
+            executor = exec;
+        }
+    }
+    if (decoderIndex !== -1 && executorIndex !== -1 && executorIndex >= decoderIndex) {
+        return { stages, decoderIndex, executorIndex, executor };
+    }
+    return null;
+}
+/** Public: analyze a shell command into structural metadata. */
+export function analyzeShellCommandV2(command) {
+    const raw = command;
+    const topSegments = splitTopLevelCommands(command);
+    const segments = topSegments.map((text) => ({ text, tokens: tokenize(text) }));
+    const state = {
+        subcommands: [],
+        subshells: [],
+        processSubs: [],
+        expansions: [],
+        diagnostics: [],
+        maxDepth: 0,
+    };
+    scanStructural(command, state, 0);
+    const assignments = [];
+    for (const seg of topSegments)
+        assignments.push(...detectAssignments(seg));
+    const decoderPipelines = [];
+    for (const seg of topSegments) {
+        const dp = detectDecoderPipeline(seg);
+        if (dp)
+            decoderPipelines.push(dp);
+    }
+    return {
+        raw,
+        segments,
+        subcommands: state.subcommands,
+        subshells: state.subshells,
+        processSubstitutions: state.processSubs,
+        assignments,
+        dynamicExpansions: state.expansions,
+        decoderPipelines,
+        wrapperDepth: state.maxDepth,
+        diagnostics: state.diagnostics,
+    };
+}
+function bump(current, candidate) {
+    return ACTION_RANK[candidate] > ACTION_RANK[current] ? candidate : current;
+}
+/**
+ * Public: classify a shell command into allow / confirm / block / escalate,
+ * composing the existing `classifyShellCommand` verdict with V2 structural
+ * detections. The result never lowers the existing risk tier.
+ */
+export function classifyCommandRiskV2(command) {
+    const analysis = analyzeShellCommandV2(command);
+    const base = classifyShellCommand(command);
+    let action = base.risk === "block" ? "block" : base.risk === "confirm" ? "confirm" : "allow";
+    const reasons = [{ code: base.rule, message: base.reason }];
+    const normalizedCommands = [command];
+    for (const node of analysis.subcommands)
+        normalizedCommands.push(node.inner);
+    for (const node of analysis.subshells)
+        normalizedCommands.push(node.inner);
+    for (const node of analysis.processSubstitutions)
+        normalizedCommands.push(node.inner);
+    // Privilege commands escalate (sudo / su / doas / pkexec). Never auto-allowed headlessly.
+    if (base.rule.startsWith("priv.")) {
+        reasons.push({ code: "priv.escalate", message: "Privilege escalation requires explicit human approval." });
+        action = bump(action, "escalate");
+    }
+    // Inspect dynamic-structure inner content for hidden destructive commands.
+    for (const node of analysis.subcommands) {
+        const innerVerdict = classifyShellCommand(node.inner);
+        if (innerVerdict.risk === "block") {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: `exec.inner_block:${innerVerdict.rule}`,
+                message: `Command substitution hides a destructive command: ${innerVerdict.reason}`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "block");
+        }
+        else if (innerVerdict.risk === "confirm") {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: `exec.inner_confirm:${innerVerdict.rule}`,
+                message: `Command substitution hides a risky command: ${innerVerdict.reason}`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    for (const node of analysis.subshells) {
+        const innerVerdict = classifyShellCommand(node.inner);
+        if (innerVerdict.risk === "block") {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: `exec.inner_block:${innerVerdict.rule}`,
+                message: `Subshell hides a destructive command: ${innerVerdict.reason}`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "block");
+        }
+        else if (innerVerdict.risk === "confirm") {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: `exec.inner_confirm:${innerVerdict.rule}`,
+                message: `Subshell hides a risky command: ${innerVerdict.reason}`,
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    for (const node of analysis.processSubstitutions) {
+        const innerVerdict = classifyShellCommand(node.inner);
+        if (innerVerdict.risk === "block") {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: `exec.inner_block:${innerVerdict.rule}`,
+                message: `Process substitution hides a destructive command: ${innerVerdict.reason}`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "block");
+        }
+    }
+    const hasDynamic = analysis.subcommands.length > 0 || analysis.subshells.length > 0 || analysis.processSubstitutions.length > 0;
+    // Dynamic plus already-risky base -> escalate (the dynamic part can hide a worse payload).
+    if (hasDynamic && base.risk !== "allow") {
+        reasons.push({
+            code: "exec.dynamic_elevated",
+            message: "Dynamic shell structure combined with a risky base command.",
+        });
+        action = bump(action, "escalate");
+    }
+    if (analysis.subcommands.length > 0) {
+        reasons.push({
+            code: "exec.command_substitution",
+            message: "Command substitution $(...) or backticks can execute arbitrary commands.",
+        });
+        action = bump(action, "confirm");
+    }
+    if (analysis.subshells.length > 0) {
+        reasons.push({ code: "exec.subshell", message: "Subshell grouping (...) can execute arbitrary commands." });
+        action = bump(action, "confirm");
+    }
+    if (analysis.processSubstitutions.length > 0) {
+        reasons.push({
+            code: "exec.process_substitution",
+            message: "Process substitution <(...) or >(...) spawns a process.",
+        });
+        action = bump(action, "confirm");
+    }
+    for (const dp of analysis.decoderPipelines) {
+        reasons.push({
+            code: "exec.decoder_pipeline",
+            message: `Decoder pipeline (${dp.stages[dp.decoderIndex]} -> ${dp.executor}) can execute a decoded payload.`,
+        });
+        action = bump(action, "confirm");
+    }
+    for (const assignment of analysis.assignments) {
+        if (assignment.loaderInjection) {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: "env.loader_injection",
+                message: `Assignment sets loader/runtime injection variable ${assignment.name}.`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "confirm");
+        }
+        else if (assignment.sensitiveName) {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: "env.sensitive_assignment",
+                message: `Assignment exposes a sensitive variable ${assignment.name} on the command line.`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "confirm");
+        }
+    }
+    // Unresolved expansion inside a risky command's argument list (could expand to /, ~, or a sensitive path).
+    for (const seg of analysis.segments) {
+        const exec = seg.tokens[0]?.toLowerCase();
+        if (!exec || !RISKY_EXPANSION_EXEC.has(exec))
+            continue;
+        const hasExpansion = seg.tokens.slice(1).some((tok) => tok.includes("$"));
+        if (hasExpansion) {
+            reasons.push({
+                code: "exec.dynamic_target",
+                message: `Unresolved expansion in arguments of risky command '${exec}'.`,
+            });
+            action = bump(action, "confirm");
+        }
+    }
+    for (const diag of analysis.diagnostics) {
+        if (diag.fatal) {
+            reasons.push({ code: diag.code, message: diag.message });
+            // Parser fatal -> fail-closed to at least confirm (block stays block).
+            action = bump(action, "confirm");
+        }
+    }
+    return { action, reasons, normalizedCommands, analysis };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=command-safety-parser.js.map