open-agreements 0.7.6 → 0.7.7

package/skills/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/kansas.md

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+---
+jurisdiction: "Kansas"
+slug: kansas
+countryCode: US
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+lastReviewed: "2026-06-02"
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/kansas
+license: CC BY 4.0
+stale: false
+---
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
+> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
+> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
+> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
+>
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/kansas · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+
+# Non-Competes in Kansas[^about]
+
+A question-by-question summary of Kansas non-compete law, including the Weber reasonableness test, judicial reformation of overbroad covenants, tolling-during-breach clauses, the SB 241 amendments to K.S.A. 50-163, non-solicitation safe harbors, healthcare covenants, and trade-secret alternatives.
+
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Question | Kansas |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
+| **Bottom line** | Kansas enforces an employee non-compete that is ancillary, reasonable under the four-factor Weber test, and not adverse to the public welfare, and is one of the more employer-friendly states; courts will narrow an overbroad restraint. |
+| **Main law or case** | common law (Weber v. Tillman, 913 P.2d 84 (Kan. 1996)) |
+| **Main exceptions** | Non-competes excluded from K.S.A. 50-163 Restraint of Trade Act; non-solicit & owner safe harbors; no physician/healthcare ban |
+| **Can a court narrow it?** | Yes — rewrites to reasonable |
+| **Applies to contractors?** | Unclear |
+| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | No — Doan declined an indefinite tolling-during-breach clause |
+| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory limit for non-competes |
+
+## Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Kansas? {#employee-noncompetes}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, when they are reasonable. Kansas enforces an employee non-compete that is ancillary to a lawful contract, reasonable under the circumstances, and not adverse to the public welfare [^weber-governing-standard].
+
+Kansas is a reasonableness state, and it is one of the more employer-friendly jurisdictions in the country. The starting point is not a statute but the common law: a covenant is judged by whether the restraint is reasonable and the employer carries the burden of showing it [^weber-governing-standard].
+
+The Kansas Supreme Court framed the governing rule in *Weber v. Tillman*, a physician case that remains the leading authority on employee covenants.
+
+"A noncompetition covenant ancillary to an employment contract is valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances and not adverse to the public welfare."[^weber-governing-standard]
+
+## What reasonableness test do Kansas courts apply to non-competes? {#reasonableness-test}
+
+**Short answer.** A four-factor test. Kansas courts ask whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest, whether it imposes an undue burden on the employee, whether it injures the public welfare, and whether its time and territory limits are reasonable [^q2-weber-four-factor].
+
+The four factors come from *Weber* and are restated in later cases.
+
+"The analysis of whether the noncompetition clause is reasonable evaluates these factors: (1) Does the covenant protect a legitimate business interest of the employer? (2) Does the covenant create an undue burden on the employee? (3) Is the covenant injurious to the public welfare? (4) Are the time and territorial limitations contained in the covenant reasonable?"[^q2-weber-four-factor]
+
+Enforceability is a question Kansas appellate courts decide without deference to the trial court, so a covenant that reads as reasonable on its face can still be tested fully on appeal [^doan-de-novo].
+
+The public-welfare factor is a real limit, not a formality. In *Caring Hearts*, the Kansas Court of Appeals applied the same four questions to home-health workers and found no public-welfare problem on the facts [^caring-hearts-public-welfare].
+
+## Will a Kansas court narrow an overbroad non-compete instead of voiding it? {#modification-blue-pencil}
+
+**Short answer.** Usually it narrows. Kansas courts have long used their equitable power to reduce an overbroad restraint and enforce it as reduced, rather than striking the whole covenant [^eastern-equitable-reduction].
+
+The modern rule has a common-law root. In *Eastern Distributing*, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed a trial court that cut an excessive territory down to what was reasonably necessary and enforced the covenant to that extent.
+
+"We think the trial court in the exercise of its equitable powers fairly and reasonably reduced the area restriction to only that which was necessary to protect plaintiff's interest."[^eastern-equitable-reduction]
+
+Reformation has a ceiling, though. A court reforms an *unreasonable* term; it may not rewrite a term that was already reasonable. In *Doan*, the Court of Appeals held the trial court erred when it cut a reasonable two-year term down to one year [^doan-no-rewrite].
+
+The 2025 statutory amendments add a separate, mandatory reformation command, but it is aimed at the covenants the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act actually governs. K.S.A. 50-163 directs a court to modify and enforce an overbroad covenant that is *not* conclusively presumed enforceable [^q3-ksa-50-163-reform], yet the same statute excludes covenants not to compete from the Act altogether [^q3-ksa-50-163-noncompete-exclusion]. For a traditional non-compete, the operative reformation authority remains the common-law equity power recognized in *Eastern Distributing*, not the statute. No published Kansas decision has yet construed that exclusion as applied to a non-compete, so this reading rests on the statute's plain text.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on reformation as a license to overreach. Kansas will narrow an unreasonable restraint, but *Doan* shows a court will refuse to rewrite a term that is already reasonable, and an employer that drafts too broadly risks getting only the minimum relief a court considers necessary [^doan-no-rewrite][^eastern-equitable-reduction].
+
+## Does a tolling or extension-during-breach clause extend a Kansas non-compete? {#tolling-during-breach}
+
+**Short answer.** Probably not as written. The only Kansas appellate decision on point refused to enforce a clause that tolled the restricted period during breach and during enforcement litigation, treating the resulting open-ended restraint as unreasonable [^doan-tolling-declined].
+
+Many templates add a tolling or extension clause so the employer gets the full benefit of the restricted period even if the former employee competes during it. In *Doan*, the agreement did exactly that, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's refusal to enforce the tolling provision.
+
+"The district court did not err, however, when it declined to enforce the noncompete clause's tolling provision."[^doan-tolling-declined]
+
+The court's reasoning was about reasonableness, not a technicality. A fixed two-year term was reasonable, but an open-ended extension tied to breach and litigation was not.
+
+"While a two-year period is a reasonable restriction under these facts, an indefinite extension of that period is not a reasonable restraint on Arnberger."[^doan-tolling-indefinite]
+
+No Kansas case approves judicial or equitable extension of a covenant period either, and there is no Kansas Supreme Court decision on tolling. So an employer should treat the drafted, indefinite tolling clause as a serious enforcement risk and should not assume a Kansas court will add lost time back to the restricted period.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Avoid an open-ended tolling-during-breach-and-litigation clause in a Kansas non-compete. *Doan* refused to enforce one as an unreasonable, potentially indefinite restraint, so a defined and reasonable fixed term is the safer drafting choice [^doan-tolling-declined][^doan-tolling-indefinite].
+
+## How did the 2025 SB 241 amendments change Kansas restrictive-covenant law? {#sb-241-changes}
+
+**Short answer.** They created statutory safe harbors for non-solicitation and owner covenants, not for traditional non-competes. K.S.A. 50-163, as amended in 2025, conclusively presumes certain solicitation covenants enforceable, but it also excludes covenants not to compete from the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act [^q5-ksa-50-163-reasonable][^q5-ksa-50-163-exclusion].
+
+SB 241 (2025 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 74, effective July 1, 2025) amended K.S.A. 50-163. The amendments matter most for non-solicitation and owner covenants, which now get conclusive presumptions of enforceability inside defined limits. The statute frames the baseline as a reasonableness standard.
+
+"An arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, understanding or combination is a reasonable restraint of trade or commerce if such restraint is reasonable in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case and does not contravene public welfare."[^q5-ksa-50-163-reasonable]
+
+For overbroad covenants that the Act does govern, K.S.A. 50-163 now requires reformation rather than voiding [^q5-ksa-50-163-reform]. But the statute carves traditional non-competes out of the Act entirely, alongside franchise agreements [^q5-ksa-50-163-exclusion]. The practical result is that SB 241 did not rewrite Kansas non-compete law; ordinary employee non-competes are still governed by the common-law *Weber* test.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not overstate SB 241 as a non-compete statute. Its conclusive presumptions and statutory reformation command run to non-solicitation and owner covenants, while K.S.A. 50-163 expressly excludes covenants not to compete from the Act, leaving them to the common-law reasonableness analysis [^q5-ksa-50-163-exclusion][^q5-ksa-50-163-reform].
+
+## Are Kansas non-solicitation covenants conclusively presumed enforceable? {#non-solicitation}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, inside the statutory limits. A written employee customer non-solicit is conclusively presumed enforceable if it is limited to material contact customers and lasts no more than two years [^ksa-50-163-customer-nonsolicit].
+
+K.S.A. 50-163 sets durational and scope limits that, if met, make the covenant conclusively presumed enforceable and not a restraint of trade. For an employee customer non-solicit, the limits are a two-year cap and a material-contact-customer scope.
+
+The statute defines who counts as a material contact customer, which is the key scope concept for these covenants.
+
+"‘Material contact customer’ means any customer or prospective customer that is solicited, produced or serviced, directly or indirectly, by the employee or owner at issue or any customer or prospective customer about whom the employee or owner, directly or indirectly, had confidential business or proprietary information or trade secrets in the course of the employee's or owner's relationship with the customer."[^ksa-50-163-material-contact]
+
+Owner covenants get a longer runway. A written covenant by an owner not to solicit the entity's customers is conclusively presumed enforceable if it is limited to material contact customers and does not run more than four years after the owner's relationship with the business ends [^ksa-50-163-owner-nonsolicit].
+
+The presumption is strong but not absolute. Even for a covenant inside a safe harbor, the statute lets the employee or owner raise any available legal or equitable defense for the court to consider [^ksa-50-163-defenses].
+
+## What consideration supports a Kansas non-compete? {#consideration}
+
+**Short answer.** Continued employment is enough. Kansas does not treat continued employment of an existing at-will employee as inadequate consideration for a covenant signed after hire [^puritan-bennett-consideration].
+
+This matters for covenants rolled out mid-employment. In *Puritan-Bennett*, the Court of Appeals held that an employee's continued employment could support a covenant not to compete and reversed a contrary ruling.
+
+"After reviewing these authorities, we hold that continued employment should not as a matter of law be disregarded as consideration sufficient to uphold a covenant not to compete."[^puritan-bennett-consideration]
+
+That gives Kansas employers more flexibility than states requiring new, independent consideration such as a bonus or promotion. The covenant still has to be reasonable under *Weber*; sufficient consideration does not cure an overbroad restraint.
+
+## Do special rules apply to Kansas physician and healthcare non-competes? {#healthcare}
+
+**Short answer.** No special ban. Kansas evaluates physician covenants under the ordinary reasonableness test, and it recognizes referral sources as a legitimate interest a medical practice may protect [^idbeis-referral-sources].
+
+Kansas has no statute banning healthcare non-competes. Both of the state's leading covenant cases, *Weber* and *Idbeis*, arose in medical practices and enforced the covenants. *Idbeis* is the clearest statement that a medical group may protect referral relationships.
+
+"In Kansas, however, the law is clear that referral sources are a legitimate interest which can be protected by a restrictive covenant even in the context of a medical practice."[^idbeis-referral-sources]
+
+A 2026 bill, SB 504, would have banned most post-employment non-competes for physicians and mid-level practitioners, but it died in the 2025 to 2026 legislative session without advancing. It signals legislative interest, not a change in the law, so physician covenants in Kansas are still analyzed under the reasonableness test today.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not assume Kansas has adopted a healthcare non-compete ban. The 2026 proposal did not pass, and current law still enforces a reasonable physician covenant, including protection of referral sources [^idbeis-referral-sources].
+
+## Are trade-secret and confidentiality protections still available in Kansas? {#trade-secrets}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes. The Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act protects trade secrets, and a contractual confidentiality covenant remains available for information that is not a trade secret [^ksa-60-3320-trade-secret][^ksa-60-3326-contract].
+
+The Kansas Uniform Trade Secrets Act, K.S.A. 60-3320 et seq., defines a trade secret in terms of independent economic value and reasonable secrecy efforts.
+
+"‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."[^ksa-60-3320-trade-secret]
+
+The Act is the exclusive route for trade-secret recovery. In *Wolfe Electric*, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a tort claim cannot be used to recover for trade-secret misappropriation because the Act preempts it [^wolfe-kutsa-exclusive]. But the Act reaches only trade secrets, and it preserves contractual remedies, so a confidentiality covenant is the tool for protecting valuable information that does not qualify as a trade secret [^ksa-60-3326-contract].
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on the trade-secret statute to protect ordinary confidential information. *Wolfe Electric* confirms the Act is the exclusive remedy for trade-secret misappropriation, so non-trade-secret information should be protected by a separate, reasonable confidentiality covenant [^wolfe-kutsa-exclusive][^ksa-60-3326-contract].
+
+## How are Kansas sale-of-business and owner covenants treated? {#sale-of-business}
+
+**Short answer.** More favorably than employee covenants. Owner and seller non-solicitation covenants get a four-year statutory safe harbor, covering both no-recruit and customer non-solicitation terms, while a sale-related non-compete is still tested under the common-law reasonableness standard [^q10-ksa-50-163-owner][^q10-ksa-50-163-owner-customer].
+
+K.S.A. 50-163 treats owners and sellers differently from rank-and-file employees. An owner who agrees not to recruit the entity's employees or owners is conclusively presumed enforceable for up to four years.
+
+"A covenant in writing in which an owner agrees to not solicit, recruit, induce, persuade, encourage, direct or otherwise interfere with, directly or indirectly, one or more employees or owners of a business entity for the purpose of interfering with the employment or ownership relationship of such employees or owners shall be conclusively presumed to be enforceable and not a restraint of trade if the covenant is between a business entity and an owner of the business entity and the covenant does not continue for more than four years following the end of the owner's business relationship with the business entity."[^q10-ksa-50-163-owner]
+
+The statute defines owner broadly to include sellers of business assets and equity interests, so a buyer protecting purchased goodwill can use the longer owner runway for solicitation covenants [^q10-ksa-50-163-owner-def]. A pure non-compete tied to a sale still falls outside the Act and is judged under *Weber*, where courts generally give sale-of-business restraints more latitude than employee restraints.
+
+A 2026 bill, HB 2650, would have voided non-competes on the sale or change in control of an employer, but it also died in the 2025 to 2026 session and is not law.
+
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-02. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Kansas. This article synthesizes Kansas primary law and is not legal advice from a Kansas-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+[^weber-governing-standard]: **Weber v. Tillman** — "A noncompetition covenant ancillary to an employment contract is valid and enforceable if the restraint is reasonable under the circumstances and not adverse to the public welfare." *Weber v. Tillman, 259 Kan. 457, 913 P.2d 84 (1996).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7969238/weber-v-tillman/#:~:text=A%20noncompetition%20covenant%20ancillary%20to,adverse%20to%20the%20public%20welfare.>
+
+[^q2-weber-four-factor]: **Weber v. Tillman** — "The analysis of whether the noncompetition clause is reasonable evaluates these factors: (1) Does the covenant protect a legitimate business interest of the employer? (2) Does the covenant create an undue burden on the employee? (3) Is the covenant injurious to the public welfare? (4) Are the time and territorial limitations contained in the covenant reasonable?" *Weber v. Tillman, 259 Kan. 457, 913 P.2d 84 (1996).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7969238/weber-v-tillman/#:~:text=The%20analysis%20of%20whether%20the,contained%20in%20the%20covenant%20reasonable%3F>
+
+[^doan-de-novo]: **Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger** — "Kansas appellate courts exercise unlimited review when determining whether a noncompete clause in an employment contract is enforceable as written." *Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger, 522 P.3d 364 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9367497/doan-family-corp-v-arnberger/#:~:text=Kansas%20appellate%20courts%20exercise%20unlimited,contract%20is%20enforceable%20as%20written.>
+
+[^caring-hearts-public-welfare]: **Caring Hearts Personal Home Services, Inc. v. Hobley** — "There is no evidence that enforcement of the noncompete agreement is injurious to the public welfare." *Caring Hearts Personal Home Servs., Inc. v. Hobley, 35 Kan. App. 2d 345, 130 P.3d 1215 (2006).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7213041/caring-hearts-personal-home-services-inc-v-hobley/#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20evidence%20that%20enforcement,injurious%20to%20the%20public%20welfare.>
+
+[^eastern-equitable-reduction]: **Eastern Distributing Co. v. Flynn** — "We think the trial court in the exercise of its equitable powers fairly and reasonably reduced the area restriction to only that which was necessary to protect plaintiff's interest." *Eastern Distributing Co. v. Flynn, 222 Kan. 666, 567 P.2d 1371 (1977).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1195583/eastern-distributing-co-inc-v-flynn/#:~:text=We%20think%20the%20trial%20court,necessary%20to%20protect%20plaintiff's%20interest.>
+
+[^doan-no-rewrite]: **Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger** — "Because the two-year term was reasonable, the court did not have the discretion to rewrite that term of the agreement." *Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger, 522 P.3d 364 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9367497/doan-family-corp-v-arnberger/#:~:text=Because%20the%20two%2Dyear%20term%20was,that%20term%20of%20the%20agreement.>
+
+[^q3-ksa-50-163-reform]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "If a covenant that is not presumed to be enforceable pursuant to subsection (c) is determined to be overbroad or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect a business interest of the business entity seeking enforcement of the covenant, the court shall modify the covenant, enforce the covenant as modified and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interests." *K.S.A. 50-163(b).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^q3-ksa-50-163-noncompete-exclusion]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "any franchise agreements or covenants not to compete" *K.S.A. 50-163(e)(6).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^doan-tolling-declined]: **Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger** — "The district court did not err, however, when it declined to enforce the noncompete clause's tolling provision." *Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger, 522 P.3d 364 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9367497/doan-family-corp-v-arnberger/#:~:text=The%20district%20court%20did%20not,the%20noncompete%20clause's%20tolling%20provision.>
+
+[^doan-tolling-indefinite]: **Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger** — "While a two-year period is a reasonable restriction under these facts, an indefinite extension of that period is not a reasonable restraint on Arnberger." *Doan Family Corp. v. Arnberger, 522 P.3d 364 (Kan. Ct. App. 2022).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9367497/doan-family-corp-v-arnberger/#:~:text=While%20a%20two%2Dyear%20period%20is,a%20reasonable%20restraint%20on%20Arnberger.>
+
+[^q5-ksa-50-163-reasonable]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "An arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, understanding or combination is a reasonable restraint of trade or commerce if such restraint is reasonable in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case and does not contravene public welfare." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(1).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^q5-ksa-50-163-exclusion]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "any franchise agreements or covenants not to compete" *K.S.A. 50-163(e)(6).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^q5-ksa-50-163-reform]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "If a covenant that is not presumed to be enforceable pursuant to subsection (c) is determined to be overbroad or otherwise not reasonably necessary to protect a business interest of the business entity seeking enforcement of the covenant, the court shall modify the covenant, enforce the covenant as modified and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect such interests." *K.S.A. 50-163(b).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^ksa-50-163-customer-nonsolicit]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "A covenant in writing in which an employee agrees not to solicit, recruit, induce, persuade, encourage, direct or otherwise interfere with, directly or indirectly, a business entity's customers, including any reduction, termination, acceptance or transfer of any customer's business, in whole or in part, for the purpose of providing any product or service that is competitive with those provided by the employer shall be conclusively presumed to be enforceable and not a restraint of trade if the covenant is limited to material contact customers and the covenant is between an employer and an employee and does not continue for more than two years following the end of the employee's employment with the employer." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(5).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^ksa-50-163-material-contact]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "‘Material contact customer’ means any customer or prospective customer that is solicited, produced or serviced, directly or indirectly, by the employee or owner at issue or any customer or prospective customer about whom the employee or owner, directly or indirectly, had confidential business or proprietary information or trade secrets in the course of the employee's or owner's relationship with the customer." *K.S.A. 50-163(g)(2).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^ksa-50-163-owner-nonsolicit]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "A covenant in writing in which an owner agrees to not solicit, induce, persuade, encourage, service, direct or otherwise interfere with, directly or indirectly, a business entity's customers, including any reduction, termination, acceptance or transfer of any customer's business, in whole or in part, for the purpose of providing any product or service that is competitive with those provided by the business entity shall be conclusively presumed to be enforceable and not a restraint of trade if the covenant is limited to material contact customers and the covenant does not continue for more than four years following the end of the owner's business relationship with the business entity." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(3).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^ksa-50-163-defenses]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "Notwithstanding the presumption of enforceability provided in subsections (c)(2) through (c)(5), an employee or owner shall be permitted to assert any applicable defense available at law or in equity for the court's consideration in a dispute regarding a written covenant." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(7).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^puritan-bennett-consideration]: **Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter** — "After reviewing these authorities, we hold that continued employment should not as a matter of law be disregarded as consideration sufficient to uphold a covenant not to compete." *Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Richter, 8 Kan. App. 2d 311, 657 P.2d 589 (1983).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1159191/puritan-bennett-corp-v-richter/#:~:text=After%20reviewing%20these%20authorities%2C%20we,a%20covenant%20not%20to%20compete.>
+
+[^idbeis-referral-sources]: **Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A.** — "In Kansas, however, the law is clear that referral sources are a legitimate interest which can be protected by a restrictive covenant even in the context of a medical practice." *Idbeis v. Wichita Surgical Specialists, P.A., 279 Kan. 755, 112 P.3d 81 (2005).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7970031/idbeis-v-wichita-surgical-specialists-pa/#:~:text=In%20Kansas%2C%20however%2C%20the%20law,context%20of%20a%20medical%20practice.>
+
+[^ksa-60-3320-trade-secret]: **K.S.A. 60-3320** — "‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." *K.S.A. 60-3320(4).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_033_0020.html>
+
+[^ksa-60-3326-contract]: **K.S.A. 60-3326** — "This act does not affect: (1) Contractual remedies, whether or not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret;" *K.S.A. 60-3326(b)(1).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch60/060_033_0026.html>
+
+[^wolfe-kutsa-exclusive]: **Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth** — "This is error because tort causes of action cannot include a claim to recover for trade secrets; KUTSA is the exclusive remedy." *Wolfe Electric, Inc. v. Duckworth, 293 Kan. 375, 266 P.3d 516 (2011).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/7970813/wolfe-electric-inc-v-duckworth/#:~:text=This%20is%20error%20because%20tort,KUTSA%20is%20the%20exclusive%20remedy.>
+
+[^q10-ksa-50-163-owner]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "A covenant in writing in which an owner agrees to not solicit, recruit, induce, persuade, encourage, direct or otherwise interfere with, directly or indirectly, one or more employees or owners of a business entity for the purpose of interfering with the employment or ownership relationship of such employees or owners shall be conclusively presumed to be enforceable and not a restraint of trade if the covenant is between a business entity and an owner of the business entity and the covenant does not continue for more than four years following the end of the owner's business relationship with the business entity." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(2).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^q10-ksa-50-163-owner-customer]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "A covenant in writing in which an owner agrees to not solicit, induce, persuade, encourage, service, direct or otherwise interfere with, directly or indirectly, a business entity's customers, including any reduction, termination, acceptance or transfer of any customer's business, in whole or in part, for the purpose of providing any product or service that is competitive with those provided by the business entity shall be conclusively presumed to be enforceable and not a restraint of trade if the covenant is limited to material contact customers and the covenant does not continue for more than four years following the end of the owner's business relationship with the business entity." *K.S.A. 50-163(c)(3).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>
+
+[^q10-ksa-50-163-owner-def]: **K.S.A. 50-163** — "‘Owner’ means a current or former owner or seller of all or any part of the assets of a business entity or any interest in a business entity, including, but not limited to, a partnership interest, a membership interest in a limited liability company or a series limited liability company or any other equity interest or ownership interest." *K.S.A. 50-163(g)(3).* <https://ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch50/050_001_0063.html>

package/skills/non-compete-contract-explainer/content/kentucky.md

@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+---
+jurisdiction: "Kentucky"
+slug: kentucky
+countryCode: US
+snapshotAsOf: "2026-06-08"
+lastReviewed: "2026-06-03"
+canonicalUrl: https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/kentucky
+license: CC BY 4.0
+stale: false
+---
+
+> [!IMPORTANT]
+> **Informational only — not legal advice.** This is a snapshot of an OpenAgreements practice note,
+> provided for general information. It is not legal advice, does not create an attorney-client
+> relationship, and is not a substitute for a licensed attorney in the relevant jurisdiction.
+> Laws change; verify against the canonical version before relying on it.
+>
+> **Canonical:** https://openagreements.org/legal/non-compete/kentucky · **Snapshot as of:** 2026-06-08 · License: CC BY 4.0 · © UseJunior
+
+# Non-Competes in Kentucky[^about]
+
+Kentucky enforces non-competes only when the restraint is reasonable under common law and supported by valid consideration, with a narrow statutory ban for temporary health care staffing.
+
+
+## At a glance
+
+| Question | Kentucky |
+| --- | --- |
+| **Are non-competes enforceable?** | Allowed if reasonable |
+| **Bottom line** | Kentucky enforces a non-compete only if it is supported by valid consideration and reasonable in scope; existing employees must get new consideration, and courts may blue-pencil overbroad terms. |
+| **Main law or case** | common law (Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009); Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014)) |
+| **Main exceptions** | Temporary health-care staffing ban (KRS 216.724) |
+| **Can a court narrow it?** | Yes — rewrites to reasonable |
+| **Applies to contractors?** | Unclear |
+| **Restriction extended during a breach?** | Unsettled |
+| **Maximum length set by law** | No statutory cap |
+
+## Are employee non-compete agreements enforceable in Kentucky? {#employee-noncompetes}
+
+**Short answer.** Yes, sometimes. Kentucky is a reasonableness state, not a general ban state. A non-compete is enforceable only if it is supported by valid consideration and is reasonable — affording fair protection to a legitimate employer interest without being so broad as to harm the public or impose undue hardship on the employee [^kegel-reasonableness-test].
+
+The common-law standard traces to *Ceresia v. Mitchell* and is restated in later cases such as *Kegel v. Tillotson*. In practice the recurring questions are duration, geography, the employer's protectable interest, the burden on the employee, and the effect on the public [^kegel-reasonableness-test].
+
+Kentucky has not enacted a general non-compete statute for the ordinary workforce. The enforceability analysis is judge-made, with one narrow statutory exception for temporary health care staffing covered later in this note.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not treat Kentucky as either a free-for-all or a ban state. Confirm there is valid consideration first, then test the restraint for reasonableness in time, territory, and scope before assuming a Kentucky covenant is enforceable [^kegel-reasonableness-test].
+
+## Is continued at-will employment enough consideration for a Kentucky non-compete? {#consideration}
+
+**Short answer.** No, not by itself, for an existing employee. Since *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown*, requiring a current employee to sign a non-compete without giving anything new — no raise, promotion, or other benefit — fails for lack of consideration [^creech-no-consideration][^creech-existing-employee-nothing].
+
+In *Creech*, a sixteen-year employee was asked to sign a conflicts-of-interest agreement containing a non-compete and received nothing in exchange. The Kentucky Supreme Court held the covenant unenforceable because the employer gave up no legal right and the employee gained no new benefit, so there was no mutuality of obligation [^creech-no-consideration].
+
+The practical rule that emerges is a split between new hires and incumbents. An offer of employment at the outset of the relationship is itself adequate consideration, but an employer that introduces a covenant mid-employment must provide independent, new consideration such as a bonus, a raise, a promotion, or specialized training [^creech-existing-employee-nothing].
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on continued at-will employment alone when an existing Kentucky employee signs a new covenant. Tie the signature to identifiable new consideration and document it, because a bare recital of consideration did not save the agreement in *Creech* [^creech-no-consideration][^creech-existing-employee-nothing].
+
+## What legitimate business interests can support a Kentucky non-compete? {#protectable-interests}
+
+**Short answer.** Trade secrets, confidential information, and customer goodwill are the core interests that can justify a tailored Kentucky restraint, and the Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act supplies the statutory trade-secret overlay [^kutsa-trade-secret-definition].
+
+A covenant cannot exist only to suppress ordinary competition. It must protect something the employer is entitled to guard, such as trade secrets, confidential business information, or customer goodwill, rather than a general wish to keep a former employee out of the market [^kutsa-trade-secret-definition].
+
+The Kentucky Uniform Trade Secrets Act, codified at KRS 365.880 through 365.900, runs alongside contractual restraints. It defines a trade secret by the twin tests of independent economic value from secrecy and reasonable efforts to keep the information secret [^kutsa-trade-secret-definition]. A non-solicitation covenant is often easier to enforce than a trade-secret claim, because it requires proving contact with protected customers rather than meeting the statutory trade-secret threshold.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not use a Kentucky non-compete to block competition disconnected from a protectable interest. Tie the restraint to specific confidential information, trade secrets, or customer goodwill, and keep trade-secret remedies in a separate confidentiality and KUTSA strategy [^kutsa-trade-secret-definition].
+
+## What duration and geographic scope are reasonable for a Kentucky non-compete? {#duration-geography}
+
+**Short answer.** There is no statutory cap. Kentucky courts weigh duration, geography, the employer's protectable interest, the burden on the employee, and the public effect as a whole, rather than applying fixed numbers [^q4-kegel-reasonableness].
+
+During the *Creech* litigation, the Kentucky Court of Appeals proposed a six-factor reasonableness test — covering the nature of the industry, the employer's characteristics, the history of the employment relationship, the protectable interest, the hardship on the employee, and the effect on the public [^creech-six-factor-proposed]. Trial courts often look to that framework, but its status is limited: the Kentucky Supreme Court resolved *Creech* on consideration grounds alone and expressly addressed only that issue, so it never adopted the six-factor test [^creech-consideration-only-issue].
+
+Because the standard is holistic, geography and duration are evaluated together against the employer's actual footprint. A restraint limited to the area where the employer does business and to a duration that matches the time needed to protect the relationship is far easier to defend than a long, open-ended, statewide ban [^q4-kegel-reasonableness].
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not copy a fixed term or radius from another form. Match the duration and territory to the employee's role and the employer's real market, because a Kentucky court evaluates the restraint as a whole and there is no safe-harbor number [^q4-kegel-reasonableness][^creech-consideration-only-issue].
+
+## Will a Kentucky court blue-pencil or reform an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing}
+
+**Short answer.** Often, yes. Kentucky is a reformation jurisdiction: its courts have a blue-pencil power to reform or amend overly broad restrictions, and in some cases to supply a missing reasonable limit, rather than voiding the covenant outright [^kegel-blue-pencil][^hodges-reformation-geography].
+
+*Kegel v. Tillotson* states the rule directly: Kentucky courts are empowered to reform or amend restrictions in a non-compete clause when the initial terms are overly broad or burdensome [^kegel-blue-pencil]. *Hodges v. Todd* shows how far that power can reach — there, in the sale-of-a-business context, the court held that a trial court could enforce a covenant that omitted any geographic limit by establishing a reasonable one based on the parties' intent [^hodges-reformation-geography].
+
+That equitable power is not a license to overreach. Reformation is discretionary, and an employer that drafts an abusively broad covenant cannot assume a court will simply rewrite it into something enforceable.
+
+> [!CAUTION]
+> **Drafting note.**
+>
+> Do not rely on Kentucky's blue-pencil power as a safety net for an aggressive covenant. Draft tiered, severable, reasonable restraints, because reformation is discretionary and a court may decline to rescue a covenant it views as overreaching [^kegel-blue-pencil][^hodges-reformation-geography].
+
+## Does a Kentucky non-compete toll or extend during breach or litigation? {#tolling-extension}
+
+**Short answer.** This is an open Kentucky question. No staged Kentucky statute or appellate decision squarely endorses automatically tolling or extending the restricted period while the former employee is in breach or while litigation is pending [^q6-kegel-reasonableness-backdrop][^q6-kegel-blue-pencil].
+
+Kentucky law gives two signals rather than a rule. First, any clause that extends the restricted period must still satisfy the ordinary reasonableness standard, so an extension that turns a fixed covenant into an open-ended restraint risks being found unreasonable [^q6-kegel-reasonableness-backdrop]. Second, Kentucky courts reform restraints toward reasonableness rather than mechanically enlarging them, which cuts against assuming a court will tack on extra time for a breach [^q6-kegel-blue-pencil].
+
+A contractual extension-on-breach clause is therefore unsettled and fact-dependent in Kentucky. It is most defensible when it is tied to the duration of an actual breach and a legitimate interest, rather than written as an automatic, indefinite extension.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Open question: Kentucky law is unsettled on whether an extension-on-breach or tolling clause is enforceable after the original restricted period expires. Draft any such clause as a separate, reasonable restraint tied to the breach, and do not assume a Kentucky court will automatically extend an expired covenant [^q6-kegel-reasonableness-backdrop][^q6-kegel-blue-pencil].
+
+## Which Kentucky workers have special non-compete limits? {#industry-specific-limits}
+
+**Short answer.** Kentucky's one categorical statutory ban targets temporary health care staffing. KRS 216.724 voids non-compete and contract buy-out provisions between a health care services agency and its temporary direct care staff [^krs-216-724-healthcare-ban][^krs-216-724-void].
+
+The statute bars a health care services agency from restricting the employment opportunities of temporary direct care staff, including through non-compete or buy-out clauses [^krs-216-724-healthcare-ban]. A contract that violates the rule is treated as an unfair trade practice and is void [^krs-216-724-void]. A 2023 amendment narrowed the ban so it does not reach the placement of permanent direct care staff.
+
+Outside that carve-out, Kentucky has no broad occupational exemptions for non-competes. Ordinary employees — including most professionals — fall back on the common-law reasonableness and consideration analysis described above rather than an industry-specific statute.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not use ordinary reasonableness analysis to rescue a covenant that KRS 216.724 voids. For a temporary direct care staffer at a health care services agency, the statutory ban controls and the covenant is void regardless of how reasonable it looks [^krs-216-724-healthcare-ban][^krs-216-724-void].
+
+## Will a choice-of-law clause selecting Kentucky law be enforced? {#choice-of-law}
+
+**Short answer.** Often, yes. Kentucky's moderate reformation approach makes Kentucky law a common pick for multi-state covenants, and courts — even in states that reject blue-penciling — have applied a contractual Kentucky choice-of-law clause and found Kentucky's rule not contrary to the forum's public policy [^senture-applies-kentucky-law][^edwards-public-policy-not-repugnant].
+
+In *Senture, LLC v. Dietrich*, a Virginia federal court applied Kentucky law to a non-compete pursuant to the agreement's choice-of-law and forum-selection clause [^senture-applies-kentucky-law]. In *Edwards Moving & Rigging, Inc. v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc.*, another Virginia federal court enforced a Kentucky choice-of-law clause and held that applying Kentucky law — which allows blue-penciling, unlike Virginia — was not repugnant enough to Virginia public policy to override the parties' choice [^edwards-public-policy-not-repugnant].
+
+The limit is public policy. A court applies the chosen law only when doing so does not offend the forum's own public policy, and both decisions are federal trial-court rulings rather than binding Kentucky Supreme Court authority.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Do not treat a Kentucky choice-of-law clause as automatically dispositive. It is strongest when paired with a real connection to Kentucky and a covenant that is reasonable on its own terms, because a forum court will still test the clause against its own public policy before applying Kentucky law [^senture-applies-kentucky-law][^edwards-public-policy-not-repugnant].
+
+## Did the FTC's federal non-compete rule change Kentucky non-compete law? {#federal-ftc-overlay}
+
+**Short answer.** No. The FTC's 2024 nationwide Non-Compete Rule was set aside by a federal court before it took effect, so Kentucky non-competes remain governed by Kentucky common law and the state's narrow statutory carve-out [^ryan-ftc-rule-set-aside].
+
+*Ryan LLC v. FTC* held that the FTC lacked statutory authority to issue the rule and that the rule was arbitrary and capricious [^ryan-ftc-unlawful]. The court set the rule aside with nationwide effect so that it would not be enforced or take effect [^ryan-ftc-rule-set-aside].
+
+That outcome does not make every Kentucky covenant enforceable. It simply removes the FTC rule as a nationwide overlay and leaves Kentucky's reasonableness and consideration requirements in control.
+
+"The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter."[^ryan-ftc-rule-set-aside]
+
+## What recent Kentucky non-compete reform efforts should employers watch? {#pending-reform}
+
+**Short answer.** None is currently law. Kentucky's most recent reform efforts, House Bill 690 and Senate Bill 234 in the 2025 session, would have restricted non-competes for lower-wage and other workers, but both died without enactment [^hb690-wage-threshold].
+
+House Bill 690 would have barred non-competes against a *covered employee* — defined as a worker earning less than two thousand dollars per week — and let affected workers sue [^hb690-wage-threshold]. A broader companion proposal, Senate Bill 234, also failed that session. Neither bill passed before the 2025 session adjourned, and the 2026 session likewise ended without enacting a general non-compete restriction.
+
+The enacted baseline therefore remains common-law reasonableness and consideration, plus the narrow health care staffing ban. These bills matter as a signal of likely future direction, not as current law.
+
+> [!NOTE]
+> **Practice note.**
+>
+> Treat House Bill 690 and Senate Bill 234 as monitoring items, not present Kentucky law. Recheck the Kentucky General Assembly bill status each session before changing forms or telling workers that Kentucky has enacted a wage-threshold or general non-compete ban [^hb690-wage-threshold].
+
+[^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org) · Maintained by [UseJunior](https://usejunior.com). Last reviewed 2026-06-03. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is admitted in New York, not Kentucky. This article synthesizes Kentucky primary law and is not legal advice from a Kentucky-admitted attorney. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship.
+
+[^kegel-reasonableness-test]: **Kegel v. Tillotson** — "agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, ‘on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted." *Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169063/kegel-v-tillotson/#:~:text=agreements%20on%20restraint%20of%20trade,hardship%20on%20the%20party%20restricted.>
+
+[^creech-no-consideration]: **Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown** — "Because the Agreement did not require Creech to forbear the exercise of some legal right or otherwise result in some detriment to Creech, there was no consideration." *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5444327/charles-t-creech-inc-v-brown/#:~:text=Because%20the%20Agreement%20did%20not,Creech%2C%20there%20was%20no%20consideration.>
+
+[^creech-existing-employee-nothing]: **Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown** — "In short, Brown received no consideration from Creech in exchange for signing the Agreement or after he signed the Agreement." *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5444327/charles-t-creech-inc-v-brown/#:~:text=In%20short%2C%20Brown%20received%20no,after%20he%20signed%20the%20Agreement.>
+
+[^kutsa-trade-secret-definition]: **Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880** — "‘Trade secret’ means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, data, device, method, technique, or process, that: (a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." *Ky. Rev. Stat. § 365.880(4).* <https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=34868>
+
+[^q4-kegel-reasonableness]: **Kegel v. Tillotson** — "agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, ‘on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted." *Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169063/kegel-v-tillotson/#:~:text=agreements%20on%20restraint%20of%20trade,hardship%20on%20the%20party%20restricted.>
+
+[^creech-six-factor-proposed]: **Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown** — "In doing so, the Court proposed a six factor test that should be applied by the trial court in determining whether the non-compete portion of the Agreement is enforceable." *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5444327/charles-t-creech-inc-v-brown/#:~:text=In%20doing%20so%2C%20the%20Court%20proposed,of%20the%20Agreement%20is%20enforceable.>
+
+[^creech-consideration-only-issue]: **Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown** — "Because we hold that this Agreement was not supported by adequate consideration, that is the only issue we address." *Charles T. Creech, Inc. v. Brown, 433 S.W.3d 345 (Ky. 2014).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/5444327/charles-t-creech-inc-v-brown/#:~:text=Because%20we%20hold%20that%20this,the%20only%20issue%20we%20address.>
+
+[^kegel-blue-pencil]: **Kegel v. Tillotson** — "our courts have adopted a ‘blue pencil’ rule, whereby we are empowered to reform or amend restrictions in a non-compete clause if the initial restrictions are overly broad or burdensome." *Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169063/kegel-v-tillotson/#:~:text=our%20courts%20have%20adopted%20a,are%20overly%20broad%20or%20burdensome.>
+
+[^hodges-reformation-geography]: **Hodges v. Todd** — "we hold that the trial court had the authority to enforce the covenant by establishing a reasonable geographical limitation based on the intention of the parties at the time the contract was executed." *Hodges v. Todd, 698 S.W.2d 317 (Ky. App. 1985).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1781513/hodges-v-todd/#:~:text=we%20hold%20that%20the%20trial,time%20the%20contract%20was%20executed.>
+
+[^q6-kegel-reasonableness-backdrop]: **Kegel v. Tillotson** — "agreements on restraint of trade are reasonable if, ‘on consideration of the subject, nature of the business, situation of the parties and circumstances of the particular case, the restriction is such only as to afford fair protection to the interests of the covenan-tee and is not so large as to interfere with the public interests or impose undue hardship on the party restricted." *Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169063/kegel-v-tillotson/#:~:text=agreements%20on%20restraint%20of%20trade,hardship%20on%20the%20party%20restricted.>
+
+[^q6-kegel-blue-pencil]: **Kegel v. Tillotson** — "our courts have adopted a ‘blue pencil’ rule, whereby we are empowered to reform or amend restrictions in a non-compete clause if the initial restrictions are overly broad or burdensome." *Kegel v. Tillotson, 297 S.W.3d 908 (Ky. App. 2009).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2169063/kegel-v-tillotson/#:~:text=our%20courts%20have%20adopted%20a,are%20overly%20broad%20or%20burdensome.>
+
+[^krs-216-724-healthcare-ban]: **Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724** — "Restrict in any manner the employment opportunities of any temporary direct care staff that is contracted with or employed by the agency, including but not limited to contract buy-out provisions or contract non-compete clauses;" *Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724(1)(a).* <https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=53778>
+
+[^krs-216-724-void]: **Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724** — "Any contract between a health care services agency and temporary direct care staff that does not comply with subsection (1) of this section shall be considered an unfair trade practice and be void pursuant to KRS 365.060." *Ky. Rev. Stat. § 216.724(2).* <https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=53778>
+
+[^senture-applies-kentucky-law]: **Senture, LLC v. Dietrich** — "With respect to the first issue, this Court will apply Kentucky law to this case." *Senture, LLC v. Dietrich, 575 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D. Va. 2008).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/2465686/senture-llc-v-dietrich/#:~:text=With%20respect%20to%20the%20first,Kentucky%20law%20to%20this%20case.>
+
+[^edwards-public-policy-not-repugnant]: **Edwards Moving & Rigging, Inc. v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc.** — "Applying the law of a state that allows ‘blue penciling’ is not so repugnant to Virginia public policy as to overcome Virginia's preference for enforcing choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses." *Edwards Moving & Rigging, Inc. v. W.O. Grubb Steel Erection, Inc., No. 3:12CV146-HEH (E.D. Va. Apr. 23, 2012).* <https://www.casemine.com/judgement/us/5914ae80add7b04934747bf6>
+
+[^ryan-ftc-rule-set-aside]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "The Non-Compete Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 910.1–.6, is hereby SET ASIDE and shall not be enforced or otherwise take effect on September 4, 2024, or thereafter." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10205745/ryan-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/#:~:text=The%20Non%2DCompete%20Rule%2C%2016%20C.F.R.,September%204%2C%202024%2C%20or%20thereafter.>
+
+[^ryan-ftc-unlawful]: **Ryan LLC v. Federal Trade Commission** — "In sum, the Court concludes that the FTC lacks statutory authority to promulgate the Non- Compete Rule, and that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious." *Ryan LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 746 F. Supp. 3d 369 (N.D. Tex. 2024).* <https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10205745/ryan-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/#:~:text=In%20sum%2C%20the%20Court%20concludes%20that,Rule%20is%20arbitrary%20and%20capricious.>
+
+[^hb690-wage-threshold]: **An Act relating to contracts (H.B. 690)** — "No employer shall enter into, enforce, or threaten to enforce a covenant not to compete with any covered employee." *H.B. 690, 2025 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2025).* <https://apps.legislature.ky.gov/recorddocuments/bill/25RS/hb690/orig_bill.pdf>