onadit 0.0.1 → 1.0.0

package/dist/src/runtime/rift-env.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+export interface LoadRiftEnvOptions {
+    env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    filePath?: string;
+    overrideExisting?: boolean;
+    allowedKeys?: readonly string[];
+}
+export interface LoadRiftEnvResult {
+    filePath: string;
+    loadedKeys: string[];
+    existed: boolean;
+}
+export declare function defaultRiftEnvPath(homeDir?: string): string;
+export declare function loadRiftEnv(opts?: LoadRiftEnvOptions): LoadRiftEnvResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=rift-env.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/runtime/rift-env.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/runtime/rift-env.js

@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import os from "node:os";
+import path from "node:path";
+const DEFAULT_KEYS = [
+    "VOYAGE_API_KEY",
+    "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
+    "HUBSPOT_ACCESS_TOKEN",
+];
+export function defaultRiftEnvPath(homeDir = os.homedir()) {
+    return path.join(homeDir, ".rift.env");
+}
+// Legacy fallback path. Read silently when ~/.rift.env is absent so a
+// machine carrying state from before the rename keeps working until
+// Slice 1.5 migrates the file. Not for friend use; not documented.
+function legacyEnvPath(homeDir = os.homedir()) {
+    return path.join(homeDir, ".life-brain.env");
+}
+export function loadRiftEnv(opts = {}) {
+    const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
+    const filePath = opts.filePath ?? resolveDefaultPath();
+    const overrideExisting = opts.overrideExisting ?? true;
+    const allowedKeys = new Set(opts.allowedKeys ?? DEFAULT_KEYS);
+    if (!fs.existsSync(filePath)) {
+        return { filePath, loadedKeys: [], existed: false };
+    }
+    const loadedKeys = [];
+    const raw = fs.readFileSync(filePath, "utf8");
+    for (const entry of parseEnvFile(raw)) {
+        if (!allowedKeys.has(entry.key))
+            continue;
+        const current = env[entry.key];
+        if (!overrideExisting && typeof current === "string" && current.length > 0) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        env[entry.key] = entry.value;
+        loadedKeys.push(entry.key);
+    }
+    return { filePath, loadedKeys, existed: true };
+}
+function resolveDefaultPath() {
+    const rift = defaultRiftEnvPath();
+    if (fs.existsSync(rift))
+        return rift;
+    const legacy = legacyEnvPath();
+    if (fs.existsSync(legacy))
+        return legacy;
+    return rift;
+}
+function parseEnvFile(raw) {
+    const entries = [];
+    for (const line of raw.split(/\r?\n/)) {
+        const trimmed = line.trim();
+        if (!trimmed || trimmed.startsWith("#"))
+            continue;
+        const withoutExport = trimmed.startsWith("export ")
+            ? trimmed.slice("export ".length).trim()
+            : trimmed;
+        const separator = withoutExport.indexOf("=");
+        if (separator <= 0)
+            continue;
+        const key = withoutExport.slice(0, separator).trim();
+        if (!/^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/.test(key))
+            continue;
+        const value = stripWrappingQuotes(withoutExport.slice(separator + 1).trim());
+        entries.push({ key, value });
+    }
+    return entries;
+}
+function stripWrappingQuotes(value) {
+    if (value.length < 2)
+        return value;
+    const first = value[0];
+    const last = value[value.length - 1];
+    if ((first === "\"" || first === "'") && first === last) {
+        return value.slice(1, -1);
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=rift-env.js.map

package/dist/src/runtime/rift-env.js.map

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package/dist/src/runtime/voyage-key-source.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+export type VoyageKeySource = "shell_env" | "rift_env_file" | "none";
+export interface VoyageKeyResolution {
+    /** The key an in-process CLI check would use, or null when none is found. */
+    key: string | null;
+    /** Where `key` came from. */
+    source: VoyageKeySource;
+    /** Last-4 of `key` (safe to display), or null. */
+    last4: string | null;
+    /**
+     * True only when a shell `$VOYAGE_API_KEY` is set AND a saved `~/.rift.env`
+     * key is set AND they DIFFER — the shell value shadows the saved key for
+     * in-process CLI checks, even though the daemon/search use `~/.rift.env`.
+     */
+    shellShadowsFile: boolean;
+}
+export declare function last4Of(key: string | null | undefined): string | null;
+/**
+ * Read the saved `VOYAGE_API_KEY` from an Onadit env file WITHOUT mutating
+ * `process.env` (loads into a throwaway env object). Null when the file is
+ * absent/unreadable or the key is empty.
+ */
+export declare function readSavedVoyageKey(riftEnvPath: string): string | null;
+/**
+ * Pure resolver: pick the source an in-process check uses. Shell env wins (it
+ * overrides for in-process embedding/validation), then the saved file, then
+ * none. `shellShadowsFile` is set only when both exist and differ.
+ */
+export declare function resolveVoyageKeySource(shellKey: string | null | undefined, fileKey: string | null | undefined): VoyageKeyResolution;
+/**
+ * Resolve from the live machine: shell `$VOYAGE_API_KEY` plus the saved file at
+ * `riftEnvPath` (defaults to `~/.rift.env`). Reads the file without mutating
+ * `process.env`. Injectable for tests.
+ */
+export declare function resolveLiveVoyageKeySource(opts?: {
+    env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv;
+    riftEnvPath?: string;
+}): VoyageKeyResolution;
+export declare function describeVoyageKeySource(source: VoyageKeySource): string;
+export declare const SHELL_SHADOW_WARNING: string;
+/**
+ * The display lines both `onboard` and `doctor` print: which source the key
+ * came from (with last-4), plus the shadow warning when applicable. Never
+ * includes key bytes beyond the last 4.
+ */
+export declare function voyageKeySourceLines(res: VoyageKeyResolution): string[];
+//# sourceMappingURL=voyage-key-source.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/runtime/voyage-key-source.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/runtime/voyage-key-source.js

@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/**
+ * Voyage key SOURCE resolution + transparency, shared by `onadit onboard` and
+ * `onadit doctor`.
+ *
+ * The trap this exists to surface: in-process CLI key checks read
+ * `$VOYAGE_API_KEY` from the shell FIRST, falling back to the saved
+ * `~/.rift.env`. The DAEMON (and therefore real semantic search) only ever
+ * reads `~/.rift.env`. So a stale/placeholder shell export makes the CLI's
+ * health probe validate the WRONG key and report "rejected" while search is
+ * actually healthy. These helpers let onboard/doctor say which key they checked
+ * and warn when the shell shadows the saved key. Never expose key bytes — only
+ * the last 4.
+ */
+import { defaultRiftEnvPath, loadRiftEnv } from "./rift-env.js";
+export function last4Of(key) {
+    const k = (key ?? "").trim();
+    return k.length >= 4 ? k.slice(-4) : null;
+}
+/**
+ * Read the saved `VOYAGE_API_KEY` from an Onadit env file WITHOUT mutating
+ * `process.env` (loads into a throwaway env object). Null when the file is
+ * absent/unreadable or the key is empty.
+ */
+export function readSavedVoyageKey(riftEnvPath) {
+    const scratch = {};
+    try {
+        loadRiftEnv({
+            env: scratch,
+            filePath: riftEnvPath,
+            overrideExisting: true,
+            allowedKeys: ["VOYAGE_API_KEY"],
+        });
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+    const value = (scratch["VOYAGE_API_KEY"] ?? "").trim();
+    return value.length > 0 ? value : null;
+}
+/**
+ * Pure resolver: pick the source an in-process check uses. Shell env wins (it
+ * overrides for in-process embedding/validation), then the saved file, then
+ * none. `shellShadowsFile` is set only when both exist and differ.
+ */
+export function resolveVoyageKeySource(shellKey, fileKey) {
+    const shell = (shellKey ?? "").trim() || null;
+    const file = (fileKey ?? "").trim() || null;
+    const shellShadowsFile = Boolean(shell && file && shell !== file);
+    if (shell) {
+        return { key: shell, source: "shell_env", last4: last4Of(shell), shellShadowsFile };
+    }
+    if (file) {
+        return { key: file, source: "rift_env_file", last4: last4Of(file), shellShadowsFile: false };
+    }
+    return { key: null, source: "none", last4: null, shellShadowsFile: false };
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve from the live machine: shell `$VOYAGE_API_KEY` plus the saved file at
+ * `riftEnvPath` (defaults to `~/.rift.env`). Reads the file without mutating
+ * `process.env`. Injectable for tests.
+ */
+export function resolveLiveVoyageKeySource(opts = {}) {
+    const env = opts.env ?? process.env;
+    const shellKey = env["VOYAGE_API_KEY"] ?? null;
+    const fileKey = readSavedVoyageKey(opts.riftEnvPath ?? defaultRiftEnvPath());
+    return resolveVoyageKeySource(shellKey, fileKey);
+}
+export function describeVoyageKeySource(source) {
+    switch (source) {
+        case "shell_env":
+            return "shell env ($VOYAGE_API_KEY)";
+        case "rift_env_file":
+            return "~/.rift.env (saved)";
+        case "none":
+            return "none";
+    }
+}
+export const SHELL_SHADOW_WARNING = "Shell $VOYAGE_API_KEY is set and differs from ~/.rift.env — it overrides CLI " +
+    "key checks here, but the daemon and semantic search use ~/.rift.env. Unset it " +
+    "to make CLI checks match (search itself is unaffected).";
+/**
+ * The display lines both `onboard` and `doctor` print: which source the key
+ * came from (with last-4), plus the shadow warning when applicable. Never
+ * includes key bytes beyond the last 4.
+ */
+export function voyageKeySourceLines(res) {
+    const where = describeVoyageKeySource(res.source);
+    const lines = [
+        res.last4
+            ? `Voyage key source: ${where} (····${res.last4}).`
+            : `Voyage key source: ${where}.`,
+    ];
+    if (res.shellShadowsFile)
+        lines.push(`⚠ ${SHELL_SHADOW_WARNING}`);
+    return lines;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=voyage-key-source.js.map

package/dist/src/runtime/voyage-key-source.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/runtime/watcher-startup.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+export declare function watcherStartupDisabled(env?: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): boolean;
+//# sourceMappingURL=watcher-startup.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/runtime/watcher-startup.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"watcher-startup.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/runtime/watcher-startup.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,wBAAgB,sBAAsB,CACpC,GAAG,GAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAwB,GACnC,OAAO,CAET"}

package/dist/src/runtime/watcher-startup.js

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+export function watcherStartupDisabled(env = process.env) {
+    return env["RIFT_DISABLE_WATCHERS"] === "1";
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=watcher-startup.js.map

package/dist/src/runtime/watcher-startup.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"watcher-startup.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/runtime/watcher-startup.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,MAAM,UAAU,sBAAsB,CACpC,MAAyB,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG;IAEpC,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC,uBAAuB,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,CAAC;AAC9C,CAAC"}

package/dist/src/security/archive.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+export interface ExtractedFile {
+    /** Relative path within the archive (or filename for single files). */
+    path: string;
+    /** File contents. */
+    data: Buffer;
+}
+export interface ExtractionResult {
+    files: ExtractedFile[];
+}
+export declare class ArchiveSecurityError extends Error {
+    readonly code: "PATH_TRAVERSAL" | "SYMLINK" | "TOO_MANY_FILES" | "TOO_LARGE" | "UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT";
+    constructor(message: string, code: "PATH_TRAVERSAL" | "SYMLINK" | "TOO_MANY_FILES" | "TOO_LARGE" | "UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT");
+}
+/**
+ * Extract an uploaded archive or single file with full security checks.
+ *
+ * @param buffer - Raw uploaded file content
+ * @param originalName - Original filename (used for format detection)
+ * @returns Extracted files
+ * @throws ArchiveSecurityError on any security violation
+ */
+export declare function extractArchive(buffer: Buffer, originalName: string): ExtractionResult;
+//# sourceMappingURL=archive.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/security/archive.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"archive.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/security/archive.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAwBA,MAAM,WAAW,aAAa;IAC5B,uEAAuE;IACvE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,qBAAqB;IACrB,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACd;AAED,MAAM,WAAW,gBAAgB;IAC/B,KAAK,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;CACxB;AAED,qBAAa,oBAAqB,SAAQ,KAAK;aAG3B,IAAI,EAChB,gBAAgB,GAChB,SAAS,GACT,gBAAgB,GAChB,WAAW,GACX,oBAAoB;gBANxB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EACC,IAAI,EAChB,gBAAgB,GAChB,SAAS,GACT,gBAAgB,GAChB,WAAW,GACX,oBAAoB;CAK3B;AAwJD;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,cAAc,CAC5B,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,GACnB,gBAAgB,CAkBlB"}

package/dist/src/security/archive.js

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/**
+ * Archive extraction with security protections — Slice 12.
+ *
+ * Supports:
+ *   - zip archives (multiple entries)
+ *   - single JSON files (passthrough)
+ *
+ * Blocks:
+ *   - Zip-slip via path traversal (../ in entry names)
+ *   - Symlink entries in zip archives
+ *   - Archive bombs (>10,000 files or >1 GB uncompressed)
+ *   - Markdown and other non-JSON/zip formats — there is no parser
+ *     for raw markdown for any web conversation source, so accepting
+ *     it would either silently no-op (parser skips non-JSON) or fail
+ *     deep in the pipeline. Rejecting at this boundary makes the
+ *     contract honest.
+ */
+import path from "node:path";
+import AdmZip from "adm-zip";
+// --- Limits (PRD Section 3.4) ---
+const MAX_FILES = 10_000;
+const MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES = 1_073_741_824; // 1 GB
+export class ArchiveSecurityError extends Error {
+    code;
+    constructor(message, code) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.name = "ArchiveSecurityError";
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Detect format from buffer magic bytes and original filename.
+ *
+ * Markdown (.md/.markdown) is explicitly rejected: no web-conversation
+ * parser handles raw markdown, so accepting it here would only enable
+ * silent no-op ingests downstream.
+ */
+function detectFormat(buffer, originalName) {
+    // ZIP magic: PK\x03\x04
+    if (buffer.length >= 4 &&
+        buffer[0] === 0x50 &&
+        buffer[1] === 0x4b &&
+        buffer[2] === 0x03 &&
+        buffer[3] === 0x04) {
+        return "zip";
+    }
+    const lower = originalName.toLowerCase();
+    if (lower.endsWith(".md") || lower.endsWith(".markdown")) {
+        throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Unsupported file format: ${originalName} (markdown is not a supported ingest format)`, "UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT");
+    }
+    if (lower.endsWith(".json"))
+        return "json";
+    // Try content sniffing: if it starts with { or [, treat as JSON
+    const trimmed = buffer.toString("utf8", 0, Math.min(buffer.length, 64)).trimStart();
+    if (trimmed.startsWith("{") || trimmed.startsWith("["))
+        return "json";
+    throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Unsupported file format: ${originalName}`, "UNSUPPORTED_FORMAT");
+}
+/**
+ * Validate that a zip entry name is safe (no path traversal).
+ */
+function validateEntryPath(entryName) {
+    // Normalize to forward slashes for consistency
+    const normalized = entryName.replace(/\\/g, "/");
+    // Reject absolute paths
+    if (path.isAbsolute(normalized) || normalized.startsWith("/")) {
+        throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Zip-slip: absolute path in archive entry: ${entryName}`, "PATH_TRAVERSAL");
+    }
+    // Reject any path component that is ".."
+    const segments = normalized.split("/");
+    for (const seg of segments) {
+        if (seg === "..") {
+            throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Zip-slip: path traversal in archive entry: ${entryName}`, "PATH_TRAVERSAL");
+        }
+    }
+    // Double-check: resolved path must not escape a hypothetical root
+    const resolved = path.resolve("/safe-root", normalized);
+    if (!resolved.startsWith("/safe-root/") && resolved !== "/safe-root") {
+        throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Zip-slip: path escapes extraction root: ${entryName}`, "PATH_TRAVERSAL");
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Extract a zip buffer with security checks.
+ */
+function extractZip(buffer) {
+    const zip = new AdmZip(buffer);
+    const entries = zip.getEntries();
+    // --- Archive bomb: file count ---
+    const fileEntries = entries.filter((e) => !e.isDirectory);
+    if (fileEntries.length > MAX_FILES) {
+        throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Archive bomb: ${fileEntries.length} files exceeds limit of ${MAX_FILES}`, "TOO_MANY_FILES");
+    }
+    // --- Pre-scan all entries for security violations ---
+    let totalUncompressed = 0;
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+        // Reject symlinks (external attributes bit 0120000 in Unix)
+        // AdmZip stores the Unix file attributes in the upper 16 bits of attr
+        const unixAttr = (entry.header.attr >>> 16) & 0xffff;
+        const isSymlink = (unixAttr & 0o170000) === 0o120000;
+        if (isSymlink) {
+            throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Symlink in archive: ${entry.entryName}`, "SYMLINK");
+        }
+        // Validate path (zip-slip)
+        validateEntryPath(entry.entryName);
+        // Accumulate uncompressed size
+        if (!entry.isDirectory) {
+            totalUncompressed += entry.header.size;
+            if (totalUncompressed > MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES) {
+                throw new ArchiveSecurityError(`Archive bomb: uncompressed size exceeds ${MAX_UNCOMPRESSED_BYTES} bytes (1 GB)`, "TOO_LARGE");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    // --- Extract files ---
+    const files = [];
+    for (const entry of fileEntries) {
+        files.push({
+            path: entry.entryName.replace(/\\/g, "/"),
+            data: entry.getData(),
+        });
+    }
+    return { files };
+}
+/**
+ * Sanitize a single-file upload name.
+ *
+ * Applies the same path-traversal checks used for zip entries, then
+ * strips to the basename so the returned path is always a plain
+ * filename with no directory component.
+ */
+function sanitizeSingleFileName(originalName) {
+    // Run the zip-entry validator — it rejects ../, absolute paths, etc.
+    validateEntryPath(originalName);
+    // Even if validation passes (e.g. "subdir/file.json"), strip to basename
+    // so the caller cannot influence the storage directory.
+    const normalized = originalName.replace(/\\/g, "/");
+    const base = normalized.split("/").pop() ?? originalName;
+    return base;
+}
+/**
+ * Extract an uploaded archive or single file with full security checks.
+ *
+ * @param buffer - Raw uploaded file content
+ * @param originalName - Original filename (used for format detection)
+ * @returns Extracted files
+ * @throws ArchiveSecurityError on any security violation
+ */
+export function extractArchive(buffer, originalName) {
+    const format = detectFormat(buffer, originalName);
+    if (format === "zip") {
+        return extractZip(buffer);
+    }
+    // Single JSON passthrough — sanitize the name
+    const safeName = sanitizeSingleFileName(originalName);
+    return {
+        files: [
+            {
+                path: safeName,
+                data: buffer,
+            },
+        ],
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=archive.js.map

package/dist/src/security/archive.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/security/paths.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/**
+ * Validate and canonicalize a file path against allowed source roots.
+ *
+ * 1. Resolves the path to absolute.
+ * 2. Resolves symlinks via realpath.
+ * 3. Confirms the canonical path falls under at least one allowed root.
+ *
+ * @returns The canonical (symlink-resolved) absolute path.
+ * @throws If the path is outside all allowed roots, unresolvable, or inaccessible.
+ */
+export declare function validatePath(filePath: string, allowedRoots: readonly string[]): string;
+/**
+ * Validate a path for an unlink event (file already deleted).
+ *
+ * Since the file no longer exists, we cannot resolve symlinks.
+ * We fall back to path.resolve() and prefix-check only.
+ * This is safe because: the path was validated on add/change,
+ * and unlink only removes existing rows — it cannot insert data.
+ */
+export declare function validateUnlinkPath(filePath: string, allowedRoots: readonly string[]): string;
+//# sourceMappingURL=paths.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/security/paths.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"paths.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../src/security/paths.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAUA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CA4BtF;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,SAAS,MAAM,EAAE,GAAG,MAAM,CAe5F"}

package/dist/src/security/paths.js

@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/**
+ * Path canonicalization and security validation.
+ *
+ * Every file path entering the indexing pipeline must pass through
+ * validatePath() to prevent directory traversal, symlink escapes,
+ * and access to files outside configured source roots.
+ */
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+/**
+ * Validate and canonicalize a file path against allowed source roots.
+ *
+ * 1. Resolves the path to absolute.
+ * 2. Resolves symlinks via realpath.
+ * 3. Confirms the canonical path falls under at least one allowed root.
+ *
+ * @returns The canonical (symlink-resolved) absolute path.
+ * @throws If the path is outside all allowed roots, unresolvable, or inaccessible.
+ */
+export function validatePath(filePath, allowedRoots) {
+    if (allowedRoots.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("No allowed roots configured");
+    }
+    const absolute = path.resolve(filePath);
+    let real;
+    try {
+        real = fs.realpathSync(absolute);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new Error(`Path does not exist or is inaccessible: ${filePath}`);
+    }
+    for (const root of allowedRoots) {
+        let realRoot;
+        try {
+            realRoot = fs.realpathSync(root);
+        }
+        catch {
+            continue; // Root itself doesn't exist — skip
+        }
+        if (real === realRoot || real.startsWith(realRoot + path.sep)) {
+            return real;
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Path outside allowed roots: ${filePath}`);
+}
+/**
+ * Validate a path for an unlink event (file already deleted).
+ *
+ * Since the file no longer exists, we cannot resolve symlinks.
+ * We fall back to path.resolve() and prefix-check only.
+ * This is safe because: the path was validated on add/change,
+ * and unlink only removes existing rows — it cannot insert data.
+ */
+export function validateUnlinkPath(filePath, allowedRoots) {
+    if (allowedRoots.length === 0) {
+        throw new Error("No allowed roots configured");
+    }
+    const absolute = path.resolve(filePath);
+    for (const root of allowedRoots) {
+        const absoluteRoot = path.resolve(root);
+        if (absolute === absoluteRoot || absolute.startsWith(absoluteRoot + path.sep)) {
+            return absolute;
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Path outside allowed roots: ${filePath}`);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=paths.js.map

package/dist/src/security/paths.js.map

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package/dist/src/server/app.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import { type FastifyInstance } from "fastify";
+import type { Config } from "../config/schema.js";
+import type { TokenManager } from "../auth/rotation.js";
+import type { JobQueue } from "../jobs/queue.js";
+import type { EmbeddingProvider } from "../providers/types.js";
+import type { DigestSummarizer, MetadataExtractor } from "../providers/types.js";
+import type { Watcher } from "../ingestion/watcher.js";
+import type { Scanner } from "../ingestion/scanner.js";
+export interface App {
+    server: FastifyInstance;
+    markReady: () => void;
+    isReady: () => boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Build a Fastify instance from validated config.
+ *
+ * Returns the server plus per-instance readiness controls.
+ * Does NOT call `listen()` — the caller is responsible for that
+ * so tests can use `inject()` without binding a port.
+ *
+ * As of Slice 19, job handlers are registered externally (main.ts)
+ * via worker-wrapped handlers. buildApp only registers HTTP routes.
+ *
+ * If `tokenManager` is provided, bearer auth validates against it.
+ * If omitted (e.g. in non-auth tests), only the test_token bypass
+ * works for authenticated routes; all other tokens are rejected.
+ */
+export declare function buildApp(config: Config, tokenManager?: TokenManager, jobQueue?: JobQueue, embeddingProvider?: EmbeddingProvider, watchers?: Watcher[], scanner?: Scanner | null, digestSummarizer?: DigestSummarizer, metadataExtractor?: MetadataExtractor, localEmbeddingProvider?: EmbeddingProvider, configPath?: string): Promise<App>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=app.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/server/app.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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