omp-conductor 0.4.5 → 0.5.1

package/src/credentials.ts

@@ -1,2203 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * The credential boundary between the daemon and model-executed code (#125).
- *
- * The fact this file exists to fix: until it did, a worker session ran in the
- * daemon's own process, as the daemon's own user, with the daemon's `$HOME` and
- * `process.env`. The daemon authenticates by shelling out to the operator's
- * logged-in `gh`, so a worker's `bash` reached the same credential by running
- * the same binary. Scrubbing `GH_TOKEN` does not fix that and must never be
- * described as if it did: same-uid code defeats an environment variable in one
- * line (`GH_CONFIG_DIR=$HOME/.config/gh gh pr merge`), and the keychain,
- * `~/.ssh` and `~/.git-credentials` need no environment at all.
- *
- * So this module has exactly two jobs, and they are not the same kind of thing:
- *
- * 1. **{@link credentialedEnv} — the one construction site of credential
- *    material in the daemon.** Every privileged spawn (`gh`, the mirror's
- *    clone/fetch, {@link pushRunBranch}, {@link openRunPr}) goes through it, so
- *    "which processes can reach the credential" is a list one grep long.
- * 2. **{@link probeHost} and {@link launcherArgv} — the OS principal.** This is
- *    the layer that makes the claim true. {@link sessionEnv} sits beside it as
- *    *convenience and accident-prevention only*; see its own comment.
- *
- * Nothing here may describe env scrubbing, or the degraded `group-mode`
- * mechanism, as containing a determined bash escape. Only `uid-pool` on Linux
- * and `sandbox-exec` on macOS make that claim, and `status` says which is live.
- */
-
-import {
-  chmodSync,
-  chownSync,
-  existsSync,
-  lstatSync,
-  mkdirSync,
-  readFileSync,
-  readdirSync,
-  rmSync,
-  writeFileSync,
-  type Stats,
-} from "node:fs";
-import { homedir } from "node:os";
-import { dirname, join, resolve } from "node:path";
-
-import {
-  CONDUCTOR_GROUPS,
-  type CredentialIsolation,
-  type IsolationMechanism,
-  type ProjectConfig,
-  type RepoTarget,
-  type SessionRole,
-} from "./types.ts";
-
-/**
- * Environment variables that carry, or lead to, a write credential. Removed
- * from every session child.
- *
- * The first four are the set #125 names. `NPM_TOKEN`/`NODE_AUTH_TOKEN` are here
- * because publish credentials are inside the same blast radius — `npm whoami`
- * failing is one of the issue's acceptance probes — and `GH_HOST` because it
- * redirects `gh` at an enterprise host whose credential may be configured
- * separately from github.com's.
- */
-export const CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS = [
-  "GH_TOKEN",
-  "GITHUB_TOKEN",
-  "GH_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN",
-  "GITHUB_ENTERPRISE_TOKEN",
-  "SSH_AUTH_SOCK",
-  "GH_HOST",
-  "NPM_TOKEN",
-  "NODE_AUTH_TOKEN",
-] as const;
-
-/**
- * A binary that always fails, for `GIT_ASKPASS`/`SSH_ASKPASS` and git's own
- * `core.askPass`.
- *
- * #125 names `/bin/false`, which is right on Linux and **does not exist on
- * macOS** — there it is `/usr/bin/false`. The difference is not academic: a
- * missing askpass makes git fail with `cannot exec '/bin/false'`, which happens
- * to be the outcome we want but reads in a log like a broken conductor rather
- * than a refused credential. Resolved once so the failure says what it means.
- */
-const ALWAYS_FAILS = existsSync("/bin/false") ? "/bin/false" : "/usr/bin/false";
-
-/**
- * The `.gitconfig` a session gets. No credential helper, and `askpass` wired to
- * a binary that always fails, so an https push cannot silently pick up a helper
- * the operator configured globally. Fenced and rewritten on every dispatch, the
- * same way `info/exclude` is, so an older release's file heals itself.
- */
-const SESSION_GITCONFIG = [
-  "# Written by omp-conductor for one session (#125). Rewritten on every dispatch.",
-  "# Deliberately empty of credential helpers: a session must not be able to",
-  "# reach a credential through git's own configuration. This is the",
-  "# accident-prevention layer — the OS principal is what makes it true.",
-  "[credential]",
-  "\thelper =",
-  "[core]",
-  `\taskPass = ${ALWAYS_FAILS}`,
-  // The run repository borrows its objects from a mirror the DAEMON owns, and
-  // git refuses to touch a repository owned by another uid ("detected dubious
-  // ownership") — which under `uid-pool` is every object read through
-  // alternates. Without this the checkout looks corrupt on the first command,
-  // and the operator is told to run a `git config --global` the session is
-  // deliberately unable to make stick. It is a trust statement about ownership,
-  // not a permission grant: the mirror stays 0750 and unwritable.
-  "[safe]",
-  "\tdirectory = *",
-  "",
-].join("\n");
-
-/**
- * One process run, captured. Injected everywhere in this module so the probe,
- * the launcher smoke test and the daemon-side push are all testable without a
- * privileged host.
- */
-export type Exec = (
-  argv: readonly string[],
-  opts?: { cwd?: string; env?: Record<string, string>; stdin?: string },
-) => Promise<{ code: number; stdout: string; stderr: string }>;
-
-/** The real one. Never inherits stdin: an unattended daemon must not block on a prompt. */
-export const spawnCaptured: Exec = async (argv, opts = {}) => {
-  const [command, ...rest] = argv;
-  if (command === undefined) return { code: 127, stdout: "", stderr: "empty argv" };
-  const proc = Bun.spawn([command, ...rest], {
-    ...(opts.cwd === undefined ? {} : { cwd: opts.cwd }),
-    ...(opts.env === undefined ? {} : { env: opts.env }),
-    stdin: new Blob([opts.stdin ?? ""]),
-    stdout: "pipe",
-    stderr: "pipe",
-  });
-  const [stdout, stderr, code] = await Promise.all([
-    new Response(proc.stdout).text(),
-    new Response(proc.stderr).text(),
-    proc.exited,
-  ]);
-  return { code, stdout, stderr };
-};
-
-// --------------------------------------------------------------- credentials
-
-/**
- * The daemon's own environment, credentials intact. **The only place this
- * package constructs credential material.**
- *
- * There is nothing clever in the body, and that is deliberate: the value is
- * that it is one named function, so "what can reach the operator's `gh`
- * credential" is answered by its call sites rather than by auditing every
- * `Bun.spawn` in the tree. A privileged spawn that does not come through here
- * is a bug, whatever it happens to do.
- *
- * `GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT=0` rides along because every caller is unattended: a
- * credential prompt nobody can answer is a hang, not a failure.
- */
-export function credentialedEnv(
-  extra: Readonly<Record<string, string>> = {},
-  base: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> = process.env,
-): Record<string, string> {
-  const env: Record<string, string> = {};
-  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(base)) {
-    if (value !== undefined) env[key] = value;
-  }
-  env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0";
-  return { ...env, ...extra };
-}
-
-/** Where one session's private config tree lives. All of it daemon-created. */
-export interface SessionEnvRoot {
-  /** `$HOME` for the child — the agent principal's config root, not the operator's. */
-  home: string;
-  /** `GH_CONFIG_DIR`: exists, is empty, and is not the operator's. */
-  ghConfigDir: string;
-  /** `GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL`: conductor-owned, no credential helper. */
-  gitConfigGlobal: string;
-  /** `NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG`: an empty file, so `~/.npmrc` is not consulted. */
-  npmrc: string;
-  /** `TMPDIR`: inside the boundary, so a sandbox profile can grant it by name. */
-  tmp: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Materialise a session's private config tree under `root`.
- *
- * `$HOME` is redirected rather than merely scrubbed because the harness
- * discovers its user-level configuration — including `mcp.json` — from
- * `os.homedir()`, which reads `$HOME`. Leaving it pointed at the operator's
- * home is what put a GitHub MCP server carrying its own PAT inside every
- * session (#125 item 5). The redirect is what makes "the agent principal's
- * config root" a real directory an operator can populate deliberately.
- */
-export function prepareSessionEnvRoot(root: string): SessionEnvRoot {
-  const paths: SessionEnvRoot = {
-    home: join(root, "home"),
-    ghConfigDir: join(root, "gh"),
-    gitConfigGlobal: join(root, "gitconfig"),
-    npmrc: join(root, "npmrc"),
-    tmp: join(root, "tmp"),
-  };
-  // 0711 on the root, 0700 on the leaves: a slot principal reaches its own
-  // subtree by traversal and cannot list what else the daemon put here.
-  mkdirSync(root, { recursive: true, mode: 0o711 });
-  for (const dir of [paths.home, paths.ghConfigDir, paths.tmp]) {
-    mkdirSync(dir, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
-  }
-  writeFileSync(paths.gitConfigGlobal, SESSION_GITCONFIG, { mode: 0o644 });
-  if (!existsSync(paths.npmrc)) writeFileSync(paths.npmrc, "", { mode: 0o644 });
-  return paths;
-}
-
-/**
- * Environment variables that carry a model credential directly.
- *
- * Deliberately NOT in {@link CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS}: those are the ones a session
- * must never inherit. A model credential is the opposite — without one there is
- * no session at all.
- */
-export const MODEL_ENV_KEYS = [
-  "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY",
-  "OPENAI_API_KEY",
-  "OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
-  "XAI_API_KEY",
-  "GEMINI_API_KEY",
-  "GOOGLE_API_KEY",
-] as const;
-
-/** The harness's auth-broker connection, as its own env vars name it. */
-export const BROKER_URL_ENV = "OMP_AUTH_BROKER_URL";
-export const BROKER_TOKEN_ENV = "OMP_AUTH_BROKER_TOKEN";
-
-export type ModelCredential =
-  /** Already in the daemon's environment, so it survives the redirect untouched. */
-  | { kind: "env" }
-  /** Resolved from the operator's own home and injected as broker env vars. */
-  | { kind: "broker"; url: string; token: string };
-
-/**
- * How a session under a redirected `$HOME` is going to authenticate a model —
- * or `undefined` when it cannot, which is a fleet that must not dispatch.
- *
- * Sessions run with `$HOME` pointed at a per-run tree so the harness never reads
- * the operator's configuration; that is what kept a GitHub MCP server carrying
- * its own PAT out of every session. It also hid the harness's *own* credentials,
- * so every worker died at turn 0 with `No model selected` and spent an issue
- * attempt doing it — 27 recoveries on the reference fleet, while the fleet looked
- * busy (#152).
- *
- * The fix is emphatically **not** to copy `<agentDir>/agent.db` into each run.
- * That file holds OAuth credentials the harness rotates, plus threads, jobs and
- * caches; the first run to refresh a token would update its own private copy and
- * strand every later run — and the provider may invalidate the old refresh token
- * as it rotates, so a copy can break the operator's own login too. The harness
- * ships the right answer: an auth broker whose whole point is that *refresh
- * tokens never leave it*, handing clients short-lived access tokens. That is also
- * exactly the shape per-run isolation wants.
- *
- * Precedence mirrors the harness's own resolver, narrowly:
- *   1. broker env vars, or any model API key, already in this process.
- *   2. `auth.broker.url` / `auth.broker.token` in `<agentDir>/config.yml`.
- *   3. `<configRoot>/auth-broker.token`, paired with a URL from 1 or 2.
- *
- * Re-read here rather than imported from the harness because this package must
- * type-check and publish without its optional peer dependency — `omp.ts` is the
- * only file allowed to touch it. `!command` indirection is deliberately not
- * supported: an operator using that has the env-var path, which this honours.
- */
-export function resolveModelCredential(
-  base: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> = process.env,
-  agentDir = join(homedir(), ".omp", "agent"),
-  configRoot = join(homedir(), ".omp"),
-): ModelCredential | undefined {
-  const envUrl = base[BROKER_URL_ENV];
-  const envToken = base[BROKER_TOKEN_ENV];
-  if ((envUrl ?? "").length > 0 && (envToken ?? "").length > 0) return { kind: "env" };
-  if (MODEL_ENV_KEYS.some((key) => (base[key] ?? "").length > 0)) return { kind: "env" };
-
-  const configured = readBrokerConfig(agentDir);
-  const url = (envUrl ?? "").length > 0 ? envUrl : configured.url;
-  if (url === undefined || url.length === 0) return undefined;
-  const token = configured.token ?? readTokenFile(join(configRoot, "auth-broker.token"));
-  if (token === undefined || token.length === 0) return undefined;
-  return { kind: "broker", url, token };
-}
-
-/**
- * The two `auth.broker.*` values out of the harness's `config.yml`.
- *
- * A deliberately tiny reader rather than a YAML dependency: exactly two scalar
- * keys under one mapping, and anything it cannot understand simply reads as
- * absent — which lands on the same refusal as no broker at all, rather than a
- * parse error during dispatch.
- */
-function readBrokerConfig(agentDir: string): { url?: string; token?: string } {
-  for (const name of ["config.yml", "config.yaml"]) {
-    const path = join(agentDir, name);
-    if (!existsSync(path)) continue;
-    let text: string;
-    try {
-      text = readFileSync(path, "utf8");
-    } catch {
-      continue;
-    }
-    const found = scanBrokerKeys(text);
-    if (found.url !== undefined || found.token !== undefined) return found;
-  }
-  return {};
-}
-
-/**
- * `auth.broker.url` / `auth.broker.token` out of a YAML document, in either the
- * dotted or the nested shape the harness's own docs use.
- *
- * An indentation scan rather than a regex or a YAML dependency: two scalar keys
- * under one known path, and anything it cannot understand reads as absent, which
- * lands on the same refusal as no broker at all rather than a parse error during
- * dispatch.
- */
-function scanBrokerKeys(text: string): { url?: string; token?: string } {
-  const out: { url?: string; token?: string } = {};
-  /** Enclosing mapping keys, innermost last, by indentation. */
-  const path: { indent: number; key: string }[] = [];
-  for (const raw of text.split("\n")) {
-    const line = raw.replace(/\s+$/, "");
-    if (line.trim().length === 0 || line.trim().startsWith("#")) continue;
-    const indent = line.length - line.trimStart().length;
-    const at = line.indexOf(":");
-    if (at < 0) continue;
-    const key = line.slice(indent, at).trim();
-    const value = line.slice(at + 1);
-    while (path.length > 0 && (path.at(-1) as { indent: number }).indent >= indent) path.pop();
-
-    const dotted = key.split(".");
-    const full = [...path.map((p) => p.key), ...dotted];
-    if (value.trim().length === 0) {
-      path.push({ indent, key: dotted.join(".") });
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (full.length !== 3 || full[0] !== "auth" || full[1] !== "broker") continue;
-    const scalar = unquote(value);
-    if (scalar.length === 0) continue;
-    if (full[2] === "url") out.url ??= scalar;
-    else if (full[2] === "token") out.token ??= scalar;
-  }
-  return out;
-}
-
-function unquote(raw: string): string {
-  const text = raw.trim();
-  if (text.startsWith("!")) return "";
-  const quoted = /^(['"])(.*)\1$/.exec(text);
-  return (quoted?.[2] ?? text).trim();
-}
-
-function readTokenFile(path: string): string | undefined {
-  if (!existsSync(path)) return undefined;
-  try {
-    const text = readFileSync(path, "utf8").trim();
-    return text.length === 0 ? undefined : text;
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The environment one session child runs with.
- *
- * **This layer is convenience and accident-prevention, not the boundary.** It
- * stops a well-behaved tool from picking up a credential it was never meant to
- * see, and it makes the common accidents — `git push` finding a helper, `gh`
- * finding a config — fail immediately and legibly. It stops nothing that is
- * trying. Model-executed code running as the same uid re-points every one of
- * these variables in a single line, and needs none of them to read the
- * keychain or `~/.ssh`. What makes the claim in #125 true is the OS principal
- * selected by {@link probeHost} — and when that resolves to `none`, this
- * function is all there is and `status` says the fleet is unprotected.
- */
-export function sessionEnv(
-  paths: SessionEnvRoot,
-  opts: { readToken?: string; model?: ModelCredential } = {},
-  base: Readonly<Record<string, string | undefined>> = process.env,
-): Record<string, string> {
-  const env: Record<string, string> = {};
-  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(base)) {
-    if (value !== undefined) env[key] = value;
-  }
-  for (const key of CREDENTIAL_ENV_KEYS) delete env[key];
-
-  env["HOME"] = paths.home;
-  env["GH_CONFIG_DIR"] = paths.ghConfigDir;
-  env["GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL"] = paths.gitConfigGlobal;
-  // Without this a session inherits the *system* gitconfig's helpers, which on
-  // a developer host is where `osxkeychain` usually lives.
-  env["GIT_CONFIG_SYSTEM"] = "/dev/null";
-  env["GIT_CONFIG_NOSYSTEM"] = "1";
-  env["GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT"] = "0";
-  env["GIT_ASKPASS"] = ALWAYS_FAILS;
-  env["SSH_ASKPASS"] = ALWAYS_FAILS;
-  env["NPM_CONFIG_USERCONFIG"] = paths.npmrc;
-  env["TMPDIR"] = paths.tmp;
-
-  // The redirect hides the operator's `config.yml` and token file, so a broker
-  // configured *there* has to be handed over explicitly or the session falls back
-  // to an empty local store and dies at turn 0 (#152). Env vars are the harness's
-  // own highest-precedence shape, and they carry an access-minting token rather
-  // than a refresh credential: the broker keeps that.
-  if (opts.model?.kind === "broker") {
-    env[BROKER_URL_ENV] = opts.model.url;
-    env[BROKER_TOKEN_ENV] = opts.model.token;
-  }
-
-  // The one credential a session may be given, and only when an operator
-  // configured it. Read-scoped by construction on GitHub's side — this package
-  // cannot verify the scope, so the README says plainly that a write-scoped
-  // value here reopens the hole the rest of this file closes.
-  if (opts.readToken !== undefined && opts.readToken !== "") {
-    env["GH_TOKEN"] = opts.readToken;
-    env["GITHUB_TOKEN"] = opts.readToken;
-  }
-  return env;
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------------------- the principal
-
-/**
- * One run slot's OS account. `gid`/`group` are the slot's *own* primary group,
- * never a shared one: the shared group a slot gets back is
- * {@link CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs}, and it is granted through the launcher's
- * supplementary list rather than by making it anyone's primary.
- */
-export interface SlotPrincipal {
-  /** Pool index, or `"orch"` for the orchestrator's own distinct account. */
-  slot: string;
-  user: string;
-  uid: number;
-  gid: number;
-  group: string;
-}
-
-/** Everything one session child needs to be launched behind the boundary. */
-export interface SessionBoundary {
-  mechanism: IsolationMechanism;
-  /** argv prefix that drops privilege. Empty for `group-mode` and `none`. */
-  launcher: string[];
-  /** Environment overrides for the child (see {@link sessionEnv}). */
-  env: Record<string, string>;
-  /** Present only when the mechanism gives this run a distinct uid. */
-  principal?: SlotPrincipal;
-}
-
-/**
- * The privilege-dropping launcher, composed exactly once.
- *
- * **Never `spawn({ uid, gid })`.** Granting the daemon ambient
- * `CAP_SETUID`/`CAP_SETGID` and calling a raw spawn looks identical from the
- * outside and voids the entire boundary: ambient capabilities survive `execve`
- * for ordinary binaries, so the child holds `CAP_SETUID` itself and can
- * `setuid()` straight back — to the daemon, or to a sibling run. `setpriv` is
- * preferred over a hand-rolled helper for the same reason one uses `sudo`
- * instead of a setuid shell script: it is audited, and it does the five steps
- * in the order that makes them stick (groups, gid, uid, empty every capability
- * set, `PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS`, then exec).
- *
- * Two flag traps, both of which fail *before* exec and so read like a broken
- * conductor rather than a permissions problem:
- *
- * - `--clear-groups`, `--groups`, `--keep-groups` and `--init-groups` are
- *   mutually exclusive. `--clear-groups --groups conductor-runs` exits non-zero
- *   before running anything. `--groups` alone already *replaces* the inherited
- *   list, which is the wanted behaviour, so it is used alone.
- * - The one group granted back is the read-only mirror group. Omit it and the
- *   child cannot read the shared mirror, so git alternates fail with a
- *   permission error that reads like a corrupt object store.
- *
- * `--bounding-set=-all` performs `PR_CAPBSET_DROP`, which needs `CAP_SETPCAP`
- * in the *caller's* permitted set. When the host did not grant it the flag is
- * omitted rather than attempted: with every other set empty, an unprivileged
- * uid and `NoNewPrivs: 1`, the child cannot acquire anything in the bounding
- * set, so the leftover `CapBnd` is inert — and reported by `status` as a named
- * residual instead of quietly ignored.
- */
-export function setprivArgv(
-  principal: SlotPrincipal,
-  opts: { boundingSet: boolean; sharedGroup?: string | false },
-  command: readonly string[],
-): string[] {
-  // `false` means "no supplementary group at all", which is the orchestrator's
-  // case: it never reads the shared mirror, so granting it `conductor-runs`
-  // would hand it the one residual the design says it does not get. Expressed
-  // as `--clear-groups`, which is valid alone and is mutually exclusive with
-  // `--groups` — passing both aborts before exec.
-  const groups = opts.sharedGroup === false ? "--clear-groups" : `--groups=${opts.sharedGroup ?? CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs}`;
-  return [
-    "setpriv",
-    `--reuid=${principal.user}`,
-    `--regid=${principal.group}`,
-    groups,
-    "--inh-caps=-all",
-    "--ambient-caps=-all",
-    ...(opts.boundingSet ? ["--bounding-set=-all"] : []),
-    "--no-new-privs",
-    "--",
-    ...command,
-  ];
-}
-
-
-/**
- * The exact, idempotent root commands that build the `uid-pool` topology.
- *
- * Shipped rather than documented, and generated rather than duplicated: the
- * probe, the dispatch-time refusals and this script have to agree about account
- * names, group names, modes and the shared root, and three prose copies of that
- * would drift the first time one of them changed. `omp-conductor boundary-setup`
- * prints it; CI runs the same output. Nothing here runs automatically — it
- * creates system accounts, so it is the operator's call and their `sudo`.
- *
- * Printed rather than executed for the same reason `graph-setup` prints: an
- * operator gets to read what will touch their box before it does.
- */
-/**
- * Credential paths inside the daemon's home, relative.
- *
- * One list, two consumers: the generated hardening chmods them, and
- * `credentialDenyFiles()` builds the empirical recheck from the same names. A
- * path hardened but not probed is a credential nobody verified was out of
- * reach — which is exactly how `.gitconfig` (and its `url.*.insteadOf` inline
- * tokens) was chmod-ed while dispatch still reported clean.
- */
-export const CREDENTIAL_DIRS = [".ssh", ".config/gh", ".gnupg", ".aws"] as const;
-export const CREDENTIAL_FILES = [
-  ".npmrc",
-  ".git-credentials",
-  ".netrc",
-  ".gitconfig",
-  ".config/git/config",
-] as const;
-
-export function boundarySetupScript(opts: { slots: number; sharedRoot: string; daemonUser: string }): string {
-  const slots = Array.from({ length: opts.slots }, (_, i) => `${DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PREFIX}${String(i)}`);
-  const accounts = [...slots, `${DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PREFIX}orch`];
-  const q = (s: string): string => JSON.stringify(s);
-  return [
-    "#!/usr/bin/env bash",
-    "# Generated by `omp-conductor boundary-setup`. Idempotent; run as root.",
-    "set -euo pipefail",
-    "",
-    `DAEMON_USER=${q(opts.daemonUser)}`,
-    `SHARED_ROOT=${q(opts.sharedRoot)}`,
-    "",
-    "# Two groups: one the daemon alone holds (so it can fetch, salvage and",
-    "# reclaim every run repo), one every slot holds (read-only mirror access).",
-    `getent group ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} >/dev/null || groupadd --system ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon}`,
-    `getent group ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs} >/dev/null || groupadd --system ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs}`,
-    "",
-    ...accounts.flatMap((user) => [
-      `id ${user} >/dev/null 2>&1 || useradd --system --no-create-home --shell /usr/sbin/nologin --user-group ${user}`,
-      `usermod -aG ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs} ${user}`,
-      `# A slot in the daemon group would reach every other run's repo.`,
-      `gpasswd -d ${user} ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} >/dev/null 2>&1 || true`,
-    ]),
-    "",
-    `usermod -aG ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} "$DAEMON_USER"`,
-    `usermod -aG ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs} "$DAEMON_USER"`,
-    "",
-    "# Searchable, unlistable, unwritable — a slot reaches its own tree and",
-    "# cannot enumerate its siblings.",
-    'mkdir -p "$SHARED_ROOT"',
-    `chown "$DAEMON_USER":${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} "$SHARED_ROOT"`,
-    'chmod 0711 "$SHARED_ROOT"',
-    "",
-    "# The daemon's home must be BOTH searchable and closed: the runtime and the",
-    "# installed package live in it, so 0700 kills every worker before it starts,",
-    "# while the credential leaves are what the boundary actually rests on.",
-    'DAEMON_HOME="$(getent passwd "$DAEMON_USER" | cut -d: -f6)"',
-    'if [ -n "$DAEMON_HOME" ] && [ -d "$DAEMON_HOME" ]; then',
-    '  chmod 0711 "$DAEMON_HOME"',
-    `  for d in ${CREDENTIAL_DIRS.join(" ")}; do [ -d "$DAEMON_HOME/$d" ] && chmod 0700 "$DAEMON_HOME/$d"; done`,
-    `  for f in ${CREDENTIAL_FILES.join(" ")}; do [ -f "$DAEMON_HOME/$f" ] && chmod 0600 "$DAEMON_HOME/$f"; done`,
-    "fi",
-    "",
-    'echo "boundary provisioned. Supplementary groups apply to NEW processes:"',
-    'echo "  systemctl restart omp-conductor.service"',
-    "",
-  ].join("\n");
-}
-
-/**
- * Ask the slot principal itself whether it can read any credential path, and
- * refuse the boundary if it can.
- *
- * This is the difference between the claim and the wish. On macOS the
- * `sandbox-exec` profile carries `denyReadRoots`/`denyReadFiles` and enforces
- * them; on Linux `uid-pool` carries no such list — separation is DAC, and DAC
- * is the *operator's* file modes, which nothing in this package chose. A home
- * directory is commonly `0755`, `~/.npmrc` and `~/.gitconfig` commonly `0644`,
- * and an inline token in either is then readable by every slot uid on the box.
- * The boundary would report `uid-pool` and be wide open.
- *
- * So the check is empirical and runs as the principal: `test -r` through the
- * real launcher, so ACLs, setgid and anything else the kernel honours all
- * count. Anything readable is named and the mechanism refuses rather than
- * resolving down quietly — a credential the model can read is the whole thing
- * #125 exists to prevent.
- */
-export async function credentialReadRefusal(
-  exec: Exec,
-  principal: SlotPrincipal,
-  opts: { boundingSet: boolean; sharedGroup?: string | false },
-  paths: readonly string[],
-): Promise<string | undefined> {
-  if (paths.length === 0) return undefined;
-  const q = (s: string): string => JSON.stringify(s);
-  // A directory leaks on **search**, not just read. With `$HOME` at 0711 a
-  // drifted `.ssh` at 0711 defeats `[ -r dir ]` and `ls` while
-  // `cat ~/.ssh/id_ed25519` still works, because reaching a known leaf needs
-  // only `+x` on the way down. So directories are tested for either bit, and
-  // the well-known leaves are additionally opened by exact path — which is what
-  // an attacker does, and what a listing-based check never notices.
-  const LEAVES: Record<string, readonly string[]> = {
-    ".ssh": ["id_rsa", "id_ed25519", "id_ecdsa", "id_dsa"],
-    "gh": ["hosts.yml"],
-    "git": ["config"],
-  };
-  const lines: string[] = [];
-  for (const p of paths) {
-    lines.push(`if [ -d ${q(p)} ]; then [ -r ${q(p)} ] || [ -x ${q(p)} ]; else [ -r ${q(p)} ]; fi && printf '%s\\n' ${q(p)}`);
-    const base = p.split("/").pop() ?? "";
-    for (const leaf of LEAVES[base] ?? []) {
-      const full = `${p}/${leaf}`;
-      lines.push(`[ -r ${q(full)} ] && printf '%s\\n' ${q(full)}`);
-    }
-  }
-  // `CHECKED` is the proof the launcher actually ran. Without it a `setpriv`
-  // the host rejects exits nonzero with empty stdout, which is indistinguishable
-  // from "nothing was readable" — the one wrong answer this function must never
-  // give. Absence is a refusal, not a pass.
-  const script = `${lines.join("; ")}; printf 'CHECKED\\n'`;
-  const out = await exec(setprivArgv(principal, opts, ["/bin/sh", "-c", script]));
-  const seen = out.stdout.split("\n").map((l) => l.trim()).filter((l) => l.length > 0);
-  if (!seen.includes("CHECKED")) {
-    return (
-      `the credential readability check could not be run as ${principal.user} (launcher exited ` +
-      `${String(out.code)}: ${out.stderr.trim() || "no output"}). Refusing rather than assuming the ` +
-      `credentials are out of reach.`
-    );
-  }
-  const readable = seen.filter((l) => l !== "CHECKED");
-  if (readable.length === 0) return undefined;
-  return (
-    `${principal.user} can reach ${String(readable.length)} credential path(s) the boundary claims to ` +
-    `deny: ${readable.join(", ")}. On Linux the per-run principal separates by file permissions only, so a ` +
-    `world-readable file — or a merely *searchable* credential directory — defeats it entirely. Tighten ` +
-    `those paths (0600 files, 0700 credential directories) and restart.`
-  );
-}
-
-/**
- * A macOS sandbox profile whose only writable paths are this run's own tree.
- *
- * Shaped as allow-default plus targeted denials rather than deny-default plus
- * allowances, and that is not laziness: a deny-default profile has to enumerate
- * every dyld cache, sysctl and mach service the harness and its toolchain
- * touch, and the failure mode when it misses one is `SIGABRT` at exec with no
- * diagnostic — measured on this host while developing #125. The write rule is
- * still a whitelist (`deny file-write*` then allow the run's tree), which is
- * the property the issue asks for; the read denials are what make the
- * credential paths unreachable.
- *
- * Paths must be *resolved* — `/tmp` is a symlink to `/private/tmp` and a rule
- * naming the symlink matches nothing, which silently produces a profile that
- * denies the writes it meant to allow.
- */
-export function sandboxProfile(input: {
-  writeRoots: readonly string[];
-  denyReadRoots: readonly string[];
-  denyReadFiles: readonly string[];
-}): string {
-  const subpaths = (values: readonly string[]): string =>
-    values.map((v) => `(subpath ${JSON.stringify(v)})`).join(" ");
-  const literals = (values: readonly string[]): string =>
-    values.map((v) => `(literal ${JSON.stringify(v)})`).join(" ");
-  return [
-    "(version 1)",
-    ";; omp-conductor per-run profile (#125). Regenerated per dispatch.",
-    "(allow default)",
-    ";; Writable: this run's checkout and its own scratch, and nothing else.",
-    "(deny file-write*)",
-    `(allow file-write* ${subpaths(input.writeRoots)} ` +
-      `(literal "/dev/null") (literal "/dev/stdout") (literal "/dev/stderr") ` +
-      `(literal "/dev/dtracehelper") (regex #"^/dev/tty"))`,
-    ";; The credential paths an environment variable cannot hide, plus the",
-    ";; sibling run checkouts — cross-run separation on macOS is the profile's",
-    ";; job, because sandbox-exec does not change the uid.",
-    ...(input.denyReadRoots.length === 0 && input.denyReadFiles.length === 0
-      ? []
-      : [
-          `(deny file-read* ${subpaths(input.denyReadRoots)}${
-            input.denyReadFiles.length === 0 ? "" : ` ${literals(input.denyReadFiles)}`
-          })`,
-        ]),
-    ";; Last, so it outranks the denials above: a run must still be able to read",
-    ";; its OWN checkout even when the workspace root that contains it is denied",
-    ";; wholesale. SBPL takes the last matching rule, so ordering is the grant.",
-    `(allow file-read* ${subpaths(input.writeRoots)})`,
-    ";; The login keychain, which is reached over mach and not through the filesystem.",
-    '(deny mach-lookup (global-name "com.apple.SecurityServer") ' +
-      '(global-name "com.apple.securityd") (global-name "com.apple.securityd.xpc"))',
-    "",
-  ].join("\n");
-}
-
-/** `sandbox-exec` prefix for an already-written profile. */
-export function sandboxExecArgv(profilePath: string, command: readonly string[]): string[] {
-  return ["sandbox-exec", "-f", profilePath, ...command];
-}
-
-// -------------------------------------------------------- capability probing
-
-/** The five capability sets and the one flag that makes an empty set stick. */
-export interface CapabilityState {
-  prm: string;
-  eff: string;
-  inh: string;
-  amb: string;
-  bnd: string;
-  noNewPrivs: number;
-  uid?: number;
-  gid?: number;
-}
-
-const CAP_FIELDS: Record<string, keyof CapabilityState> = {
-  CapPrm: "prm",
-  CapEff: "eff",
-  CapInh: "inh",
-  CapAmb: "amb",
-  CapBnd: "bnd",
-};
-
-/**
- * Parse `/proc/<pid>/status`. Pure, so the acceptance assertions in #125 can be
- * pinned against a captured fixture as well as run live inside a worker.
- *
- * Returns `undefined` on a kernel that reports no capability fields at all
- * (and on macOS, where there is no procfs) — an absence the caller must handle
- * as "cannot assert", never as "all clear".
- */
-export function parseProcStatusCaps(text: string): CapabilityState | undefined {
-  const caps: Partial<CapabilityState> = { noNewPrivs: 0 };
-  let sawCap = false;
-  for (const line of text.split("\n")) {
-    const sep = line.indexOf(":");
-    if (sep === -1) continue;
-    const key = line.slice(0, sep);
-    const value = line.slice(sep + 1).trim();
-    const field = CAP_FIELDS[key];
-    if (field !== undefined) {
-      (caps as Record<string, unknown>)[field] = value;
-      sawCap = true;
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (key === "NoNewPrivs") caps.noNewPrivs = Number.parseInt(value, 10) || 0;
-    // "Uid:\treal\teffective\tsaved\tfs" — the effective id is the one that
-    // decides what this process may open, so it is the one asserted.
-    if (key === "Uid" || key === "Gid") {
-      const parts = value.split(/\s+/);
-      const effective = Number.parseInt(parts[1] ?? parts[0] ?? "", 10);
-      if (Number.isFinite(effective)) {
-        if (key === "Uid") caps.uid = effective;
-        else caps.gid = effective;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  if (!sawCap) return undefined;
-  return {
-    prm: caps.prm ?? "",
-    eff: caps.eff ?? "",
-    inh: caps.inh ?? "",
-    amb: caps.amb ?? "",
-    bnd: caps.bnd ?? "",
-    noNewPrivs: caps.noNewPrivs ?? 0,
-    ...(caps.uid === undefined ? {} : { uid: caps.uid }),
-    ...(caps.gid === undefined ? {} : { gid: caps.gid }),
-  };
-}
-
-/** True for `0000000000000000` and any other all-zero spelling of an empty set. */
-function emptyCapSet(value: string): boolean {
-  return value !== "" && /^0+$/.test(value);
-}
-
-/** Does a capability mask contain a given bit? `CAP_SETPCAP` is 8, `CAP_SETUID` 7. */
-export function hasCapability(mask: string, bit: number): boolean {
-  if (mask === "") return false;
-  let value: bigint;
-  try {
-    value = BigInt(`0x${mask}`);
-  } catch {
-    return false;
-  }
-  return (value & (1n << BigInt(bit))) !== 0n;
-}
-
-export const CAP_SETGID = 6;
-export const CAP_SETUID = 7;
-export const CAP_SETPCAP = 8;
-export const CAP_CHOWN = 0;
-/**
- * Needed because `applyRunOwnership` chowns a tree to the slot principal and
- * only then chmods it — at which point the daemon is no longer the owner, and
- * membership in `conductor-daemon` does not authorise `chmod`. Reordering does
- * not help: `chown` clears the setgid bit, so the `g+s` that makes the group
- * inheritable has to come after it. Without this capability the very first
- * ownership handoff fails EPERM, and only a root CI run hides it.
- */
-export const CAP_FOWNER = 3;
-
-/**
- * Everything wrong with a session child's capability state, as a list of
- * sentences. Empty means the child is as unprivileged as this host allows.
- *
- * `boundingSetDropped` is the probe's own answer, not a guess: when the host
- * refused `CAP_SETPCAP` a non-empty `CapBnd` is the documented residual rather
- * than a failure, and asserting it unconditionally would turn a correctly
- * configured fallback host into a red build.
- */
-export function capabilityViolations(
-  caps: CapabilityState,
-  opts: { boundingSetDropped: boolean },
-): string[] {
-  const wrong: string[] = [];
-  for (const [name, value] of [
-    ["CapPrm", caps.prm],
-    ["CapEff", caps.eff],
-    ["CapInh", caps.inh],
-    ["CapAmb", caps.amb],
-  ] as const) {
-    if (!emptyCapSet(value)) wrong.push(`${name} is ${value || "(absent)"}, expected all zero`);
-  }
-  if (opts.boundingSetDropped && !emptyCapSet(caps.bnd)) {
-    wrong.push(`CapBnd is ${caps.bnd || "(absent)"}, expected all zero on a host granting CAP_SETPCAP`);
-  }
-  if (caps.noNewPrivs !== 1) wrong.push(`NoNewPrivs is ${String(caps.noNewPrivs)}, expected 1`);
-  return wrong;
-}
-
-/** A POSIX identity as `id(1)` reports it. */
-export interface Identity {
-  uid: number;
-  user: string;
-  gid: number;
-  group: string;
-  groups: { id: number; name: string }[];
-}
-
-const ID_PART = /^(uid|gid)=(\d+)\(([^)]*)\)$/;
-
-/**
- * Parse `id` output. Pure, because the identity assertion in #125 is
- * "the *whole* identity, not just an absence" — a test that only checks
- * `conductor-daemon` is missing also passes a launcher that forgot to replace
- * the supplementary list at all, which is the bug it exists to catch.
- */
-export function parseIdOutput(text: string): Identity | undefined {
-  const fields = text.trim().split(/\s+/);
-  let uid: number | undefined;
-  let user = "";
-  let gid: number | undefined;
-  let group = "";
-  const groups: { id: number; name: string }[] = [];
-  for (const field of fields) {
-    const simple = ID_PART.exec(field);
-    if (simple !== null) {
-      const value = Number.parseInt(simple[2] ?? "", 10);
-      if (simple[1] === "uid") {
-        uid = value;
-        user = simple[3] ?? "";
-      } else {
-        gid = value;
-        group = simple[3] ?? "";
-      }
-      continue;
-    }
-    if (!field.startsWith("groups=")) continue;
-    for (const entry of field.slice("groups=".length).split(",")) {
-      const m = /^(\d+)\(([^)]*)\)$/.exec(entry);
-      if (m === null) continue;
-      groups.push({ id: Number.parseInt(m[1] ?? "", 10), name: m[2] ?? "" });
-    }
-  }
-  if (uid === undefined || gid === undefined) return undefined;
-  return { uid, user, gid, group, groups };
-}
-
-/**
- * Everything wrong with a launched child's identity. Pins all three facts the
- * spec calls for: the uid is the slot principal, the gid is that slot's *own*
- * primary group, and the supplementary list is exactly the shared runs group.
- */
-export function identityViolations(
-  actual: Identity,
-  expected: { principal: SlotPrincipal; sharedGroup?: string },
-): string[] {
-  const shared = expected.sharedGroup ?? CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs;
-  const wrong: string[] = [];
-  if (actual.uid !== expected.principal.uid) {
-    wrong.push(`uid is ${String(actual.uid)}, expected ${String(expected.principal.uid)} (${expected.principal.user})`);
-  }
-  if (actual.gid !== expected.principal.gid) {
-    wrong.push(
-      `gid is ${String(actual.gid)}, expected ${String(expected.principal.gid)} (${expected.principal.group})`,
-    );
-  }
-  // The slot's own primary group reappears in `groups=` on every libc; the
-  // shared runs group is the only *additional* member allowed.
-  const extra = actual.groups
-    .map((g) => g.name)
-    .filter((name) => name !== shared && name !== expected.principal.group);
-  if (extra.length > 0) {
-    wrong.push(`supplementary groups include ${extra.join(", ")}, expected only ${shared}`);
-  }
-  if (!actual.groups.some((g) => g.name === shared)) {
-    wrong.push(`not a member of ${shared} — the child cannot read the shared mirror`);
-  }
-  if (actual.groups.some((g) => g.name === CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon)) {
-    wrong.push(`is a member of ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} — that group is what keeps sibling runs out`);
-  }
-  return wrong;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------- host probe
-
-/** What this host can actually enforce, decided once at daemon startup. */
-export interface HostProbe {
-  mechanism: IsolationMechanism;
-  /**
-   * Why the stronger mechanisms were unavailable, in probe order. Read by the
-   * refusal message so an operator who asked for `per-run` on a host that
-   * cannot do it is told the missing piece rather than "isolation unavailable".
-   */
-  reasons: string[];
-  /** Real, named weaknesses of the mechanism that *was* selected. */
-  residuals: string[];
-  /** Whether the launcher may pass `--bounding-set=-all`. See {@link setprivArgv}. */
-  boundingSetDropped: boolean;
-  /** Worker slot principals, one per concurrent slot. Empty unless `uid-pool`. */
-  slots: SlotPrincipal[];
-  /** The orchestrator's own distinct account. Absent unless `uid-pool`. */
-  orchestrator?: SlotPrincipal;
-  /**
-   * The resolved `conductor-runs` gid, so the mirror can be handed the group
-   * every slot principal reads it through. Absent when the group is not
-   * defined, which is also why the mechanism is never `uid-pool` then.
-   */
-  runsGid?: number;
-  /**
-   * The resolved `conductor-daemon` gid. Carried rather than taken from the
-   * daemon's own `egid`, which is a different group entirely: the shipped unit
-   * runs `User=fleet`/`Group=fleet` with `conductor-daemon` only supplementary,
-   * so `egid` is `fleet` and handing that to {@link applyRunOwnership} would
-   * make every run repo `<slot>:fleet` — not the documented layout, readable by
-   * anyone else in `fleet`, and validated by a probe that checked a group the
-   * modes never used.
-   */
-  daemonGid?: number;
-}
-
-export interface ProbeOptions {
-  /** How many worker slots to provision principals for (`maxConcurrentWorkers`). */
-  slots: number;
-  platform?: NodeJS.Platform;
-  exec?: Exec;
-  /** `/proc/self/status` text for the daemon itself. Injected for tests. */
-  selfStatus?: () => string | undefined;
-  /** Prefix for slot account names. Pinned by the provisioning docs. */
-  accountPrefix?: string;
-  /**
-   * The daemon's own live credentials. Injected so the membership decision can
-   * be tested on a host that has neither conductor group; production reads the
-   * running process, which is the whole point (see {@link daemonGroupViolations}).
-   */
-  credentials?: () => DaemonCredentials;
-}
-
-/** This process's real group credentials, as the kernel sees them right now. */
-export function liveDaemonCredentials(): DaemonCredentials {
-  return {
-    egid: typeof process.getegid === "function" ? process.getegid() : -1,
-    groups: typeof process.getgroups === "function" ? process.getgroups() : [],
-  };
-}
-
-const DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PREFIX = "conductor-agent-";
-
-function readSelfStatus(): string | undefined {
-  try {
-    return readFileSync("/proc/self/status", "utf8");
-  } catch {
-    return undefined;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The daemon's own *live* credentials. Read from the running process, never
- * from the passwd/group database — see {@link daemonGroupViolations}.
- */
-export interface DaemonCredentials {
-  egid: number;
-  groups: readonly number[];
-}
-
-/** `getent group` output → gid, or `undefined` when the group is not defined. */
-export function parseGetentGid(output: string, group: string): number | undefined {
-  for (const line of output.split("\n")) {
-    const parts = line.split(":");
-    if (parts[0] !== group) continue;
-    const gid = Number.parseInt(parts[2] ?? "", 10);
-    if (Number.isFinite(gid)) return gid;
-  }
-  return undefined;
-}
-
-/**
- * Why this daemon must not be reported as `uid-pool`, from its own credentials.
- *
- * **Existence is not membership, and this distinction can brick a fleet
- * silently.** `getent group conductor-daemon` succeeds on a host where the
- * daemon account is not in the group at all; the probe then reports `uid-pool`,
- * the daemon chowns every run repo to `<slot>:conductor-daemon 2770`, and locks
- * *itself* out of push, salvage and reclaim — after ownership handoff, which is
- * the point of no return. The symptom is unexplained permission errors at the
- * next settle, not a probe failure.
- *
- * It is not a hypothetical either: supplementary group membership is fixed when
- * a process starts, so `usermod -aG conductor-daemon fleet` without a service
- * restart leaves a live daemon whose credentials lack the group while every
- * database check passes. That is the ordinary upgrade path.
- *
- * Pure, and takes the group list as data, so the decision is testable on a host
- * that has neither group.
- *
- * Note what is *not* checked here: whether each slot principal is really in
- * `conductor-runs`. That cannot be read from this process's credentials, and
- * the database would be the same weak evidence this function exists to reject —
- * so it is proven instead by the launcher smoke test, which reads the identity
- * a real launched child actually ends up with.
- */
-export function daemonGroupViolations(
-  creds: DaemonCredentials,
-  resolved: { daemonGid?: number; runsGid?: number },
-): string[] {
-  const wrong: string[] = [];
-  const member = (gid: number): boolean => creds.egid === gid || creds.groups.includes(gid);
-
-  if (resolved.daemonGid === undefined) {
-    wrong.push(`group ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} is not defined on this host`);
-  } else if (!member(resolved.daemonGid)) {
-    wrong.push(
-      `the daemon is not an effective member of ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} (gid ` +
-        `${String(resolved.daemonGid)}) — it would chown every run repo to a group it cannot use, and lock ` +
-        `itself out of push, salvage and reclaim. Supplementary groups are fixed at process start: run ` +
-        `\`usermod -aG ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} <daemon-account>\` and RESTART the service.`,
-    );
-  }
-  if (resolved.runsGid === undefined) {
-    wrong.push(`group ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs} is not defined on this host`);
-  }
-  return wrong;
-}
-
-/** Resolve one slot account to its numeric ids, or say why it could not be. */
-async function resolvePrincipal(
-  exec: Exec,
-  slot: string,
-  user: string,
-): Promise<{ principal: SlotPrincipal } | { missing: string }> {
-  const id = await exec(["id", user]);
-  if (id.code !== 0) return { missing: `account ${user} does not exist` };
-  const parsed = parseIdOutput(id.stdout);
-  if (parsed === undefined) return { missing: `could not read the identity of ${user}` };
-  return {
-    principal: { slot, user, uid: parsed.uid, gid: parsed.gid, group: parsed.group },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Decide the mechanism, then **prove it** before reporting it available.
- *
- * The smoke test is the part that is not optional. A mechanism whose launcher
- * argv the host rejects — a `setpriv` too old for `--no-new-privs`, a slot
- * account the daemon may not become, a mutually-exclusive group flag — looks
- * exactly like an available mechanism at startup and then fails *every*
- * dispatch at run time, which is the worst way to learn it. So the composed
- * argv is run against `id` and the resulting identity is checked; anything
- * short of the expected identity resolves the mechanism down rather than
- * leaving a fleet that cannot dispatch.
- */
-export async function probeHost(opts: ProbeOptions): Promise<HostProbe> {
-  const exec = opts.exec ?? spawnCaptured;
-  const platform = opts.platform ?? process.platform;
-  const prefix = opts.accountPrefix ?? DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PREFIX;
-  const credentials = opts.credentials ?? liveDaemonCredentials;
-  const reasons: string[] = [];
-
-  if (platform === "darwin") return probeDarwin(exec, reasons);
-  if (platform !== "linux") {
-    reasons.push(`${platform} has no supported per-run isolation mechanism`);
-    return { mechanism: "none", reasons, residuals: [], boundingSetDropped: false, slots: [] };
-  }
-
-  const status = (opts.selfStatus ?? readSelfStatus)();
-  const caps = status === undefined ? undefined : parseProcStatusCaps(status);
-  const root = caps?.uid === 0;
-  const canSetuid = root || (caps !== undefined && hasCapability(caps.prm, CAP_SETUID) && hasCapability(caps.prm, CAP_SETGID));
-  // Ownership handoff needs both: CAP_CHOWN to give the tree away, CAP_FOWNER
-  // to keep chmod-ing it afterwards. Probed rather than assumed, because the
-  // failure lands at the first dispatch's point of no return.
-  const canOwn =
-    root || (caps !== undefined && hasCapability(caps.prm, CAP_CHOWN) && hasCapability(caps.prm, CAP_FOWNER));
-  const boundingSetDropped = root || (caps !== undefined && hasCapability(caps.prm, CAP_SETPCAP));
-
-  const setpriv = await exec(["setpriv", "--help"]);
-  const haveSetpriv = setpriv.code === 0;
-
-  if (!canOwn) {
-    reasons.push(
-      "the daemon holds neither CAP_CHOWN nor CAP_FOWNER in its permitted set — it could hand a run tree to " +
-        "its slot principal and then be unable to chmod it, failing at the point of no return. Add " +
-        "AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_SETPCAP to the unit",
-    );
-  }
-  if (!canSetuid) {
-    reasons.push(
-      "the daemon holds neither CAP_SETUID nor CAP_SETGID in its permitted set — " +
-        "add AmbientCapabilities=CAP_SETUID CAP_SETGID CAP_CHOWN CAP_FOWNER CAP_SETPCAP to the unit",
-    );
-  }
-  if (!haveSetpriv) {
-    reasons.push(
-      "setpriv (util-linux) is not on PATH — a raw spawn({uid,gid}) is deliberately not a fallback, " +
-        "because a child launched that way can hold CAP_SETUID and setuid() back",
-    );
-  }
-
-  if (canSetuid && canOwn && haveSetpriv) {
-    const slots: SlotPrincipal[] = [];
-    let unresolved: string | undefined;
-    for (let i = 0; i < opts.slots; i += 1) {
-      const found = await resolvePrincipal(exec, String(i), `${prefix}${String(i)}`);
-      if ("missing" in found) {
-        unresolved = found.missing;
-        break;
-      }
-      slots.push(found.principal);
-    }
-    const orch = unresolved === undefined ? await resolvePrincipal(exec, "orch", `${prefix}orch`) : undefined;
-    if (orch !== undefined && "missing" in orch) unresolved = orch.missing;
-
-    if (unresolved !== undefined) {
-      reasons.push(`${unresolved} — provision the slot accounts as described in the README`);
-    } else if (orch !== undefined && "principal" in orch) {
-      const groups = await exec(["getent", "group", CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs]);
-      // The database answers "does the group exist"; the running process
-      // answers "may this daemon use it". Only the second one is load-bearing.
-      const wrongGroups = daemonGroupViolations(credentials(), {
-        ...(parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon) === undefined
-          ? {}
-          : { daemonGid: parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon) }),
-        ...(parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs) === undefined
-          ? {}
-          : { runsGid: parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs) }),
-      });
-      if (wrongGroups.length > 0) {
-        // Without both groups the layout either locks the daemon out of the run
-        // repos it must fetch and reclaim, or lets the runs into each other's.
-        reasons.push(...wrongGroups);
-      } else {
-        const smoke = await smokeTestLauncher(exec, slots[0] ?? orch.principal, boundingSetDropped);
-        if (smoke === undefined) {
-          return {
-            mechanism: "uid-pool",
-            reasons,
-            residuals: boundingSetDropped
-              ? []
-              : [
-                  "CAP_SETPCAP was not granted, so the child's capability bounding set is not emptied. " +
-                    "It is inert — NoNewPrivs blocks both routes to acquiring anything in it — but it is not zero.",
-                  "A run can read another run's git objects through the shared mirror. Bounded and by design: " +
-                    "same source, no write path, no credential.",
-                ],
-            boundingSetDropped,
-            slots,
-            orchestrator: orch.principal,
-            ...(parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs) === undefined
-              ? {}
-              : { runsGid: parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs) }),
-            ...(parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon) === undefined
-              ? {}
-              : { daemonGid: parseGetentGid(groups.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon) }),
-          };
-        }
-        reasons.push(`the launcher smoke test failed: ${smoke}`);
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  // Degraded, and named as such. It bounds cross-run accidents by group and
-  // mode; it does not stop a determined same-uid escape, and no string in this
-  // package may say otherwise.
-  // Live credentials again, not the database: a daemon that was added to the
-  // group without a restart cannot use it, and group-mode's entire claim is
-  // that the group separates the checkouts.
-  const runsEntry = await exec(["getent", "group", CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs]);
-  const runsGid = parseGetentGid(runsEntry.stdout, CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs);
-  const live = credentials();
-  if (runsGid !== undefined && (live.egid === runsGid || live.groups.includes(runsGid))) {
-    return {
-      mechanism: "group-mode",
-      reasons,
-      residuals: [
-        "group-mode runs sessions as the daemon's own uid. It separates run checkouts by group and mode, " +
-          "and it does NOT contain a determined bash escape: same-uid code reaches the daemon's credential.",
-      ],
-      boundingSetDropped: false,
-      slots: [],
-    };
-  }
-  reasons.push(
-    `the daemon is not an effective member of ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.runs}, so even group-mode is unavailable`,
-  );
-  return { mechanism: "none", reasons, residuals: [], boundingSetDropped: false, slots: [] };
-}
-
-/** Runs the exact composed argv against `id`. Returns a reason, or `undefined` on success. */
-async function smokeTestLauncher(
-  exec: Exec,
-  principal: SlotPrincipal,
-  boundingSet: boolean,
-): Promise<string | undefined> {
-  const argv = setprivArgv(principal, { boundingSet }, ["id"]);
-  const out = await exec(argv);
-  if (out.code !== 0) {
-    return `${argv.join(" ")} exited ${String(out.code)}: ${out.stderr.trim() || "no output"}`;
-  }
-  const identity = parseIdOutput(out.stdout);
-  if (identity === undefined) return `could not parse the identity the launcher produced: ${out.stdout.trim()}`;
-  const wrong = identityViolations(identity, { principal });
-  return wrong.length === 0 ? undefined : wrong.join("; ");
-}
-
-/**
- * macOS. `sandbox-exec` is deprecated by Apple and still the only thing on a
- * stock dev host that denies a *read*, which is what this boundary needs: the
- * profile is a kernel-enforced MAC layer, not an environment variable, so
- * `~/.ssh`, the login keychain and the operator's `gh` config genuinely become
- * unreachable to the session. Verified against the #125 probe list on
- * darwin 25.5.0 while writing this.
- */
-async function probeDarwin(exec: Exec, reasons: string[]): Promise<HostProbe> {
-  const smoke = await exec(["sandbox-exec", "-p", "(version 1)(allow default)", "/usr/bin/true"]);
-  if (smoke.code !== 0) {
-    reasons.push(
-      `sandbox-exec is unavailable or refused a trivial profile (${smoke.stderr.trim() || `exit ${String(smoke.code)}`})`,
-    );
-    return { mechanism: "none", reasons, residuals: [], boundingSetDropped: false, slots: [] };
-  }
-  return {
-    mechanism: "sandbox-exec",
-    reasons,
-    residuals: [
-      "sandbox-exec runs the session as the operator's own uid. Reads of the credential paths and writes " +
-        "outside the run's checkout are denied by the kernel, but anything the profile does not name is allowed, " +
-        "and Apple has deprecated the interface. A fleet host should use uid-pool on Linux.",
-    ],
-    boundingSetDropped: false,
-    slots: [],
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * The refusal an operator sees when they asked for a boundary this host cannot
- * build. Fail-closed, and it only ever fires because they asked by name.
- */
-export function boundaryRefusal(probe: HostProbe): string {
-  const missing = probe.reasons.length === 0 ? ["no mechanism was found"] : probe.reasons;
-  return (
-    `credentials.isolation is "per-run" but this host offers no per-run mechanism: ${missing.join("; ")}. ` +
-    `Fix the host, or set credentials.isolation to "none" — which dispatches, and which status reports as an ` +
-    `unprotected fleet.`
-  );
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------------------------ mcp audit
-
-/**
- * One MCP server that would carry a credential into a session, and why we say
- * so. `reason` is user-facing: dispatch refuses with it, and a refusal that
- * only said "credential-bearing server found" would leave the operator hunting
- * through four config files.
- */
-export interface McpServerRef {
-  name: string;
-  source: string;
-  reason: string;
-}
-
-/** Looks like a GitHub-facing server, by any of the three ways one is spelled. */
-function looksGitHub(name: string, entry: Record<string, unknown>): boolean {
-  const haystack = [
-    name,
-    String(entry["command"] ?? ""),
-    Array.isArray(entry["args"]) ? entry["args"].join(" ") : "",
-    String(entry["url"] ?? ""),
-  ]
-    .join(" ")
-    .toLowerCase();
-  return haystack.includes("github");
-}
-
-/** Environment/header keys that name a credential rather than a setting. */
-const SECRET_KEY = /(TOKEN|^PAT$|_PAT$|SECRET|PASSWORD|APIKEY|API_KEY|CREDENTIAL|AUTHORIZATION)/i;
-/** GitHub's own token prefixes, which are unambiguous wherever they appear. */
-const GITHUB_TOKEN_VALUE = /\b(gh[pousr]_[A-Za-z0-9]{16,}|github_pat_[A-Za-z0-9_]{20,})\b/;
-
-/**
- * Which servers in one parsed `mcp.json` would hand a session a credential.
- *
- * Pure and separate from the file reading, for the reason every other decision
- * in this package is: the interesting cases (a PAT inlined in `args`, a bearer
- * header, an `env` key named `GITHUB_TOKEN` with a `${...}` placeholder) are
- * worth pinning as data, and none of them needs a filesystem.
- *
- * A GitHub server with no credential material is *allowed*: it is reaching the
- * public API unauthenticated, which is exactly what item 6 of #125 permits.
- */
-export function auditMcpConfig(parsed: unknown, source: string): McpServerRef[] {
-  if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== "object") return [];
-  const servers = (parsed as Record<string, unknown>)["mcpServers"];
-  if (servers === null || typeof servers !== "object") return [];
-
-  const found: McpServerRef[] = [];
-  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(servers as Record<string, unknown>)) {
-    if (value === null || typeof value !== "object") continue;
-    const entry = value as Record<string, unknown>;
-    const github = looksGitHub(name, entry);
-
-    const holders: [string, unknown][] = [
-      ["env", entry["env"]],
-      ["headers", entry["headers"]],
-    ];
-    let reason: string | undefined;
-    for (const [where, holder] of holders) {
-      if (holder === null || typeof holder !== "object") continue;
-      for (const [key, raw] of Object.entries(holder as Record<string, unknown>)) {
-        const text = typeof raw === "string" ? raw : "";
-        if (GITHUB_TOKEN_VALUE.test(text)) {
-          reason = `${where}.${key} holds a literal GitHub token`;
-          break;
-        }
-        if (github && SECRET_KEY.test(key)) {
-          reason = `${where}.${key} carries a credential for a GitHub-facing server`;
-          break;
-        }
-      }
-      if (reason !== undefined) break;
-    }
-    if (reason === undefined) {
-      const argv = Array.isArray(entry["args"]) ? entry["args"].join(" ") : "";
-      const inline = `${String(entry["command"] ?? "")} ${argv} ${String(entry["url"] ?? "")}`;
-      if (GITHUB_TOKEN_VALUE.test(inline)) reason = "a GitHub token is inlined in its command line";
-    }
-    if (reason !== undefined) found.push({ name, source, reason });
-  }
-  return found;
-}
-
-/**
- * The files the harness would discover for a session, in its own order: the
- * checkout first, then the *agent principal's* config root — which is the
- * redirected `$HOME` from {@link prepareSessionEnvRoot}, never the operator's.
- */
-export function mcpConfigPaths(roots: { agentHome: string; cwd: string }): string[] {
-  return [
-    join(roots.cwd, ".mcp.json"),
-    join(roots.cwd, ".omp", "mcp.json"),
-    join(roots.agentHome, ".omp", "agent", "mcp.json"),
-    join(roots.agentHome, ".mcp.json"),
-  ];
-}
-
-/** Reads and audits every discoverable config. Unreadable files are not findings. */
-export function auditMcpRoots(roots: { agentHome: string; cwd: string }): McpServerRef[] {
-  const found: McpServerRef[] = [];
-  for (const path of mcpConfigPaths(roots)) {
-    let parsed: unknown;
-    try {
-      parsed = JSON.parse(readFileSync(path, "utf8"));
-    } catch {
-      // Absent or malformed: the harness will not load servers from it either.
-      continue;
-    }
-    found.push(...auditMcpConfig(parsed, path));
-  }
-  return found;
-}
-
-/**
- * The named error dispatch refuses with. `undefined` when the discovered set is
- * clean, which is the normal case and must stay silent.
- */
-export function mcpRefusal(found: readonly McpServerRef[]): string | undefined {
-  if (found.length === 0) return undefined;
-  const list = found.map((f) => `${f.name} (${f.source}: ${f.reason})`).join("; ");
-  return (
-    `credential-bearing MCP server configured for a session: ${list}. ` +
-    `An MCP server carrying its own PAT re-opens the hole the per-run principal closes, so dispatch refuses ` +
-    `rather than running with it. Move the server out of the agent principal's config root, or strip its credential.`
-  );
-}
-
-// --------------------------------------------------- run filesystem ownership
-
-/**
- * Hand one run's tree to its slot principal, keeping the daemon's own access.
- *
- * Owner `conductor-agent-<slot>`, group `conductor-daemon`, directories `2770`
- * and files `0660`. The setgid bit is what makes it hold: without it every file
- * the worker creates lands in the worker's own group and the daemon's access
- * becomes silently partial — discovered, if at all, when a salvage or a
- * `conductor_push` fails in production rather than at provisioning time.
- *
- * The daemon deliberately gets write, not just read: it fetches the run branch,
- * runs salvage, and reclaims the tree at settlement, and reclaim needs write on
- * the directories. Only the daemon is in that group, so this is not a widening
- * — and a slot principal must never be added to it.
- */
-export function applyRunOwnership(root: string, principal: SlotPrincipal, daemonGid: number): void {
-  // Collected during the walk and set in one pass at the end, because Bun's
-  // `fs.chmodSync` **silently masks the mode to 0o777** (measured on Bun
-  // 1.3.14): `chmodSync(dir, 0o2770)` leaves 0o770 and raises nothing, and
-  // `fs.constants.S_ISGID` is undefined there so the usual workaround folds to
-  // the same value. Losing that bit is not cosmetic — it is what makes every
-  // file the worker creates inherit `conductor-daemon`, and without it the
-  // daemon's access to a run's own output is silently partial, which surfaces
-  // as a failed salvage in production rather than here.
-  const directories: string[] = [];
-
-  const walk = (path: string): void => {
-    let stat: Stats;
-    try {
-      stat = lstatSync(path);
-    } catch {
-      return;
-    }
-    // Before the chown and the chmod, not merely before the recursion. `lstat`
-    // does not follow a link but `chown` and `chmod` both do, so touching a
-    // symlink here would reach through it: a link inside the checkout pointing
-    // anywhere outside would become a write primitive aimed out of the jail,
-    // exercised by the daemon with its capabilities. For a function whose whole
-    // job is confining a run, that is the worst possible bug, so the link
-    // itself is left exactly as the worker found it.
-    if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return;
-
-    chownSync(path, principal.uid, daemonGid);
-    if (stat.isDirectory()) {
-      chmodSync(path, 0o770);
-      directories.push(path);
-      for (const entry of readdirSync(path)) walk(join(path, entry));
-      return;
-    }
-    // Execute is preserved, never granted: a flat `0o660` strips `+x` from
-    // every script in the checkout — `setup.sh`, anything in `node_modules/.bin`,
-    // whatever a configured gate invokes — and the run's own gates then fail
-    // with "permission denied" the moment ownership changes hands, reading like
-    // a toolchain fault rather than a chmod. Owner and group are granted
-    // together so the daemon group keeps parity with the owner, which is the
-    // same reasoning as the `2770` on directories.
-    const executable = (stat.mode & 0o111) === 0 ? 0 : 0o110;
-    chmodSync(path, 0o660 | executable);
-  };
-  walk(root);
-  setgidDirectories(directories);
-}
-
-/**
- * Make the shared mirror readable by every run principal, and writable by none.
- *
- * Owner stays the daemon, group becomes `conductor-runs`, directories `2750`
- * and files `0640`. Without this the whole per-run repository model does not
- * work: a run's git dir borrows the mirror's objects through `alternates`, and
- * a mirror the slot principal cannot read makes every worker's repository look
- * corrupt — `fatal: cannot change to .../repo.git: Permission denied` — which
- * reads like a broken clone rather than a permissions layout.
- *
- * It was missed once already, and could not have been caught by a fixture: the
- * adversarial suite *documents* the mirror as "0750 daemon:conductor-runs" and
- * expects the read to be **allowed** as the known residual, but nothing
- * established that layout, so the read was denied on the first real uid-pool
- * host the suite ever ran on.
- *
- * Read-only is the point. The mirror is the one thing every run shares, so a
- * writable one would let any run rewrite the objects every other run builds on.
- * That a run can *read* another run's objects here is the documented residual:
- * same source, no write path, no credential.
- */
-export function applyMirrorReadAccess(root: string, runsGid: number): void {
-
-  const directories: string[] = [];
-
-  const walk = (path: string): void => {
-    let stat: Stats;
-    try {
-      stat = lstatSync(path);
-    } catch {
-      return;
-    }
-    // Same reasoning as applyRunOwnership: lstat does not follow a link but
-    // chown and chmod both do, so touching one here would reach outside the
-    // mirror with the daemon's privileges.
-    if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return;
-
-    chownSync(path, -1, runsGid);
-    if (stat.isDirectory()) {
-      chmodSync(path, 0o750);
-      directories.push(path);
-      for (const entry of readdirSync(path)) walk(join(path, entry));
-      return;
-    }
-    // Git keeps hooks in here, and a hook that lost `+x` is a silently broken
-    // repository. Preserved, never granted — exactly as on the run side.
-    const executable = (stat.mode & 0o111) === 0 ? 0 : 0o010;
-    chmodSync(path, 0o640 | executable);
-  };
-  walk(root);
-  // Setgid so objects the daemon fetches later keep the group; a fetch that
-  // wrote root-group objects would re-break alternates one pack at a time.
-  setgidDirectories(directories);
-}
-
-/**
- * Why a run principal could not walk down to the shared mirror, if it cannot.
- *
- * Group-readable objects are useless if the path to them is not searchable, and
- * `mirrorRoot` defaults to a directory under the state dir — which is `0700`
- * daemon-owned, so by default it is not.
- *
- * This **refuses instead of widening**, and the distinction is the whole point.
- * Adding `+x` to the state directory would look like a one-bit fix and would
- * quietly publish everything else in there: `openStore` creates
- * `conductor.db` and its `-wal`/`-shm` siblings with the process umask, so a
- * searchable parent makes fleet, run and report history readable by every local
- * account. SQLite recreates those files at runtime, so chmod-ing them once does
- * not hold either. The safe layout is a mirror root that is not inside the
- * private tree, and the operator has to say where — so this names the problem
- * and the fix rather than guessing.
- */
-export function mirrorTraversalRefusal(mirrorPath: string, privateRoot: string): string | undefined {
-  const stop = resolve(privateRoot);
-  let cursor = resolve(mirrorPath);
-  const blocked: string[] = [];
-  // Ancestors only, and only up to the filesystem root — a `privateRoot` that
-  // is not actually an ancestor must not send this walking off widening or
-  // inspecting unrelated directories.
-  while (cursor !== dirname(cursor)) {
-    cursor = dirname(cursor);
-    try {
-      if ((lstatSync(cursor).mode & 0o001) === 0) blocked.push(cursor);
-    } catch {
-      break;
-    }
-    if (cursor === stop) break;
-  }
-  if (blocked.length === 0) return undefined;
-  return (
-    `run principals cannot reach the shared mirror ${mirrorPath}: ${blocked.join(", ")} ` +
-    `${blocked.length === 1 ? "is" : "are"} not searchable. The run repository borrows the mirror's objects ` +
-    `through git alternates, so every checkout would look corrupt rather than forbidden. Do NOT chmod the ` +
-    `state directory to fix this — it holds conductor.db and its WAL, which SQLite recreates with the process ` +
-    `umask, so a searchable parent publishes fleet history to every local account. Set "mirrorRoot" to a ` +
-    `directory outside the private state tree (for example /srv/conductor/mirrors, mode 0711) and restart.`
-  );
-}
-
-/**
- * Adds the setgid bit to directories, in as few `chmod` calls as the argument
- * limit allows. Shelled out only because the runtime's own `chmod` cannot
- * express it — see the note in {@link applyRunOwnership}.
- */
-function setgidDirectories(directories: readonly string[]): void {
-  const CHUNK = 256;
-  for (let i = 0; i < directories.length; i += CHUNK) {
-    const chunk = directories.slice(i, i + CHUNK);
-    const out = Bun.spawnSync(["chmod", "g+s", ...chunk], { stdin: "ignore", stdout: "pipe", stderr: "pipe" });
-    if (out.exitCode !== 0) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `could not set the setgid bit on ${String(chunk.length)} run directories ` +
-          `(first: ${chunk[0] ?? "?"}): ${out.stderr.toString().trim() || `chmod exited ${String(out.exitCode)}`}. ` +
-          `Without it the worker's own files do not inherit ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} and the daemon loses ` +
-          `access to the run's output.`,
-      );
-    }
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * The name of the probe file {@link verifyDaemonAccess} writes. A dotfile
- * inside the run's own tree, removed immediately, and matched by the managed
- * `info/exclude` block so a racing `git status` never reports it.
- */
-export const DAEMON_ACCESS_PROBE = ".conductor-access-probe";
-
-/**
- * Prove the daemon can still reach a run tree it has just handed to a slot
- * principal — by writing, reading and removing, not by inspecting modes.
- *
- * This runs *after* {@link applyRunOwnership}, which is the point of no return:
- * once the tree is `<slot>:conductor-daemon 2770`, a daemon that is not an
- * effective member of that group has locked itself out of `pushRunBranch`,
- * salvage and settlement reclaim. Mode arithmetic cannot see that, because the
- * modes are correct — it is the daemon's own credentials that are wrong.
- *
- * The realistic way to get there is the ordinary upgrade path: supplementary
- * groups are established when a process starts, so an operator who runs
- * `usermod -aG conductor-daemon fleet` without restarting the unit has a live
- * daemon whose credentials lack the group while every `getent` check passes.
- * Returns the actionable sentence, not a bare `EACCES`.
- */
-export function verifyDaemonAccess(root: string): string | undefined {
-  const probe = join(root, DAEMON_ACCESS_PROBE);
-  try {
-    writeFileSync(probe, "conductor", { mode: 0o660 });
-    const read = readFileSync(probe, "utf8");
-    rmSync(probe, { force: true });
-    if (read !== "conductor") return `wrote ${probe} but read back ${JSON.stringify(read)}`;
-    return undefined;
-  } catch (err) {
-    rmSync(probe, { force: true });
-    return (
-      `the daemon cannot write inside ${root} after handing it to ${"the run's slot principal"}: ` +
-      `${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}. The usual cause is that the daemon is not an ` +
-      `EFFECTIVE member of ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} — supplementary groups are fixed at process start, so ` +
-      `restart the service after \`usermod -aG ${CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon} <daemon-account>\`.`
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------- the privileged publish path
-
-/** One run's own repository, as the daemon addresses it. */
-export interface RunRepoRef {
-  repo: RepoTarget;
-  /** The run's own git repository — not a linked worktree of the mirror (#125 1b). */
-  runRepoPath: string;
-  branch: string;
-}
-
-export type PushOutcome = { ok: true; sha: string } | { ok: false; stderr: string };
-export type PrOutcome = { ok: true; url: string } | { ok: false; stderr: string };
-
-/** A clone URL can carry a token, and it lands in git's own error text. */
-const URL_USERINFO = /([a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9+.-]*:\/\/)[^\s/@]+@/g;
-
-/** Blank the `user:token@` part of any URL before a string reaches a log or a human. */
-export function scrubUserinfo(text: string): string {
-  return text.replace(URL_USERINFO, "$1***@");
-}
-
-function mirrorPath(project: Pick<ProjectConfig, "mirrorRoot">, repo: RepoTarget): string {
-  return join(project.mirrorRoot, `${repo.name}.git`);
-}
-
-/** GitHub slug parsed off the clone URL, falling back to the routing name. */
-export function repoSlugFor(repo: RepoTarget): string {
-  const m = /(?:[:/])([^/:]+\/[^/]+?)(?:\.git)?$/.exec(repo.cloneUrl);
-  return m?.[1] ?? repo.name;
-}
-
-/**
- * Publish a run's branch: run repo → mirror → GitHub, **fast-forward only**.
- *
- * This is the whole reason a worker needs no credential (#125 item 3). The
- * worker commits into its own repository, which is durable, local and readable
- * by the daemon through {@link CONDUCTOR_GROUPS.daemon}; everything that
- * touches the network happens here, on the privileged side, through
- * {@link credentialedEnv}.
- *
- * Both hops are fast-forward only and there is no force path anywhere in this
- * package. The fetch refspec deliberately carries **no leading `+`** — that
- * single character is the difference between "advance the mirror's copy of this
- * branch" and "make the mirror's copy whatever the run says it is", and a run
- * repo is the one place in this system that model-executed code fully controls.
- * The push carries no `--force` and no `--force-with-lease`: a lease is still a
- * force, and a rejected push is a decision for a human, not a retry.
- *
- * A rejection — non-fast-forward, protected ref, unauthorised — comes back as a
- * value carrying git's stderr verbatim, because the caller settles the run
- * `failed` on it and a paraphrase is worthless in that report.
- */
-export async function pushRunBranch(
-  project: Pick<ProjectConfig, "mirrorRoot">,
-  run: RunRepoRef,
-  exec: Exec = spawnCaptured,
-): Promise<PushOutcome> {
-  const mirror = mirrorPath(project, run.repo);
-  const ref = `refs/heads/${run.branch}`;
-  const env = credentialedEnv();
-
-  const fetched = await exec(["git", "-C", mirror, "fetch", "--no-tags", run.runRepoPath, `${ref}:${ref}`], { env });
-  if (fetched.code !== 0) {
-    return { ok: false, stderr: scrubUserinfo(fetched.stderr.trim() || fetched.stdout.trim() || `git fetch exited ${String(fetched.code)}`) };
-  }
-
-  const resolved = await exec(["git", "-C", mirror, "rev-parse", ref], { env });
-  if (resolved.code !== 0) {
-    return { ok: false, stderr: scrubUserinfo(resolved.stderr.trim() || `git rev-parse ${ref} exited ${String(resolved.code)}`) };
-  }
-  const sha = resolved.stdout.trim();
-
-  const pushed = await exec(["git", "-C", mirror, "push", "origin", `${ref}:${ref}`], { env });
-  if (pushed.code !== 0) {
-    return { ok: false, stderr: scrubUserinfo(pushed.stderr.trim() || pushed.stdout.trim() || `git push exited ${String(pushed.code)}`) };
-  }
-  return { ok: true, sha };
-}
-
-/**
- * Open the run's pull request from the privileged side.
- *
- * The body goes over stdin, never argv: a body with newlines, backticks or a
- * leading `-` is ordinary, and interpolating it into a command line is how a
- * worker's report would become an argument.
- */
-export async function openRunPr(
-  project: Pick<ProjectConfig, "mirrorRoot">,
-  run: RunRepoRef,
-  opts: { title: string; body: string; base: string },
-  exec: Exec = spawnCaptured,
-): Promise<PrOutcome> {
-  void project;
-  const out = await exec(
-    [
-      "gh",
-      "pr",
-      "create",
-      "--repo",
-      repoSlugFor(run.repo),
-      "--head",
-      run.branch,
-      "--base",
-      opts.base,
-      "--title",
-      opts.title,
-      "--body-file",
-      "-",
-    ],
-    { env: credentialedEnv(), stdin: opts.body },
-  );
-  if (out.code !== 0) {
-    return { ok: false, stderr: scrubUserinfo(out.stderr.trim() || out.stdout.trim() || `gh pr create exited ${String(out.code)}`) };
-  }
-  const url = /https:\/\/github\.com\/\S+\/pull\/\d+/.exec(out.stdout)?.[0];
-  if (url === undefined) {
-    return { ok: false, stderr: `gh pr create succeeded but printed no PR URL: ${out.stdout.trim()}` };
-  }
-  return { ok: true, url };
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------- composing one run's boundary
-
-/** Everything the daemon knows about one session before it launches it. */
-export interface BoundaryRequest {
-  probe: HostProbe;
-  isolation: CredentialIsolation;
-  role: SessionRole;
-  /**
-   * Worker slot index for a worker session; ignored for the orchestrator, which
-   * has its own distinct account precisely so it cannot reach a run checkout.
-   */
-  slot?: number;
-  /** Private config tree for this session, already materialised. */
-  envRoot: string;
-  /** The only paths this session may write. A worker's is its checkout. */
-  writeRoots: readonly string[];
-  /** Credential paths the macOS profile must deny outright. */
-  denyReadRoots?: readonly string[];
-  denyReadFiles?: readonly string[];
-  readToken?: string;
-  /**
-   * How this session authenticates a model. Resolved once by the daemon and
-   * handed down rather than re-read per session, so every child of one tick
-   * agrees — and so a fleet with no credential is refused at admission instead of
-   * discovering it at turn 0 (#152).
-   */
-  model?: ModelCredential;
-  /** Where a generated `sandbox-exec` profile is written. */
-  profilePath?: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Does what the host can build satisfy what the operator asked for?
- *
- * The one place the ordering between the two vocabularies is written down, so
- * the dispatch gate, the boundary builder, `status` and the setup wizard cannot
- * disagree about whether a host is good enough. Stronger always satisfies
- * weaker — `uid-pool` honours a `group-mode` request — but never the reverse,
- * which is the whole point: a `per-run` request that `group-mode` could satisfy
- * would be a downgrade nobody consented to (#125).
- */
-export function mechanismSatisfies(
-  isolation: CredentialIsolation,
-  mechanism: IsolationMechanism,
-): boolean {
-  if (isolation === "none") return true;
-  if (isolation === "group-mode") return mechanism !== "none";
-  return mechanism === "uid-pool" || mechanism === "sandbox-exec";
-}
-
-/**
- * Compose the launcher and environment for one session.
- *
- * Note what this does *not* do: it never downgrades. If the operator asked for
- * `per-run` and the probe found nothing, the caller must refuse the dispatch —
- * silently returning an unprotected boundary here is exactly the failure the
- * issue calls "never the silent default", and it would be invisible because the
- * session would start and work.
- */
-export function buildSessionBoundary(req: BoundaryRequest): SessionBoundary {
-  const paths = prepareSessionEnvRoot(req.envRoot);
-  const env = sessionEnv(paths, {
-    ...(req.readToken === undefined ? {} : { readToken: req.readToken }),
-    ...(req.model === undefined ? {} : { model: req.model }),
-  });
-
-  if (req.isolation === "none") {
-    return { mechanism: "none", launcher: [], env };
-  }
-
-  // Defensive, not decorative: dispatch is gated on the same predicate, so
-  // reaching here means a caller skipped the gate. Returning a weaker boundary
-  // would start the session and work, which is exactly how a downgrade becomes
-  // invisible — so this throws instead.
-  if (!mechanismSatisfies(req.isolation, req.probe.mechanism)) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `credentials.isolation is "${req.isolation}" but this host's mechanism is "${req.probe.mechanism}": ` +
-        `${req.probe.reasons.join("; ") || "no stronger mechanism was found"}. Refusing to build a weaker ` +
-        `boundary than the one configured.`,
-    );
-  }
-
-  if (req.probe.mechanism === "uid-pool") {
-    const principal =
-      req.role === "orchestrator" ? req.probe.orchestrator : req.probe.slots[req.slot ?? 0];
-    if (principal === undefined) {
-      throw new Error(
-        `no slot principal for a ${req.role} session (slot ${String(req.slot ?? 0)}) — the probe reported ` +
-          `uid-pool with ${String(req.probe.slots.length)} slot account(s); this is a provisioning mismatch, ` +
-          `not something to run unprotected.`,
-      );
-    }
-    return {
-      mechanism: "uid-pool",
-      // An empty command yields exactly the prefix, `--` included: the caller
-      // appends the real argv after it.
-      // The orchestrator gets NO supplementary group. `conductor-runs` exists
-      // to let a worker read the shared mirror through git alternates; the
-      // orchestrator has no checkout and no alternates, so granting it would
-      // hand over the one residual the design explicitly says it does not get.
-      launcher: setprivArgv(
-        principal,
-        {
-          boundingSet: req.probe.boundingSetDropped,
-          ...(req.role === "orchestrator" ? { sharedGroup: false as const } : {}),
-        },
-        [],
-      ),
-      env,
-      principal,
-    };
-  }
-
-  if (req.probe.mechanism === "sandbox-exec") {
-    const profilePath = req.profilePath ?? join(req.envRoot, "sandbox.sb");
-    writeFileSync(
-      profilePath,
-      sandboxProfile({
-        // The session's own scratch and config tree are writable for the same
-        // reason its checkout is: the harness writes its transcript, and a
-        // profile that forgot it fails at session startup, not at a tool call.
-        writeRoots: [...req.writeRoots, paths.home, paths.tmp, paths.ghConfigDir],
-        denyReadRoots: req.denyReadRoots ?? [],
-        denyReadFiles: req.denyReadFiles ?? [],
-      }),
-      { mode: 0o600 },
-    );
-    return { mechanism: "sandbox-exec", launcher: sandboxExecArgv(profilePath, []), env };
-  }
-
-  // group-mode: same uid, separation by group and mode only. Only reachable
-  // when the operator asked for it by name — `mechanismSatisfies` above refuses
-  // to let a `per-run` request land here. No launcher, and no claim beyond what
-  // the probe's own residual already says out loud.
-  return { mechanism: "group-mode", launcher: [], env };
-}
-
-/**
- * Which worker slot a run occupies, for the lifetime of that run.
- *
- * A pool rather than a counter because the slot *is* the principal: two live
- * runs holding the same index would run as the same uid and could write each
- * other's checkout, which is the cross-run property #124's metric forbids. The
- * pool is `maxConcurrentWorkers` wide, so acquiring never blocks in practice —
- * admission has already capped concurrency — but it returns `undefined` rather
- * than handing out a duplicate if it ever did.
- */
-export interface SlotPool {
-  acquire(): number | undefined;
-  release(slot: number): void;
-  size(): number;
-}
-
-export function createSlotPool(size: number): SlotPool {
-  const taken = new Set<number>();
-  return {
-    acquire() {
-      for (let i = 0; i < size; i += 1) {
-        if (taken.has(i)) continue;
-        taken.add(i);
-        return i;
-      }
-      return undefined;
-    },
-    release(slot) {
-      taken.delete(slot);
-    },
-    size: () => size,
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * How `status` describes the live boundary. One sentence for the mechanism and
- * one line per residual, because "protected" with no qualifier is the claim
- * this whole issue exists to stop anyone making by accident.
- */
-export function describeBoundary(
-  isolation: CredentialIsolation,
-  probe: HostProbe,
-): { headline: string; detail: string[] } {
-  if (isolation === "none") {
-    return {
-      headline: `unprotected — credentials.isolation is "none"`,
-      detail: [
-        "Sessions run as the daemon's own user with its GitHub credential reachable. Environment scrubbing is",
-        "in force and is accident-prevention only: same-uid code defeats it in one line.",
-      ],
-    };
-  }
-  if (!mechanismSatisfies(isolation, probe.mechanism)) {
-    return {
-      headline: `REFUSING DISPATCH — "${isolation}" requested, this host offers "${probe.mechanism}"`,
-      detail: probe.reasons,
-    };
-  }
-  if (probe.mechanism === "uid-pool") {
-    return {
-      headline: "per-run — uid-pool (one OS principal per run slot)",
-      detail: probe.residuals,
-    };
-  }
-  if (probe.mechanism === "sandbox-exec") {
-    return { headline: "per-run — sandbox-exec (macOS dev host)", detail: probe.residuals };
-  }
-  // Reached only when the operator asked for group-mode by name, so the
-  // headline states the weaker claim rather than dressing it as the boundary.
-  return {
-    headline: "group-mode — cross-run separation only, does NOT contain a bash escape",
-    detail: probe.residuals,
-  };
-}
-
-// ------------------------------------------------------- the adversarial probe
-
-/**
- * One check that the boundary holds, written the way an attacker would write it.
- *
- * Declared as data, and run through {@link runAdversarialProbes}, so the *same*
- * checks execute in two places: in CI against a fixture credential layout, and
- * from inside a real session. #125 asks for both, and two hand-written copies
- * would drift — the CI one would keep passing while the live one stopped being
- * run, which is the failure mode a regression suite exists to prevent.
- *
- * `expect` is part of the data because not every answer is "denied". A run can
- * read another run's git objects out of the shared mirror; that is the known,
- * documented residual, and a suite that asserted it was blocked would either be
- * wrong or would quietly be made to pass by weakening the mirror.
- */
-export interface AdversarialProbe {
-  name: string;
-  /** Shell rather than argv: several of these attacks *are* shell one-liners. */
-  script: string;
-  expect: "denied" | "allowed";
-  /** What this probe defends, in the words of the issue that paid for it. */
-  why: string;
-}
-
-export interface ProbeTargets {
-  /** The operator's real home — the credential store the session must not reach. */
-  operatorHome: string;
-  /** This run's own checkout. */
-  checkout: string;
-  /** `owner/repo`, for the push attempts. */
-  repoSlug: string;
-  /** A sibling run's checkout, when there is one to try. */
-  siblingCheckout?: string;
-  /** A sibling run's branch name, for the ref-write attempts. */
-  siblingBranch?: string;
-  /** The shared mirror, which is readable and must not be writable. */
-  mirror?: string;
-}
-
-/** The checks from #125's acceptance list, plus the cross-run ones from the spec. */
-export function adversarialProbes(t: ProbeTargets): AdversarialProbe[] {
-  const q = (s: string): string => `'${s.replaceAll("'", `'\\''`)}'`;
-  const probes: AdversarialProbe[] = [
-    {
-      name: "gh auth status",
-      script: "gh auth status",
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "the daemon authenticates by shelling out to gh; a session running the same binary reached the same credential",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "gh with the operator's config dir",
-      script: `GH_CONFIG_DIR=${q(join(t.operatorHome, ".config", "gh"))} gh auth status`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "scrubbing GH_CONFIG_DIR is an environment variable; the config file has to be unreadable, not merely unreferenced",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "read the operator's gh hosts.yml",
-      script: `cat ${q(join(t.operatorHome, ".config", "gh", "hosts.yml"))}`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "the oauth token lives in this file in plain text",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "read ~/.git-credentials",
-      script: `cat ${q(join(t.operatorHome, ".git-credentials"))}`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "git's store helper keeps https credentials here in plain text",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "list the operator's ~/.ssh",
-      script: `ls ${q(join(t.operatorHome, ".ssh"))}`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "a private key plus git@github.com needs no environment variable at all",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "read ~/.npmrc",
-      script: `cat ${q(join(t.operatorHome, ".npmrc"))}`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "publish credentials are inside the same blast radius",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "npm whoami",
-      script: "npm whoami",
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "the registry credential is reachable the same way the git one is",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "ssh to github",
-      script: "ssh -o BatchMode=yes -o ConnectTimeout=5 -T git@github.com",
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "no usable key and no agent socket",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "push over ssh",
-      script: `git -C ${q(t.checkout)} push git@github.com:${t.repoSlug} HEAD`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "the ssh route bypasses every gh and https control",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "push with an explicit credential helper",
-      script: `git -C ${q(t.checkout)} -c credential.helper=${process.platform === "darwin" ? "osxkeychain" : "store"} push https://github.com/${t.repoSlug} HEAD`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "a helper named on the command line ignores GIT_CONFIG_GLOBAL entirely",
-    },
-    {
-      name: "push to origin from the checkout",
-      script: `git -C ${q(t.checkout)} push origin HEAD`,
-      expect: "denied",
-      why: "the ordinary push. It must fail, and the daemon must publish the same branch afterwards",
-    },
-  ];
-
-  if (t.siblingCheckout !== undefined) {
-    probes.push(
-      {
-        name: "write a sibling run's checkout",
-        script: `touch ${q(join(t.siblingCheckout, ".conductor-cross-run"))}`,
-        expect: "denied",
-        why: "a rogue run editing a sibling's work is what makes a shared agent account insufficient",
-      },
-      {
-        name: "read a sibling run's checkout",
-        script: `ls ${q(t.siblingCheckout)}`,
-        expect: "denied",
-        why: "run checkouts are 2770 <slot>:conductor-daemon, so a sibling slot cannot even list one",
-      },
-    );
-    if (t.siblingBranch !== undefined) {
-      probes.push(
-        {
-          name: "update a sibling run's ref",
-          script: `git -C ${q(t.siblingCheckout)} update-ref refs/heads/${t.siblingBranch} HEAD`,
-          expect: "denied",
-          why: "the linked worktree this replaced gave every run write access to every other run's refs",
-        },
-        {
-          name: "push a sibling run's branch",
-          script: `git -C ${q(t.siblingCheckout)} push origin ${t.siblingBranch}`,
-          expect: "denied",
-          why: "publishing a sibling's branch under this run's name",
-        },
-      );
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (t.mirror !== undefined) {
-    probes.push(
-      {
-        name: "read the shared mirror's objects",
-        script: `git -C ${q(t.mirror)} rev-parse --git-dir`,
-        expect: "allowed",
-        why: "THE DOCUMENTED RESIDUAL: a run can read another run's commits out of the shared object store. Bounded — same source, no write path, no credential — and the price of not cloning per run",
-      },
-      {
-        name: "write inside the shared mirror",
-        script: `touch ${q(join(t.mirror, ".conductor-mirror-write"))}`,
-        expect: "denied",
-        why: "the mirror is 0750 daemon:conductor-runs — readable by every slot, writable by none",
-      },
-      {
-        name: "delete a ref from the shared mirror",
-        script: `git -C ${q(t.mirror)} update-ref -d refs/heads/nonexistent-probe`,
-        expect: "denied",
-        why: "rewriting the shared object store would reach every run at once",
-      },
-    );
-  }
-
-  return probes;
-}
-
-/** What one probe found. `contained` is true when the boundary behaved. */
-export interface ProbeResult {
-  name: string;
-  contained: boolean;
-  expect: "denied" | "allowed";
-  detail: string;
-  why: string;
-}
-
-/**
- * Run every probe through `exec`, which must place the command *inside* the
- * boundary — see {@link boundaryShell}. A probe is "contained" when the answer
- * matched its `expect`, so a suite reading all-contained is the boundary
- * holding and a suite reading otherwise is a named list of what got through.
- */
-export async function runAdversarialProbes(
-  probes: readonly AdversarialProbe[],
-  exec: (script: string) => Promise<{ code: number; stdout: string; stderr: string }>,
-): Promise<ProbeResult[]> {
-  const results: ProbeResult[] = [];
-  for (const probe of probes) {
-    const out = await exec(probe.script);
-    const denied = out.code !== 0;
-    results.push({
-      name: probe.name,
-      expect: probe.expect,
-      contained: probe.expect === "denied" ? denied : !denied,
-      detail: scrubUserinfo((out.stderr.trim() || out.stdout.trim() || `exit ${String(out.code)}`).slice(0, 400)),
-      why: probe.why,
-    });
-  }
-  return results;
-}
-
-/**
- * Runs a shell command inside a session's boundary — the same launcher and the
- * same environment a real session gets. This is what makes the probe suite
- * evidence rather than a description: it exercises the composed argv, not a
- * reconstruction of it.
- */
-export function boundaryShell(
-  boundary: SessionBoundary,
-  exec: Exec = spawnCaptured,
-): (script: string) => Promise<{ code: number; stdout: string; stderr: string }> {
-  return (script) =>
-    exec([...boundary.launcher, "/bin/sh", "-c", script], { env: boundary.env });
-}
-
-/** The probes that got through, formatted for a test failure or an escalation. */
-export function escapedProbes(results: readonly ProbeResult[]): string[] {
-  return results
-    .filter((r) => !r.contained)
-    .map((r) => `${r.name}: expected ${r.expect} — ${r.detail} (${r.why})`);
-}