oauthlint-rules 0.2.2 → 0.2.3

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "oauthlint-rules",
-  "version": "0.2.2",
+  "version": "0.2.3",
   "description": "Semgrep rules catching the OAuth/OIDC/JWT anti-patterns that AI coding tools systematically produce.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",

package/rules/cookie/samesite-none-insecure.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.cookie.samesite-none-insecure
+    languages:
+      - javascript
+      - typescript
+    severity: WARNING
+    message: |
+      A cookie is being set with `SameSite=None` but WITHOUT `Secure`.
+      `SameSite=None` *requires* `Secure`: modern browsers reject a
+      `SameSite=None` cookie that is not also `Secure`, so the cookie is
+      silently dropped. Worse, if anything does accept it, the cookie is a
+      cross-site cookie travelling over plaintext — it can be sent over plain
+      HTTP and offers no CSRF protection at all.
+
+      Fix: add `secure: true`, and only use `SameSite=None` when you genuinely
+      need the cookie sent on cross-site requests; otherwise prefer
+      `SameSite=Strict` or `Lax`. See CWE-1275.
+    pattern-either:
+      # An options object that sets sameSite: 'none' (any casing) but does NOT
+      # also set secure: true. The `pattern-not` requires the ABSENCE of
+      # `secure: true`, which covers both "secure omitted entirely" and the
+      # explicit `secure: false` case — neither satisfies the negation.
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-either:
+              - pattern: "{..., sameSite: 'none', ...}"
+              - pattern: '{..., sameSite: "none", ...}'
+              - pattern: "{..., sameSite: 'None', ...}"
+              - pattern: '{..., sameSite: "None", ...}'
+          - pattern-not: '{..., secure: true, ...}'
+      # Raw Set-Cookie header string carrying SameSite=None with no Secure
+      # attribute. We match the whole quoted/backtick cookie string so the
+      # Secure check spans the *entire* string (Secure may legitimately appear
+      # before OR after SameSite=None) rather than the narrow `SameSite=None`
+      # span. The negative lookahead `(?!...secure)` is anchored at the opening
+      # quote, so it fails the match if a `secure` attribute appears anywhere
+      # inside the literal — leaving only SameSite=None strings that lack it.
+      - pattern-regex: '(?i)(["''`])(?![^"''`\n]*\bsecure\b)[^"''`\n]*\bsamesite\s*=\s*none\b[^"''`\n]*\1'
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-COOKIE-005
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/cookie-samesite-none-insecure
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-1275
+      owasp: A05:2021
+      llm-prevalence: MEDIUM
+      technology:
+        - express
+        - cookie
+      references:
+        - https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Set-Cookie/SameSite#samesitenone_requires_secure
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1275.html

package/rules/go/jwt/skip-claims-validation.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.go.jwt.skip-claims-validation
+    languages:
+      - go
+    severity: WARNING
+    message: |
+      A JWT parser is configured with `jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation()`, which
+      turns OFF the standard registered-claims validation golang-jwt performs by
+      default — the `exp` (expiry), `nbf` (not-before) and `iat` (issued-at)
+      checks. With validation disabled an expired or not-yet-valid token still
+      parses successfully, so a stolen or long-expired token is accepted as if
+      it were current (CWE-613).
+
+      Remove `jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation()` and let golang-jwt validate the
+      time-based claims. If a specific claim must be relaxed, scope it narrowly
+      (e.g. `jwt.WithLeeway(...)`) instead of disabling all claims validation.
+    # Presence-based: `jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation()` is a parser option whose
+    # only purpose is to disable claims validation, so matching the call
+    # expression anywhere it is passed (to `jwt.Parse`, `jwt.ParseWithClaims`
+    # or `jwt.NewParser`) is unambiguous and low false-positive. Normal
+    # `jwt.Parse(...)` / `jwt.ParseWithClaims(...)` calls without the option are
+    # NOT matched. `jwt` is the golang-jwt/jwt/v5 import used in the sibling
+    # rules.
+    pattern: jwt.WithoutClaimsValidation()
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-GO-JWT-005
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/go-jwt-skip-claims-validation
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-613
+      owasp: API2:2023
+      llm-prevalence: MEDIUM
+      technology:
+        - golang-jwt
+      references:
+        - https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5#ParserOption
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html

package/rules/jwt/ignore-expiration.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.jwt.ignore-expiration
+    languages:
+      - javascript
+      - typescript
+    severity: WARNING
+    message: |
+      `jwt.verify(token, key, { ignoreExpiration: true })` from `jsonwebtoken`
+      disables the `exp` (expiry) claim check, so an expired token is accepted
+      as valid forever. A stolen or long-old token then never stops working,
+      defeating the whole point of short-lived access tokens.
+
+      Remove `ignoreExpiration: true` so the `exp` claim is enforced, and set a
+      sane `expiresIn` when signing (`jwt.sign(payload, key, { expiresIn: '15m'
+      })`). See CWE-613 (Insufficient Session Expiration).
+    # Scoped to the `jsonwebtoken` library via the common alias `jwt`, mirroring
+    # decode-without-verify.yml. We only flag `verify(...)` calls that explicitly
+    # pass `ignoreExpiration: true`; `verify(...)` without that option, and
+    # `ignoreExpiration: false`, are never matched. We also support the
+    # destructured import `import { verify } from 'jsonwebtoken'`, scoped to that
+    # import so an unrelated `verify()` is safe. The options object is matched
+    # with `{ ..., ignoreExpiration: true, ... }` so the flag is caught
+    # regardless of which other options (algorithms, maxAge, audience, ...)
+    # appear alongside it.
+    pattern-either:
+      - pattern: 'jwt.verify($T, $K, { ..., ignoreExpiration: true, ... })'
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-inside: |
+              import { ..., verify, ... } from 'jsonwebtoken'
+              ...
+          - pattern: 'verify($T, $K, { ..., ignoreExpiration: true, ... })'
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-JWT-011
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/jwt-ignore-expiration
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-613
+      owasp: API2:2023
+      llm-prevalence: HIGH
+      technology:
+        - jsonwebtoken
+      references:
+        - https://github.com/auth0/node-jsonwebtoken#jwtverifytoken-secretorpublickey-options-callback
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html

package/rules/oauth/token-in-localstorage.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.oauth.token-in-localstorage
+    languages:
+      - javascript
+      - typescript
+    severity: WARNING
+    message: |
+      An OAuth/OIDC token is being written to `localStorage` /
+      `sessionStorage` under a token-named key (`access_token`,
+      `refresh_token`, `id_token`, …). Web storage is readable by any
+      script on the origin, so any XSS — including a compromised
+      third-party dependency — can exfiltrate the token via
+      `getItem(...)`. There is no browser-side mitigation, unlike
+      `HttpOnly` cookies.
+
+      Keep access/refresh/id tokens in memory only, or have the server
+      issue them in a `Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Strict` cookie.
+      `sessionStorage` is no safer than `localStorage` against XSS — it
+      grants the same attacker capability.
+
+      See CWE-922: Insecure Storage of Sensitive Information.
+    # We scope to common OAuth token KEY NAMES (case-insensitively) so this
+    # stays low-FP: `localStorage.setItem("theme", …)` and other non-token
+    # keys are NOT flagged. The key is bound to a metavariable and constrained
+    # with metavariable-regex `(?i)(access|refresh|id)[_-]?token`, which matches
+    # access_token / refresh_token / id_token and the camelCase accessToken /
+    # refreshToken / idToken. This deliberately overlaps as little as possible
+    # with auth.jwt.localstorage, which keys off the strong word `token`/`jwt`
+    # in either key or value (incl. variable keys); this rule is presence-based
+    # on a fixed set of OAuth/OIDC token key names.
+    pattern-either:
+      # setItem("access_token", v) on localStorage / sessionStorage.
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-either:
+              - pattern: localStorage.setItem("$KEY", $V)
+              - pattern: sessionStorage.setItem("$KEY", $V)
+              - pattern: window.localStorage.setItem("$KEY", $V)
+              - pattern: window.sessionStorage.setItem("$KEY", $V)
+          - metavariable-regex:
+              metavariable: $KEY
+              regex: (?i)^(access|refresh|id)[_-]?token$
+      # Property assignment: localStorage.accessToken = v
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-either:
+              - pattern: localStorage.$KEY = $V
+              - pattern: sessionStorage.$KEY = $V
+              - pattern: window.localStorage.$KEY = $V
+              - pattern: window.sessionStorage.$KEY = $V
+          - metavariable-regex:
+              metavariable: $KEY
+              regex: (?i)^(access|refresh|id)[_-]?token$
+      # Bracket assignment: localStorage["access_token"] = v
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-either:
+              - pattern: localStorage["$KEY"] = $V
+              - pattern: sessionStorage["$KEY"] = $V
+              - pattern: window.localStorage["$KEY"] = $V
+              - pattern: window.sessionStorage["$KEY"] = $V
+          - metavariable-regex:
+              metavariable: $KEY
+              regex: (?i)^(access|refresh|id)[_-]?token$
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-OAUTH-012
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/oauth-token-in-localstorage
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-922
+      owasp: A05:2021
+      llm-prevalence: HIGH
+      technology:
+        - localStorage
+        - sessionStorage
+      references:
+        - https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/HTML5_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html#local-storage
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/922.html

package/rules/py/cors/allow-all.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.py.cors.allow-all
+    languages:
+      - python
+    severity: ERROR
+    message: |
+      Flask-CORS is configured with `supports_credentials=True` together with a
+      wildcard origin (`origins="*"`, `origins=["*"]`, or — since Flask-CORS
+      defaults to `*` — no `origins` argument at all). The CORS spec forbids the
+      `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true`
+      combination, so browsers will block it; the dangerous "fix" is to leave the
+      wildcard in place while keeping credentials on, which exposes credentialed
+      cross-origin access to ANY website (CWE-942). For OAuth/OIDC this leaks
+      cookies, session tokens and CSRF protections cross-origin.
+
+      Credentialed requests must use an explicit allow-list of trusted origins,
+      e.g. `CORS(app, origins=["https://app.example.com"], supports_credentials=True)`.
+      If you genuinely need a public, wildcard endpoint, drop credentials:
+      `CORS(app, origins="*")` (the default, `supports_credentials=False`).
+    # Match presence of `supports_credentials=True` paired with a wildcard origin
+    # (`origins="*"` / `origins=["*"]`) OR no `origins` argument (Flask-CORS then
+    # defaults to `*`). The explicit-wildcard arms fire on `CORS(...)` and the
+    # `@cross_origin(...)` decorator; the default-wildcard arm uses `pattern-not`
+    # to require that NO `origins=...` is present, so an explicit allow-list such
+    # as `origins=["https://app.example.com"]` is never flagged.
+    pattern-either:
+      # Explicit wildcard origin + credentials — CORS(...) call.
+      - pattern: CORS(..., origins="*", ..., supports_credentials=True, ...)
+      - pattern: CORS(..., supports_credentials=True, ..., origins="*", ...)
+      - pattern: CORS(..., origins=["*"], ..., supports_credentials=True, ...)
+      - pattern: CORS(..., supports_credentials=True, ..., origins=["*"], ...)
+      # Explicit wildcard origin + credentials — @cross_origin(...) decorator.
+      - pattern: '@cross_origin(..., origins="*", ..., supports_credentials=True, ...)'
+      - pattern: '@cross_origin(..., supports_credentials=True, ..., origins="*", ...)'
+      - pattern: '@cross_origin(..., origins=["*"], ..., supports_credentials=True, ...)'
+      - pattern: '@cross_origin(..., supports_credentials=True, ..., origins=["*"], ...)'
+      # Credentials on, NO origins argument → Flask-CORS defaults to wildcard.
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern: CORS(..., supports_credentials=True, ...)
+          - pattern-not: CORS(..., origins=$ORIGINS, ...)
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern: '@cross_origin(..., supports_credentials=True, ...)'
+          - pattern-not: '@cross_origin(..., origins=$ORIGINS, ...)'
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-PY-CORS-001
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/py-cors-allow-all
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-942
+      owasp: A05:2021
+      llm-prevalence: MEDIUM
+      technology:
+        - flask-cors
+      references:
+        - https://flask-cors.readthedocs.io/en/latest/configuration.html
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/942.html

package/rules/py/jwt/no-expiration.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.py.jwt.no-expiration
+    languages:
+      - python
+    severity: WARNING
+    message: |
+      A JWT is decoded with `options={"verify_exp": False}`, which turns off
+      PyJWT's `exp` (expiration) check. With expiry verification disabled, an
+      expired — or stolen and long-since-revoked — token is still accepted, so
+      tokens effectively never expire.
+
+      Remove the `"verify_exp": False` option; PyJWT verifies `exp` by default,
+      e.g. `jwt.decode(token, key, algorithms=["RS256"])`. If a token legitimately
+      carries no `exp`, prefer `options={"require": ["exp"]}` to mandate one.
+    # Scoped to PyJWT's `jwt.decode(...)`. Matches the `options` dict containing
+    # `"verify_exp": False`, covering both `jwt.decode(...)` and a destructured
+    # `from jwt import decode` -> `decode(..., options=...)` call shape.
+    patterns:
+      - pattern-either:
+          - pattern: jwt.decode(..., options=$OPTS, ...)
+          - pattern: decode(..., options=$OPTS, ...)
+      - metavariable-pattern:
+          metavariable: $OPTS
+          pattern: '{..., "verify_exp": False, ...}'
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-PY-JWT-005
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/py-jwt-no-expiration
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-613
+      owasp: API2:2023
+      llm-prevalence: HIGH
+      technology:
+        - PyJWT
+      references:
+        - https://pyjwt.readthedocs.io/en/stable/api.html#jwt.decode
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html

package/rules/tls/reject-unauthorized.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+rules:
+  - id: auth.tls.reject-unauthorized
+    languages:
+      - javascript
+      - typescript
+    severity: ERROR
+    message: |
+      Disabling TLS certificate validation (`rejectUnauthorized: false` or
+      `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED=0`) makes the connection accept ANY
+      certificate, including self-signed or attacker-supplied ones. This
+      removes the protection TLS provides against man-in-the-middle attacks:
+      anyone able to intercept the network path can present a forged
+      certificate, then read and modify the traffic (credentials, tokens, data).
+
+      Keep certificate validation enabled. If the server uses a private or
+      self-signed CA, supply that CA explicitly instead of turning validation
+      off — e.g. `new https.Agent({ ca: fs.readFileSync('ca.pem') })`. See
+      CWE-295 and the Node.js TLS docs.
+    # Matches an options object literal that contains `rejectUnauthorized: false`,
+    # wherever it appears (https.request, new https.Agent, tls.connect, axios
+    # `httpsAgent`, node-fetch `agent`, etc.). `rejectUnauthorized` is a
+    # TLS-specific key, so matching the literal directly is very low FP. We also
+    # flag setting the global escape hatch `NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED` to "0".
+    # `rejectUnauthorized: true` and objects without the key are never matched.
+    pattern-either:
+      - pattern: '{..., rejectUnauthorized: false, ...}'
+      - pattern: 'process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = "0"'
+      - pattern: "process.env.NODE_TLS_REJECT_UNAUTHORIZED = '0'"
+    metadata:
+      oauthlint-rule-id: AUTH-TLS-001
+      oauthlint-doc-url: https://oauthlint.dev/rules/tls-reject-unauthorized
+      category: security
+      cwe: CWE-295
+      owasp: A05:2021
+      llm-prevalence: HIGH
+      technology:
+        - node
+        - https
+        - axios
+      references:
+        - https://nodejs.org/api/tls.html#tlsconnectoptions-callback
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/295.html