nyxora 1.6.1 → 1.6.2
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package/README.md
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# Nyxora Agent 🤖
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**Production-Grade Secure AI Execution Framework for Web3 Agents.**
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[](https://github.com/perasyudha/Nyxora)
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[](https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
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[](#️-advanced-security-threat-model)
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[](#️-advanced-security-threat-model)
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[](#️-advanced-security-threat-model)
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Nyxora (v1.6.
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Nyxora (v1.6.2) is a **secure, non-custodial runtime infrastructure for autonomous onchain agents** built with a robust Monorepo architecture (Node.js & React). Designed for autonomous workflows with a premium Glassmorphism UI dashboard and strict client-side key isolation.
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It operates under an institutional-grade **Cryptographically Bound Human-in-the-Loop** execution model, ensuring that Remote AIs (LLMs) never have unilateral access to your funds.
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## 🔥 Key Features
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### Advanced Security Architecture (v1.6.
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### Advanced Security Architecture (v1.6.2)
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* **3-Tier IPC Architecture**: Nyxora is split into isolated processes: **Core** (LLM Runtime), **Policy Engine** (Guardrails on port 3001), and **Signer Vault** (Isolated Key Manager on Unix Sockets).
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* **Cryptographically Bound Approval**: Policy changes and transactions requested by the AI are drafted as hashes (`sha256`). Approval via the UI requires a challenge nonce, preventing Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.
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* **Immutable Policy Guardrails**: Transaction limits (e.g. `max_usd_per_tx`) are strictly enforced by the Policy Engine. The LLM has zero write-access to bypass these rules.
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package/SECURITY.md
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To achieve this, Nyxora uses a **3-Tier Monorepo IPC (Inter-Process Communication)** architecture:
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1. **Core Runtime (Port 3000):** Executes the LLM logic, handles the UI dashboard, and processes chat inputs.
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2. **Policy Engine (Port 3001):** A strict middleware that evaluates all transaction requests against hard limits (e.g., `max_usd_per_tx`).
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3. **Signer Vault (Unix Socket):** A completely isolated Node.js process that holds the decrypted private keys in memory. It listens exclusively on `/tmp/nyxora-signer.sock`.
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### The Security Flow
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When the LLM
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When the LLM processes a transaction instruction (e.g., swapping tokens), the lifecycle is as follows:
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```text
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[1] User (Dashboard/Telegram) ──> Sends prompt "Please swap ETH to USDC"
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│
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[2] Core Runtime (LLM) <── Understands context & generates JSON Tool Call
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│
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[3] Policy Engine <── Receives payload, evaluates rules & limits
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│
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[4] User (Dashboard/Telegram) <── (If Auth required) Requests Approval (Challenge Nonce)
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│
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[5] Signer Vault <── Receives certified instruction from Policy
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│
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[6] Blockchain RPC <── Signer Vault signs & broadcasts to RPC
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│
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[7] User (Dashboard/Telegram) <── Success status returned to chat interface
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```
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The diagram above illustrates the lifecycle of a transaction initiated from the user interface. Due to Nyxora's layered architecture, the LLM in the Core Runtime acts solely as a planner generating transaction data structures. The actual cryptographic execution and signing are strictly locked and fully controlled by the Policy Engine and Signer Vault after you provide authorization.
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> **Performance Note:** Although the multi-layered security flow above appears complex and lengthy, the entire internal verification, IPC communication, and cryptographic signing process is highly optimized and takes only a few **milliseconds (ms)** to complete.
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---
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## 4. Reporting Vulnerabilities
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If you discover a vulnerability in the Nyxora architecture, please DO NOT open a public issue.
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Instead, email the core maintainer directly at **
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Instead, email the core maintainer directly at **ainyxor@gmail.com**.
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package/package.json
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