nx 23.1.0 → 23.1.2

package/dist/src/utils/owned-private-dir.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+declare const safeSharedRootBrand: unique symbol;
+declare const sharedRootEstablishedBrand: unique symbol;
+declare const ownedRealDirBrand: unique symbol;
+declare const ownedPrivateDirBrand: unique symbol;
+/** Verified safe to keep an owner-only directory under. Not created. */
+export type SafeSharedRoot = string & {
+    readonly [safeSharedRootBrand]: true;
+};
+/** Created if absent, then verified safe as above. */
+export type EstablishedSharedRoot = string & {
+    readonly [sharedRootEstablishedBrand]: true;
+};
+/** An existing real directory owned by us. Mode is *not* checked. */
+export type OwnedRealDir = string & {
+    readonly [ownedRealDirBrand]: true;
+};
+/**
+ * POSIX: created if absent, owned by us, and carrying no group or other bits —
+ * re-locked first if it was looser. The mode is checked on whichever branch
+ * produced it, so the brand does not depend on who created the directory.
+ *
+ * Windows: only *is a real directory*. `getuid` is unavailable there, so
+ * neither ownership nor mode is checked; `%TMP%` is already per-account.
+ */
+export type OwnedPrivateDir = string & {
+    readonly [ownedPrivateDirBrand]: true;
+};
+/** Why a guard refused a directory. Data, not a sentence: `remedyFor` decides on it. */
+export type DirRefusal = {
+    kind: 'not-created';
+    dir: string;
+    code?: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'not-inspectable';
+    dir: string;
+    code?: string;
+} | {
+    kind: 'not-a-directory';
+    dir: string;
+    symlink?: true;
+} | {
+    kind: 'foreign-owner';
+    dir: string;
+    uid: number;
+} | {
+    kind: 'foreign-shared-container';
+    dir: string;
+    uid: number;
+} | {
+    kind: 'not-tightenable';
+    dir: string;
+    mode: number;
+} | {
+    kind: 'peer-writable-not-sticky';
+    dir: string;
+    mode: number;
+};
+/** A guard's verdict. */
+export type GuardResult<T> = {
+    status: 'ok';
+    path: T;
+} | {
+    status: 'refused';
+    refusal: DirRefusal;
+};
+/** The user-facing sentence for a refusal. The only place wording is decided. */
+export declare function describeRefusal(r: DirRefusal): string;
+/** What the user can do about a refusal, or `undefined` when there is nothing. */
+export declare function remedyFor(r: DirRefusal): string | undefined;
+/** One refusal as an `Error`, so several can travel in an `AggregateError`. */
+export declare class DirectoryRefusedError extends Error {
+    readonly refusal: DirRefusal;
+    constructor(refusal: DirRefusal);
+}
+/**
+ * Whether a shared container is safe to keep an owner-only directory under.
+ *
+ * On POSIX, a container writable by other users must be sticky, and it must be
+ * owned by either root or the current user. Windows short-circuits after the
+ * directory test — the OS temp root is already scoped to one account, so there
+ * is no shared level whose ownership could matter.
+ *
+ * Sticky directories still let the directory's own owner rename entries, so a
+ * container owned by another unprivileged user could replace a previously
+ * verified private directory beneath it.
+ */
+export declare function isSafeSharedRoot(dir: string): GuardResult<SafeSharedRoot>;
+/**
+ * Whether other users on this machine can write into `dir`. Gates whether a
+ * refusal message may cite other users, so it must not over-report: `false` on
+ * Windows, where libuv synthesizes `st_mode` from the READONLY attribute and
+ * reports an ordinary per-account directory as `0666`, and `false` on a path
+ * that cannot be inspected.
+ *
+ * `statSync`, not `lstatSync`: the question is about the directory that will be
+ * used, not the link pointing at it. Link modes mislead in both directions —
+ * Linux creates symlinks `0777`, macOS applies the umask. Nothing here decides
+ * whether a path is accepted, so following the link costs nothing the guards
+ * do not already re-check.
+ */
+export declare function isPeerWritable(dir: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Create a shared container as sticky + world-writable if it does not exist,
+ * and report whether the resulting path is safe for the current user.
+ *
+ * **A container that already exists is never modified — only judged.** Do not
+ * chmod before deciding trust: `CAP_FOWNER` (root's default in Docker and most
+ * CI images) can chmod a directory it does not own, so a peer-owned root would
+ * be widened to `1777` and then refused, and an operator who deliberately
+ * tightened this root would have it re-widened on every `nx` process.
+ */
+export declare function ensureSafeSharedRoot(dir: string): GuardResult<EstablishedSharedRoot>;
+/**
+ * Whether `dir` is an existing real directory owned by us. Unlike
+ * `ensureOwnedPrivateDir` it creates nothing and repairs nothing — for callers
+ * that only want to know whether a path is safe to act on, such as deleting.
+ */
+export declare function isOwnedRealDirectory(dir: string): OwnedRealDir | null;
+/** The path segment separating one user's Nx runtime state from another's. */
+export declare function getUserSegment(): string;
+/**
+ * Ensure `dir` exists, is a real directory owned by us, and carries no group or
+ * other bits at all — read and search alone reach a socket inside it, so 0755 is
+ * re-locked rather than accepted. A `refused` status carries which check said
+ * no — usually `foreign-owner` for a directory another user planted, but also
+ * `not-created`/`not-inspectable` for a filesystem error, `not-a-directory`, or
+ * `not-tightenable` when the re-lock did not land.
+ *
+ * Node builtins only: reached from the native binding loader.
+ */
+export declare function ensureOwnedPrivateDir(dir: string): GuardResult<OwnedPrivateDir>;
+export {};

package/dist/src/utils/owned-private-dir.js

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.DirectoryRefusedError = void 0;
+exports.describeRefusal = describeRefusal;
+exports.remedyFor = remedyFor;
+exports.isSafeSharedRoot = isSafeSharedRoot;
+exports.isPeerWritable = isPeerWritable;
+exports.ensureSafeSharedRoot = ensureSafeSharedRoot;
+exports.isOwnedRealDirectory = isOwnedRealDirectory;
+exports.getUserSegment = getUserSegment;
+exports.ensureOwnedPrivateDir = ensureOwnedPrivateDir;
+const node_fs_1 = require("node:fs");
+const node_os_1 = require("node:os");
+// A string discriminant, not a boolean `ok`: this repo compiles with
+// `strict: false`, where TypeScript does not narrow a union on a boolean literal.
+const allow = (path) => ({ status: 'ok', path });
+const deny = (refusal) => ({
+    status: 'refused',
+    refusal,
+});
+const notADirectory = (dir, stats) => stats.isSymbolicLink()
+    ? { kind: 'not-a-directory', dir, symlink: true }
+    : { kind: 'not-a-directory', dir };
+// Four octal digits, so a sticky container reads `1777` and a plain directory
+// `0755` — the notation `chmod` and `ls` use. Prefixing a literal `0` instead
+// renders sticky modes as `01777`, which is not a form anyone writes.
+const asMode = (mode) => (mode & 0o7777).toString(8).padStart(4, '0');
+/** The user-facing sentence for a refusal. The only place wording is decided. */
+function describeRefusal(r) {
+    switch (r.kind) {
+        case 'not-created':
+            return `${r.dir} could not be created${r.code ? ` (${r.code})` : ''}`;
+        case 'not-inspectable':
+            return `${r.dir} could not be inspected${r.code ? ` (${r.code})` : ''}`;
+        case 'not-a-directory':
+            return r.symlink
+                ? `${r.dir} is a symlink, not a real directory — something replaced the path Nx expected to create`
+                : `${r.dir} exists and is not a directory`;
+        case 'foreign-owner':
+            return `${r.dir} is owned by uid ${r.uid}, not by you`;
+        case 'foreign-shared-container':
+            return `${r.dir} belongs to another user (uid ${r.uid}) rather than to you or to root`;
+        case 'not-tightenable':
+            return `${r.dir} is reachable by other users (mode ${asMode(r.mode)}) and could not be tightened to 0700`;
+        case 'peer-writable-not-sticky':
+            return `${r.dir} is writable by other users but not sticky (mode ${asMode(r.mode)}), so a peer could replace directories inside it`;
+        default: {
+            // This repo sets `strict: false` and leaves `noImplicitReturns` unset, so
+            // a new DirRefusal member would otherwise compile here and render as
+            // `undefined` inside the aggregate message. Assignability to `never` still
+            // holds under these settings, so this is a real compile-time guard.
+            const unhandled = r;
+            throw new Error(`Unhandled directory refusal: ${unhandled.kind}`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** Single-quoted for a shell, so a path with a space or quote survives a paste. */
+const shellQuote = (s) => `'${s.replace(/'/g, `'\\''`)}'`;
+/** What the user can do about a refusal, or `undefined` when there is nothing. */
+function remedyFor(r) {
+    switch (r.kind) {
+        case 'not-a-directory':
+            return r.symlink
+                ? `${r.dir} is a symlink where Nx expects a directory. If you did not create it, treat it as hostile: remove the link itself (not what it points at) and run the command again.`
+                : undefined;
+        case 'foreign-owner':
+            return `${r.dir} belongs to another user on this machine, so Nx cannot keep its own directory there. Set NX_SOCKET_DIR to a short directory your user owns, or move it aside — which you can do yourself if you own the directory it sits in, and otherwise needs an administrator.`;
+        case 'not-tightenable':
+            // Both producers reach here having already established that the directory
+            // is ours, so `chmod` is the user's to run. Names no cause: one producer
+            // is a mount that discards the mode, the other is any `chmod` failure.
+            return `${r.dir} is reachable by other users (mode ${asMode(r.mode)}) and Nx could not restrict it. Run \`chmod 0700 ${shellQuote(r.dir)}\` and try again; if the mode does not stick, set NX_SOCKET_DIR to a short directory on a filesystem that keeps POSIX permissions.`;
+        case 'foreign-shared-container':
+            // Unreachable today: `isSafeSharedRoot` denies with this kind only when
+            // `stats.uid !== 0`, so a root-owned container never reaches here.
+            if (r.uid === 0) {
+                return undefined;
+            }
+            const q = shellQuote(r.dir);
+            return `${r.dir} belongs to another user on this machine, so Nx cannot keep a private directory beneath it. Ask an administrator to hand it to root with \`sudo chown root ${q} && sudo chmod 1777 ${q}\`; every user can then keep their own directory under it.`;
+        case 'not-created':
+        case 'not-inspectable':
+        case 'peer-writable-not-sticky':
+            return undefined;
+        default: {
+            // Matches `describeRefusal`'s arm, so a new kind cannot ship with a
+            // sentence and no advice — which is how `not-tightenable` went unadvised.
+            const unhandled = r;
+            return undefined;
+        }
+    }
+}
+/** One refusal as an `Error`, so several can travel in an `AggregateError`. */
+class DirectoryRefusedError extends Error {
+    constructor(refusal) {
+        super(describeRefusal(refusal));
+        this.refusal = refusal;
+        this.name = 'DirectoryRefusedError';
+    }
+}
+exports.DirectoryRefusedError = DirectoryRefusedError;
+/**
+ * chmod a path only if it is a real directory, never following a symlink at its
+ * final component — `chmodSync` follows them, retargeting the mode change. The
+ * directory check is on the descriptor, not the errno: a deny-list fails *open*
+ * on codes it does not know. `O_NONBLOCK` stops a planted FIFO blocking `openSync`.
+ */
+function chmodRealDirectory(path, mode) {
+    let fd;
+    try {
+        fd = (0, node_fs_1.openSync)(path, node_fs_1.constants.O_RDONLY | node_fs_1.constants.O_NOFOLLOW | node_fs_1.constants.O_NONBLOCK);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    try {
+        if (!(0, node_fs_1.fstatSync)(fd).isDirectory()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        (0, node_fs_1.fchmodSync)(fd, mode);
+        return true;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    finally {
+        (0, node_fs_1.closeSync)(fd);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Sticky. Restricts rename and unlink in a writable directory to the owner of
+ * each entry — plus the directory's own owner, which is why the ownership check
+ * below is not redundant with this one.
+ */
+const S_ISVTX = 0o1000;
+/**
+ * Whether a shared container is safe to keep an owner-only directory under.
+ *
+ * On POSIX, a container writable by other users must be sticky, and it must be
+ * owned by either root or the current user. Windows short-circuits after the
+ * directory test — the OS temp root is already scoped to one account, so there
+ * is no shared level whose ownership could matter.
+ *
+ * Sticky directories still let the directory's own owner rename entries, so a
+ * container owned by another unprivileged user could replace a previously
+ * verified private directory beneath it.
+ */
+function isSafeSharedRoot(dir) {
+    try {
+        const stats = (0, node_fs_1.lstatSync)(dir);
+        if (!stats.isDirectory()) {
+            return deny(notADirectory(dir, stats));
+        }
+        if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+            // The OS temp root is already scoped to the current Windows user.
+            return allow(dir);
+        }
+        if (typeof process.getuid === 'function' &&
+            stats.uid !== process.getuid() &&
+            stats.uid !== 0) {
+            return deny({ kind: 'foreign-shared-container', dir, uid: stats.uid });
+        }
+        return !(stats.mode & 0o022) || !!(stats.mode & S_ISVTX)
+            ? allow(dir)
+            : deny({ kind: 'peer-writable-not-sticky', dir, mode: stats.mode });
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return deny({ kind: 'not-inspectable', dir, code: e?.code });
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Whether other users on this machine can write into `dir`. Gates whether a
+ * refusal message may cite other users, so it must not over-report: `false` on
+ * Windows, where libuv synthesizes `st_mode` from the READONLY attribute and
+ * reports an ordinary per-account directory as `0666`, and `false` on a path
+ * that cannot be inspected.
+ *
+ * `statSync`, not `lstatSync`: the question is about the directory that will be
+ * used, not the link pointing at it. Link modes mislead in both directions —
+ * Linux creates symlinks `0777`, macOS applies the umask. Nothing here decides
+ * whether a path is accepted, so following the link costs nothing the guards
+ * do not already re-check.
+ */
+function isPeerWritable(dir) {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+        return false;
+    }
+    try {
+        return !!((0, node_fs_1.statSync)(dir).mode & 0o022);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Create a shared container as sticky + world-writable if it does not exist,
+ * and report whether the resulting path is safe for the current user.
+ *
+ * **A container that already exists is never modified — only judged.** Do not
+ * chmod before deciding trust: `CAP_FOWNER` (root's default in Docker and most
+ * CI images) can chmod a directory it does not own, so a peer-owned root would
+ * be widened to `1777` and then refused, and an operator who deliberately
+ * tightened this root would have it re-widened on every `nx` process.
+ */
+function ensureSafeSharedRoot(dir) {
+    if (process.platform === 'win32') {
+        try {
+            (0, node_fs_1.mkdirSync)(dir, { recursive: true });
+            return allow(dir);
+        }
+        catch (e) {
+            return deny({ kind: 'not-created', dir, code: e?.code });
+        }
+    }
+    try {
+        (0, node_fs_1.mkdirSync)(dir, { mode: 0o1777 });
+        // Ours, created a statement ago. Load-bearing on macOS: XNU strips S_ISVTX
+        // at mkdir, so the sticky bit exists solely because of this call.
+        chmodRealDirectory(dir, 0o1777);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        if (e?.code !== 'EEXIST') {
+            return deny({ kind: 'not-created', dir, code: e?.code });
+        }
+    }
+    // One verdict for both branches: the chmod above can fail and leave a
+    // peer-writable non-sticky container, which trusting the creation would brand
+    // safe.
+    const verdict = isSafeSharedRoot(dir);
+    return verdict.status === 'ok'
+        ? allow(dir)
+        : deny(verdict.refusal);
+}
+/**
+ * Whether `dir` is an existing real directory owned by us. Unlike
+ * `ensureOwnedPrivateDir` it creates nothing and repairs nothing — for callers
+ * that only want to know whether a path is safe to act on, such as deleting.
+ */
+function isOwnedRealDirectory(dir) {
+    try {
+        const stats = (0, node_fs_1.lstatSync)(dir);
+        if (!stats.isDirectory()) {
+            return null;
+        }
+        return typeof process.getuid !== 'function' ||
+            stats.uid === process.getuid()
+            ? dir
+            : null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/** The path segment separating one user's Nx runtime state from another's. */
+function getUserSegment() {
+    try {
+        if (typeof process.getuid === 'function') {
+            return String(process.getuid());
+        }
+    }
+    catch { }
+    try {
+        const { username } = (0, node_os_1.userInfo)();
+        if (username) {
+            return username;
+        }
+    }
+    catch { }
+    return 'unknown';
+}
+/**
+ * Ensure `dir` exists, is a real directory owned by us, and carries no group or
+ * other bits at all — read and search alone reach a socket inside it, so 0755 is
+ * re-locked rather than accepted. A `refused` status carries which check said
+ * no — usually `foreign-owner` for a directory another user planted, but also
+ * `not-created`/`not-inspectable` for a filesystem error, `not-a-directory`, or
+ * `not-tightenable` when the re-lock did not land.
+ *
+ * Node builtins only: reached from the native binding loader.
+ */
+function ensureOwnedPrivateDir(dir) {
+    try {
+        (0, node_fs_1.mkdirSync)(dir, { mode: 0o700 });
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        if (e?.code !== 'EEXIST') {
+            return deny({ kind: 'not-created', dir, code: e?.code });
+        }
+    }
+    // One verdict for both branches, as in `ensureSafeSharedRoot`: mounts that
+    // ignore the mode argument can land a directory Nx asked for at 0700 on 0777,
+    // so the creation path is judged like any other.
+    try {
+        const stats = (0, node_fs_1.lstatSync)(dir);
+        // Before the Windows short-circuit: "is a real directory" holds on every
+        // platform.
+        if (!stats.isDirectory()) {
+            return deny(notADirectory(dir, stats));
+        }
+        if (typeof process.getuid !== 'function') {
+            // Windows: the roots there are per-user OS temp dirs, not a shared /tmp.
+            return allow(dir);
+        }
+        if (stats.uid !== process.getuid()) {
+            return deny({ kind: 'foreign-owner', dir, uid: stats.uid });
+        }
+        if (stats.mode & 0o077) {
+            if (!chmodRealDirectory(dir, 0o700)) {
+                return deny({ kind: 'not-tightenable', dir, mode: stats.mode });
+            }
+            // Read the mode back rather than trusting the chmod's return: mounts that
+            // ignore modes report success and change nothing.
+            const after = (0, node_fs_1.lstatSync)(dir);
+            if (after.mode & 0o077) {
+                return deny({ kind: 'not-tightenable', dir, mode: after.mode });
+            }
+        }
+        return allow(dir);
+    }
+    catch (e) {
+        return deny({ kind: 'not-inspectable', dir, code: e?.code });
+    }
+}

package/dist/src/utils/package-json.js

@@ -225,19 +225,23 @@ function preparePackageInstallation(pkg, requiredVersion, packageManager) {
     // it into the temp dir, so the `-w` here resolves to the temp dir.
     const pmCommands = (0, package_manager_1.getPackageManagerCommand)(packageManager);
     const preInstallCommand = pmCommands.preInstall;
-    // Omit peer dependencies from the temp install. `ensurePackage` puts the
+    // Keep peer dependencies out of the temp install. `ensurePackage` puts the
     // workspace's `node_modules` on `NODE_PATH`, so a loaded package resolves its
     // peers from the workspace instead of pulling its own (possibly incompatible)
     // copies into the temp dir.
-    const omitPeerDependenciesFlag = packageManager === 'npm' || packageManager === 'bun'
-        ? '--omit=peer'
-        : packageManager === 'pnpm'
-            ? '--config.auto-install-peers=false'
-            : '';
+    //
+    // npm needs `--legacy-peer-deps` rather than `--omit=peer`: npm marks a package
+    // as a peer if anything in the tree peer-depends on it, so `--omit=peer` also
+    // prunes packages that are real dependencies. Bun's `--omit=peer` does not.
+    const skipPeerDependenciesFlags = {
+        npm: '--legacy-peer-deps',
+        bun: '--omit=peer',
+        pnpm: '--config.auto-install-peers=false',
+    };
     const installCommand = [
         pmCommands.addDev,
         `${pkg}@${requiredVersion}`,
-        omitPeerDependenciesFlag,
+        skipPeerDependenciesFlags[packageManager],
         pmCommands.ignoreScriptsFlag,
     ]
         .filter(Boolean)

package/dist/src/utils/package-manager-config/bunfig.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+/**
+ * The directory holding bun's global config files (.bunfig.toml and, for bun's
+ * npmrc support, .npmrc): $XDG_CONFIG_HOME when set, else the home dir (bun's
+ * getHomeConfigPath). Null when neither is set, where bun reads no global
+ * config.
+ */
+export declare function getBunGlobalConfigBase(env: NodeJS.ProcessEnv): string | null;
+/**
+ * Parses a bunfig.toml: null when absent, 'unreadable' when it cannot be read
+ * (bun skips it and resolves on, so most callers collapse the two), 'invalid'
+ * when bun's own TOML parser would reject it (bun hard-errors there, so no
+ * resolution is left for a caller to reproduce).
+ */
+export declare function readBunfigRaw(path: string): Record<string, unknown> | 'unreadable' | 'invalid' | null;

package/dist/src/utils/package-manager-config/bunfig.js

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.getBunGlobalConfigBase = getBunGlobalConfigBase;
+exports.readBunfigRaw = readBunfigRaw;
+const fs_1 = require("fs");
+/**
+ * The directory holding bun's global config files (.bunfig.toml and, for bun's
+ * npmrc support, .npmrc): $XDG_CONFIG_HOME when set, else the home dir (bun's
+ * getHomeConfigPath). Null when neither is set, where bun reads no global
+ * config.
+ */
+function getBunGlobalConfigBase(env) {
+    // bun's getenvZ treats a set-but-empty var as present, so an exported empty
+    // XDG_CONFIG_HOME still short-circuits HOME (bun: `XDG_CONFIG_HOME orelse HOME`).
+    if (env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME !== undefined) {
+        return env.XDG_CONFIG_HOME;
+    }
+    // Mirrors bun's platform-specific HOME accessor (env_var.zig).
+    const home = process.platform === 'win32' ? env.USERPROFILE : env.HOME;
+    return home ?? null;
+}
+/**
+ * Parses a bunfig.toml: null when absent, 'unreadable' when it cannot be read
+ * (bun skips it and resolves on, so most callers collapse the two), 'invalid'
+ * when bun's own TOML parser would reject it (bun hard-errors there, so no
+ * resolution is left for a caller to reproduce).
+ */
+function readBunfigRaw(path) {
+    // Outside the try because a parser that will not load is a broken
+    // installation, not a corrupt bunfig.
+    const { parse } = require('smol-toml');
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = (0, fs_1.readFileSync)(path, 'utf-8');
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        // ENOTDIR (a path through a non-directory) is another shape of absent, the
+        // same way the .npmrc reader classifies it.
+        return error?.code === 'ENOENT' || error?.code === 'ENOTDIR'
+            ? null
+            : 'unreadable';
+    }
+    try {
+        return parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return 'invalid';
+    }
+}

package/dist/src/utils/package-manager-config/npmrc.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+export interface NpmrcEntry {
+    key: string;
+    value: string;
+    /** True when the source used ini's `key[]` array-append syntax. */
+    array?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Parses an .npmrc file into its `key = value` entries the way npm/yarn/pnpm do
+ * (via the `ini` package). Returns null when the file is missing, and
+ * 'unreadable' when it exists but cannot be read (permissions, a directory):
+ * package managers diverge on that state, so each caller decides whether to
+ * skip, warn, or abort rather than having it collapsed into "absent" here.
+ */
+export declare function readNpmrcEntries(path: string): NpmrcEntry[] | 'unreadable' | null;
+export declare function parseNpmrcContent(raw: string): NpmrcEntry[];
+/**
+ * Reads an .npmrc-format file into a map with ini's semantics for repeated
+ * keys: scalars last-write-wins, `key[]` values joined. Null and 'unreadable'
+ * pass through from {@link readNpmrcEntries}.
+ */
+export declare function readNpmrcMap(path: string): Map<string, string> | 'unreadable' | null;
+/** Those entries under ini's semantics for repeated keys. */
+export declare function npmrcEntriesToMap(entries: NpmrcEntry[]): Map<string, string>;