nsauditor-ai 0.2.55 → 0.2.56

package/README.md

@@ -7,31 +7,35 @@ A modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform that scans, understands,
 [![npm](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/nsauditor-ai.svg)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/nsauditor-ai)
 [![MIT License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg)](LICENSE)
 [![Node.js 20+](https://img.shields.io/badge/node-20%2B-green.svg)](https://nodejs.org)
-[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-1582%20passing-brightgreen.svg)](#tests)
+[![Tests](https://img.shields.io/badge/tests-passing-brightgreen.svg)](#tests)
 
 ---
 
 NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence platform built by [Nsasoft US LLC](https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/). It orchestrates 27 specialized scanning plugins against target hosts, fuses their results through an intelligent concluder, and optionally produces AI-powered vulnerability reports — all running entirely on your machine.
 
-**Zero Data Exfiltration by design — and stated precisely.** We never see your scan data: no customer data is collected, transmitted, or stored by Nsasoft US LLC, and the product has no telemetry or phone-home endpoint. Scanning, analysis, license verification and report generation all run on your machine. Two clarifications that matter operationally: AI enrichment is **opt-in** and uses your own API keys (point it at a local Ollama and nothing leaves the host), while **CVE correlation queries NIST's public NVD API by default** — set `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` with a local NVD store to make it fully local, which reports an explicit coverage gap instead of a silent clean.
+**Zero Data Exfiltration by design — and stated precisely.** We never see your scan data: no customer data is collected, transmitted, or stored by Nsasoft US LLC, and the product has no telemetry or phone-home endpoint. Scanning, analysis, license verification and report generation all run on your machine. Two clarifications that matter operationally: AI enrichment is **opt-in** and uses your own API keys (point it at a local Ollama and nothing leaves the host), while **CVE correlation queries NIST's public NVD API by default** — set `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` with a local NVD store to make it fully local, which reports an explicit coverage gap in the scan instead of a silent clean (in Enterprise 1.2.0 that gap reaches no compliance control, so a control only the missing CVE rows would fail can read PASS).
 
 ## What's New
 
-**Latest: CE 0.2.55 + Enterprise 1.1.0 — *what changed since the last scan*.**
-`nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --since <runId|prior>` (Pro/Enterprise) compares two scan runs:
-what is new, what is resolved, what changed severity — and, above all, **what could NOT be compared
-and why**. "Resolved" is the dangerous verdict: a finding that disappeared because the host was not
-scanned, the plugin did not run, the scanner lost permission, or the framework enumeration moved is
-reported as NOT COMPARABLE **with its reason**, never as remediation. Run records are sealed with a
-SHA-256 chain, so an altered baseline REFUSES the comparison instead of producing verdicts from it —
-tamper-EVIDENT against corruption, partial restore and unsophisticated edits, **not tamper-proof
-against host-level access and not non-repudiation**, and the report says so in the body. The delta
-renders into the client-facing HTML report, not only to stdout. Plugin counts UNCHANGED at 27
-Community + 29 Enterprise; every coverage matrix UNCHANGED; **the Enterprise peer floor MOVES to
-`>= 0.2.55`, because Enterprise now CALLS this release's code** — the per-plugin run statuses this
-version publishes on the scan context, which EE plugin 1023 requires before it will assert a Zero
-Trust posture and the CPE mapper uses to tell an empty service set from one whose discovery never
-ran. The free last-vs-current webhook alerting delta is untouched and stays free.
+**Latest: CE 0.2.56 + Enterprise 1.2.0 — *the delta refuses five more ways a finding could read as fixed without being fixed*.**
+The Pro/Enterprise `report --since` delta (introduced in CE 0.2.55) now refuses five more ways a
+finding could read as fixed without being fixed: a UDP service that did not answer in the
+other run (`port-not-measured`, listed as `<port>/udp`), a CVE row whose lookup failed there, a
+finding of an analysis agent that did not run, and — new in this release — **an Enterprise package
+that failed to load**, which used to leave its plugins running while the scan skipped its intelligence,
+analysis-agent and compliance stages without a word. It is now
+named on stderr and recorded on the scan's conclusion, and the delta refuses that host's agent and
+CVE-mapper rows as `evidence-gap`. And a CVE row that vanished while the same program and version
+still answer is `vulnerability-data-changed` — the vulnerability data moved, not the estate.
+**Not refused in this release:** when the two scans ran different `--plugins`, a row that an analysis agent or
+the CVE mapper derived from the output of a plugin one scan did not request can read resolved (and in Enterprise,
+with SLA tracking on, MTTR counts it closed and the control it failed can read PASS) or new — keep `--plugins`
+identical between compared scans. Every
+reason's detail names its run absolutely ("this run", "the baseline run"), and two scans of one host
+whose plugin runs finished in the same second get distinct directories. Plugin counts UNCHANGED at 27 Community + 29 Enterprise; every coverage matrix UNCHANGED; **Enterprise 1.2.0
+requires this release** (`nsauditor-ai >= 0.2.56`). The free last-vs-current webhook alerting delta
+is untouched and stays free; in this release it does not fire on a service, version or finding change (see
+Continuous Monitoring below).
 
 For the full per-release history — every prior cycle, in detail — see [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md). This README keeps only the current release headline.
 
@@ -45,8 +49,8 @@ Scan → Analyze → Prioritize → Track → Act
 - **Smart result fusion** — the Result Concluder merges all plugin outputs into a normalized view with OS detection, service fingerprinting, and evidence linking
 - **Structured finding format** — all findings use a common schema with category, severity, evidence, and remediation — enabling consistent SARIF export and MCP integration
 - **AI-powered analysis** — send redacted scan results to OpenAI or Claude (your keys, your choice) for vulnerability assessments and remediation guidance
-- **Risk-scored prioritization (Pro/Enterprise)** — findings carry a composite risk score (CVSS weighted by verification status, with an uplift for initial-access techniques) and a status field, and an operator suppression workflow (accepted-risk / false-positive with expiry) keeps triaged findings out of the report until they expire
-- **Continuous monitoring (CTEM)** — watch mode rescans on a schedule, diffs against previous results, and fires webhook alerts on changes
+- **Risk-scored prioritization (Pro/Enterprise)** — findings carry a composite risk score (CVSS weighted by verification status, with an uplift for initial-access techniques) and a status field. Enterprise adds an operator suppression workflow for compliance findings (accepted-risk / false-positive with expiry): the compliance report shows a suppressed finding as suppressed, naming its approver and rationale, and an expired suppression no longer applies
+- **Continuous monitoring (CTEM)** — watch mode rescans on a schedule and compares each host's scan with its previous one; in this release its webhook alert does not fire on a service, version or finding change
 - **MCP integration** — expose scanning tools to AI assistants like Claude Code via Model Context Protocol
 - **CI/CD ready** — SARIF output with `--fail-on` severity gating for pipeline integration
 
@@ -184,10 +188,11 @@ Expose scanning capabilities to AI assistants via [Model Context Protocol](https
 
 ```bash
 nsauditor-ai-mcp
-# or
-npx nsauditor-ai-mcp
 ```
 
+Run the installed bin, never `npx nsauditor-ai-mcp`: `nsauditor-ai-mcp` is a bin inside the `nsauditor-ai` package, and when npx does not find that bin it looks the name up on the npm registry instead — which never starts this server. For Claude Desktop, paste the block
+`nsauditor-ai mcp install-key` prints (Claude Desktop Setup, below).
+
 The server registers **seven** tools and lists all seven to every client. The licence is
 checked when a tool is CALLED, not when the list is served — so an unlicensed call returns
 an explicit 🔒 refusal naming the tier it needs, never an empty result that reads as "nothing
@@ -197,7 +202,7 @@ found". A higher tier does not add tools; it unlocks the ones already in the lis
 
 | Tool | Purpose |
 |---|---|
-| `scan_host` | Run a full plugin scan against a host — service detection, OS fingerprint, structured findings |
+| `scan_host` | Run a full plugin scan against a host — service detection, OS fingerprint and the flags the service checks leave on each service record (weak SSH algorithms, SNMP community, weak TLS protocols / ciphers and a self-signed certificate, the MCP server checks; anonymous FTP login and zone transfer only when `FTP_CHECK_ANON` / `DNS_CHECK_AXFR` are set — both off by default). It does NOT look up CVEs, run the analysis agents, or return the HTTP probe's dangerous methods (006), SMB null sessions (014), the TLS-certificate / debug-endpoint / DNS-security auditors' findings (040 / 050 / 060) or Enterprise's zero-trust assessment (1023), so zero findings is not a clean verdict (use `get_vulnerabilities` per service CPE and `probe_service` for those plugins — both Pro — or the CLI scan with the Enterprise package and a Pro or Enterprise licence) |
 | `list_plugins` | List available scanner plugins with their IDs, priorities and requirements |
 | `compliance_matrix` | Return the shipped coverage matrix for a framework — Covered / Partial / Out of scope, with the per-group out-of-scope reasons. **Needs the Enterprise pack installed**: the matrices are its data, so on a Community-only install this fails closed with an install instruction rather than returning an empty matrix (an empty matrix is what gets filled in with a guess) |
 
@@ -216,20 +221,19 @@ found". A higher tier does not add tools; it unlocks the ones already in the lis
 | `get_findings` | Drill into the findings of the most recent `scan_cloud` run (per-provider session cache — not live state) |
 
 > `scan_cloud` runs the requested clouds' plugins **concurrently** (default up to 20 at once, 25s per-plugin
-> timeout) so a full multi-service cloud audit completes within Claude Desktop's ~60s tool-call limit. Tune with
+> timeout; a plugin that runs out is listed as `timeout` in the result's `manifest`, i.e. not measured). Tune with
 > `CLOUD_SCAN_CONCURRENCY` (default 20) and `CLOUD_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` (default 25000) in the server env. The
 > network `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` governs `scan_host` and `probe_service`, and binds every plugin there — including
 > one that declares a longer budget of its own. Read the result's **`findingsSummary`**
 > (per-provider severity counts + a CRITICAL/HIGH list) for the findings; `audited:false` / `notes` / `pluginsRan:0`
 > still mean a cloud was NOT audited (never a clean pass). Pass `providers:["aws"]` to audit only the cloud named.
 
-> **Full all-region AWS coverage fits Desktop's limit automatically.** When you ask for "all regions" / "full
-> coverage", the agent scans the enabled regions in small **region-group batches** (each within the ~60s window)
-> rather than one long `regions:["all"]` call — so it completes without timing out, and you do **not** raise any
-> timeout for it. Keep `CLOUD_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` **under** Desktop's ~60s tool-call cap (default `25000`; raise to
-> ~`45000` only for very large accounts — a higher per-plugin cap can let one plugin run past Desktop's wall and
-> cause a hard timeout). For unbounded multi-region scans use the **CLI** (`nsauditor-ai scan … --aws-region all`),
-> which has no MCP tool-call cap — there you can raise `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` (e.g. `90000`) freely. On the CLI a
+> **All-region AWS coverage.** The server does not split a `regions:["all"]` call into batches; the agent skill
+> (`nsauditor-ai-agent-skill`) teaches the assistant to cover the enabled regions in batches of 3–5 region codes per
+> call. `CLOUD_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` (default `25000`) bounds each plugin, not the call: raising it can give a slow
+> plugin more time and lengthen the call. A call that times out in the client returned no result — never read it as
+> a clean account. For unbounded multi-region scans use the **CLI** (`nsauditor-ai scan … --aws-region all`), which
+> has no MCP client in the path — there you can raise `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` (e.g. `90000`) freely. On the CLI a
 > plugin that declares its own budget already gets it; `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_CEILING_MS` caps those.
 
 Security: SSRF protection on all host inputs (blocks RFC 1918, loopback, fc00::/7, cloud metadata), port validation (1–65535), CPE format enforcement, dependency injection for test isolation. **Server-startup authentication is required** — see next section.
@@ -292,13 +296,16 @@ npm install -g nsauditor-ai
 nsauditor-ai mcp install-key   # required before MCP server will start
 ```
 
-Then add this to your `claude_desktop_config.json` (Settings → Developer → Edit Config):
+Then paste the `mcpServers` block that `install-key` prints into your `claude_desktop_config.json` (Settings →
+Developer → Edit Config). It names node and the server script by absolute path, because Claude Desktop may not see
+the directory your shell finds `nsauditor-ai-mcp` in. Add any other variables to its `env` block, for example:
 
 ```json
 {
   "mcpServers": {
     "nsauditor-ai": {
-      "command": "nsauditor-ai-mcp",
+      "command": "<from: nsauditor-ai mcp install-key — the absolute path to node>",
+      "args": ["<from: nsauditor-ai mcp install-key — the absolute path to bin/nsauditor-ai-mcp.mjs>"],
       "env": {
         "NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY": "keychain:NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY",
         "NSA_ENV_FILE": "~/envs/prod-aws.env",
@@ -313,11 +320,14 @@ Then add this to your `claude_desktop_config.json` (Settings → Developer → E
 The exact `NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY` value to paste is printed by `nsauditor-ai mcp install-key` — on macOS it's the `keychain:NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY` placeholder shown above; on Linux/Windows it's the literal key value (and you should `chmod 600` your config file).
 
 - `NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY` — **required** (see Authentication section above)
-- `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS=1` — required to scan private/RFC 1918 addresses (e.g., `192.168.x.x`)
-- `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS=5000` — the per-plugin budget for `scan_host` and `probe_service` (default 30000), and it binds every plugin there, including one that declares a longer budget of its own. It bounds each PLUGIN, not the call: `scan_host` runs a host's plugins one after another, so the call takes roughly the sum of their times, and fits inside Claude Desktop's ~60 s tool-call limit only when most of them finish quickly. On a real home gateway the plugins of one full scan took ~113 s between them at the default budget.
+- `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS=1` — required to scan private/RFC 1918 addresses (e.g., `192.168.x.x`). It turns off the MCP
+  server's check of what a host name resolves to, so a name that resolves to a loopback or cloud-metadata address then gets
+  through too; targets written as `localhost`, `127.x`, `::1`, `169.254.x` or `metadata.google…` stay refused
+- `FTP_CHECK_ANON=true` — lets the FTP check try an anonymous login (off by default; without it `scan_host` never reports anonymous FTP). `DNS_CHECK_AXFR=true` with `DNS_AXFR_DOMAIN=<zone>` — lets the DNS check try a zone transfer of that zone (off by default). The same variables govern the CLI scan.
+- `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS=5000` — the per-plugin budget for `scan_host` and `probe_service` (default 30000), and it binds every plugin there, including one that declares a longer budget of its own. It bounds each PLUGIN, not the call: `scan_host` runs a host's plugins one after another, so the call takes roughly the sum of their times. On one router a `scan_host` call timed out in Claude Desktop on 2026-08-10 and one returned within 138 s on 2026-09-30, so neither outcome is promised: a call that times out returned no result — never read it as a clean host. On a real home gateway the plugins of one full scan took ~113 s between them at the default budget.
 - `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_CEILING_MS` — the upper bound on any plugin's DECLARED budget (default 120000). A few plugins declare their own budget because their cost grows with what they scan (the UPnP and MCP scanners here; several cloud auditors in Enterprise). On the CLI a declaration outranks `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS`, so this is the setting that caps every plugin there. The MCP tools already bind declarations with their own limits.
 - `CLOUD_SCAN_CONCURRENCY` — max cloud plugins run at once by `scan_cloud` (default 20).
-- `CLOUD_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` — per-plugin timeout for `scan_cloud` (default 25000; independent of the network `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS`). Keep it **under** Desktop's ~60s tool-call cap (raise to ~`45000` only for very large accounts); full all-region coverage is delivered by automatic region-batching, so it needs **no** timeout increase.
+- `CLOUD_PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS` — per-plugin timeout for `scan_cloud` (default 25000; independent of the network `PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS`). It bounds each plugin, not the call — see the all-region note above before raising it.
 - `AI_PROVIDER` and API key — optional, enables AI-powered analysis of scan results
 
 #### `NSA_ENV_FILE` — point the MCP server at an environment file
@@ -352,7 +362,7 @@ PLUGIN_TIMEOUT_MS=5000
 nsauditor-ai mcp install-key   # required before MCP server will start
 claude mcp add nsauditor-ai \
   --env NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY=keychain:NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY \
-  -- npx nsauditor-ai-mcp
+  -- nsauditor-ai-mcp
 ```
 
 To target an environment via the file, add it as an env value:
@@ -361,7 +371,7 @@ To target an environment via the file, add it as an env value:
 claude mcp add nsauditor-ai \
   --env NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY=keychain:NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY \
   --env NSA_ENV_FILE=~/envs/prod-aws.env \
-  -- npx nsauditor-ai-mcp
+  -- nsauditor-ai-mcp
 ```
 
 (On Linux/Windows, replace the `keychain:NSA_MCP_AUTH_KEY` placeholder with the literal key printed by `install-key`.)
@@ -436,7 +446,7 @@ nsauditor-ai validate
 nsauditor-ai feed bundle --from <dir-of-NVD-feeds> --out <bundle.json.gz> [--kev <f>] [--epss <f>]
 nsauditor-ai feed import --file <feed-or-bundle> [--cache-dir <d>] [--extras-dir <d>] [--append]   # the feeds you downloaded
 nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen|sign-pack|verify-pack>   (Enterprise)
-nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira [--run <id>] [--brand <brand.json>] [--out <path>] [--allow-partial]   (Pro/Enterprise)
+nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira [--run <id>] [--since <runId|prior>] [--brand <brand.json>] [--out <path>] [--allow-partial]   (Pro/Enterprise)
 nsauditor-ai mcp
 nsauditor-ai --help        (or -h, or `help`)
 nsauditor-ai --version     (or -v, or `version`)
@@ -449,15 +459,15 @@ nsauditor-ai --version     (or -v, or `version`)
 | `--host <target>` | Target: IP, hostname, CIDR, dash range. Aliases: `--ip`, `--target` | *required*\* |
 | `--host-file <path>` | File with one host per line (`#` comments, blank lines OK) | — |
 | `--plugins <list>` | Comma-separated plugin IDs or `all` | `all` |
-| `--ports <list>` | **Additional** ports to scan, merged into the default config-derived list. Comma-separated. Optional `/tcp` or `/udp` suffix per entry (default: `tcp`). Examples: `8090` · `8090,9090` · `8090/tcp,5353/udp`. Use this to scan custom services on non-standard ports (e.g. MCP servers on `8090`, dev servers on `3000–9000`) | — |
+| `--ports <list>` | **Additional** ports to scan, merged into the default config-derived list. Comma-separated. Optional `/tcp` or `/udp` suffix per entry (default: `tcp`). Examples: `8090` · `8090,9090` · `8090/tcp,5353/udp`. Use this to scan custom services on non-standard ports (e.g. MCP servers on `8090`). A range such as `1-1000` is not parsed and adds nothing | — |
 | `--out <dir>` | Custom output directory — applies to the per-scan folder *and* to alternate-format files (SARIF/CSV/Markdown) | `out/` |
 | `--parallel <n>` | Concurrent host scans | `1` |
 | `--output-format <fmt>` | Additional output format: `sarif` (CI/CD) · `csv` (spreadsheet) · `md` or `markdown` (chat/PR/Slack quotable) | — |
-| `--fail-on <sev>` | Exit code 2 if findings ≥ severity: `critical\|high\|medium\|low\|info` | — |
+| `--fail-on <sev>` | Exit code 1 if a flag it gates on is ≥ severity (`critical\|high\|medium\|low\|info`): anonymous FTP login and DNS zone transfer are critical, weak SSH algorithms medium, and any concluded scan counts as info — so `--fail-on info` fails every scan that concludes. Anonymous FTP login and zone transfer are tested only when `FTP_CHECK_ANON=true` / `DNS_CHECK_AXFR=true` with `DNS_AXFR_DOMAIN` are set, so on a default scan `--fail-on high` and `--fail-on critical` never exit 1. It also reads dangerous HTTP methods (medium), but no scan's conclusion carries that flag today. It does not read the SNMP default community, weak TLS protocols / ciphers, a self-signed certificate, the MCP server checks, Enterprise's CVE rows or agent findings, so exit 0 is not a clean host; exit 2 for an unknown severity or no conclusion | — |
 | `--insecure-https` | Accept self-signed TLS certificates | `false` |
-| `--watch` | CTEM continuous **alerting** loop — re-scan on `--interval`, diff, webhook on `--alert-severity`. Not an evidence cadence: no retention, no cross-run aggregation, skips SARIF/CSV/Markdown + `--fail-on`, dies with the process. Use a scheduler for SOC 2 Type II history. | `false` |
+| `--watch` | CTEM continuous **alerting** loop — re-scan on `--interval`, compare each host with its previous scan (`[ScanHistory]` lines), webhook on `--alert-severity` — but not on a service, version or finding change in this release (see Continuous Monitoring). Not an evidence cadence: no retention, no cross-run aggregation, skips SARIF/CSV/Markdown + `--fail-on`, dies with the process. Use a scheduler for SOC 2 Type II history. | `false` |
 | `--interval <min>` | Rescan interval in minutes (requires `--watch`) | `60` |
-| `--webhook-url <url>` | Webhook URL for delta alerts | — |
+| `--webhook-url <url>` | Webhook URL for watch-mode alerts (see `--watch`) | — |
 | `--alert-severity <sev>` | Minimum severity for webhook alerts | `high` |
 | `--compliance <fw>` | Compliance framework to map findings into. Accepts CSV for multi-framework runs (e.g. `soc2`, `hipaa`, `nist-csf`, `pci-dss`, `iso-27001`, `cis-v8`, `gdpr`, `nist-800-171`, or any combination like `soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr,nist-800-171` — `all` expands to the same eight). **Enterprise license required.** Supported frameworks as of EE 0.40.0 — **eight**: `soc2` (AICPA TSC 2017) + `hipaa` (HIPAA Security Rule §164.312 Technical Safeguards) + `nist-csf` (NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 Core, CSWP 29 Feb 2024) + `pci-dss` (PCI DSS v4.0.1, PCI SSC June 2024 errata) + `iso-27001` (ISO/IEC 27001:2022, ISO + IEC October 2022) + `cis-v8` (CIS Critical Security Controls v8, CIS May 2021 / v8.1 errata June 2024) + `gdpr` (GDPR Article 32 / Security of Processing, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 — Art. 32 infrastructure substrate, **not** GDPR compliance) + `nist-800-171` (NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 — evidence substrate for **CMMC Level 2 preparation**, **not** a CMMC certification, **not** a FedRAMP authorization, and no MET/NOT MET determination or SPRS score). See `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` README for per-framework coverage details. | — |
 | `--compliance-scope <path>` | Optional JSON file describing the assessment scope (passed to the compliance engine for cover-page attestation) | — |
@@ -489,7 +499,8 @@ nsauditor-ai scan --host 192.168.1.0/24 --plugins all --parallel 10
 # Targeted scan: TLS + HTTP + DNS + OS detection
 nsauditor-ai scan --host 192.168.1.8 --plugins 011,006,009,013,008
 
-# SARIF output for CI/CD, fail on high+ findings
+# SARIF output for CI/CD. --fail-on high exits 1 only on anonymous FTP / zone transfer, which are tested only with
+# FTP_CHECK_ANON / DNS_CHECK_AXFR set — see the --fail-on row; exit 0 is not a clean host
 nsauditor-ai scan --host 10.0.0.5 --plugins all --output-format sarif --fail-on high
 
 # Markdown report — paste straight into a GitHub issue, Slack thread, or chat
@@ -542,15 +553,17 @@ HEALTHCHECK --interval=60s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
 | `--format executive` | Self-contained, print-ready HTML report; no external network reference other than an `http(s)`/`mailto` `<a href>` | — |
 | `--format jira` | Jira-importer CSV (`Summary`/`Description`/`Priority`/`Labels`/`External ID`); the import mapping is done in Jira and has not been verified against a live Jira instance. **`pass`-tier records are EXCLUDED** — a Jira issue is a work item and a passing check is not work; every other tier is kept, INFO included, because INFO carries the evidence gaps and scope boundaries. Passing checks appear in the `executive` report under their own **PASS** tier. | — |
 | `--run <id>` | Report a specific run id instead of the newest one under `--from` | newest run |
+| `--since <runId\|prior>` | Compare the reported run with a baseline run under `--from`: `prior` is the run that started immediately before it, or name a run id. The `executive` report lists each new, resolved and changed finding, and each finding that could NOT be compared with its reason; stdout prints the counts, the changed and not-comparable rows and the limits; the `jira` CSV carries none of it. Keep `--plugins` identical between the two scans (see What's New). Every refusal exits 2: if the baseline was found but cannot support a comparison, the `executive` report is still written, states the refusal and lists no new, resolved or changed finding; if no baseline is found, if the reported run's own record fails verification, or with `--format jira`, nothing is written | — |
 | `--brand <brand.json>` | Cover-page branding (company name, prepared-by, contact, logo) — `--format executive` only | unbranded |
 | `--out <path>` | Write to this path instead of `report_<runId>.<ext>` beside the run record | `report_<runId>.<ext>` |
 | `--allow-partial` | Render even if some requested hosts were never written, or the run never recorded completion — the caveat is stated on the cover, never hidden | `false` |
 
-A value-less `--from`/`--brand`/`--run`/`--out` (nothing after the flag, or a shell glob that swallowed the argument) is a fatal error, not a silent default.
+A value-less `--from`/`--brand`/`--run`/`--out`/`--since` (nothing after the flag, or a shell glob that swallowed the argument) is a fatal error, not a silent default.
 
 **Exit contract** — `0` a report was rendered · `1` fix the RUN (no run record under `--from`, or an
 incomplete run without `--allow-partial`) · `2` fix the REQUEST or its environment (an unknown or
-missing flag value, an unwritable `--out`, a `--brand` file that is refused).
+missing flag value, an unwritable `--out`, a `--brand` file that is refused, or a `--since` comparison
+that could not be made — see `--since` above).
 
 ⚠️ `--brand` with `--format jira` is **refused**, not ignored: a Jira CSV has nowhere to put branding,
 and silently dropping a flag the caller passed is how a report goes out unbranded without anyone
@@ -680,7 +693,7 @@ No license key? Everything in this repository works perfectly without one. The C
 
 ### Pro/Enterprise Plugins
 
-Pro and Enterprise add 29 cloud and posture auditors on top of the Community scanners — AWS, Azure and GCP, mapped to eight compliance frameworks. They require `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` and a licence.
+Enterprise adds 29 cloud and posture auditors on top of the Community scanners — AWS, Azure and GCP, mapped to eight compliance frameworks. They require `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` and an Enterprise licence; a Pro licence does not unlock them.
 
 **→ [Pro / Enterprise plugin catalog](./docs/enterprise-plugins.md)** — every plugin with its id, what it audits, and the AWS region-scoping rules for the regional auditors (`--aws-region <one|csv|all>`).
 
@@ -692,14 +705,14 @@ See [Pro & Enterprise Activation](#pro--enterprise-activation) to install a lice
 
 Every compliance scan already produces a GRC-ready JSON evidence artifact. The **GRC connectors** take the next step: they map each NSAuditor compliance finding to your GRC platform's own evidence/test records and **push them at scan time** — so your Vanta, Drata, or Secureframe workspace reflects the latest cloud posture without a manual export/import round-trip.
 
-**Opt-in, and Zero-Data-Exfiltration by default.** The push is off unless you set the environment variables below. When it runs, egress is redaction-gated: resource identifiers can be hashed or removed, the persisted audit log stores a body **fingerprint** (never the raw payload), and your API token is never written to any artifact. Nothing leaves your infrastructure that you didn't opt into.
+**Opt-in, and Zero-Data-Exfiltration by default.** The push is off unless you set the environment variables below. When it runs, finding text and target identifiers go to your platform as written unless you set `COMPLIANCE_GRC_REDACTION` to `hash` or `remove` (redaction is off by default); the persisted audit log stores a body **fingerprint** (never the raw payload), and your API token is never written to any artifact. Nothing leaves your infrastructure that you didn't opt into.
 
 ```bash
 # Enable the scan-time push (Enterprise)
 COMPLIANCE_GRC_PROVIDER=vanta        # or: drata | secureframe
 COMPLIANCE_GRC_TOKEN=<your API key>  # never serialized to artifacts
 # Optional:
-# COMPLIANCE_GRC_REDACTION=hash      # off | hash | remove  (egress identifier redaction)
+# COMPLIANCE_GRC_REDACTION=hash      # off by default | hash | remove  (scrubs finding text and targets before egress)
 # COMPLIANCE_GRC_CONTROL_MAP=/path/to/config.json  # provider config: Vanta control→test map, Drata connection ({connectionId, resourceId, schemaMap}), or Secureframe ({workspaceId, collectionId, schemaMap})
 ```
 
@@ -739,7 +752,7 @@ NSAuditor AI supports three AI providers for vulnerability analysis. **All provi
 - **Pro** — intelligence-enriched prompts (CVE matches, MITRE ATT&CK technique annotations, composite risk scores injected into the prompt). Same API call, better-grounded output
 - **Enterprise** — Pro prompts + compliance context
 
-**Redaction:** Before any data reaches an AI API, the redaction pipeline masks IP addresses, MAC addresses, serial numbers, and configurable confidential keywords. Admin RAW reports retain full detail for internal review.
+**Redaction:** On by default (`OPENAI_REDACT=false` turns it off), the redaction pipeline masks IP addresses, MAC addresses, serial numbers, and configurable confidential keywords before the payload reaches an AI API. Admin RAW reports retain full detail for internal review.
 
 ```ini
 # .env
@@ -771,10 +784,10 @@ nsauditor-ai scan --host 192.168.1.0/24 --plugins all \
 ```
 
 - **Scheduling** with configurable intervals and concurrency control
-- **Delta detection** — new, removed, and changed services highlighted between cycles
-- **Webhook alerts** — JSON POST with retry (exponential backoff, no retry on 4xx)
-- **SSRF protection** — private, loopback, and cloud metadata addresses blocked at the scan entry point and inside `sendWebhook()`. Set `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS=1` to scan RFC 1918 ranges (local network auditing)
-- **Scan history** stored in `.scan_history/` (JSONL format, 7-day retention in CE)
+- **Change detection** — each host's scan is compared with that host's previous line in `scan_history.jsonl` and printed as a `[ScanHistory]` line: new, removed and changed services, and the findings delta
+- **Webhook alerts** — a JSON POST, retried up to twice 1 s apart on a 5xx or network error, not on a 4xx. ⚠️ **In this release the webhook does NOT fire on a service, version or finding change:** the cycle comparison it is gated on finds no services in the scan results it is handed, so its `=== Delta Report ===` shows no change for any host. The gate opens only when a cycle scanned a different set of hosts from the cycle before (in practice, one cut short by stopping the loop); an alert is then posted for each host whose services carry a flag at or above `--alert-severity` (at `info`, every service counts). Read changes from the `[ScanHistory]` lines.
+- **SSRF protection** — private, loopback, and cloud metadata addresses blocked at the scan entry point and inside `sendWebhook()`. `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS=1` lifts the scan-entry guard for local network auditing — on the CLI the whole guard, loopback and metadata included; over MCP, the check of what a host name resolves to — and never the webhook guard
+- **Scan history** stored in `scan_history.jsonl` in the output directory (`--out`, default `out/`; 7-day retention in CE)
 
 ---
 
@@ -784,7 +797,7 @@ Configuration is entirely environment-based — a `.env` file, `--env <file>`, o
 
 **→ [Configuration reference](./docs/configuration.md)** — every environment variable, its default and its effect.
 
-The two that change behaviour most: `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` forbids outbound CVE lookups and reads a local NVD store instead (reporting an explicit coverage gap rather than a silent clean), and `OPENAI_API_KEY` / `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` / a local Ollama endpoint enable the opt-in AI analysis pass.
+The two that change behaviour most: `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1` forbids outbound CVE lookups and reads a local NVD store instead (reporting an explicit coverage gap in the scan rather than a silent clean; in Enterprise 1.2.0 that gap reaches no compliance control, so a control only the missing CVE rows would fail can read PASS), and `OPENAI_API_KEY` / `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` / a local Ollama endpoint enable the opt-in AI analysis pass.
 
 ## Developing Plugins
 
@@ -857,7 +870,7 @@ export default {
 
 ## Tests
 
-Run all 1582 tests:
+Run the full suite:
 
 ```bash
 npm test
@@ -888,7 +901,7 @@ Tests use Node.js built-in `--test` runner with the `assert` module — no exter
 | RPC not detected | Ensure port 111 is accessible and RPC portmapper is running |
 | WS-Discovery timeout | Check network config and firewall for multicast on UDP 3702 |
 | SYN scan requires root | Run with `sudo` or use TCP connect scanner (plugin 003) instead |
-| Webhook URL rejected | Private/loopback/cloud metadata blocked by SSRF guard. Use `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS=1` to allow RFC 1918 scan targets |
+| Webhook URL rejected | Private/loopback/cloud metadata blocked by SSRF guard. `NSA_ALLOW_ALL_HOSTS` does not lift this guard: use a public webhook URL |
 | EE plugins not loading | Verify `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` is installed and license key is set |
 
 ---
@@ -935,9 +948,9 @@ NSAuditor AI is built on a **Zero Data Exfiltration (ZDE)** architecture:
 
 - **No telemetry.** No analytics. No usage tracking. No phone-home.
 - **No data processing.** Nsasoft US LLC never sees, stores, or processes your scan results.
-- **AI is opt-in.** External AI calls use your own API keys. Redaction runs locally first.
+- **AI is opt-in.** External AI calls use your own API keys. Redaction runs locally first, on by default (`OPENAI_REDACT=false` turns it off).
 - **License validation is offline.** JWT signature verified locally with an embedded public key.
-- **Air-gappable, once configured for it.** Scanning, analysis, license verification and evidence-pack generation all run with no outbound network access; Enterprise adds offline CVE matching from a local NVD store under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`, which emits an explicit coverage gap rather than a silent clean when the store cannot answer. Stated precisely because it matters operationally: a **default** scan still attempts NVD egress unless that variable is set. The other outbound paths — AI enrichment, the GRC push, the continuous-monitoring webhook, the opt-in RFC 3161 timestamping path (`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, no default ever), and the AWS KMS signing path that ships but is not yet wired — are opt-in and off by default; the paths that are *not* optional are the scan target itself, your own cloud provider's APIs during a cloud scan, and DNS resolution of the target. All of them are enumerated with their trigger and default state in the egress register (EE `docs/architecture.md` §14.1.1), which is generated from code and guarded in both directions — deliberately, so this sentence never again has to carry a completeness claim that prose alone cannot keep true. Populating the local NVD store is the operator's; no feed data is delivered with the product. The prior absolute form of this bullet — *"Fully air-gappable. Every feature works without internet access (Enterprise includes offline NVD feeds)"* — is **WITHDRAWN** (CE 0.2.33): quoted here so the withdrawal record stays on this page now that release history lives in the [CHANGELOG](./CHANGELOG.md).
+- **Air-gappable, once configured for it.** Scanning, analysis, license verification and evidence-pack generation all run with no outbound network access; Enterprise adds offline CVE matching from a local NVD store under `NSAUDITOR_OFFLINE_ONLY=1`, which emits an explicit coverage gap in the scan rather than a silent clean when the store cannot answer (in Enterprise 1.2.0 that gap reaches no compliance control, so a control only the missing CVE rows would fail can read PASS). Stated precisely because it matters operationally: a **default** scan still attempts NVD egress unless that variable is set. The other outbound paths — AI enrichment, the GRC push, the continuous-monitoring webhook, the opt-in RFC 3161 timestamping path (`NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, no default ever), and the AWS KMS signing path that ships but is not yet wired — are opt-in and off by default; the paths that are *not* optional are the scan target itself, your own cloud provider's APIs during a cloud scan, and DNS resolution of the target. All of them are enumerated with their trigger and default state in the egress register (EE `docs/architecture.md` §14.1.1), which is generated from code and guarded in both directions — deliberately, so this sentence never again has to carry a completeness claim that prose alone cannot keep true. Populating the local NVD store is the operator's; no feed data is delivered with the product. The prior absolute form of this bullet — *"Fully air-gappable. Every feature works without internet access (Enterprise includes offline NVD feeds)"* — is **WITHDRAWN** (CE 0.2.33): quoted here so the withdrawal record stays on this page now that release history lives in the [CHANGELOG](./CHANGELOG.md).
 
 Nsasoft US LLC is not a data processor, data controller, or business associate under any data protection regulation. You own and control all data produced by NSAuditor AI.
 

package/cli.mjs

@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ import { scrubByKey } from './utils/redact.mjs';
 import { isBlockedIp, resolveAndValidate } from './utils/net_validation.mjs';
 import { getAllTechniques } from './utils/attack_map.mjs';
 import { TOOL_VERSION } from './utils/tool_version.mjs';
-import { resolveBaseOutDir } from './utils/output_dir.mjs';
+import { resolveBaseOutDir, createHostOutDir, safeHost } from './utils/output_dir.mjs';
+import { loadEnterprise } from './utils/ee_load.mjs';
 import { deriveFindingsCount } from './utils/report_inputs.mjs';
 import { toCleanPath } from './utils/path_helpers.mjs';
 import { newRunId, writeRunStart, appendHostWritten, finalizeRunRecord, pruneRunRecordsForCE, aggregateNvdCache, abortReasonOf } from './utils/run_record.mjs';
@@ -45,19 +46,7 @@ const parseBool = (val, def = false) => {
   if (!s && def != null) return !!def;
   return ['true', '1', 'yes', 'on', 'y'].includes(s);
 };
-const nowStamp = () => {
-  const d = new Date();
-  const pad = (n) => String(n).padStart(2, '0');
-  return (
-    d.getFullYear().toString() +
-    pad(d.getMonth() + 1) +
-    pad(d.getDate()) + '_' +
-    pad(d.getHours()) +
-    pad(d.getMinutes()) +
-    pad(d.getSeconds())
-  );
-};
-const safeHost = (h) => String(h ?? 'unknown').replace(/[\/\\?%*:|"<>]/g, '_');
+// `nowStamp` and `safeHost` live in utils/output_dir.mjs beside `createHostOutDir`, so the directory name has one definition.
 // toCleanPath imported from ./utils/path_helpers.mjs (consolidated in v0.1.20)
 
 /**
@@ -157,17 +146,12 @@ async function maybeSendToOpenAI({ host, results, conclusion, promptMode = 'basi
     : await resolveSecret(process.env.OPENAI_API_KEY);
   const key           = keyRaw ? String(keyRaw).trim() : null;
 
-  // Per-scan folder. Caller (scanSingleHost) may pass a pre-computed outDir so
-  // that EE enrichment + compliance artifacts share the same folder as the AI
-  // outputs — otherwise compute one here for legacy callers.
-  let outDir = presetOutDir;
-  if (!outDir) {
-    const baseOutDir = resolveBaseOutDir();
-    await fsp.mkdir(baseOutDir, { recursive: true });
-    const ts     = nowStamp();
-    const runDir = `${safeHost(host)}_${ts}`;
-    outDir       = path.join(baseOutDir, runDir);
-  }
+  // Per-scan folder — REQUIRED. Its only caller, scanSingleHost, creates it exclusively (createHostOutDir) so that EE
+  // enrichment, compliance artifacts and the AI outputs share one folder. ⚠️ The fallback that used to compose a
+  // directory here (`${safeHost(host)}_${nowStamp()}`, recursive mkdir) had no caller and was the same-second
+  // collision's shape kept warm (1.1.1, audit seat's fold); it is gone, and a missing outDir is an error.
+  if (!presetOutDir) throw new Error('maybeSendToOpenAI: outDir is required — scanSingleHost creates it with createHostOutDir');
+  const outDir = presetOutDir;
   await fsp.mkdir(outDir, { recursive: true });
 
   // Paths (fixed names inside per-scan folder)
@@ -930,11 +914,11 @@ async function scanSingleHost(pm, host, plugins, opts, promptMode) {
   // Pre-compute the per-scan output folder so EE enrichment, compliance
   // artifacts, and AI outputs all land in the same directory. maybeSendToOpenAI
   // will reuse this presetOutDir below.
-  const baseOutDir = resolveBaseOutDir();
-  await fsp.mkdir(baseOutDir, { recursive: true });
-  const ts        = nowStamp();
-  const outDir    = path.join(baseOutDir, `${safeHost(host)}_${ts}`);
-  await fsp.mkdir(outDir, { recursive: true });
+  //
+  // ⚠️ AN EXCLUSIVE CREATE (1.1.1 board): two scans of one host reaching this line in the same second used to share
+  // one directory and the later one overwrote the earlier one's evidence — see createHostOutDir. `opts.nowStamp` is
+  // a test seam (testHooks.nowStamp), absent in every real invocation.
+  const outDir = await createHostOutDir(resolveBaseOutDir(), host, opts?.nowStamp ? { stamp: opts.nowStamp } : {});
 
   // EE enrichment hook — no-op if @nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee is not installed
   // or the license tier doesn't grant intelligenceEngine. Compliance + outDir
@@ -971,11 +955,20 @@ async function scanSingleHost(pm, host, plugins, opts, promptMode) {
   let epssDataAsOf = null;
   // Enterprise's report of WHERE the NVD store/cache it read lives (board item 23) — null without EE.
   let nvdCache = null;
-  try {
-    // `opts.importEE`: test-only injection seam, mirroring `preflightNsauditorPosture`'s
-    // `importEE` option elsewhere in this file — absent in every real invocation.
-    ee = opts?.importEE ? await opts.importEE() : await import('@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee');
-  } catch { /* EE not installed — CE proceeds unchanged. The ONLY silent case. */ }
+  // ⚠️ "NOT INSTALLED" AND "INSTALLED BUT BROKEN" ARE TWO EVENTS (1.1.1, the audit seat's T1-c ruling). This used to be
+  // a bare `catch {}` read as "EE not installed — the ONLY silent case", and every import failure landed in it — measured
+  // at EE 174212f: Enterprise imported names this Community did not export, so below the floor the whole EE stage
+  // vanished without a word and the Pro delta read its rows RESOLVED. The package is RESOLVED first (utils/ee_load.mjs):
+  // absence stays silent; a failed load is named on stderr and recorded on the conclusion, beside `eeEnrichmentError`.
+  // `opts.importEE` / `opts.resolveEE`: test-only seams — absent in every real invocation.
+  const eeLoad = await loadEnterprise({ importEE: opts?.importEE ?? null, resolveEE: opts?.resolveEE ?? null });
+  ee = eeLoad.ee;
+  if (eeLoad.loadError) {
+    console.error(`[EE] Enterprise is installed but FAILED TO LOAD — this scan has no compliance report, no `
+      + `intelligence enrichment and no analysis-agent findings: ${eeLoad.loadError}`);
+    conclusion.result = conclusion.result || {};
+    conclusion.result.eeLoadError = eeLoad.loadError;
+  }
   // ⚠️ HOISTED DELIBERATELY, and only this value. `eeEnrichment` is `const` INSIDE the try below,
   // so reading it at the `appendHostWritten` call ~100 lines on is a ReferenceError — which the
   // suite caught as 16 failures rather than one, because every history comparison swallowed it as
@@ -1276,7 +1269,7 @@ async function readSecretFromStdin(keyName) {
   });
 }
 
-function maxSeverityInConclusion(conclusion) {
+export function maxSeverityInConclusion(conclusion) {
   const services = conclusion?.result?.services || [];
   let max = 0;
 
@@ -1398,7 +1391,9 @@ export async function preflightGrcIfRequested(env, opts = {}) {
 // test drive the real scan pipeline (including this function's own run-record wiring) against
 // a controlled, injected EE module — e.g. one whose `enrichScan` reports a specific KEV/EPSS
 // `dataAsOf` — without depending on the real `@nsasoft/nsauditor-ai-ee` package, a real store
-// file, or the machine's own license/tier state being any particular thing.
+// file, or the machine's own license/tier state being any particular thing. An injected `importEE` counts as an
+// INSTALLED package (utils/ee_load.mjs): to describe one that is NOT installed, pass `testHooks.resolveEE` throwing —
+// a throwing `importEE` alone is now a package that is installed and FAILED to load, which the scan reports.
 // Reconstructs a single tier word ('ce' | 'pro' | 'enterprise') from the resolved capability
 // map — never from getTierFromEnv()'s own global cache. `runReport` below deliberately never
 // reads that cache: `caps` is passed in as an argument specifically so Pro is reachable from the
@@ -1682,22 +1677,30 @@ Scan options:
                                incomplete-coverage notice); CloudTrail trail discovery,
                                GuardDuty/Inspector and EC2 instances attempt every region.
   --plugins <list|all>         Plugins to run (e.g. 001,003,020 or "all"; default: all)
-  --ports <range>              Override port list (e.g. 22,80,443 or 1-1000)
+  --ports <list>               Ports ADDED to the default set (e.g. 22,80,443 or 161/udp;
+                               a range such as 1-1000 is not parsed and adds nothing)
   --out <dir>                  Output directory for scan artifacts
   --parallel <n>               Parallel host concurrency (default 1)
-  --fail-on <severity>         Exit non-zero if any finding ≥ severity
+  --fail-on <severity>         Exit 1 if a gated flag ≥ severity: anonymous FTP / zone
+                               transfer (critical; tested only with FTP_CHECK_ANON /
+                               DNS_CHECK_AXFR set), weak SSH algorithms (medium); any
+                               concluded scan is info. Dangerous HTTP methods are read
+                               but never reach the conclusion today. Not SNMP community,
+                               weak TLS, MCP checks, CVEs or agent findings — exit 0 is
+                               not a clean host. Exit 2: unknown severity or no conclusion.
   --output-format <fmt>        Additional report format: sarif | csv | md
   --insecure-https             Skip TLS validation on probed HTTPS targets
   --watch                      CTEM continuous ALERTING mode: re-scan on --interval,
-                               diff against the previous cycle, fire --webhook-url when a
-                               change crosses --alert-severity. NOT an evidence cadence —
+                               compare each host with its previous scan ([ScanHistory]
+                               lines); --webhook-url does NOT fire on a service, version or
+                               finding change in this release. NOT an evidence cadence —
                                it adds no retention or cross-run aggregation, skips SARIF/
                                CSV/Markdown output and --fail-on, and dies with this process.
                                Each tick is an ordinary scan, so with --compliance it writes
                                that tick's artifacts; nothing relates them across ticks. For
                                SOC 2 Type II history use a scheduler (cron/systemd/CI).
   --interval <minutes>         Watch interval (default 60)
-  --webhook-url <url>          Send delta alerts (must be public; private/loopback blocked)
+  --webhook-url <url>          Send --watch alerts (must be public; private/loopback blocked)
   --alert-severity <sev>       Min severity to alert on (default: high)
   --compliance <framework>     Map findings to controls. 'all' = all 8 frameworks, or a CSV of
                                soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr,nist-800-171
@@ -3156,6 +3159,10 @@ Docs: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/   |   Pricing: https://www.nsauditor.com/ai/
 
   const opts = { insecureHttps };
   if (testHooks.importEE) opts.importEE = testHooks.importEE;
+  if (testHooks.resolveEE) opts.resolveEE = testHooks.resolveEE;
+  // `testHooks.nowStamp`: a test seam, absent in every real invocation — it pins the per-host directory's second so a
+  // leg can drive the same-second collision through the shipped scan path.
+  if (testHooks.nowStamp) opts.nowStamp = testHooks.nowStamp;
   if (ports) opts.ports = ports;
   if (compliance) opts.compliance = compliance;
   if (complianceScope) opts.complianceScope = complianceScope;

package/mcp_server.mjs

@@ -244,7 +244,20 @@ export const TOOLS = [
   {
     name: 'scan_host',
     description:
-      'Run a full plugin scan on a target host and return structured results including service detection, OS fingerprinting, and security findings.',
+      'Run a full plugin scan on a target host and return structured results: service detection, OS fingerprinting, and'
+      + ' the flags the service checks leave on each service record — weak SSH algorithms, SNMP default community, weak '
+      + 'TLS protocols / ciphers and a self-signed certificate, the MCP server checks, and anonymous FTP login and DNS '
+      + 'zone transfer only when the server\'s environment enables those two checks (FTP_CHECK_ANON; DNS_CHECK_AXFR with '
+      + 'DNS_AXFR_DOMAIN — both off by default). It runs, when their requirements are met, but does NOT return the '
+      + 'results of the HTTP probe (006, dangerous HTTP methods), the NetBIOS/SMB scanner (014, null sessions and '
+      + 'shares), the TLS-certificate (040), debug-endpoint (050) and DNS-security (060) auditors — use probe_service '
+      + '(Pro) with that plugin — or, with the Enterprise package, its zero-trust assessment (1023). It does NOT look up '
+      + 'CVEs and does NOT run the Enterprise analysis agents or exploit intelligence — so zero findings here is NOT a '
+      + 'statement that the host has no known vulnerabilities. For CVEs, call get_vulnerabilities (Pro) with each '
+      + 'service\'s cpe where it names a concrete version; a service whose cpe is null gets no lookup, so its CVE coverage'
+      + ' is unknown, not clean. With the Enterprise package and a Pro or Enterprise licence, the CLI scan (nsauditor-ai '
+      + 'scan --host <host>) runs the CVE mapper and the analysis agents, and joins exploit intelligence when a KEV / '
+      + 'EPSS store is configured.',
     inputSchema: {
       type: 'object',
       properties: {
@@ -335,7 +348,7 @@ export const TOOLS = [
         },
         pluginName: {
           type: 'string',
-          description: 'Plugin name or ID to run (e.g. "ssh_scanner" or "002")',
+          description: 'Plugin ID (e.g. "002") or its full name as list_plugins returns it, in any case (e.g. "SSH Scanner")',
         },
       },
       required: ['host', 'port', 'pluginName'],

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai",
-  "version": "0.2.55",
+  "version": "0.2.56",
   "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform — Community Edition",
   "type": "module",
   "private": false,

package/plugins/mcp_scanner.mjs

@@ -454,7 +454,8 @@ export function conclude({ result }) {
       detection.tools.length ? `tools=${detection.tools.length}` : null,
     ].filter(Boolean).join(' '),
     authoritative: true,
-    // Security flags (consumed by AI prompt / report renderer / SARIF)
+    // Security flags. scan_host returns them on this record; the Markdown report, SARIF, CSV and --fail-on do NOT read
+    // them yet (1.2.0 build 3 states it; boarded for 1.2.1).
     ...flags,
     // Evidence fields per N.5 FindingSchema
     evidence: { cwe, owasp, mitre },

package/plugins/result_concluder.mjs

@@ -8,8 +8,9 @@ function pickResultsFromArgs(args) {
   return [];
 }
 
-// Stable slug from plugin name, falling back to IDs
-function slugify(name, id) {
+// Stable slug from plugin name, falling back to IDs. Exported so tests/concluder_drops_honesty.test.mjs derives the
+// adapter census with THIS rule rather than a copy of it.
+export function slugify(name, id) {
   const base = String(name || '').toLowerCase().replace(/[^a-z0-9]+/g, '_').replace(/^_+|_+$/g, '');
   if (base) return base;
   const map = { '001':'ping_checker','002':'ssh_scanner','003':'port_scanner','004':'ftp_banner_check','005':'host_up_check','006':'http_probe','007':'snmp_scanner','009':'dns_scanner','010':'webapp_detector','011':'tls_scanner','012':'opensearch_scanner','013':'os_detector','014':'netbios__smb_scanner','015':'sunrpc_scanner','024':'syn_scanner','025':'db_scanner','026':'arp_scanner','027':'mdns_scanner','028':'upnp_scanner' };