nsauditor-ai 0.2.50 → 0.2.52
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +112 -4
- package/cli.mjs +443 -7
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/utils/brand.mjs +252 -0
- package/utils/capabilities.mjs +1 -0
- package/utils/executive_report.mjs +637 -0
- package/utils/jira_export.mjs +174 -0
- package/utils/report_finding_census.mjs +438 -0
- package/utils/report_inputs.mjs +544 -0
- package/utils/run_record.mjs +241 -0
- package/utils/scan_history.mjs +1 -1
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ A modular, AI-assisted network security audit platform that scans, understands,
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[](https://www.npmjs.com/package/nsauditor-ai)
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[](LICENSE)
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[](https://nodejs.org)
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[](#tests)
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---
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@@ -17,6 +17,36 @@ NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence pl
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## What's New
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**Latest: CE 0.2.52 + Enterprise 0.45.0 — the Enterprise NTP clock attestation is WITHDRAWN.** The probe
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is deleted: it validated any reply of at least 48 bytes with a non-null transmit timestamp and nothing
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else — no mode byte, no stratum, no originate echo — so over unauthenticated UDP a datagram of the right
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shape produced a false clean reading, and it measured the SCANNER's own clock rather than your estate.
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It had never been reachable from any shipped entry point.
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RFC 3161 trusted timestamping is untouched, opt-in, and is the capability that answers the question —
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off unless you configure a Time-Stamp Authority, and an outbound call to a third party when you do. On the Community side this cycle changes no behaviour: the
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withdrawn-claim guard over `license --capabilities` descriptions learns the wording the product actually
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published, so the class cannot recur silently here. See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md).
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**The Pro `report` subcommand, over a run record that states its own coverage (CE 0.2.51 / Enterprise 0.44.0).**
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`nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira` turns a completed scan run into a
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client-facing deliverable — a self-contained, print-ready HTML report a consultant sends to their
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customer, or a Jira-importer CSV. Beneath it is a **per-run scan record**: written at run start,
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appended per host, finalized at the end, so the report's cover **states** what was covered — hosts
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requested, written and reachable, and the exploit-intelligence as-of dates read from the store's own
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metadata — instead of implying completeness. An incomplete run says so on the cover; `--allow-partial`
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renders it anyway with the caveat visible, never hidden. Two limits are shipped as text rather than
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left to be discovered: the **Jira import mapping has not been verified against a live Jira instance**,
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and a value-less `--from`/`--brand`/`--run`/`--out` is a **fatal error, not a silent default**. On the
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Enterprise side the same cycle stops reporting an S3 audit-trail gap on a bucket whose object-level
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reads and writes a CloudTrail data-event trail already records. See the
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[`report` command section](#report-command-pro) and the [CHANGELOG](./CHANGELOG.md).
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⚠️ **The Enterprise peer floor stays `>=0.2.49` — it is NOT raised to 0.2.51.** Raising it would charge
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every Enterprise operator an upgrade for a Community feature they may not want. The consequence is
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worth stating rather than discovering: an Enterprise 0.44.0 install resolves cleanly against Community
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0.2.49 or 0.2.50 and simply has **no `report` command**. Install Community 0.2.51 to get it.
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Every scan now also writes `scan_run_<runId>.json` at the root of `--out` — the record the report is
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built from. On the free tier these are pruned after a retention window; on Pro they are kept.
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**A provider badge you can trust, and an evidence gap that never tells an auditor what to type (CE 0.2.50 / Enterprise 0.43.0).**
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**No Community behaviour changed this cycle** — the version moves so the trio stays in lockstep, and **the Enterprise peer floor stays `>=0.2.49`** rather than being raised reflexively, because the
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one Community behaviour the Enterprise fix depends on already shipped there. What changed is on the
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- **Smart result fusion** — the Result Concluder merges all plugin outputs into a normalized view with OS detection, service fingerprinting, and evidence linking
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- **Structured finding format** — all findings use a common schema with category, severity, evidence, and remediation — enabling consistent SARIF export and MCP integration
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- **AI-powered analysis** — send redacted scan results to OpenAI or Claude (your keys, your choice) for vulnerability assessments and remediation guidance
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- **Risk-scored prioritization (Pro)** — findings carry a composite risk score (CVSS weighted by verification status, with an uplift for initial-access techniques) and a status field, and an operator suppression workflow (accepted-risk / false-positive with expiry) keeps triaged findings out of the report until they expire
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- **Risk-scored prioritization (Pro/Enterprise)** — findings carry a composite risk score (CVSS weighted by verification status, with an uplift for initial-access techniques) and a status field, and an operator suppression workflow (accepted-risk / false-positive with expiry) keeps triaged findings out of the report until they expire
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- **Continuous monitoring (CTEM)** — watch mode rescans on a schedule, diffs against previous results, and fires webhook alerts on changes
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- **MCP integration** — expose scanning tools to AI assistants like Claude Code via Model Context Protocol
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- **CI/CD ready** — SARIF output with `--fail-on` severity gating for pipeline integration
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| AI analysis (OpenAI, Claude, Ollama — your keys) | ✅ basic | ✅ enriched | ✅ enriched |
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| Structured findings + SARIF + CSV export | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ |
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| CTEM watch mode | ✅ basic | ✅ advanced | ✅ advanced |
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| **Pro features
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| **Pro features** | | | |
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| CVE matching + MITRE ATT&CK mapping | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| Risk scoring + prioritization | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| Exploit intelligence — **CISA KEV** + **FIRST EPSS** joined onto the CVE matches, exploit-first ordering (a KEV-listed MEDIUM outranks an unexploited CRITICAL); stores are operator-populated — no feed data ships | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| Parallel analysis agents | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| **Client reporting** — `report --format executive` renders a completed run as a self-contained, print-ready HTML report with optional cover-page branding (`--brand`); `--format jira` writes a Jira-importer CSV. ⚠️ The Jira import mapping is done in Jira and has **not been verified against a live Jira instance**. | — | ✅ | ✅ |
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| **Enterprise — cloud scanning** | | | |
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| 29 enterprise plugins — 28 cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) + 1 network-scan zero-trust check | — | — | ✅ |
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| Zero Trust assessment | — | — | ✅ |
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nsauditor-ai feed bundle --from <dir-of-NVD-feeds> --out <bundle.json.gz> [--kev <f>] [--epss <f>]
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nsauditor-ai feed import --file <feed-or-bundle> [--cache-dir <d>] [--extras-dir <d>] [--append] # the feeds you downloaded
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nsauditor-ai compliance <attest|suppress|review|renew|keygen|sign-pack|verify-pack> (Enterprise)
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nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira [--run <id>] [--brand <brand.json>] [--out <path>] [--allow-partial] (Pro/Enterprise)
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nsauditor-ai mcp
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nsauditor-ai --help (or -h, or `help`)
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nsauditor-ai --version (or -v, or `version`)
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CMD nsauditor-ai validate --json | grep -q '"overall": "ok"' || exit 1
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```
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### `report` command (Pro/Enterprise)
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`nsauditor-ai report --from <dir> --format executive|jira` turns a completed scan run under `--from` into a client-facing deliverable — an HTML report a consultant sends to their customer, or a Jira-importer CSV.
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**What it reads.** A scan record keeps findings in more than one place, and the report reads all of them: each plugin's `result.findings` (an array, or a dict of categories as the DNS auditor emits), zero-trust dimension findings, per-port TLS issues, and the **finding queue** (`scan_finding_queue.json`) that carries the CVE/KEV/EPSS-enriched entries. `result.data` is deliberately NOT read — on a network scan it holds probe telemetry, not findings. The container inventory is enforced by a census: a container holding findings that no reader opens fails the build rather than rendering as a clean report.
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| Flag | Description | Default |
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|---|---|---|
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| `--from <dir>` | The scan `--out` directory holding the run's record and per-host evidence | *required* |
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| `--format executive` | Self-contained, print-ready HTML report; no external network reference other than an `http(s)`/`mailto` `<a href>` | — |
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| `--format jira` | Jira-importer CSV (`Summary`/`Description`/`Priority`/`Labels`/`External ID`); the import mapping is done in Jira and has not been verified against a live Jira instance. **`pass`-tier records are EXCLUDED** — a Jira issue is a work item and a passing check is not work; every other tier is kept, INFO included, because INFO carries the evidence gaps and scope boundaries. Passing checks appear in the `executive` report under their own **PASS** tier. | — |
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| `--run <id>` | Report a specific run id instead of the newest one under `--from` | newest run |
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| `--brand <brand.json>` | Cover-page branding (company name, prepared-by, contact, logo) — `--format executive` only | unbranded |
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| `--out <path>` | Write to this path instead of `report_<runId>.<ext>` beside the run record | `report_<runId>.<ext>` |
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| `--allow-partial` | Render even if some requested hosts were never written, or the run never recorded completion — the caveat is stated on the cover, never hidden | `false` |
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A value-less `--from`/`--brand`/`--run`/`--out` (nothing after the flag, or a shell glob that swallowed the argument) is a fatal error, not a silent default.
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**Exit contract** — `0` a report was rendered · `1` fix the RUN (no run record under `--from`, or an
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incomplete run without `--allow-partial`) · `2` fix the REQUEST or its environment (an unknown or
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missing flag value, an unwritable `--out`, a `--brand` file that is refused).
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⚠️ `--brand` with `--format jira` is **refused**, not ignored: a Jira CSV has nowhere to put branding,
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and silently dropping a flag the caller passed is how a report goes out unbranded without anyone
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noticing.
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```bash
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nsauditor-ai report --from out/2026-08-26 --format executive --brand brand.json --out report.html
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nsauditor-ai report --from out/2026-08-26 --format jira
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```
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#### The `brand.json` file
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`--brand` takes a small JSON object. Every field is optional; omit the file entirely and the report
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renders unbranded with the default title.
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```json
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{
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"title": "Q3 External Perimeter Review",
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"companyName": "Acme Manufacturing GmbH",
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"preparedBy": "J. Rivera, Security Consulting LLC",
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"contact": "security@example.com",
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"logoPath": "acme-logo.png"
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}
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```
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| field | type | default | notes |
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| `title` | string | `Network Scan Report` | Replaces the report's headline. |
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| `companyName` | string | *(empty)* | The client the report is prepared **for**. |
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| `preparedBy` | string | *(empty)* | The consultant or firm preparing it. |
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| `contact` | string | *(empty)* | Free text — an address, an email, a phone number. |
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| `logoPath` | string | *(none)* | A **local** PNG or JPEG, resolved relative to the brand file's own directory. Embedded into the HTML as a data URI. |
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**`logoPath` is deliberately restrictive, and each refusal protects the report's core promise —
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that it opens with no external network reference of any kind:**
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- **A URL is refused and never fetched.** A remote logo is egress at render time and a tracking
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pixel every time your client opens the file.
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- **A UNC share (`\\host\share\...`) is refused** for the same reason: it is a network reference.
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- **SVG is refused.** SVG is markup and can carry a script, which would break the report's
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no-script guarantee from inside the image. Use PNG or JPEG.
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- **The path must stay inside the brand file's own directory** — `../` escapes are refused, checked
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both as typed and again after symlinks are resolved.
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- **2 MB maximum**, and the format is detected by **magic bytes, not by file extension** — renaming
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`logo.svg` to `logo.png` does not get it past the check.
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- **An empty string is read as "no logo"**, the same as omitting the key, so a generated
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`brand.json` that emits `""` is not an error.
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A brand file that cannot be read, is not valid JSON, is not a JSON object, or whose `logoPath` is
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refused is a **fatal error** — the report is not written. A flag you passed is never silently
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dropped, because that is how a report goes out unbranded without anyone noticing.
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⚠️ `--brand` applies to `--format executive` only. Passing it with `--format jira` is **refused**,
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not ignored: a CSV has nowhere to put a cover page.
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---
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## Configuration
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## Tests
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Run all 1582 tests:
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```bash
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npm test
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