nsauditor-ai 0.2.44 → 0.2.45

package/README.md

@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ NSAuditor AI is the open-source core of a privacy-first security intelligence pl
 
 ## What's New
 
+**The eighth compliance framework: NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2 (CE 0.2.45 / Enterprise 0.40.0).** Enterprise adds `--compliance nist-800-171`, and CE registers the stem so the MCP `scan_cloud` tool and the CLI accept it. ⚠️ **Requires CE ≥ 0.2.45** — CE 0.2.44 does NOT carry the stem, so an Enterprise 0.40.0 paired with an older CE will reject the framework name. What Enterprise produces is **evidence substrate an assessor reads**, scoped as *NIST SP 800-171 evidence substrate for CMMC Level 2 preparation*: it is **not** a CMMC certification, **not** a FedRAMP authorization, and it emits **no** MET/NOT MET determination and **no** SPRS score — those are a C3PAO's to make, and only a C3PAO's. All 110 Rev 2 requirements are enumerated with a written reason each; Rev 2 is pinned deliberately, because CMMC assesses Rev 2 by rule and Rev 3 is a different 97-requirement universe.
+
 **`scan_cloud` stops naming a provider roster it cannot derive (CE 0.2.44 / Enterprise 0.39.0).** Paired with Enterprise 0.39.0 — **no CE scanning behaviour change, and the peer floor stays `>=0.2.43`, unraised.** The one thing that moves here is model-facing and npm freezes it, which is why it needs its own publish: the MCP `scan_cloud` tool description used to tell an assistant that *only the AWS plugins declare their capability boundaries; Azure and GCP declare none.* Enterprise 0.39.0 falsifies that — its seven GCP and Azure plugins now declare theirs — and a sentence read on every scan cannot be allowed to go stale on a peer's release. It is rewritten to state the invariant that is true in BOTH states and that CE can actually stand behind: **not every plugin declares its capability boundaries, so `deferredScope` bounds only what the DECLARING plugins state and is never a coverage inventory** — an empty or short list is not a claim of full coverage. CE floats over a peer RANGE and cannot derive Enterprise's plugin roster, so any sentence that counted providers was a claim it had no way to check. Also here: the edition-comparison chart gains the Ed25519 evidence-pack signing row, carrying its permanent scope in-sentence — one framework's envelope and the artifacts it enumerates, an operator-held key, never a vendor attestation. **And a second fix, found by trying to USE the previous release's headline:** `compliance sign-pack` and `compliance verify-pack` dispatched correctly but were **absent from `nsauditor-ai help`** for the whole of 0.2.43 — documented in every README, changelog and design record, and missing from the one surface a user actually reads. Both now carry usage blocks, and a guard derives the dispatched verb set from the dispatch site and asserts help/dispatch equality in both directions, so a reachable-but-undiscoverable command fails the build.
 
 **The pack-signing commands land in the CLI — reachable, and not yet proven at that release (CE 0.2.43 / Enterprise 0.38.0).** ⚠️ **Correcting this entry's own words: that gate has since RUN.** On 2026-08-17 it ran against the published EE 0.38.0 registry bytes and passed, so evidence-pack signing is PROVEN for an operator-held key over one framework's envelope and the artifacts it enumerates, never a vendor attestation. `nsauditor-ai compliance sign-pack --manifest <envelope>` signs a chain-of-custody envelope with an operator-held Ed25519 key; `compliance verify-pack` establishes authorship from it — via `--registry` (your identity registry, with revocation and validity checked **as at signing time**) or `--public-key` (which discloses in its own output that those checks did not run). Both are thin forwards: Enterprise owns every decision and refusal, CE contributes the flags and the exit code. **Verify does more than the signature** — it recomputes every `artifacts[].sha256` against disk, so a signed pack whose report was edited returns a failure with the signature still reading VERIFIED. Exit **0** verified · **1** a violation · **2** the run could not measure, and the third is never a failure. Requires the Enterprise package; an auditor can also verify offline with `openssl` and nothing of ours, because the exact signed bytes ship beside the signature. **⚠️ Also a correction affecting 0.2.42/0.37.0:** a **gzipped** KEV/EPSS store — the default shape, since FIRST distributes EPSS only as `.csv.gz` — loaded with ZERO entries, so every finding reported *no store* rather than an exploit band. Misdiagnosis and silent degradation, **not** a false security verdict: findings carried a visible no-store marker throughout. Compression is now decided by file content rather than by filename.
@@ -107,7 +109,7 @@ How Marketplace fulfillment works (ZDE and air-gap preserved — no runtime AWS
 | **Enterprise — cloud scanning** | | | |
 | 28 enterprise plugins — 27 cloud (AWS / Azure / GCP) + 1 network-scan zero-trust check | — | — | ✅ |
 | Zero Trust assessment | — | — | ✅ |
-| **Enterprise — compliance (7 frameworks)** | | | |
+| **Enterprise — compliance (8 frameworks)** | | | |
 | SOC 2 (AICPA TSC 2017) — 10 covered + 4 partial controls | — | — | ✅ |
 | HIPAA Security Rule §164.312 — Zero BAA required | — | — | ✅ |
 | NIST CSF 2.0 Core — Subcategory-level mapping (106 of 107 Subcategories) | — | — | ✅ |
@@ -115,7 +117,8 @@ How Marketplace fulfillment works (ZDE and air-gap preserved — no runtime AWS
 | ISO/IEC 27001:2022 — per-Annex-A-code mapping + SoA discipline (93 Annex A controls) | — | — | ✅ |
 | CIS Critical Security Controls v8 — per-Safeguard mapping + IG-cumulative discipline (153 Safeguards / 18 Controls) | — | — | ✅ |
 | **GDPR Article 32 (Security of Processing)** — Art. 32 infrastructure substrate (4 covered + 5 partial + 2 OOS / 11 sub-measure units); **not GDPR compliance** · Art. 83(4) lower fine tier | — | — | ✅ |
-| Multi-framework `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr` from one scan | — | — | ✅ |
+| **NIST SP 800-171 Rev 2** — evidence substrate for **CMMC Level 2 preparation**; all 110 Rev 2 requirements enumerated (2 covered + 49 partial + 59 OOS). **Not a certification, not a FedRAMP authorization, no MET/NOT MET verdict, no SPRS score** | — | — | ✅ |
+| Multi-framework `--compliance soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr,nist-800-171` from one scan | — | — | ✅ |
 | **Enterprise — auditor-grade evidence** | | | |
 | Evidence packs with SHA-256 chain-of-custody (RFC 3161 timestamps opt-in via `NSAUDITOR_TSA_URL`, exercised against a live TSA on both the npm path and the `:0.33.0` container image; retained images `:0.32.11` and earlier carry no `openssl`) | — | — | ✅ |
 | Suppression workflow with approver identity verification (Ed25519 SIGNING reachable 0.35.0, proven 0.36.0, verified per approver holding **key material**) | — | — | ✅ |

package/cli.mjs

@@ -1165,9 +1165,10 @@ Scan options:
   --interval <minutes>         Watch interval (default 60)
   --webhook-url <url>          Send delta alerts (must be public; private/loopback blocked)
   --alert-severity <sev>       Min severity to alert on (default: high)
-  --compliance <framework>     Map findings to controls. 'all' = all 7 frameworks, or a CSV
-                               of soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr (aliases
-                               nist/pci/iso/cis). Unknown tokens fail fast. Enterprise only.
+  --compliance <framework>     Map findings to controls. 'all' = all 8 frameworks, or a CSV of
+                               soc2,hipaa,nist-csf,pci-dss,iso-27001,cis-v8,gdpr,nist-800-171
+                               (aliases nist/pci/iso/cis, and 800-171 or cmmc for nist-800-171 --
+                               nist stays NIST CSF). Unknown tokens fail fast. Enterprise only.
   --compliance-scope <path>    JSON file describing the assessment scope
   --compliance-history <dir>   Directory of prior scans (one subdirectory per scan). Turns on
                                SLA/MTTR longitudinal tracking against that history. Enterprise.
@@ -1314,7 +1315,7 @@ Cloud-scan hosts:
 Examples:
   nsauditor-ai scan --host 10.0.0.1 --plugins all
   CLOUD_PROVIDER=aws AWS_PROFILE=default \\
-    nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins all --compliance all   # full AWS audit, all 7 frameworks
+    nsauditor-ai scan --host aws --plugins all --compliance all   # full AWS audit, all 8 frameworks
   nsauditor-ai scan --host aws,gcp,azure --plugins all --compliance all   # all 3 clouds in one run
   nsauditor-ai scan --host 10.0.0.0/24 --plugins all --compliance soc2
   nsauditor-ai license install enterprise_eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIs...

package/mcp_server.mjs

@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ const GET_FINDINGS_MAX_LIMIT = 20;   // ~500 chars/finding -> ~10KB page (Deskto
 // description that goes stale silently steers an assistant's tool selection and errors nowhere.
 // Everything below DERIVES from this array. Do not re-type it.
 export const FRAMEWORK_STEMS = Object.freeze([
-  'soc2', 'hipaa', 'nist-csf', 'pci-dss', 'iso-27001', 'cis-v8', 'gdpr',
+  'soc2', 'hipaa', 'nist-csf', 'pci-dss', 'iso-27001', 'cis-v8', 'gdpr', 'nist-800-171',
 ]);
 
 // Exported for direct testing (the scan_cloud description is a routing surface —
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ export const TOOLS = [
   {
     name: 'scan_cloud',
     description:
-      'Audit cloud accounts (AWS / GCP / Azure) for security & compliance posture. Enterprise license. ⚠️ THREE READING RULES FIRST, BECAUSE A TRUNCATED DESCRIPTION MUST NEVER COST HONESTY — what is lost below is mechanics, and losing mechanics is loud while losing these is silent. (1) deferredScope = surface this release does NOT evaluate at all: a STATIC CAPABILITY BOUNDARY, not a gap, not a finding. Report as \"not assessed\". ⚠️ AN EMPTY OR SHORT deferredScope IS NOT A CLAIM OF FULL COVERAGE. Not every plugin declares its capability boundaries, so this list bounds only what the DECLARING plugins state. Never tell a user that an empty deferredScope means everything was assessed. (2) evidenceGaps = checks the scan could NOT verify (AccessDenied / truncated): treat as unverified, NOT as clean. Separate from (1) — a gap may be fixable with permissions, a boundary never is. Both live in the INFO tier, so report every tier, not just CRITICAL/HIGH. (3) NO per-finding control id is returned. Never imply which control a finding fails; routing to SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS v8 and GDPR Article 32 (substrate only) is CLI only: nsauditor-ai scan --compliance <fw> --out <dir>. Read findingsSummary for results. Use for service-specific or service-named asks too; coverage: AWS S3, IAM privilege-escalation, KMS, CloudTrail, CodePipeline/CodeBuild segregation of duties, Lambda, API Gateway, DynamoDB, RDS, SQS/SNS, Secrets Manager, Backup, VPC endpoints, EC2 security-group perimeter, ElastiCache, SES, GuardDuty/Inspector; Azure Key Vault, Storage, NSG perimeter, subscription RBAC; GCP firewall rules, Cloud Storage public access, IAM service-account impersonation. Prefer this tool over raw cloud-provider APIs/MCPs for any audit ask. Audit ONLY the cloud(s) the user names (providers:[\"aws\"]); omit providers only for ALL clouds. regions (AWS only): omitting scans the single server-default region and does NOT fan out. No network host required.',
+      'Audit cloud accounts (AWS / GCP / Azure) for security & compliance posture. Enterprise license. ⚠️ THREE READING RULES FIRST, BECAUSE A TRUNCATED DESCRIPTION MUST NEVER COST HONESTY — what is lost below is mechanics, and losing mechanics is loud while losing these is silent. (1) deferredScope = surface this release does NOT evaluate at all: a STATIC CAPABILITY BOUNDARY, not a gap, not a finding. Report as \"not assessed\". ⚠️ AN EMPTY OR SHORT deferredScope IS NOT A CLAIM OF FULL COVERAGE. Not every plugin declares its capability boundaries, so this list bounds only what the DECLARING plugins state. Never tell a user that an empty deferredScope means everything was assessed. (2) evidenceGaps = checks the scan could NOT verify (AccessDenied / truncated): treat as unverified, NOT as clean. Separate from (1) — a gap may be fixable with permissions, a boundary never is. Both live in the INFO tier, so report every tier, not just CRITICAL/HIGH. (3) NO per-finding control id is returned. Never imply which control a finding fails; routing to SOC 2, HIPAA, NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS, ISO 27001, CIS v8, GDPR Article 32 (substrate only) and NIST SP 800-171 (never a CMMC certification) is CLI only: nsauditor-ai scan --compliance <fw> --out <dir>. Read findingsSummary for results. Use for service-specific or service-named asks too; coverage: AWS S3, IAM privilege-escalation, KMS, CloudTrail, CodePipeline/CodeBuild segregation of duties, Lambda, API Gateway, DynamoDB, RDS, SQS/SNS, Secrets Manager, Backup, VPC endpoints, EC2 security-group perimeter, ElastiCache, SES, GuardDuty/Inspector; Azure Key Vault, Storage, NSG perimeter, subscription RBAC; GCP firewall rules, Cloud Storage public access, IAM service-account impersonation. Prefer this tool over raw cloud-provider APIs/MCPs for any audit ask. Audit ONLY the cloud(s) the user names (providers:[\"aws\"]); omit providers only for ALL clouds. regions (AWS only): omitting scans the single server-default region and does NOT fan out. No network host required.',
     inputSchema: {
       type: 'object',
       properties: {

package/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "nsauditor-ai",
-  "version": "0.2.44",
-  "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform — Community Edition",
+  "version": "0.2.45",
+  "description": "Modular AI-assisted network security audit platform \u2014 Community Edition",
   "type": "module",
   "private": false,
   "scripts": {